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Abstract 
 
During the prelude to the industrial revolution, as Britain and France 
experienced the first age of globalisation, with its associated expansion 
of markets and regional specialisation, certain assumptions were called 
into question. These included the traditional mentalités of trust in local 
markets; belief in the economic responsibilities of political authorities; 
and the idea of ‘the economy’ itself in relation to the region and nation. 
While globalisation could offer increased income and consumer choice, 
this could come at the cost of restricting the life and autonomy of 
regional economies. 
 
Historians have explored these tensions in treatments of the friction 
between capitalism and adherence to a moral economy. However, even 
capitalistic ideas about free trade were heavily concerned with national 
economic competitiveness. This thesis addresses this dynamic by 
examining theoretical and practical approaches to the grain trade. It 
aims to unravel contemporary interpretations of the role of 
government, regions and individuals in national economic stability and 
growth, which in turn informed ideas about national belonging. It 
explores attempts by French and British writers, legislators, and people 
to assert their interpretation of economic identity, and design an 
economic destiny for their nation or region. 
 
Since this thesis is chiefly concerned with national belonging and 
citizenship, it draws on the work of historians who have examined the 
role of commodities in forming or defining national identities. These 
include Anderson’s treatment of vernacular print literature, which 
differentiated European nations,1 or Morieux’s depiction of the shared 
economic interests that bridged the Channel.2 It uses primary sources 
relating to administration (such as laws, parliamentary debates, and 
local court rulings) and contemporary published economic works to 
produce a thorough comparison of economic identity in each nation. 
                                                         
1 B. Anderson, Imagined Communities (London, 2006), p. 67. 
2 R. Morieux, Une Mer pour deux Royaumes (Rennes, 2008), p. 345. 
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Introduction 
 
During the first age of globalization, the increasing capitalisation of 
agriculture in Britain and France confounded customary and 
supposedly outmoded localist consumption practices. For it meant 
stamping a national political economy on regions and peoples 
accustomed, economically at least, to autonomy and self-sufficiency. 
Even as it was challenged on humanitarian grounds, this process was 
usually peddled as congruent with the national good and hence 
generally beneficial to all citizens. This thesis examines issues of 
citizenship and national belonging by looking at these changing 
patterns of thought about grain and the nation, as well as the practical 
fallout from structural changes in society in eighteenth-century Britain 
and France. 
 
This introduction offers a brief survey of the historiography of the 
nation and nationality. It begins by introducing the notion of the nation 
state, and the scepticism or enthusiasm with which various historians 
have embraced this framework of analysis. In a second section it looks 
especially at the challenge which jurisdictional fragmentation poses to 
the idea of nation states. Often accounts of jurisdictional fragmentation 
have focused on traditional privileges and changing conceptions of 
liberty, which form an essential strand of this thesis.  
 
The third section addresses the lack of a human element which 
institutional accounts of the nation may suffer. It introduces the 
emphasis that the thesis places on popular politics and interactions 
between the people and authorities on a local basis. Globalisation was a 
great threat to the economic life of these local communities, and this is 
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explored in the next section. This section contemplates especially the 
complex history of the term mercantilism. It also explores the problems 
of applying the term to economic writings of the past, and considers the 
intellectual history of economics. The final section of this introduction 
deals with the transnationalism of intellectual history, and the 
comparative framework which characterises the thesis. This section 
brings the introduction to a close by describing the structure and 
argument of what follows. 
 
The Nation State 
 
Britain has never seemed more like a composite state than it does 
today. Devolution; a referendum in favour of a compromising unity; and 
the overwhelming electoral victory of the SNP in Scotland have 
emphasised Charles Tilly’s claim that Britain, like France and Germany, 
has never met the ideal of a fully realised nation state.1 Nevertheless, 
the nation state remains the organisational principal of choice for 
learning about, understanding, and explaining European development 
after the collapse of the potential universalism of the Middle Ages.  
 
In spite of the failure of the nation state to fully materialise in three 
major European contexts, the national configuration is still the focus of 
Tilly’s book, as he strives to explain why Europe ‘converge[d] on 
different variants of the national state’.2 The argument goes that, in the 
course of nearly one-thousand years, the fiscal-military needs 
generated by wars of religion and conflicts over mercantilist exploits 
between European institutions forced the fusion of scattered 
sovereignties, as well as remote markets and local economies, into a 
series of discrete roughly national entities.3  
 
                                                         
1 C. Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1992 (Cambridge, MA & 
Oxford, 1992), p. 3. 
2 Ibid, p. 5. 
3 Ibid, pp. 27-8; P.K. O’Brien and P.A. Hunt, ‘The Rise of a Fiscal State in England, 1485–
1815’, Historical Research, 66:160 (1993), p. 129 
Daisy Gibbs   10 
Revenue maximisation and autonomy on the part of the national state 
became critical. The central state is therefore traditionally portrayed as 
an engulfing power. On the pretext of territorial defence in increasingly 
costly wars, it absorbed the tax and other powers which had 
customarily belonged to alternative institutions. At the same time, it 
encouraged the commercial, and hence taxable, activity of a national 
exchange economy.1 Fixed borders and a national identity needed to be 
established and stabilised, either replacing or resting upon existing 
devotions to alternative often local denominations.2 
 
However, Tilly is among those historians who are more sympathetic to 
the weaknesses of the concept of the nation state. He accepts that to 
visualise a coherent and successful national state is to turn a blind eye 
to the persistence of more resilient and sometimes preferred 
alternative structures. Accordingly he admits that ‘arrangements at the 
level of household, village, or region clearly affected the viability of 
different kinds of taxation, conscription, and surveillance’- some of the 
key activities of any state that would dominate the nation.3 Moreover, 
as useful as it may seem, J.H. Elliott has pointed out that, far from 
perfect harmony, the notion of the nation state has mostly generated 
disunity in the five hundred years of its history.4 As a result, revisions of 
the concept tend to deal with the failures or sticking points of national 
consolidation, developing an image of the nation state in the negative.5 
 
Historians have sometimes ascribed the relative success or failure of 
states to their constitutional configuration. Douglass North and Barry 
Weingast, for example, argue that it was thanks to the Glorious 
Revolution that England proved successful in a systematic programme 
of fund-raising. The revolution of 1688, they claim, instituted a new 
                                                         
1 G. Ardent, ‘Financial Policy and Economic Infrastructure of Modern States and 
Nations’ in C. Tilly (ed.), The Formation of National States in Western Europe 
(Princeton, 1975), pp. 165-6. 
2 P. Sahlins, Boundaries (Berkeley & Oxford, 1989), p. 8.  
3 Tilly, Coercion, p. 34. 
4 J.H. Elliott, ‘A Europe of Composite Monarchies’, P&P, 137 (1992), p. 48. 
5 R. Grafe, Distant Tyranny (Princeton, 2012), p. 4. 
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‘credible commitment’ on the part of the crown to the security of 
individual rights and hence private wealth. This meant that finance, 
mostly in the form of loans, was more forthcoming.1 The evolution of 
the military fiscal state went in tandem with the unfurling of 
representation, rights, and political liberties to members of the nation 
who faced taxation. North and Weingast therefore associate the 
apparent institutional and political developments of the Glorious 
Revolution with economic freedom and growth.2 
 
This is how Liah Greenfeld seems to interpret political and economic 
development in England (and later Britain) and beyond from the 
seventeenth century onwards. Coming to the rescue of all historians 
who could understand how, but supposedly not why, European 
economies took-off in this period, Greenfeld argues that it was 
nationalism that propelled economic growth.3 She invokes the work of 
Albert Hirschman, who, although apparently also struggling with 
causation, describes the gradual ideological change which saw the 
pursuit of personal gain become a socially acceptable activity. 
According to Hirschman, human behaviour was for a long time thought 
to be determined by passions. However, eventually it was imagined that 
the unwieldy passions of ambition, power, and lust could be offset by 
more amenable passions, such as greed and avarice. These in turn were 
transformed into the supposedly relatively harmless, and fashionably 
rational, notion of interest.4  
 
Again, Greenfeld’s claim is that nationalism can explain why this 
process took place.5 This is reminiscent of a point made by Bob Harris. 
His more nuanced version refers also to continuing contemporary 
ambivalence towards commerce, and particularly towards the 
corrupting luxury associated with overseas trade, not to mention the 
                                                         
1 D.C. North and B.R. Weingast, ‘Constitutions and Commitment’ The Journal of 
Economic History, 49:4 (1989), p. 829, quote from p. 824. 
2 Ibid, pp. 830-1. 
3 L. Greenfeld, The Spirit of Capitalism (Cambridge, MA & London, 2003), p. 1. 
4 A.O. Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests (Princeton, 1977), pp. 40-43. 
5 Greenfeld, Spirit of Capitalism, p. 487, n. 2. 
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ever-lingering anxiety about the private greed of merchants.1 However, 
in spite of these doubts, Harris maintains that patriotism in Britain 
helped commerce to earn and maintain a respectable reputation. He 
suggests that in the absence of the French menace ‘deep-rooted 
tensions between mercantile activity and patriotism… would become 
more apparent’.2 Thanks to the French threat, there were relatively few 
issues capable of driving a wedge between the landed and commercial 
interests.3  
 
Greenfeld’s argument also draws heavily on the work of David Landes, 
who considers British national identity as a key early advantage over 
less consciously unified European units.4 To demonstrate this national 
consciousness, Greenfeld relies on mercantilist authors and assumes 
that they alluded to the nation in the same sense as it is understood 
today. In this way, she argues that nationalism appeared fully-formed in 
seventeenth-century England, and spread from there to France, 
Germany, Japan and then the United States. This new spirit transformed 
seventeenth-century England, not only because it justified the pursuit 
of individual wealth in contemporary consciousness, but also because it 
came with a notion of equality and freedom inherent in the idea of the 
sovereignty of the nation (that is, the people).5  
 
Later, in France, an imported nationalism was at first rejected by 
adherents of the absolute monarchy, and then, ultimately, contributed 
to the political upheaval of the French Revolution. This, therefore, was a 
nationalist and emphatically not a bourgeois revolution, which allowed 
for political maturity and sustained economic growth in a French nation 
state.6 The economies of Britain and then France took off, according to 
                                                         
1 B. Harris, Politics and the Nation (Oxford, 2002), pp. 273-4. 
2 Ibid, p. 275. 
3 Ibid, p. 276. 
4 D.S. Landes, Wealth and Poverty of Nations (London, 1998), p. 219. 
5 Greenfield, Spirit of Capitalism, p. 2. 
6 Ibid, p. 139-147; D.A. Bell, The Cult of the Nation in France (Cambridge, MA & London, 
2001), p. 18. 
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Greenfeld, in part because an egalitarian notion of nationalism ensured 
economic freedoms and the right to secure property.1 
 
However, the notion that property rights went unchallenged from 1688 
onwards, even in England and later Britain, has itself been challenged. 
Hence Julian Hoppit argues that there were instances even in the 
eighteenth century when the British state intervened in property rights. 
The pertinent example of the abolition of heritable jurisdictions, in 
particular, shows that Parliament was perfectly prepared to ‘extinguish’ 
certain kinds of property for state-building purposes, in spite of its 
otherwise credible commitments to the sanctity of property.2 
 
Furthermore, Regina Grafe suggests that arguments about constitution 
and economic development, in the style of new institutional economics, 
risk offering a false dichotomy. She argues that this places 
‘parliamentary’ in opposition to ‘absolutist’ state-building schemes in a 
fixed linear European pattern of the development of the final ideal of 
the centralised nation state.3 Grafe therefore questions the paradigm of 
a successful nation state as well as the importance of external pressures 
in the development thereof. She argues that Spain, rather than failing to 
become a centralised fiscal-military power, pursued its own de-
centralised course of modernisation. This included deliberate restraint 
on war spending and hence also on the employment of fiscal measures. 
Spain did not fail as a nation state, but rather elected to develop as an 
alternative decentralised version. European states in general, she 
suggests, had a heretofore overlooked ‘degree of agency and choice’ 
when it came to their efforts at fund-raising and centralisation. She 
therefore challenges the traditional story of the formation of nation 
states.4 
 
                                                         
1 Ibid, p. 26. 
2 J. Hoppit, ‘Compulsion, Compensation and Property Rights in Britain, 1688–1833’, 
P&P, 210 (2011), p. 115. 
3 Grafe, Distant Tyranny, p. 11. 
4 Ibid, p. 23. 
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Jurisdictional Fragmentation 
 
Efforts at centralisation were generally met with the ‘jurisdictional 
fragmentation’, to which Tilly and Elliott were alluding. Much 
historiography, including the above examples of Grafe’s and Hoppit’s 
work, has been concerned with the state’s attempts to absorb or reform 
traditionally locally held rights and privileges, especially the lucrative 
ones, and with efforts to resist the process. Where Grafe has focussed 
on the rights and privileges over the taxation and marketing of products 
such as salted cod (or bacalao as it is known in Spanish) which were 
located in the historic territories of Spain, and has argued that the 
resilience of these institutions caused the state’s ‘seeming self-restraint’ 
in military spending,1 and Hoppit has explored the matter in terms of 
private property rights,2 others still have researched rights held by 
estates, corporations or the church.  
 
Thus, Michael Kwass traces the disgruntlement of the privileged class of 
French society when confronted by the strengthening of central 
institutions and controls, specifically in the form of a new taxation 
regime. Taking for his historiographical context Alexis de Tocqueville’s 
emphasis upon state centralisation as the cause of the French 
Revolution, Kwass considers particularly the resistance of non-
monarchical institutions, such as the French parlements, to the 
changes.3 The parlements grew outraged not only because, as elites, 
their members were struck hard by a new programme of direct 
taxation, but also due to the fact that responsibility for collecting the 
new tax was awarded to intendants. This bypassed the parlements’ own 
traditional jurisdiction over the matter.4 These courts articulated their 
grievances in the language of liberalism, primarily in terms of the 
freedom of the citizen from arbitrary state intervention, which they, as 
                                                         
1 Grafe, Distant Tyranny, p. 32. 
2 Hoppit, ‘Compulsion’, p. 125. 
3 M. Kwass, Privilege and the Politics of Taxation in Eighteenth-Century France 
(Cambridge, MA, 2000), p. 48.  
4 Ibid, pp. 51-2. 
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‘temporary organs of the nation’, defended.1 They attempted to re-
establish their own sovereignty by alluding to their role as 
representatives of a sovereign nation. 
 
However, in spite of high claims of ‘equality’, ‘justice’, ‘liberty’, and the 
‘nation’, Kwass suggests that these institutions were principally 
concerned with particularism and maintaining jurisdictional 
fragmentation in the same way as Grafe’s historic territories were.2 
Evidently, the concept of the ‘nation’ could also serve as a pretext for 
political manoeuvring on the part of institutions other than the central 
state. Kwass turns to the literary sphere, however, for the origins 
proper of French liberal thought. Therefore, here he again follows 
Tocqueville, and more recent historians, such as Keith Baker, who has 
looked to the ‘conceptual space’ of the Old Regime for the origins of a 
‘revolutionary script’.3  
 
This is the source to which Arnault Skornicki also attributes French 
revolutionary liberalism. He too suggests that it was the struggle for 
power between the crown and aristocracy that spawned free-trade 
thought and, by extension, liberalism in France. However he places the 
literary sphere on the other side of this discourse. Thus, in some 
disagreement with Kwass, Skornicki argues that French liberalism was 
created endogenously as the by-product of the French crown’s struggle 
to assert itself over the aristocratic order and the traditional system of 
privilege.4  
 
For Skornicki, liberalism was not, therefore, the product of the 
rationalisations of a class of economic actors, but the creation of a state 
and its supporters (which actually included the greatest advocates of 
free-trade, such as Turgot). These supporters of liberalism and the state 
intended to make use of that great menace of the aristocratic order, 
                                                         
1 Ibid, p. 210. 
2 Ibid, p. 213. 
3 Ibid, p. 4; K.M. Baker, Inventing the French Revolution (Cambridge, 1990), p. 4. 
4 A. Skornicki, L’Économiste, la Cour et la Patrie (Paris, 2011), p. 375. 
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merchant capitalism, to enhance the crown’s monopoly of 
governmental institutions. Overall, French liberalism was not the same 
as non-intervention, but was originally intended only to purge the state 
of privilege and hence alternative sources of power.1 In this sense, 
liberalisation was supposed to entail the removal of petty tyrants and 
their arbitrary government by a distant but constitutional central 
absolutist government.2 The liberalisation programme in France was 
therefore simultaneously a programme of nationalism.  
 
Jeff Horn sees a similar course of development of liberty and 
centralisation in France. Privilege under the Bourbon state, he argues, 
actually constituted an effective tool for promoting economic growth. 
Rather than the ‘enemy of capitalism’, which contemporaries such as 
the physiocrats and also historians have portrayed, the Bourbon state 
was a dynamic force which increasingly granted privileges in the form 
of exemptions from existing privileges, in order to foster growth.3 This 
seemingly archaic mercantilist and patronage-based political economy 
in fact attempted to modernise the economy by challenging and 
redefining old-fashioned attitudes towards profit and wealth, which 
were inherent in the society of orders.4  
 
Horn overhauls the conventional story of the Bourbon centralising 
endeavour, offering a far more complex account of state granted 
privilege, as well as loopholes and enclaves of liberty, with their own 
powers of privilege, which all opposed uniformity, but could also foster 
growth.5 The ‘persistent clamor for “unrestrained liberty”’ which 
surfaced after 1750, he argues, was only a rhetorical cloaking device, 
obscuring the longstanding practice, on the part of the state, of curbing 
traditional guild style liberties of privilege in favour of exemptions.6 
Though in the 1770s a more concerted attempt to institute 
                                                         
1 Ibid, p. 29.  
2 Grafe, Distant Tyranny, pp. 116-7. 
3 J. Horn, Economic Development in Early Modern France (Cambridge, 2015), p. 9.  
4 Ibid, pp. 14-15. 
5 Ibid, p. 56.  
6 Ibid, p. 205.  
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unrestrained liberty in French manufacturing, commerce, and, indeed, 
agriculture was advanced under the leadership of Anne-Robert-Jacques 
Turgot, Horn has emphasised its limits. Ultimately he shows that a 
course of compromise between the two extremes of privilege and total 
liberty was finally established under Jacques Necker.1 It is in this 
context that any central policy which made claims to ‘liberty’, especially 
in the sense of subverting local privileges economic or political, needs 
to be considered.  
 
Thus, more recent historiography, of eighteenth-century absolutist 
states especially, is turning to the internal conditions which seem to 
have generated notions of liberty and rights for newly nationalised 
subjects. Liberty and libertarianism therefore feature in this thesis as 
important themes, particularly as they relate to the rights of citizens to 
private economic gain. Sometimes this latter was perceived as the only 
legitimate or prudent form that liberty could take when applied to the 
nation at large. This is because political liberty remained a subversive 
issue in this period, and even more so in the period after the French 
Revolution.2  
 
Meanwhile, political economy served to mediate between the individual 
and the state, and was often concerned with the idea of individual 
contribution.3 It was understood that the value of this contribution had 
a great deal to do with freedom from intervention from the state.4 This 
meant that much time was spent ruminating on how forms of 
government could invite or extort economic growth and therefore 
bolster the greatness of the nation state. Often this led to contemporary 
international comparison, as the virtual republicanism of Britain was 
                                                         
1 Ibid, pp. 224-226. 
2 E. Rothschild, Economic Sentiments (Cambridge, MA & London, 2001), pp. 56-60. 
3 E.S. Furniss, The Position of the Labourer in a System of Nationalism (New York, 
1965), pp. 6-7. 
4 Q. Skinner, Liberty before Liberalism (Cambridge, 1998), pp. 62-4; I. Hont, Jealousy of 
Trade (Cambridge, MA & London, 2005), p. 197. 
Daisy Gibbs   18 
juxtaposed against the absolute monarchy of France.1 These themes are 
explored in particular in chapters 3 and 4.  
 
In the accounts of both Kwass and Skornicki, however, the matter of 
centralisation, so vital to Tocqueville’s account, also remains a 
significant factor. Taken together, accounts such as these raise the 
possibility that the meaning of the term ‘nation’ and the implications of 
nationalism remained unfixed in the eighteenth century. Ideas such as 
national sovereignty and liberty could potentially be deployed on either 
side of the centralising initiative. This thesis, then, takes an approach 
similar to those of Kwass and Grafe, in order to explore the relationship 
between a centralising national state and local power structures of both 
the political and social varieties.  
 
As in Distant Tyranny, it takes as an entry point a commodity which 
penetrated the depth and breadth of a nation. However, it leaves the 
codfish to Grafe, concentrating instead on grain. For grain, like the 
Spanish commodity of bacalao,2 was subject to local regulation in 
France. However, this was not the case in Britain. This means that 
studying grain can shine a light on a point of comparison between the 
institutional history of the two countries, the composite nature of the 
Britain on the one hand, and the amalgamation of provinces that was 
France on the other. This thesis, specifically in chapters 1 and 2, 
explores how local authorities perceived the role of their own region 
within the national economy, and how they articulated their own right 
to influence the control of local subsistence in comparable ways. 
 
Yet grain is not a mere commodity. In eighteenth-century Britain and 
France it was a seed of contention. By tracing also the discourse about 
the grain trade in chapters 4, 5 and 6, this thesis follows Kwass’s lead in 
treating the ‘cultural field between state and society’.3 Through 
discussing the grain trade, eighteenth-century political economists 
                                                         
1 Ibid, pp. 28-9. 
2 Grafe, Distant Tyranny, p. 42. 
3 Kwass, Privilege, p. 16.  
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addressed not only constitutional questions about who and what 
amounted to the nation and the state, but they also debated the role 
that the state was to play in the national (or regional) economy. All 
together, this thesis uses the issue of the grain trade to unearth 
contemporary interpretations of the role of government, regions and 
individuals in national economic stability and growth, which in turn 
informed ideas about national belonging. 
 
National Identity and Nationalism 
 
So far, this account seems to have suffered from a deficiency diagnosed 
by Linda Colley, which creates the impression that ‘these organisational 
changes took place within a human vacuum’.1 For example, although 
Grafe’s work concerns the process of the integration of local markets 
into a national economy, it spends little time dealing with consumer 
experiences of the market. Intentionally or not, her account favours 
institutional developments and the choices of elites only, with the 
common people treated as the passive victims of events. She twice casts 
the common consumer as simply the unreflecting and non-participating 
‘loser’ of the situation.2 The assumption is that the people necessarily 
ought to approve of measures which are economically rational in the 
long term. However, the British case of violent popular opposition 
towards Turnpike trusts confounds this simple expectation. In this case, 
rioters sometimes equated improved communications with higher 
prices, and with good reason according to Arthur Young. Therefore they 
rejected a measure which was economically rational in the long-run.3  
 
Hilton L. Root has analysed the economic costs of the moral economy in 
Britain and France. He points out that it in fact undermined rural 
interests and deepened rural poverty, compromising welfare on a 
general level.4 The damage in France was worse than in Britain, due to 
                                                         
1 L. Colley, Britons. Forging the Nation 1707-1837 (New Haven & London, 1992), p. 3. 
2 2 Grafe, Distant Tyranny, pp. 240; 245. 
3 W. Albert, The Turnpike Road System in England, 1663-1840 (London, 1972), p. 26. 
4 H.L. Root, The Fountain of Privilege (Berkeley, 1994), p. 85. 
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the locus of political power in each respective country. Parliament 
offered a forum for rural interests, whereas the urban situation of 
French administrative power meant that the disposition of the urban 
poor carried more weight.1 The great costs which the moral economy 
seems in hindsight to have incurred did obviously not stop the poor and 
others from preferring economically detrimental policies. 
 
In Grafe’s work, the relationship between the insubordinate regional 
institutions and the people they served is barely explored, in an account 
that deals with national (dis)integration and not nationality. Similarly, 
though Kwass sheds light on a ‘murkier world of day-to-day 
administration’ where taxpayers of all ranks brought complaints, and 
Horn deals with a variety of individuals and groups enjoying or seeking 
concessions, Skornicki, perhaps understandably, is also entirely 
preoccupied with the world of the court and the upper echelons of 
society in his account.2 
 
Colley, by comparison, attempts to restore the human factor to the 
history of the nation state by exploring the responses of British civilians 
to the series of conflicts between Britain and France which occurred 
between 1689 and 1815. She argues that a community of Britons 
established an identity as Protestants, which was reinforced in 
opposition to their Catholic enemy across the Channel.3 This 
interpretation, however, has been strongly criticised. Steve Pincus, for 
example, highlights the potential internationalism of Protestantism, 
questioning how it came to be understood, if it did, as an exclusively 
British rallying force. He also wonders why, if their Protestant identity 
was so vital to their nationalism, the British allied so easily with 
                                                         
1 Ibid, p. 108. 
2 Kwass, Privilege, p. 119; Horn, Economic Development, p. 3; Skornicki, L’Économiste, 
p. 17. 
3 Colley, Britons, pp. 4-5. Colley’s work is part of a relatively recent trend towards a 
‘new British history’ which blossomed especially around the time of the Scottish and 
Welsh devolution in 1997. Other examples include S.G. Ellis and S. Barber (eds.), 
Conquest and Union (London, 1995); L.W.B. Brockliss and D. Eastwood (eds.), A Union 
of Multiple Identities (Manchester, 1997); C. Kidd, British Identities before Nationalism 
(Cambridge, 1999); and I. McLean, State of the Union (Oxford & New York, 2005). 
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Catholic powers other than France. Finally, he complains that certain of 
the four nations received inadequate treatment in Colley’s work, and 
wonders whether Protestantism was as powerful a force in Ireland as in 
the other kingdoms.1 
 
It is on a similar thread which Colin Kidd bases his more sustained yet 
subtle attack. He sees Colley’s thesis as overly simplistic because it 
ignores the suspicion in which the Scottish held the English upon 
entrance into the Union. In spite of the hypocrisy they detected in 
English constitutionalism, Kidd argues that Scots committed to ‘English 
institutions’ in order to gain a share of the ‘birth-rights of Englishmen’.2 
He suggests that Protestantism itself was more complex than Colley 
allowed. Scots were not simply overawed by a sense of Protestant 
complicity in opposition to French Catholicism. In fact a ‘strong sense of 
ecclesiastical distinctiveness’ not only persisted in Scotland, but was 
also a something of a bulwark of Scottish identity against Englishness.3  
 
Elsewhere he also undermines the importance that Colley places on a 
Catholic other in the formation of British identity. He concedes that the 
juxtaposition existed in contemporary minds, but warns against placing 
too much emphasis on it. This is because Europeans, he argues, were 
also seen as ‘fellow Goths’, who, following an alternative path of history, 
had ‘the misfortune to succumb to the new political force of absolute 
monarchy’.4 Searching beyond religion, Britons could conceive of other 
plains on which they could connect with the inhabitants of mainland 
Europe.  
 
Perhaps, then, the problem is that Colley’s argument draws on Benedict 
Anderson’s definition of the nation as an ‘imagined political 
                                                         
1 S. Pincus, ‘Review: Britons. Forging the Nation, 1707-1837’, Journal of Modern History, 
67:1 (1995), pp. 133-5. 
2 C. Kidd, ‘North Britishness and the Nature of Eighteenth-Century British Patriotisms’, 
HJ, 39:2 (1996), p. 382. 
3 Ibid, p. 365. 
4 Kidd, British Identities, p. 213. 
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community- and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign’.1 
His definition makes nationalism necessarily prone to pushing some 
people, perhaps even members of the same society, outside of its 
inherent limits. Anderson, however, has met with certain critics of his 
own. Bell points out that the term ‘nationalism’ should only be 
understood as a conscious programme, which aims to construct a 
nation anew. Hence, he claims that some historians, including 
Anderson, have been mistaken in their terminology. In Bell’s 
conception, nationalism requires the conscious effort of recruiting 
members rather than excluding otherness. 
 
This meant that in France ‘nationalism’ did not exist until after the 
Revolution. However, Bell nevertheless discerns inklings of national 
sentiment in French pre-revolutionary thought, for instance in 
Physiocratic ideas about an older and more virtuous singular French 
character. Bell argues that it was eighteenth-century ideas about nation 
and patrie that came to inform the post-revolutionary construction of 
the conceptual French nation.2 In this sense, his description of the 
national sentiment which developed in anticipation of nationalism 
bears an admitted relation to the activity of imagining a unified 
community which Anderson had described. In each case, the nation is 
no genuine feature of human society, but a principle, albeit a powerful 
one, for organising and consolidating a large community. 
 
In each case the authors are forced to acknowledge the limits to their 
version of contemporary conceptions of the nation. Thus Colley admits 
that ‘there were always dissenting voices’, and that her study deals only 
with the ‘seeming conformists’.3 National consciousness for Anderson 
was located in the ‘vernacularizing thrust of capitalism’, which helped 
to formally establish separate national print languages, allowing for 
conceptualisation and ultimately consciousness of a nation.4 However, 
                                                         
1 B. Anderson, Imagined Communities (London, 2006), p. 6. 
2 Bell, The Cult of the Nation, pp. 3-5.  
3 Colley, Britons, pp. 4-5. 
4 Anderson, Imagined Communities, pp. 39-45. 
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he draws attention to the fact that the standardisation of language due 
to the rise of the press inevitably created ‘languages-of-power’ in each 
nation, which challenged and subordinated alternative dialects (which 
sounds something like a conscious programme of cultural uniformity, 
or Bell’s nationalism).1 Finally, Bell’s account poses the issue most 
strongly, as he describes how, in the wake of the Revolution, observers 
of the national character eventually became alarmed at the apparent 
lack thereof, and also turned on linguistic diversity within France.2 In 
each case, the organising principle of nationality either failed to reach 
the entire target community, or else it met with opposition from the 
periphery. 
 
These central-outwards accounts of national consciousness have been 
met by periphery-inwards versions, amongst which Grafe numbers 
both her own offering and that of Peter Sahlins.3 Sahlins concentrates 
on the Cerdanya Valley of the Pyrenees, where the border between 
France and Spain now lies ‘dead’, as modern theorists describe an 
uncontested frontier.4 The author describes, however, the life of the 
French-Spanish delimitation, from its inception as a border between 
local jurisdictions and their people, to its confirmation as a territorial 
demarcation and a national frontier.5 Ultimately he argues that ‘both 
state formation and nation building were two-way processes’, since 
international events on a grand scale left an undefined border, which 
came to be definitively assigned only through the experiences of village 
communities on the periphery.6 These came to regard their village 
limits as the dividing line between ‘us’ and ‘them’.7 
 
Renaud Morieux, another historian of the edges of nations, however, 
objects to the notion of the frontier as ‘a simple dividing line between 
                                                         
1 Anderson, Imagined Communities, p. 45.  
2 Bell, The Cult of the Nation, p. 171. 
3 Grafe, Distant Tyranny, p. xv. 
4 Sahlins, Boundaries, p. 1. 
5 Ibid, pp. 6-7.   
6 Ibid, p. 8. 
7 Ibid, p. 9. 
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states’.1 Overall he depicts the frontier as something rather more fluid – 
a space for international encounters – in a book which describes how 
economic interests on a very local or individual level could bridge the 
English Channel. Contact, between fishing communities for instance, 
persisted in spite of the Anglo-French rivalry and often open hostility in 
a period (1689-1815) sometimes misleadingly known as the Second 
Hundred Years’ War.2 If cross-Channel interactions such as these 
highlighted any limits, it was those of the rules and rhetoric of the 
centre, and not those between nations.3 
 
This thesis, therefore, also takes a cue from the work of Anderson and 
Morieux, using economic interactions to establish just how far common 
people experienced national sentiment when it came down to an 
everyday yet vital aspect of their lives: the grain trade. For the 
institutions which regulated the trade, on a local basis particularly, 
therefore connected legislators, common consumers and capitalists in a 
nexus of responsibility, need, and profit, perhaps to rival the imagined 
community of a nation state.  
 
Grafe’s account of market integration in early-modern Spain briefly 
alludes to the idea of a moral economy. E.P. Thompson himself argued 
that, despite the ‘parasitism of the State at the top, and the erosion of 
traditional relations by free labor and a monetary economy at the 
bottom’, certain traditional patron-client structures, which had dictated 
social relations and order in the pre-modern economy, remained in 
place well into the eighteenth century.4 Grafe shows that these sorts of 
paternalist structures remained in place in Spain in spite of attacks 
from the state. Policy-making in relation to commodities such as 
bacalao was in the hands of local elites, who prioritised local issues in 
order to preserve their own position.  
                                                         
1 R. Morieux, Une Mer pour deux Royaumes (Rennes, 2008), p. 26. This and all 
following translations of French language texts are my own unless otherwise stated. 
2 Ibid, pp. 17-8. 
3 Ibid, p. 347. 
4 E.P. Thompson, ‘Patrician Society, Plebeian Culture’, Journal of Social History, 7:4 
(1974), p. 387. 
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This meant Spain suffered from an ‘allocative inefficiency’.1 However, 
the alliance of local authority and the poor potentially shielded local 
communities from the shocks of participation in an unforgiving global 
market. This is why, Grafe suggests, Spain experienced relatively few 
food riots in the period.2 It is these sorts of interactions, unfortunately 
crammed into a mere aside in the work of Grafe and others, which this 
thesis also aims to develop. 
 
The Local and the Global 
 
There is something to be said for the privilege accorded to the 
peculiarities of place by the Annales historians and for their problem-
oriented analysis, as opposed to a narrative method. Their approach 
allows for the study of a greater range of historical activities, as 
opposed to the traditional focus on past politics.3 It makes possible 
something towards a reconstruction of everyday provincial life in its 
totality. Moreover, privileging geographical space effectively subverts 
the narrow constraints of political units, which shackled most history 
before Fernand Braudel’s La Méditerranée et le Monde Méditerranéen à 
l’Époque de Phillippe II (1949) to the nation state.4 
 
However, Peter Jones comments that the Annales historians have 
tended to assume an excessively narrow focus, transfixed on local 
agrarian conditions – ‘harvest data, prices series and demography’ – to 
the detriment of due consideration of institutional factors, which he 
thinks ‘played a significant role in determining economic outcomes’.5 
The local focus, he argues, has also meant that Ernest Labrousse, 
Fernand Braudel and other Annales historians have visualised France as 
composed of self-contained local markets, when ‘there existed, in 
                                                         
1 Grafe, Distant Tyranny, p. 197. 
2 Ibid, pp. 198-200. 
3 P. Burke, The French Historical Revolution (Cambridge, 1990), p. 2. 
4 Ibid, p. 41. 
5 P.M. Jones, Reform and Revolution in France, 1774-1791 (Cambridge, 1995), p. 83.  
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reality, a complex hierarchy of markets ranging from nationwide 
circuits for the production and distribution of high-quality textiles, to 
intensely local entrepôts for the satisfaction of day-to-day needs’.1 This 
meant that, while in some respects the isolation and autonomy which 
characterised local subsistence in Labrousse’s account may have been a 
reality, in other respects many communities were indeed exposed to 
the increasingly global trade of the period, especially when they bought 
non-subsistence items.2 
 
Globalisation was an important issue for the common consumers of the 
eighteenth century. On the one hand, it allowed them to enjoy 
commodities from the Atlantic and beyond, from bacalao to tobacco, as 
histories of consumerism attest.3 However, globalisation also had the 
potential to transform domestic economies and could bring with it 
worrisome side effects. It too, therefore, became an important 
intellectual context for the period. On a local level, specialisation could 
stifle the economic diversity of regional economies, causing decline and 
dislocation. On a national level, it was feared that global trade could 
precipitate the fall of empires.  
 
Anxiety over global trade therefore entered contemporary debates 
particularly in terms of how far nations should try to regulate their own 
economies. Issues such as wage rates and protectionism became 
matters of international politics, in a struggle for supremacy. According 
to Istvan Hont, it was the vision of commercial states competing in a 
global marketplace that led thinkers, still informed by Hobbes’ 
depiction of the gladiatorial posture of international relations, to 
politicise the economy and subjugate commerce to reason of state.4 
However, the logic of ‘jealousy of trade’ was not to be entirely squared 
                                                         
1 Ibid, p. 88. According to Jones, James Thomson is of the same persuasion in J.K.J. 
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with the civic humanism of republican thought, for it could be seen to 
strain the ideal of self-preservation beyond credible limits towards 
‘economic aggrandizement’ through overseas empire and luxury 
consumption.1 Hobbesian republican-humanism was helped along here 
by Grotius’ natural jurisprudence, which codified arguments of reason 
of state by elevating the concept to a basic right.2 The civic-humanist 
notion of the patriotic citizen was therefore facing an extravagant 
makeover.  
 
What emerged was the idea that nations were now competing through 
commerce for the resources to defend themselves in (or to wage) war, 
and it was not necessarily a comforting prospect. Though generally 
avoiding the questionable term ‘mercantilism’ itself, Hont therefore 
deals with the intellectual context of many of the policies which once 
seemed to form a system under that label.3 Since its first incarnation, 
mercantilism has been revisited, rethought and reimagined, but has 
never retreated too far from the consciousness of historians who have 
to deal with political economy in the early modern period and beyond.4 
 
Since mercantilism was originally identified by its inventor, Gustav 
Schmoller, as an integral part of the process of state-building, it has 
obvious relevance as a context and frame of analysis for this thesis.5 
Since this initial conceptualisation, however, this term has had an 
interesting history of its own. Coined in the 1880s the term was 
adopted by William Cunningham, who argued that the financial 
pressure of war ‘forced statesmen to interest themselves in the 
development of national resources, the extension of commerce and the 
                                                         
1 Ibid, p. 17.  
2 Ibid, p. 15. 
3 L. Magnusson, The Political Economy of Mercantilism (London & New York, 2015), p. 
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4 D.C. Coleman, ‘Mercantilism Revisited’, HJ, 23:4 (1980), p. 773; S. Pincus, ‘Rethinking 
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prosperity of industry’.1 Matters of a commercial or economic nature 
were, according to Cunningham, subordinated to the political needs of 
the state at home and abroad.2 Eli Heckscher tended to agree. His two 
massive volumes, simply entitled Mercantilism, were for a time the 
definitive work on the subject. Still now they represent the epitome of 
that viewpoint which takes mercantilism to be a coherent policy driver 
of the past, which was purely political and in no way related to 
contemporary economic realities.3  
 
Criticism and adjustment ensued. Jacob Viner, for example, argued that 
mercantilism was not simply a matter of power. He maintained that 
generating wealth in its own right was a deliberate intension of 
mercantilist writers. However, their endeavors were misguided, due to 
their unenlightened condition and limited understanding of economics. 
Mercantilism, therefore, was a flawed policy designed to nurture the 
dual intentions of national power and plenty.4 John Maynard Keynes, 
however, attempted to correct the assumption that mercantilist theory 
was unsound. He argued that mercantilist policies could make sense in 
primitive growth economies, where the government lacked the 
wherewithal to invest directly, and foreign direct investment or loans 
from abroad were not a plausible alternative. Ultimately he took 
mercantilist writers for intellectual predecessors of his own 
interventionist views.5 
 
D.C. Coleman headed a new charge against mercantilism. He discounted 
the role played by ideology in the actions of politicians, who acted ‘in 
particular contexts with particular problems’.6 What had seemed a 
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coherent system was, he claimed, nothing more than one of the many 
‘inventions of scholars, [which] are designed to simplify the infinite 
complexity of the past’. 1  He warned against the oversimplification that 
this could engender, pointing out that the economic policy of the past 
was subject to a multiplicity of influences, from the threat of public 
disorder in the face of food shortage, through the power of urban guilds, 
to the squabbles of the men who formed government.  
 
Meanwhile, A.V. Judges had famously declared that ‘mercantilism never 
had a creed; nor was there a priesthood dedicated to its service’.2 
Mercantilism did not live up to the criteria of a true ‘ism’ because the 
body of protectionist laws, which seemed to reflect a coherent system, 
were actually forged haphazardly out of simple ‘vested interests’ or 
rent-seeking.3 Later Steve Pincus added that Judges and even Coleman 
had fallen short of contributing a substitute narrative for the role of 
mercantilism in guiding policy. He himself, therefore, sought to develop 
one from party politics and their influence on economic policy in this 
period.4 
 
Following Judges and Coleman, it was not long before a whole volley of 
fire began to rain down on Heckscher’s ‘anti-determinist citadel’, from 
those who saw economic forces at play.5 Separating mercantilist writing 
and pamphleteering from actual policy pursued by the government, 
Barry Supple argued that what had been dubbed a mercantile system 
was actually nothing more than a series of reactive measures on the 
part of a government coping with repetitive short-term economic 
fluctuations, which could threaten the stability of the government 
through public disorder. Mercantilism for Supple was often simply the 
‘economics of crisis’.6 
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2 A.V. Judges, ‘The Idea of a Mercantile State’ in Coleman (ed.), Revisions, p. 35. 
3 Ibid, p. 41. 
4 Pincus, ‘Rethinking Mercantilism’, p. 9. 
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Lars Magnusson, however, has gone some way to restoring coherence 
to mercantilist thought. He argues that the term can denote a specific 
discourse, which allowed contemporaries to engage with economic 
subjects in new and interesting ways. This provided a framework for 
modern economic thought.1 Therefore Magnusson accuses Supple and 
also Joyce Oldham Appleby of ignoring the dynamism of economic 
discourse in the period.2 Critical as he may be, Magnusson’s argument 
bears certain similarities to Appleby’s, for both identified a new 
characteristic in the work of writers such as Thomas Mun, which she 
describes as ‘the beginning of an effort to isolate economic activity for 
purposes of analysis’.3 Early forays into ‘purely economic factors’ were 
an intellectual response to the deep depression of the early seventeenth 
century.4 
 
The concept, therefore, has tended to make sporadic comebacks, and 
evidently proves a useful way of framing the past in the light of the 
present. For example, it is clear that the context of the Great Depression 
coloured Keynes’s interpretation of past economic thought. Philip Stern 
and Carl Wennerlind have suggested that the origins of the concept also 
lay in the contemporary context of its German authors, who were 
‘arguably drawn to seventeenth-century views on the relationship 
between the economy and the state as a foil for discussing how Europe 
would negotiate liberalism, socialism, and capitalism at a moment when 
international conflicts ran high’.5 Likewise, Philipp Rössner suggests 
that we have the global economic crisis to thank (or to blame) for the 
fact that mercantilist and dirigiste schemes of political economy seem to 
have come back into fashion in current historical research.6  
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Nevertheless, although more recent historiography therefore generally 
demurs at understanding mercantilism as inspired by a ‘unified theory 
and an internally closed paradigm’, the term can still be usefully 
interpreted as a common mode of expression for dealing with an 
established set of questions, in turn used to discuss and direct economic 
development in the domestic and international sphere.1 According to 
David Todd, mercantilism ‘thus corresponds to a key moment of the 
construction of the state in Europe and of the military-commercial 
expansion of European states into America, Africa and Asia between 
1500 and 1800’.2 Apart from its historiographical use, where it often 
serves as shorthand for categorising and labelling political economists, 
the term mercantilism can therefore also represent a very specific and 
practical process of thought and action. 
 
Within the domestic sphere, however, Hoppit has reflected more than 
once on the importance of regional and national variation, especially in 
a composite state such as Britain, when it comes to state initiatives to 
protect or promote industry and agriculture.3 Mercantilism, understood 
in the sense of economic nationalism, therefore, has multiple levels of 
complexity. On a practical level, this thesis looks at regional responses 
to the nation-centric view which was inherent in the often mercantilist 
outlook of central states. Though Philippe Minard has shown that 
Colbertist tenants gripped the French trade inspectors who were 
deployed in manufacturing centres scattered across France from the 
seventeenth to the mid-eighteenth century,4 in chapters 1 and 2, this 
thesis suggests that, in France, mercantilist ‘terminology’5 had still not 
come to dominate other modes of communication between the centre 
and the periphery in economic issues, as it seems to have done in 
Britain. Meanwhile, chapter 3 looks at the effects of apparently 
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mercantilist policies from a colonial perspective also. Here it finds that, 
similarly to Morieux’s argument, economic interests regularly defeated 
both British and French national political and economic programmes.  
 
However, this thesis also confronts the chequered career of 
mercantilism in relation to economic theory, and uses the concept to 
engage with economic thought in favour of and against free trade. The 
idea of the ‘mercantile system’ was of course invented in the eighteenth 
century, though its meaning was quite distinct and far removed from 
how mercantilism is understood today. For, as Coleman pointed out, the 
term has been used problematically to describe economics and 
economists in a time when neither had yet been invented.1  
 
Thus, an important element of the second part of this thesis, which 
deals generally with economic thought, is to historicise political 
economy, and understand the early inklings of a new science of 
economics in their proper context. It is especially concerned with the 
general ambivalence that characterised contemporary attitudes 
towards the idea of economic systems. In this sense, chapter 4 
particularly seeks to refine Magnusson’s claim that mercantilist 
discourse contributed to the development of the notion of the economy 
as an autonomous system.2 
 
Part two of the thesis spends some time on the role that political 
context and other ideas played in otherwise economic debates. It 
therefore draws on the work of Emma Rothschild, especially in terms of 
the practical politically inspired elements of Turgot’s and Adam Smith’s 
economics as they pertained to the grain trade. Rothschild argues that 
Turgot in particular appreciated the need to compromise freedom in 
some markets in order to champion free market liberalism in the grain 
trade.3 In this way, and also by looking at the practical responses of 
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even more humble officials and businessmen, Rothschild, along with 
others such as Gareth Stedman Jones, has forged a ‘new history of 
economic thought’.1  
 
This new history seeks out the threads between the ‘high’ thought of 
theorists; the ‘middle’ thought of local authorities and businessmen; 
and the ‘low’ thought of day-to-day existence.2 This thesis might also be 
located in this tradition, as it attempts to go further and understand 
political economy from the bottom up. Ultimately, it seeks to link 
fruitful recent trends in historiography, such as the new approach to 
economic intellectual history and revisions of the nation state, with the 
rich older traditions of E.P. Thompson’s social history and the intensely 
local studies of the Annales historians. It thus aims to intensify and 
enliven Hont’s account of the gradual intellectual depreciation of the 
system of ‘jealousy of trade’, providing a greater context for his 
explanation of how lofty theorists such as David Hume and ultimately 
Adam Smith emerged on the other side of conflicts like the Seven Years’ 
War, still able to speculate on the civilising and ultimately pacifying 
qualities of trade.3  
 
Not that the perceived threat of globalisation exactly abated. According 
to David Todd, the dangers later posed by ‘modern globalisation’ (as 
opposed to the ‘archaic globalisation’ of the early modern period) 
informed nineteenth-century protectionist ideology in France. 
Protectionism gradually became part of a French national economic 
identity which established itself in opposition to the perceived 
character of British political economy. This was thought to be 
underscored by a callous free trade, unsympathetic towards the 
negative social effects of the unencumbered competition of a global 
economy.4 It is interesting that the term ‘protectionist’ became 
                                                         
1 M. J. Daunton, ‘The Future Direction of British History’, History Workshop Journal, 
72:1 (2011), p. 222. 
2 Ibid; E. Rothschild, ‘Political Economy’ in G. Stedman Jones and G. Claeys (eds.), The 
Cambridge History of Nineteenth-Century Political Thought (Cambridge, 2011), p. 749. 
3 Hont, Jealousy of Trade, p. 37. 
4 D. Todd, Free Trade and its Enemies in France, 1814-1851 (Cambridge, 2015), p. 1. 
Daisy Gibbs   34 
prevalent in Britain during the Corn Law debates of the 1840s, and 
remained a pejorative term until the end of the century, for even in the 
nineteenth century, debates about the fate of the grain trade 
encapsulated far broader concerns about a nation’s character and the 
extent of its participation in global trade.1  
 
Magnusson argues that mercantilism only existed in Britain as such, 
because he understands the term as referring to the economic 
discourse that developed in that specific context. However, even he has 
to admit that basic ‘unit ideas’ were shared, though the context of 
another nation could allow for the development of a discourse quite 
different from British mercantilism.2 This is the result of a very strict 
definition of the term. However, Stern and Wennerlind have suggested 
that, rather than trying to define mercantilism itself, it can be more 
productive to study its ‘reflections’ in contemporary discourse 
sometimes seemingly unrelated to economics.3  
 
Thus, though discussing free trade and protectionism, Todd’s account 
seems to fit in with this guiding principal in approaching political 
economy in and around the eighteenth century. For it helps to 
understand the economic thought of that time as inextricably linked 
with other areas of thought or concern, such as poverty or national 
identity.4 In this light, it therefore does make sense to talk about and 
compare mercantilism in the French and the British contexts, because 
the various comparable issues in which it was raised can reflect back on 
our understanding of the term itself and the apparently economic ideas 
to which it refers.  
Comparative History  
 
In spite of the inherent transnationalism of ideas to which Todd’s work 
especially can attest, this thesis focuses primarily on an international 
                                                         
1 Ibid, p. 4. 
2 Magnusson, Mercantilism, p. 174. 
3 Stern and Wennerlind, ‘Introduction’, p. 4. 
4 Ibid. 
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comparison of the grain trade in Britain and France, rather than 
providing a transnational account per se. Clearly it has to appreciate 
that national identities and national communities in general cannot be 
understood or even imagined in isolation, as the work of Colley and 
Todd show. Indeed, J.H. Elliot points out that due attention to the 
histoire croisée, which lingers in a background of emulation, exchange 
and cultural transfer between nations, can help to free comparative 
history from its propensity to assume ‘a point of view external to the 
objects which are compared’.1 Thus, while acknowledging the 
importance of the traffic of ideas, sentiments, commodities, and people 
themselves across borders, this thesis, in comparison with highly 
transnational work such as that of Morieux, is, with the exception of 
chapter 3, generally about comparable encounters within the limits of 
Britain and France. 
 
As we now know, the nation is not necessarily the useful or even stable 
unit of comparison which it had seemed. Besides this, it is necessary to 
delve a bit deeper to understand responses to nationalism. For these 
reasons, this thesis works in the first instance from regional case-
studies, adding material from other regions where a greater context is 
needed. Thus in the opening chapters, two case studies of the grain 
trade and its regulation in the county of Norfolk in the British, and the 
généralité of Tours in the French case allow for a close examination of 
the sinews of the community and nation in each country. In general, the 
thesis relies on an amalgamation of export figures from port books as 
well as weather and productivity data to establish a picture of the 
health and vigour of the trade in the aforementioned regions, before 
turning to the documents of local authorities pertaining to national and 
local market regulation; contraventions thereof and the justification or 
condemnation of transgressors; and instances of rioting or other 
popular demonstrations in relation to the grain trade. To these are 
                                                         
1 J.H. Elliott, History in the Making (New Haven & London, 2012), p. 182. 
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added the published works of contemporary political economists on the 
subject.  
 
The overall structure of the thesis again evokes the work of Kwass, for 
it places its analysis of the practical or institutional sources in the first 
section, ahead of the economic theory and published literature about 
the grain trade, which is examined in the second part. Often history 
books deal with the theory first, and then show how it was 
implemented in practice. For Kwass, however, ‘determining the 
incidence of new forms of taxation is merely a preliminary step toward 
a broader examination of the politics of taxation’.1 It is only after 
establishing the practical facts of taxation, followed by the examination 
of patterns of its contestation, that the ‘cultural space’ or context of 
these two practical elements should be added. It is in this way that 
Kwass seeks to illuminate the ‘cultural field between state and society’.2 
He places the discussion of practice ahead of the theoretical or literary 
component because his focus is politics, and not tax rituals.  
 
Likewise, though the subject matter of this thesis is the grain trade, its 
analytical focus is levelled more on a cultural field – citizenship and 
national belonging in the context of globalisation – than on the 
cornfields themselves. It explores practical and theoretical attempts by 
French and British writers, legislators and people to assert their 
interpretation of economic identity and to design an economic destiny 
for their nation or region.  
 
Nevertheless, the thesis is loosely arranged around a narrative, set at a 
time when population growth was placing increasing pressure on old 
frameworks of provisioning in Britain and France. For during the mid-
eighteenth century, subsistence crises shifted from being an 
intermittent torment to a structural problem. Though perhaps not 
entirely abreast with the factual realities of the predicament, after 1750 
                                                         
1 Kwass, Privilege, p. 15. 
2 Ibid, p. 16. 
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the people and authorities were nevertheless forced to confront this 
new situation. The stress is evident in the frequent riots and forthright 
debate of the period. The narrative which this thesis follows then, is 
that of the debates and regulatory changes which took place in Britain 
and France from 1750.  
 
In Britain, 1750 marked the beginning of new debates on the wisdom of 
corn bounties and other rules which regulated the production of grain 
in Britain.1 In France, the 1750s saw the origins of the physiocratic 
movement, epitomised in the publication of Francois Quesnay’s Tableau 
Économique in 1759.2 However, the 1760s were fraught with shortage 
and uncertainty in the grain trade, which had a corresponding effect on 
both debate and regulation. The deregulation experiment in France, 
begun in 1763, was blighted by shortage, and by the end of 1770 the 
grain trade was restricted anew.3 A second deregulation project was 
attempted between 1774 and 1776, its termination coinciding 
ironically with the publication of Adam Smith’s Inquiry into the Nature 
and Causes of the Wealth of Nations.  
 
Meanwhile, in Britain, the 1760s saw a succession of provisional laws 
which temporarily banned exportation. Only in 1773 did the House of 
Commons manage to pass a permanent law that used price levels to 
determine when importation or exportation of grain should be 
forbidden. However, this had to be modified in 1781 and beyond, as it 
was open to manipulation.4 Managing interests clearly remained a 
complicated problem for the legislature. However, Britain was by this 
time becoming a consistent net-importer of grain, changing the stakes 
for everyone involved in the debate.5 This thesis contextualises these 
legislative developments in the events and literature of the period. 
 
                                                         
1 D.G. Barnes, A History of the English Corn Laws, 1660-1846 (London, 1930), p. 23. 
2 L. Vardi, The Physiocrats and the World of the Enlightenment (Cambridge, 2012), p. 
47. 
3 S.L. Kaplan, Bread, Politics and Political Economy (The Hague, 1976), II, pp. 532-9. 
4 Barnes, English Corn Laws, p. 50. 
5 B.R.  Mitchell, British Historical Statistics (Cambridge, 1988), p. 221. 
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Part one (chapters 1-3) is concerned with the success or failure of 
programmes of economic integration and nationalism which were 
sometimes deliberately pursued through changes to grain regulation. 
Chapter 1 concentrates on the county of Norfolk, and engages with the 
efforts of its people to cope with the economic stagnation of their 
region by examining their practical relationship with grain. Ultimately it 
contradicts the notion that mercantilist language necessarily 
constituted or represented nationalism. Instead it argues that the 
mercantilist conception of the nation and national good was used as a 
pretext to defend local economic diversity, which was at stake in the 
face of globalisation and specialisation. Local elites, as well as the 
people, seem to have been equally committed to the local cause. For 
they were not prepared to see their own interests fade, and negotiated 
with the central powers in order to protect their localised perception of 
the economy. 
 
Chapter 2 shows that, similarly, the autonomy of Tours was directly 
challenged – in terms of administration and justice, and also to an 
extent, fiscal matters – by a national programme of deregulating, or 
‘liberating’, the grain trade. However, ultimately, the community seems 
to have been insufficiently awash with national patriotism to respond 
to a system which removed local controls over grain grown within and 
passing through the region. In comparison with Norfolk, the people and 
authorities of Tours did not comment on these challenges in the 
language of mercantilism, but tended to embrace the rhetoric of 
humanitarianism and altruism.  
 
In each case, popular demonstrations reflected commitment to the idea 
of a moral economy; traditional market practices and regulations; and 
limited participation in a regional economy. The people generally did 
not respond to appeals on the grounds of patriotism or shared 
citizenship on a national level. Nor indeed did traders in and around the 
British and French colonies in North America and the Caribbean, which 
is the focus of chapter 3. In this highly politicised arena, private or even 
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community interests again did not necessarily align with mercantilist 
measures which favoured the respective metropoles in the guise of the 
national interest. Illicit trade marked the point where official national 
policies and private interest diverged. This chapter tracks attempts to 
justify and legalise contraband trade, which often also took on the 
pretext of the national good. There were concerns about who actually 
belonged to the nation, and what rights citizenship ought to confer 
upon them. The relaxation of rules governing British and French 
colonial trade, it is argued, reflected renewed understandings of the 
role of the metropole and colonies in global trade. Moreover, the new 
economic identities which were developing particularly in the British 
metropole helped to open a rift between centre and colonies, which 
could potentially cast members of the empire outside the community of 
the nation. 
 
Part two, meanwhile, deals with the contemporary conceptualisation, 
within the ‘literary sphere’, of the practical issues raised in the first 
three chapters. Chapter 4 picks up particularly on the focus of chapters 
1 and 2, namely the implications for the state of a national market, in 
the work of James Steuart and Jacques Necker. Both authors wrote in 
support of regulating the grain trade and remained wary of competing 
private and ‘class’ interests. In many ways, they also preferred classical 
and feudal idylls where they imagined that labourers were sheltered 
from the reckless depravity of the market.  
 
In tracing the evolution of society, they accepted, however, that a 
market economy was part of the process of establishing a coherent 
nation. Both identified the source of social cohesion in commercial 
exchange. They believed that it was important to limit the exportation 
of grain due to its fundamental role in this exchange. Thus it is argued 
that, in dealing with the transition from a feudal to a wage economy, 
Steuart and Necker were attempting to articulate a programme of 
nation-building, wherein they imagined that the void left by traditional 
patron-client relations or the moral economy could only be filled by an 
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omniscient and interventionist central state, which cared for the 
diverse interests of every class and member. 
 
Chapters 5 and 6, meanwhile, look at arguments which were in favour 
of free trade. Chapter 5 examines the work of Charles Townshend, 
Josiah Tucker and Anne-Robert-Jacques Turgot, which dealt with the 
ideas of national interest and the global market which came through 
most strongly in chapter 3. The opinions of these authors as to which 
members of society were qualified to study political economy fed into 
their notion that it was the interests of the landed class which most 
closely aligned with that of the nation at large. This line of thought had 
implications for their ideas about citizenship and rights, and the ideal 
system of government in their own countries. It led Tucker and Turgot 
especially to make international comparisons of their own. Both shared 
positive views of naturalisation, and so their ideas about national 
belonging were fluid, and depended upon unity of interest far more so 
than considerations such as birthplace. Nevertheless, the divergence of 
interest which Tucker identified between Britain and its colonies led 
him to the conclusion that the colonists no longer belonged to what he 
considered the British nation, and Turgot similarly looked forward to 
the secession of the French and the British colonies. 
 
Finally, chapter 6 homes in on Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations and 
develops the idea of national identities in a global economy in this 
work. In Smith’s work the link between interest and national identity 
began to crystallise. For where Tucker and Turgot had sought the 
alignment of interests into a national ideal, Smith analysed systems of 
political economy which he perceived as already constructed from the 
economic orientations and interests of economic participants. Though 
misguided, the combination of interests formed a national character to 
which globalisation posed the final threat.   
 
From the perspective of modern economic theory, national integration 
of markets is good, because it allows for the more efficient allocation of 
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resources.1 However, national economic consolidation was a 
contentious issue for many individuals and groups in the eighteenth 
century, who were therefore not unconscious of the compromises 
which membership of a nation state demanded. Though self-interest 
could now be seen as a useful stimulus on an individual level, it did not 
emerge as a unifying force, with even proponents of free trade 
concerned about its limits. This was because self-interest was often 
seen to contend with the desired path of a national interest, which in 
turn was supposed to be defined by national identity and membership. 
Nor did the language of nationalism help to square this circle. For, as 
the negotiations of manufacturers and merchants in Norfolk and the 
Caribbean show, patriotism, or even anxieties about the cross-Channel 
foe, failed to unite the nation in important economic ways. This meant 
that a system of economic nationalism, though it could technically act as 
an inclusive category for national belonging, could also have the effect 
of putting up tall fences between those whose vision of the ideal 
economy diverged. 
                                                         
1 Root, Fountain of Privilege, p. xi. 
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Laws still regulated many aspects of the British corn trade in the 
eighteenth century. Rules guided how middlemen could speculate or 
make a profit on grain, placed standards on the measurement of loose 
grain and baked loaves, and forbade or allowed, and sometimes even 
encouraged, exportation and importation of grain beyond British 
borders. The purpose of this chapter is to make a case study of just one 
county, Norfolk, using the interactions of its various people with the 
grain laws to examine the way the county’s economic identity coexisted 
with a national economic ideal. That ideal was one where markets were 
integrated, regions were specialised, and commercial conditions and 
property terms were fixed and uniform across the nation.1 
 
The county of Norfolk has a strong presence and identity in the 
historiography as an agrarian region. It is usually depicted as a centre 
for corn production and the seat of the agricultural revolution. 
However, the importance of Norfolk’s manufacturing efforts is 
sometimes overlooked. The county’s non-agricultural industry, though 
in decline by the latter half of the eighteenth century, needs to be 
incorporated into our understanding of the county’s economic identity, 
as it played an important part in contemporary understandings. 
 
Therefore, the focus of the first section of this chapter is the prevalence 
of the grain trade and other industries in Norfolk. This is explored in 
terms of actual volumes of exports as well as perceived importance. 
With this in place, section two will begin to look at the contemporary 
                                                         
1 R. Grafe, Distant Tyranny (Princeton, 2012), p. 2. 
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vision of the grain trade and the county’s role therein, from the 
perspective of the poorer inhabitants of Norfolk and of large 
landowners, city-dwelling administrators, and owners of the county’s 
manufacturing initiatives, all by looking at the way they interacted with 
ancient grain legislation. The final section tackles interaction with later 
legislation, which generally dealt with the international scene, either 
blocking exportation or, at the other extreme, paying bounties on 
exports.  
 
In the eighteenth century, the legislative efforts of local administration 
in Norfolk generally tended to the protection of the manufacturing 
industry, which was fiercely guarded on the basis of the most 
mercantilist of rationales. This, in retrospect, makes for a complicated 
insight into the national identity of Norfolk’s inhabitants. On a surface 
level, it would seem that merchants and manufacturers were engaging 
with patriotic values and participating in a national anxiety about the 
propensity of foreigners to undercut British sales in a global 
marketplace. In the higher social circles of Norwich administration and 
business, national wealth was actually seen as a local matter.  
 
However, the life of this industry was seen to depend upon the 
availability of supplies in the neighbourhood, to the possible detriment 
of other regions. In this sense, elite views overlapped with those of the 
common textile workers, who were also concerned with the food 
situation within their communities and condemned interference in the 
communal food supply, be it from profiteering middlemen or 
international dealers. As sincere as commitments to the national good 
might have been, it will be argued that this vocal patriotism served as a 
rejoinder to an economic process which would see the national 
economy grow more integrated and streamlined: specialisation. In light 
of this process, even the central state was expected to serve local and 
not simply national concerns.  
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Figure 1: Map of the County of Norfolk 
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Source: E. Bowen, An Accurate Map of the County of Norfolk Divided into Hundreds and 
Drawn from Surveys (1749). gallica.bnf.fr / Bibliothèque Nationale de France. 
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Norfolk as a Corn County 
 
In 1757 a concerned inhabitant referred to Norfolk as ‘a county 
esteemed by far the greatest corn county, for its bigness, in the 
kingdom’.1 He wished to persuade the gentlemen readers of the London 
Magazine to alert their local MP to the dangers threatened by the 
expiration of a parliamentary act forbidding the exportation of corn 
overseas. This letter to the editor thus demonstrates the seeming 
importance of its writer’s county to the food supply of an entire 
kingdom, as well as its role in supplying overseas nations with life-
sustaining commodities.  
 
Similarly, Joan Thirsk has emphasised Norfolk’s early rise to 
prominence as a supplier of grain both nationally, though primarily to 
London, and internationally, to Scotland, the Netherlands and the 
Baltic.2 The county must have participated heartily in trade, as its ports 
attracted strict observation from a central government which jealously 
oversaw maritime commerce. For the quarter ending in April 1780, of 
almost £10,000 spent on customs officers in England and Wales, 
Blakeney and Cley were responsible for £62 of this cost, Wells for £87, 
King’s Lynn for £252 and Yarmouth for £531. Though dwarfed by 
spending on customs officers for Bristol, this puts Yarmouth into the 
top ten most lavished upon ports in a list of seventy. Indeed, 
Yarmouth’s customs officer salaries at this time almost matched 
Dover’s, which came in at £547 and actually had approximately only 47 
officers, to Yarmouth’s 57. King’s Lynn had around 37.3 
 
Norfolk ports were well watched, and yet customs figures show that 
they contributed little to net income. T.S. Willan tells us that, for the 
                                                         
1 Anon, ‘To the Author, &c.’, The London Magazine, or, Gentleman’s Monthly 
Intelligencer, XXVI (1757), p. 567. 
2 J. Thirsk, ‘The Farming Regions of England’ in idem (ed.), The Agrarian History of 
England and Wales, IV (Cambridge, 1967), pp. 40-41. 
3 Cambridge University Library Add Mss 5237: Customs Establishment. Quarterly 
Establishment Books of the Customs, London, Out-ports, etc. Quarter ending 5th April 
1780. 
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seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries at least, Yarmouth was the 
key water connection for Norwich, and hence was the port concerned 
with the principal out-bound shipping of Norwich’s manufactures. 
However, the port was subject to unfavourable weather and tidal 
conditions, meaning it required regular maintenance. This was to be 
financed, according to multiple parliamentary acts, from its own 
customs revenue.1 Any gain from Yarmouth customs and duties was, 
therefore, siphoned off by the burdensome upkeep required by its 
unfortunate exposure to nature’s forces. More important, perhaps, is 
the fact that bounties awarded to merchants for exporting grain abroad 
were to be paid out of the gross customs collections of the port they left. 
If a lot of grain did go abroad through one port then it could even be left 
with a deficit. This is exactly what did happen to Yarmouth and King’s 
Lynn as well as many other ports in 1753.2 The two Norfolk ports were 
especially in the red. 
 
According to bounties data from the customs office for the period 
between Christmas 1751 and Christmas 1752, the four recorded 
Norfolk ports laid out 40% of all bounties in England and Wales. In that 
year a fifth of recorded English and Welsh wheat exports left Norfolk 
outports.3 This one-off piece of data, then, would suggest that Norfolk’s 
corn exports were unusually high in relation to the rest of Britain.  
 
Certainly much of this profusion of grain exports should be attributed 
to agricultural success. However, it is also important to note that the 
Norfolk coastline was well connected via navigable rivers to the 
backcountry where the production of corn took place. The county also 
has a long coastline jutting into the North Sea economic area of 
activity.4 Bounties were, of course, only paid on international 
                                                         
1 T.S. Willan, The English Coasting Trade (Manchester, 1938), p.  129. 
2 TNA T1/351/47: Papers Concerning the Bounty on Exported Corn, 26th February 
1753. 
3 TNA Cust 24/19: Abstracts of Exports under Ports. Corn Exports and Bounty 
Statistics, 25th December 1734- 17th February 1753.  
4 P.J. Corfield, ‘East Anglia’ in P. Clark (ed.), The Cambridge History of Urban Britain, II 
(Cambridge, 2000), pp.  39-40. 
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shipments, and so this data indicates that Norfolk was especially 
important in the external grain trade.  
 
A good indication of all the legal trade entering and exiting Norfolk 
ports, together with its origin or destination, can be gleaned from the 
county’s port books. Neither the treasury’s customs receipts, nor the 
locally generated port books, which are fairly complete, can be relied 
upon for a perfectly accurate reading of the quantities of any goods 
moving in, out, or around the island. This is because, firstly, smuggled 
goods and fraud distorted calculations of the volume of external trade. 
This distortion is important in regard to the international grain trade, 
as merchants and smugglers were thought to sometimes re-land 
shipments of grain, or commit other frauds in order to claim bounty 
payments multiple times or in excess of the shipment’s actual value.1 
Secondly, the books might offer an underestimate of internal trade also, 
because within the coastal bounds of the island, road transport was 
sometimes a more viable option. Turkeys for instance, a famous 
product of Norfolk, marched their journey to London markets, as they 
were an impracticable water-going cargo.2 Apart from that, the books 
themselves are sometimes damaged and often hard to read. They are 
occasionally incomplete which means, as we see below, direct 
comparisons between certain periods are not always possible. 
 
Grain was nevertheless, by its very nature, easy maritime merchandise3 
and the port books, scruffy as they sometimes are, can offer a good 
insight (which customs documents cannot) into the volume of trade 
generally, and grain in particular, sent coastwise as compared to that 
which went abroad. This ratio, as figures 2, 3 and 4 show, depended 
heavily on legislation. 
 
                                                         
1 D.G. Barnes, A History of the English Corn Laws (London, 1930), p. 26. 
2 B.A. Holderness, ‘East Anglia and the Fens’ in J. Thirsk (ed.), The Agrarian History of 
England and Wales, V, Part 1 (Cambridge, 1984), p. 237. 
3 P. J. Corfield, The Impact of English Towns 1700-1800 (Oxford, 1982), p. 41. 
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These charts present the total volume of each type of grain shipped in 
each given period, broken down into that which went overseas and that 
which was shipped along the coast to British destinations. The first two 
periods, which more or less represent normal years (years apart from 
1756-7, 1766-7 and 1770-74 known for their hardship and 
riotousness1) show foreign exports of wheat and rye exceeded the 
amount travelling coastwise, whilst for barley and malt the reverse was 
true. This was because the highest bounty was payable on wheat and 
rye. Meanwhile, although oats were sent all round Britain and were 
eligible for a small bounty upon exportation, they were rarely, if ever, 
dispatched abroad from King’s Lynn or Yarmouth.  
 
 
Figure 2: Bushels of Main Grains shipped Overseas and Coastally from King’s 
Lynn between Christmas 1751 and Midsummer 1752 
 
Source: TNA E 190/457/7, Port of King’s Lynn, Customer and Controller Coastal, 
xmas 1751-midsummer 1752 and TNA E 190/457/5 Port of King’s Lynn, 
Searcher Overseas, xmas 1751-midsummer 1752. 
 
                                                         
1 Barnes, English Corn Laws, p.  31; E.P. Thompson, ‘The Moral Economy of the English 







Wheat Rye Barley Malt
Overseas
Coastal
Daisy Gibbs   50 
Figure 3: Bushels of Main Grains shipped Overseas and Coastally from King’s 
Lynn between Christmas 1759 and Midsummer 1760 
 
Source: TNA E 190/459/11, Port of King’s Lynn, Customer and Controller 
Coastal, xmas 1751-midsummer 1752 and TNA E 190/459/9, Port of King’s 
Lynn, Searcher Overseas, xmas 1751-midsummer 1752. 
 
 
Figure 4: Bushels of Main Grains shipped Overseas and Coastally from King’s 
Lynn between Midsummer and Christmas 1769 
 
Source: TNA E 190/462/10, Port of King’s Lynn, Customer and Controller 
Coastal, midsummer-xmas 1769 and TNA E 190/462/12, Port of King’s Lynn, 
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Norfolk farmers and merchants, therefore, were predominantly 
interested in the big pay-outs. No doubt they were struck hard when 
harvests failed and the customary ban on exports and bounties was 
deployed afresh, for example, in certain months of 1768, 1769 and 
1770.1 This prohibition explains why, on the final chart, coastal trade so 
far outstrips overseas trade. The port books for this period simply 
reflect the fact that Norfolk’s above-board international exports of grain 
were effectively stemmed by emergency methods on the part of central 
government. When the ban was in place and no grain was travelling 
abroad from King’s Lynn, very few shipments of any sort of 
merchandise were made. In the year from January 1770 to January 
1771, there were just four overseas shipments from King’s Lynn.2 
Norfolk’s international trade outwards from King’s Lynn, therefore, 
very much depended on grain. 
 
The bounty payments made on grain in times of plenty made it a 
lucrative industry especially within such a well-connected county. Here, 
then, was an incentive for increased agricultural output. Norfolk has 
been praised as the seat of the agricultural revolution, with Coke of 
Norfolk as its champion, although R.A.C. Parker has treated that notion 
with some scepticism.3 If Coke of Norfolk was not exactly the hero of 
the agricultural revolution that has traditionally been portrayed, he 
does at least serve as an example of a man who believed in unlocking 
Norfolk’s productive capacities, and if something of a self-promoter and 
a braggart, his Norfolk holdings did yield good wheat and barley 
harvests.4  
 
Coke and, in particular, his tenants were successful in their 
development, or improvement, of parts of Norfolk. However, the myth 
                                                         
1 Great Britain. Customs Establishment, Customs Tariffs of the United Kingdom from 
1800 to 1897 (London, 1897), pp. 250-252. 
2 TNA E 190/462/12: ‘Port of King’s Lynn, Controller Overseas’, 6th January 1770 - 
5th January 1771; TNA E 190/462/13: ‘Port of King’s Lynn, Searcher Overseas’, 6th 
January 1770 - 5th January 1771.  
3 R.A.C. Parker, Coke of Norfolk (Oxford, 1975), p. 124. 
4 Ibid, pp. 124-5. 
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of Coke’s success not only serves to portray the man as a miracle 
worker, but also portrays the whole county in a slightly stilted fashion. 
The myth goes that Coke transformed quite intractable land into 
bountiful fields golden with wheat,1 with the implication being that the 
same was possible of anywhere. Actually, the myth served to disguise 
the fact that Norfolk was far from uniform in its soil types and 
productive capacities. Coke personally farmed a relatively small section 
of his holdings. Tenants worked the rest of his land, which was mostly 
situated in the north west of Norfolk, an area known for its variability of 
soil condition.2 In fact, much of Norfolk’s soil was much less useful than 
Coke’s, with extensive patches of soggy clay, marshes and fenland. If 
Norfolk’s soil is by no means homogenous,3 to imagine that the 
livelihoods of its people should be, even in the later eighteenth century, 
is perhaps a little simplistic.  
 
It is perhaps this legend of agricultural improvement in tandem with a 
lack of comparable industrial progress, which has led to Norwich’s 
portrayal as an urban centre in decline in the eighteenth century. At one 
time its worsted production had made the city a titan of manufacturing, 
second only to London.4 By the middle of the eighteenth century, 
however, other cities had risen to challenge it, and, through 
comparatively advanced industrialisation and population surges, to 
dwarf it.5 In terms of countywide population statistics, Tony Wrigley 
has rendered Norfolk’s relative stagnation indisputable.6 However, this 
has all too quickly been taken as evidence of the decline of the county’s 
industry, where, in fact, what it can only really represent is continuity. 
Wrigley admits that Norfolk’s population, probably buoyed by the 
woollens industry, did continue to grow, though only by increments and 
                                                         
1 J.V. Beckett, ‘Coke, Thomas William, First Earl of Leicester of Holkham (1754–1842)’, 
Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford, 2004). 
[http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/5831, accessed 19 July 2013]. 
2 Parker, Coke of Norfolk, p. 83. 
3 P. Wade-Martins (ed.), Historical Atlas of Norfolk (Norwich, 1994), p. 18.  
4 Holderness, ‘East Anglia and the Fens’, p. 199. 
5 Corfield, ‘East Anglia’, p. 41. 
6 E.A. Wrigley, ‘Rickman Revisited’, EHR, 62:3 (2009), p. 727. 
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not at the phenomenal rate of other counties.1 So although the urban 
population was not burgeoning, in Norfolk it was not declining.  
 
It is this difference in growth rate which Wrigley uses to distinguish the 
regions of industrial importance from those he somewhat crudely 
labels ‘agricultural counties’.2 Yet whilst other regions were perhaps 
experiencing the early stages of an industrial revolution, the Norfolk 
region was not de-industrialising. If the county’s agricultural 
productivity did increase, this, Arthur H. John shows, was likely a 
function of a greater area of land falling under cultivation together with 
increased efficiencies, which meant that more agricultural labourers 
were not necessarily enlisted.3 Perhaps then, Norfolk's corn-bounty 
hunters were a profit-seeking minority. In a sense it boils down to 
whether a county or any region should be characterised quantitatively 
and in economic terms by the content of its exports or by the 
livelihoods of its people. Though within the grand scheme of things, 
Norfolk was an agrarian region, Norwich town-dwellers and weavers 
by their trade might have been possessed of quite a different 
perspective. 
 
Within Britain it seems that the port of King’s Lynn was more than just 
a grain outport, playing a secondary role as a key inward connection 
from mainland Europe. In fact, the customs receipts data shows that at 
the start of each decade between 1750 and 1780, both Yarmouth and 
Lynn ranked in the top ten ports by gross receipt.4 Thus, while a very 
large amount of grain was being channelled out of Norfolk via its 
outports, other goods, on which customs were payable, were also part 
of the story.  
 
                                                         
1 Ibid, p. 722. 
2 Ibid, p. 734. 
3 A.H. John, ‘English Agricultural Improvement and Grain Exports, 1660-1765’ in A.H. 
John and D.C. Coleman (eds.), Trade, Government and Economy in Pre-Industrial 
England (London, 1976), p. 60. 
4 BL Add Mss 8133a: ‘The Gross and Neat Produce of Customs, at the Several Ports in 
England and Wales’. 
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According to the port books, one of the chief imports into King’s Lynn 
was alcohol: port and Spanish wine, as well as brandy and rum. These 
beverages were mostly re-exported by the gallon to London, Hull, 
Boston, Liverpool, Leith and others, so that King’s Lynn served as 
something of an entrepôt for foreign liquors.1 This perhaps explains the 
attention that Norfolk’s ports drew from the customs and revenues 
division. The King’s Lynn port books also show that linen, cloth, 
earthenware and pipe staves were exported coastwise. Meanwhile, the 
port books of Yarmouth testify to a steady flow of worsteds and 
Norwich stuffs heading to the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and 
Portugal even as late as 1779.2 Norfolk manufacture was perhaps not 
entirely dead in the water.  
 
The inhabitants of the county themselves were defensive about their 
key manufacture: woollens. Even in 1751, owners of the textile industry 
in the county claimed that, thanks to their trade a ‘great Part of the Poor 
are employed, not only in the said city [Norwich], but in all the adjacent 
Countries, to the great benefit and advantage of this Nation in general’.3 
The aim of the petition was to ban the use of certain tars in marking 
sheep, a local agricultural improvement that actually diminished the 
quality and hence value of their final products, which they claimed 
made an important contribution to national exports. The petitioners of 
1751 wanted to remind parliament that Norfolk contributed to the 
nation in more ways than just by providing grain.  
 
According to contemporary notions, therefore, Norfolk, if not 
necessarily urbanised, was at least home to many textile workers. 
Indeed, the population figures of the county may be a bit misleading. 
Wrigley admits that hundredal data provides a more sensitive sketch of 
                                                         
1 TNA E 190/462/12: Port of King’s Lynn, Controller Overseas, 6th January 1770- 5th 
January 1771. 
2 TNA E 190/584/12: Port of Yarmouth, Searcher Overseas, 6th January 1770- 5th 
January 1780. 
3 Journals of the House of Commons, XXVI (17th January 1750- 6th April 1754), p. 329, 
17th December 1751. 
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England’s population distribution.1 In Norfolk there was still an urban 
dwelling population, for Corfield claims that about a quarter of 
Norfolk’s population lived in towns (although she admits a fairly low 
threshold as to what might constitute a town).2  
 
The products of this county naturally included grain, but it was also 
famous for its textiles and, so those who invest in the legend of Coke of 
Norfolk would agree, knowledge. Parker has pointed out that Coke’s 
own agricultural work was not really a profit-making activity. He 
tended to use whatever capital (financial and political) he gained from 
his estates to engage heavily in the battles for county representation.3 
What concerned Coke the most was not, in fact, producing vendible 
commodities but promoting his apparent successes and cultivating 
celebrity status.  
 
Coke himself was of interest to forward-looking and influential 
noblemen from across the country (Parker tells us that Whigs and 
radicals in particular were drawn to the home farm).4 He became a 
darling of the agricultural revolution not because he was the man to 
approach for corn, but because he seemed to be the man to approach 
for the secrets to successful agriculture in unpromising conditions. 
Norfolk shone in contemporary imaginations as an example of modern 
technique, whose immediate products could be shared, but more 
importantly, whose success could be replicated elsewhere.  
 
This, however, raises questions about contemporary notions: was 
Norfolk acknowledged as a breadbasket from outside? Was it seen in 
the same way from the inside? These are big questions, which we can 
begin to look at with the operation of the corn laws and instances of 
rioting in Norfolk as tangible entry points. These two points of 
reference, leaving their traces in the archives, can provide insight into 
                                                         
1 E.A. Wrigley, ‘English County Populations in the Later Eighteenth Century’, EHR, 60:1 
(2007), p. 53. 
2 Corfield, ‘East Anglia’, p. 36. 
3 Parker, Coke of Norfolk, see esp. chapter 9. 
4 Ibid, pp. 114-118. 
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the attitudes of both common people and their social superiors towards 
the movement of grain around and away from the county and the 
possible treatment of Norfolk as some kind of national (and 
international) silo.  
 
Norfolk and the Corn Laws 
 
In spite of their presence on the statute book until 1772,1 the ancient 
corn laws prove almost undetectable in the court records of Norfolk. 
Prosecutions for regrating, forestalling and engrossing were almost 
unheard of at the manor courts and quarter sessions.2 However, there 
are multiple ways to interpret this. It might be that the farmers, dealers 
and merchants of Norfolk were remarkably respectful of the law. On the 
other hand, perhaps law-enforcers tended to turn a blind eye to illegal 
market activity.  
 
Douglas Hay and Nicholas Rogers paint prosecutions of middlemen in 
this period as nearly always concessions to the rioting poor, suggesting 
that market regulations were only enforced when times were hard. The 
laws, they imply, were not only ancient, but also a kind of archaic ritual, 
performed for a mob whose rudimentary comprehension of the 
economics of food supply required a scapegoat.3 Even in years of 
difficulty, however, the Norfolk quarter sessions did not turn up or deal 
with a single kidder, lader, brogger or badger.4  
 
Only in Yarmouth was there discernible action in 1757 when three 
separate incidents of forestalling of fish can be found to have taken 
                                                         
1 D. Hay and N. Rogers, Eighteenth-Century English Society (Oxford, 1997), p. 98. D.G. 
Barnes notes that in spite of Parliamentary repeal, the laws remained indictable by 
common law: local authorities could still punish such activities as crimes. Barnes, 
English Corn Laws, p. 41. 
2 NRO C/S 1/1: Norfolk Quarter Sessions: Sessions Books, 1752-1774 and NRO C/S 
1/2: Session Books, 1774-1790. 
3 Hay and Rogers, Eighteenth-Century English Society, p. 94. 
4 NRO C/S 1/1: Sessions Books, 1752-1774; NRO C/S 1/2: Session Books, 1774-1790. 
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place.1 Forestalling was the action of getting in between supply and the 
market, these days, fairly normal commercial activity.2  The next year 
saw one prosecution for regrating, which normally meant speculatively 
stockpiling supplies,3 on the part of a butcher.4 At Yarmouth these 
market misdemeanours, and they were treated as such with relatively 
small repercussions, were presented at the Court Leet. Yarmouth was 
unusual in the sense that its manor court dealt with serious crimes, 
such as theft, rape and the occasional murder. In this way it was more 
like Manchester’s Court Leet, which remained active and powerful long 
into the eighteenth century and beyond because the city lacked 
borough-level administration.5  
 
Yarmouth is also special because it had its own market inquest, sworn 
to bring offending merchants and victuallers to justice.6 This mostly 
meant that they confiscated false weights and measures and prosecuted 
vendors whose produce was deemed unwholesome or putrid. However, 
as we have seen, there was the occasional presentment of forestalling 
and regrating. The years immediately after 1755 are well known as 
years of a national shortage of corn, yet the prosecutions suggest 
possibly that the troubles strained other trades. Great Yarmouth was 
primarily a fish market at this time,7 and abuses of trade in that 
commodity were evidentially heeded at certain times.   
 
Meanwhile in Norwich there were no similar prosecutions. Not even 
after rioting struck the city in 1766 was there a prosecution against 
middlemen. This does not seem merely to be question of ineffective 
implementation, for where Yarmouth had its own market inquest, the 
                                                         
1 NRO Y/S 3/60: Great Yarmouth Borough Archives: Sessions of the Peace: Sessions 
Files, 14th September 1757. 
2 R.B. Westerfield, Middlemen in English Business (New Haven, 1915), p. 138. 
3 Ibid, p. 139. 
4 NRO Y/S 3/61: Great Yarmouth Borough Archives: Sessions of the Peace: Sessions 
Files, 20th September 1758. 
5 B. Waddell, ‘Governing England through the Manor Courts’, HJ, 55:2 (2012), p. 299. 
6 NRO Y/C 14/2: Great Yarmouth Borough Archives, Town Clerk’s Department pre-
1835: Leet Book, June 1769- September 1797. There is a full list of ‘articles to be 
inquired of by the market inquest’ on the first page. Articles for the court leet to 
handle appear on the last pages. Leet books for 1735-1769 are missing. 
7 Wade-Martins (ed.), Historical Atlas, p. 131. 
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Norwich Mayor’s Court Book alluded to a market committee. In one 
instance this committee brought in and had punished a certain Mr 
Barker, whose crime unfortunately goes unrecorded.1  
 
Contrary to what Hay and Rogers have surmised, the Norwich 
procedure was to place notices in the local papers. These ordered that 
the marketplace be regulated by the use of a bell, which signified the 
beginning and end of trading times, so that officials could supervise 
sales and purchases. Edible supplies were only to be purchased for 
private consumption. Resale for profit was strictly forbidden.2 The 
notices threatened harsh penalties, but the measures were also 
explained: they were designed to avert the excessive inflation of food 
prices.  
 
Ostensibly, these notices were aimed at the merchants, but to follow 
Hay and Rogers’ logic, they would also be there to appease the common 
folk. Judging by the sort of advertisements which surrounded the 
official notifications in the Norwich Mercury, this was a paper directed 
at people of every social standing. On one hand there are notices 
advertising evening entertainments to ‘all persons of quality, 
Gentlemen and Ladies’.3 On the other hand, however, there are adverts 
seeking tradesmen. One apothecary even posted an advert seeking ‘a 
youth of small fortunes’ as an apprentice.4 Probably these 
advertisements were designed to work in conjunction with word of 
mouth, but this still means that the paper was at least intended to reach 
all sections of society in the city and beyond.  
 
The usefulness of such serials in the commercial exploits of the 
eighteenth-century merchant has already been explored.5 The Norwich 
                                                         
1 NRO, NCR Case 16a/31: ‘Mayor’s Court Book and Papers, 1746-1758’, 15th March 
1755. 
2 Ibid, 13th December 1755.  
3 Norwich Mercury, 29th December 1750. 
4 Ibid, 11th September 1756. 
5 J.R. Raven, ‘Serial Advertisement in Eighteenth-Century Britain and Ireland’ in R. 
Myers and M Harris (eds.), Serials and their Readers, 1620-1914 (Winchester, 1993), p. 
103. 
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Mercury was no exception to the trend, providing valuable information 
on shipping and prices as well as other marketplace intelligence. Thus 
merchants too were being warned in this instance. Yet perhaps most 
telling is the fact that the notice itself offered, upon the conviction of a 
so-called ‘fogger’, a reward of twenty shillings to the reader who had 
informed the authorities.1 Common market-goers were being offered 
the opportunity to punish market-place criminals and earn a cash-
reward in the process. Yet nobody was convicted.  
 
Lofty proclamations reiterating the corn laws were not peculiar to 
Norfolk. In fact, the central government made the same gesture in the 
late summer of 1766, a time of unexpected shortage in the southern 
regions of the country. Donald Barnes calls this a ‘folly’, as it grated with 
the increasingly modernised food supply chain in a newly 
commercialised society. Its only effect, according to Barnes, was to 
justify the actions of the rioting poor.2 Dale E. Williams, perhaps more 
charitably, suggests that the Chatham government was distracted by its 
own internal squabbles and managed only to re-issue these laws before 
dissolving.3 
 
For Williams, then, the proclamation was the last word of an 
incapacitated government facing a situation which was near impossible 
to control.4 Likewise, there was little that the Norwich mayoral court 
could do when faced with shortage, and so it rolled out the favoured 
response in 1755: a notice in the papers, restricting marketplace 
activity. The court repeated the notice word for word in May 1771.5  
 
The repeated response to multiple shortages in Norwich indicates that 
there was something like a routine procedure which the local 
authorities followed when faced with dearth and the resultant high 
                                                         
1 NRO, NCR Case 16a/32: Mayor’s Court Book and Papers, 13th December 1755. 
2 Barnes, English Corn Laws, p. 39. 
3 D.E. Williams,‘1766’ in A. Charlesworth (ed.), An Atlas of Rural Protest in Britain, 
1548-1900 (London, 1983), p. 89. 
4 Ibid, pp. 88–92. 
5 NRO, NCR Case 16a/33: Mayor’s Court Book and Papers, 1767-1776, 25th May 1771.  
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prices. Whenever times were hard, one part of the local authority's 
policy in dealing with shortage was to remind merchants and 
consumers alike that profiteering was antisocial. Barnes has shown that 
blaming middlemen for high prices was not only popular among 
commoners, but also played an important role in pamphlet literature.1 
Perhaps it was popular because it did seem to ring true; it was a basic 
and perennial economic logic that the activities of middlemen caused 
prices to rise. 
 
This then is how the authorities seemed to evaluate the market laws, 
but what of the people at large? As E.P. Thompson has shown, riots can 
often give insight into the mental world of those underrepresented in 
written sources.2 In 1766 rioting broke out in Norwich. Unfortunately, 
the best reports of the riots still extant today come from the 
magistrates’ papers, in particular the briefs that were prepared prior to 
prosecutions. These papers, concerned as they are with crime and 
punishment, focus on particular individuals and those actions for which 
they could be prosecuted. Therefore it is the property damage and the 
looting that receive greatest attention, so that group protest and the 
political implications of the situation fade into background noise.  
 
The events, as the magistrates pieced them together, spanned two days, 
Saturday 27th and Sunday 28th of September, beginning with a 
seemingly spontaneous outburst at about lunchtime in the marketplace. 
Here a mob of at least twenty people, with another report putting the 
figure at thirty, began to assemble and attack the temporary stalls of 
peripatetic traders. Those selling butter were the subject of special ire 
and their produce was thrown around the market, with one pad of 
butter thrown directly at the sword-bearer, who was attempting to 
contain the situation.3  
 
                                                         
1 Barnes, English Corn Laws, pp. 32-3. 
2 Thompson, ‘The Moral Economy’, pp. 78-9. 
3 NRO, NCR Case 6h/6/12-13: Papers Relating to Riots in Norwich. Statement of Case, 
Comprising Narrative of Events of 26th and 27th September 1766. 
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In the aftermath of the riots, the magistrates identified several 
ringleaders, and gathered statements about these men from 
eyewitnesses. So it was that certain exclamations on the part of the 
rioters were recorded. Robert Royce, for instance, as he proceeded to 
destroy stalls and wreck the marketplace, was reported as saying ‘we 
will down with them all’.1 Another alleged ringleader, Cornelius Brown, 
was quoted by the same witness as proclaiming ‘Damn them [the stall 
owners] I have an order from the Gentleman to secure them all alike 
and make no exceptions of none’. It was then that, having dispensed 
with these temporary stalls, the mob moved on to the permanent stalls 
owned by citizens of Norwich itself.2 The mob, it seems, had started on 
the vagrant marketeers, thinking them a safer target, but, with this 
proclamation, Brown had challenged the immunity of Norwich’s local 
traders, and the mob responded by attacking them too.  
 
The target of popular anger, therefore, was anybody selling provisions 
at prices considered unfair by the crowd. A few weeks later, an 
anonymous letter was posted under the door of a grocer, James Poole, 
threatening arson and worse if traders did not ‘sell thair corn... at a 
reasonable price as they do at other Markets’.3 There was clearly a 
sense that Norwich prices were unjustly inflated.4 The writers 
obviously suspected that the corn from their backcountry was on sale 
elsewhere, but that Norwich shopkeepers were conspiring to keep 
prices high.  
 
Unreasonable prices and the transgressions of corn merchants was the 
theme of the first day of rioting, at least. When the mob was finished in 
the marketplace it moved to the New Mills. It seems that, as they were 
attacking the mills, they were subjected to the mayor’s reading of the 
proclamation against rioting. Having put a premature end to the 
                                                         
1 Ibid. 
2 Ibid. 
3 NRO, NCR Case 6h/9/6: Riots. Minute of Mayor's Court re Anonymous Letter 
threatening to set Fire to James Poole's Shop, dated 15th October 1766. 
4 Thompson, ‘The Moral Economy’, p. 112. 
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reading by throwing stones, however, the rioters then moved on to the 
shops and homes of various bakers in the city. Windows were broken, 
buildings partly demolished and beer demanded. This first day of 
violence ended with the rioters sacking an alehouse, the White Horse. 
Here they destroyed furniture and spoiled the liquor.1  
 
These first day’s events smacked of exasperation and spontaneity. The 
second day, however, was tainted with organisation. The rioters 
reconvened on the second day, a Sunday, now bearing horns and 
handkerchiefs on sticks. They proceeded straight to the mills at Trowse. 
There the miller ‘by fair speeches and dealing out liquor in plenty, got 
rid of them’.2 Either the crowd believed in the innocence of this 
individual, or they were simply sated with the alcohol he offered. 
Because of the drinking that took place, the rioters did fall victim to the 
accusations of loutishness.3 Seizing and consuming alcohol clearly 
played an important part in the events of the two days. In a sense, 
however, these actions were congruent with the overall initiative. After 
all, the liquor that the rioters drank or destroyed was brewed or 
distilled from the grains whose prices they were protesting. 
 
Having made their way to Trowse, the rioters were now out of town, so 
they went onwards to attack the house of Mr Money. Here they 
committed their worst acts of private property damage, ransacking the 
house, looting it and then attempting to burn it down. It was this 
incident that drew the greatest attention of the magistrates and 
prosecution, and of all the events it appeared most prominently in the 
official indictments. For it seems that here the rioters really crossed a 
line, stealing cash and scaring Money’s spinster sister.  
 
This brutal attack on the Money family is not inexplicable. Simon 
Renton reveals that William Money came under fire on account of his 
                                                         
1 NRO, NCR Case 6h/6/12: Riots. Statement of Case comprising Narrative of Events of 
26th and 27th September 1766; NCR Case and 6h/6/14: Riots. List of Incidents 
divided into 5 Heads for Each Day (undated).  
2 NRO, NCR Case 6h/6/12: Riots. Statement of Case. 
3 NRO, NCR Case 6h/2: Riots: Depositions of Witnesses (Fair copies, 1767). 
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reputation as a grasping landlord, who would not allow his tenants 
their ancient gleaning rights.1 Money represented a regime which was 
increasingly cracking down on the ancient rights of commoners, 
investing instead in the strict private property rights symbolised by 
enclosure. Therefore, having seen the best part of the harvest carried 
away, the labourers had then suffered the indignity of being turned 
away from the fields where they would traditionally have collected the 
last pickings to supplement their diet. These injustices, seemingly of the 
countryside, were now avenged by a crowd composed of town-dwelling 
weavers and the like, as well as farm labourers. This heterogeneous 
community resorted to forcibly collecting its dues in cash and punishing 
the gentleman who had offended a moral system evidently still 
pertinent, in spite of increasing urbanisation and capitalisation.  
 
Having finished with the Money estate, the mob began to make its way 
back towards Norwich, but paused to destroy a granary on the 
riverbank where grain for export was stored. Nearby a boat was lying 
ready to carry its load of grain away. The rioters came onboard and 
threw its cargo into the river. They destroyed one more malt house, 
that of John Clover, and made their way back to Norwich. Here they 
returned to attacking bakers’ houses until overwhelmed by the mayor’s 
forces, with about thirty taken prisoner.2  
 
Food riots in the eighteenth century could take several different forms, 
such as preventing exports, setting the price for seized goods, or 
attacking millers or dealers.3 The rioting poor, therefore, were sensitive 
to alternative possibilities as to the cause of their distress and reacted 
accordingly. The crowd action of Norfolk in 1766 included a number of 
separate initiatives. Perceived criminals, such as the notorious Mr 
Money and the peripatetic traders, were punished for breeching the 
tacit laws of a moral economy. Middlemen were under fire: first 
                                                         
1 S. Renton, ‘The Moral Economy of the English Middling Sort: The Case of Norwich in 
1766 and 1767’ in A. Randall and A. Charlesworth (eds.), Markets, Market Culture and 
Popular Protest (Liverpool, 1996), p. 123. 
2 NRO, NCR Case 6h/9/3: Riots. Draft of Petition to King (undated). 
3 J.N. Caple, ‘1756-7’ in Charlesworth (ed.), An Atlas of Rural Protest, p. 86. 
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marketplace vendors and then bakers were attacked owing to outrage 
at their prices, and millers were confronted too. Finally, pubs and malt 
houses were clearly held in some opprobrium, and subjected to the 
destructive force of the crowd.  
 
Notably absent, however, are reports of price-setting by the rioters. 
This suggests that the rioters did not believe in a genuine shortage of 
commodities like butter and grain, which they threw around the 
marketplace; burnt; spoiled; drank in the form of liquor; or dumped in 
the river. Since they did not take the goods to consume themselves, they 
must have thought that there was plenty piled up in the storehouses of 
the badgers and kidders. Their actions were punitive only, as they 
merely enacted a confiscation (of a sort), which was the legal 
punishment for forestalling threatened in the mayor’s own formal 
notices.1  
 
Andrew Charlesworth has shown that food-riots had become almost an 
exclusively urban feature in Britain. Rioting was actually the result of 
industrialisation and the changing urban scene, developments which 
‘cut across old established patterns of internal trade’.2 As the mayor’s 
court book has shown, traditional marketing structures in Norwich 
meant decreeing strict trading hours and allowing purchasing only in 
small quantities for private consumption. Corn factors and millers, 
however, were thought to be interfering with this procedure, storing 
grain and flour and moving the product on to more distant markets. In 
Norwich they were certainly attacked. However, another of the 
Norwich crowd’s initiatives was to attack the granaries storing grain for 
export. Likewise a boat for taking grain to the head-port was attacked 
in the same way. The malt-house where grain was being prepared for 
lucrative distilling, potentially in Dutch stills, was also attacked. These 
great stores of grain could only have seemed to confirm rioters’ 
suspicions that their countryside remained bountiful, but that they 
                                                         
1 NRO, NCR Case 16a/33: Mayor’s Court Book, 13th December 1755. 
2 A. Charlesworth, ‘The Geography of Food Riots, 1585-1847’ in idem (ed.), Atlas of 
Rural Protest, p. 64. 
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themselves were cheated of the plentiful produce, on which the 
merchants grew fat.  
 
In the aftermath of the riots, magistrates and principal citizens 
apparently took this sense of urban price inflation seriously, forming a 
committee to examine the supply of the city’s markets and to address 
the causes of high prices.1 They also released a notice to traders 
assuring them that it was now safe to return to market, and sell their 
wares at ‘reasonable prices’. Traders were again warned that buying 
provisions en route to market and selling for a mark-up was strictly 
forbidden.2 There was evident sympathy with the rioters, which again 
implies that forestalling and marketplace crimes were still treated 
seriously as misdemeanours with grave ramifications for keeping the 




This rejection of the notion of true shortage (one caused by domestic 
crop failure as opposed to an artificial shortage which was created by 
faulty distribution)3 is not a sentiment restricted to common rioters. 
Historians have acknowledged that to some extent the grain shortage of 
1766 was indeed artificially exacerbated by a combination of factors 
reaching back as far as the previous year. 1765 had itself been 
troublesome, and so a new prohibition on grain exports was put in 
place early in 1766 in an attempt by Parliament to stabilise the nation’s 
grain supply. Norwich officials, and officials and inhabitants of other 
cities and counties, had petitioned for this measure, and most seemed 
to think it sensible.4  
                                                         
1 NRO, NCR Case 6h/9/7: Riots. Draft Notice of Order re Provisions (undated). 
2 NRO, NCR Case 6h/9/8: Riots. Three Printed Notices Issued by Court of Mayoralty 
(undated). 
3 R. Sheldon, ‘Practical Economics in Eighteenth Century England: Charles Smith on 
the Grain Trade and the Corn Laws, 1756–72’, Historical Research, 81:214 (2008), p. 
646. 
4 Journals of the House of Commons, XXX (10th January 1765- 16th September 1766), p. 
465, 20th January 1766. 
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Unfortunately this prohibition was allowed to lapse in August 1766.1 It 
was not until Parliament reconvened in November that it could be 
officially renewed, although an emergency embargo arranged by the 
Privy Council at the end of September stemmed the supposed outward 
flow of grain in the autumn.2 Dale Williams has suggested that, 
therefore, the incompetence of Parliament, which allowed for the 
expiration of the ban on grain exports, was in part responsible for 
shortages which led to rioting all over the country. He argues that when 
suddenly merchants were allowed again in August to ship grain abroad, 
they did so en masse, taking advantage of shortages in the rest of 
southern Europe which made for high prices.3  
 
The Norwich riots, of course, took place in September, and began a day 
after the Privy Council had placed its emergency embargo. As has been 
shown, forestallers, engrossers and regraters were acknowledged 
amongst Norwich authorities as a local cause of price hikes. However, it 
also seems that they were, by this time, not thought the primary cause. 
Allocating blame in an attempt to remedy the situation, the chief 
inhabitants of Norwich petitioned central government for a law which 
they thought could help soothe the crisis: the renewal of the ban on 
grain exports. In mid-October a petition from Norwich’s mayor to 
Parliament (then in recess) duly followed. It was hoped that these 
measures would help ‘to secure us the little remainder of our own corn, 
before our stock be exhausted, by the Exorbitant exportation’.4 When 
Parliament reconvened on November 11th 1766, it began to consider 
reapplying the ban on grain exports.5 Foreign exports were therefore 
blamed nationally and locally as a factor which could deepen and 
perhaps even cause shortage. 
                                                         
1 Williams, ‘1766’, p. 88. 
2 Journals of the House of Commons, XXXI (11th November 1766- 10th March 1768), p. 6, 
11th November 1766. 
3 Williams, ‘1766’, pp. 88-9. 
4 Norwich Mercury, 18th October 1766. 
5 Journals of the House of Commons, XXXI (11th November 1766- 10th March 1768), p. 6, 
11th November 1766. 
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However, according to the King’s Lynn port books from the late 
summer of 1766 (see figure 5), merchants were barely taking 
advantage of the lapse of the laws after all. In January they must have 
caught wind of the impeding renewal of the prohibition, and exported 
as much as possible while they could. In June, July and August, they 
were allowed to export to Ireland. However, there is no spike in 
September akin to that of January. This suggests that the demand for 
grain either within Norfolk alone or around Britain generally was high, 
and the shortage a real one, so that there was no need to sell abroad. 
 
Unfortunately, the port book recording Lynn’s outbound coastal trade 
and Great Yarmouth’s exports at this time are lost, so it is difficult to 
know just how much grain was being shipped coastwise from Norfolk. 
It seems, nevertheless, that, in petitioning against foreign exportation, 
Norwich’s well-to-do movers and shakers were not necessarily reacting 
to actual point of fact.  
 
Perhaps they were treating the problem from a long-term perspective. 
This is certainly the impression that comes from the mayor’s address to 
his MPs. Though prepared in the aftermath of the rioting, that episode is 
not the mainstay of the address. Nor are the immediate effects of food 
shortage- starvation and disease. Instead the mayor emphasised the 
longer-term implications of routine grain exports: higher food prices 
and the resultant higher wages.1 This explains why the signatories of 
the multiple petitions originating in Norwich and demanding action on 
the high prices of grain usually included manufacturers and principal 
citizens. High food prices were bad for business, specifically the 
woollens business, and it was woollens that the local government 
                                                         




































Figure 5: Monthly Exports of Principal Grains from King’s Lynn, 1766 















prioritised. Grain merchants, they argued, could not be trusted to 
behave with paternalistic altruism (the kind of altruism which led to 
cheap industrial labour). 
 
A few years later, when grain was again in short supply, the court of the 
mayoralty came into direct opposition to certain landholders, ship-
owners, maltsters and malt merchants. This interesting alliance of old 
and new money therefore petitioned parliament in the twilight of the 
1769 ban on grain exportation. They requested the exemption of malt if 
the legislation were renewed.1 The malt was destined for Dutch 
distilleries, the supply of this trade having long been seen as a financial 
crutch for the landed interest.2 The mayor, magistrates and principal 
inhabitants of Norwich, now minus the merchants who had put their 
pens to the January petition, expressed concern about the effect this 
measure would have on the price of food.3  The actions of the rioters in 
attacking pubs and malt houses earlier in the decade suggest that the 
people probably agreed.  
 
 
Interestingly, the mayor and principal inhabitants of Norwich had not 
resisted this kind of measure when grain shortages had struck the 
nation before, though these shortages had affected Norfolk less 
seriously. During the shortages of 1757, Bristol was suffering, and duly 
petitioned Parliament in complaint against high food prices.4 Yet 
Norfolk was able to sit tight with the mayoral court’s only response 
being the notice about forestalling. In fact it saw its Justices of the 
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Peace, assembled for the assize in 1759, actually petition parliament to 
allow local merchants to export their great superfluity of malt abroad.1  
 
Counterbalancing the subsistence imperative with the demand for grain 
from the distilling and brewing industries was no easy task. It was a 
conflict of interests which fermented throughout the course of the 
century. Harris points to the issue of the prohibition of distilling in the 
1750s as one of the few to divide landed and manufacturing interests. 
He considers Parliament’s willingness to compromise, in spite of being 
made up largely of a landed political elite, as evidence of their 
receptiveness to lobbying and their appreciation of the importance of 
commerce (although he seems to ignore the fact that sale of the grain 
that went into the stills was beneficial to many landowners). In the 
1750s the matter was settled for the time being by lifting the outright 
ban on distilling, while inflicting higher duties on spirituous liquors.2  
 
However, later shortages, as we have seen, took a greater toll on the 
Norfolk region.3 In such desperate conditions the mayor and his allies 
attempted to protect their region’s manufacturing interests to the 
detriment of those involved in the malt trade. This was because they 
thought that foreign demand for grain in general was now biting into 
their domestic food supply. They were therefore unsympathetic to the 
argument of the maltsters, who claimed that their business, which they 
stressed was valuable to the kingdom as a whole, would collapse unless 
they were allowed to sell abroad and receive their bounty.  
 
Meanwhile, the mayor, on behalf of the manufactures of Norfolk, and 
especially Norwich, used exactly the same defence. With the signatures 
of the magistrates; clergy; and principal inhabitants, the mayor 
addressed Norwich MPs, Harbord Harbord and Edward Bacon, 
exposing the high price of corn as: 
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an evil which must not only be highly prejudicial to the kingdom in general, 
but absolutely fatal to the woollen manufacture- a branch of trade of the 
utmost importance as a national concern, on which the welfare and 
prosperity of this City so materially depend.1  
 
Overall, this group demanded that government prioritise 
manufacturing over agriculture, and commercial interests over landed, 
by regulating agricultural exports on one hand, whilst allowing 
manufactured goods to be sent abroad unencumbered.  
 
This issue demonstrates again in the 1760s the old enmity between 
landed and moneyed interests which Harris emphasised in his example. 
Crudely speaking, manufacturers were pitted against landowners who 
reaped their own revenue directly or indirectly from agricultural 
production.2 Faced with the choice, the mayor opted to preserve the 
interests of the city, formerly the second in the nation, even against the 
interests of landowners and the countryside.  
 
Both petitions were referred to the Parliamentary committee which had 
already been assembled to consider the renewal of the expiring act. In 
the end the commons enacted the prohibition without the exemption of 
malt.3 Parliament was probably equally wrought with the tensions 
between the two manners of life and income. The ultimate victory of the 
manufacturing cause can probably in part be put down to a central 
government that was not prepared to make a nation-wide exception in 
favour of one group of petitioners, together with the fact that the malt 
was destined for the distillery, an unsavoury use of resources in the 
imaginations of the 1750s.4 What is important, however, is that both 
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sides had communicated their case in the language of national 
commercial survival, and that, therefore, Parliament was seen to 
arbitrate between interests, prioritising textile manufactures over 
refined agricultural products.  
 
Perhaps the influence of the MP, Edward Bacon (?1712-86), also had 
something to do with it. He was known for his hard work on the part of 
his constituency and had served as recorder for the city from 1752 to 
1783. He also had a seat on the Board of Trade.1 No doubt he was 
sympathetic to the city’s cause, having personally distributed cheap 
corn in the marketplace. Directly after the riots, Renton has shown that 
the gentry indulged in multiple similar acts of altruism.2 Even before 
this particular act of generosity, the ‘principal inhabitants’ had agreed 
in October 1766 not to allow turkeys or other fowl to leave the city. This 
pact was received locally, so the papers reported, with ‘general 
satisfaction’.3 Turkeys were not exactly an everyday commodity, but 
this gentlemen’s agreement was an effort to restrict the flow of 
commodities even within the nation. London was specially mentioned 
in the agreement, betraying an enduring anxiety about the size and 
voracity of that city.  
 
Careful analysis of population statistics has revealed that the uncanny 
growth of London had a profound effect upon the economic 
configuration of the entire nation.4 Even in the eighteenth century the 
capital city had long been thought an unwholesome ‘demographic sink’, 
with a near insatiable hunger for resources.5 Clearly these Norwich 
gentlemen were sensitive to the demand for Norfolk’s foodstuffs and 
were prepared to hoard them for themselves, in the same way as the 
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rioting poor were determined to prevent their corn from leaving. 
Rosemary Sweet has shown that urban histories of provincial towns 
often betray a sense of competition with London. The provincial 
middling sort, she argues, saw their own towns as fruitful alternatives 
to the great cesspit.1 This interpretation ties-in with the efforts of the 
principal inhabitants of Norwich to preserve their city and protect its 
industry from collapse. 
 
The mayor of Norwich had charged MPs Bacon and Harbord personally 
with persuading parliament to ban exports until 1768 and, if this failed, 
to attack the bounties which encouraged merchants to feed foreigners 
and ‘leave our poor to starve’.2 This was a controversial matter, which 
Charles Townshend touched upon in 1751. Townsend was a large 
Norfolk landowner and the son of the agricultural improver, Charles 
‘Turnip’ Townshend, yet he disregarded that particular interest when 
he opposed the corn bounty.3 He decided that exporting an 
unmanufactured good, such as corn, was harmful to the economy 
because the chance to employ domestic labour on its manufacture, or 
rather, preparation, was lost. Bounties were counterproductive to 
national wealth because they caused this loss to the nation.4 Thus, when 
Townshend dealt with the subject of bounties he indeed considered the 
issue in national terms. 
 
However, even members of his great farming family had interests 
‘deeply rooted’ in Norfolk industry. Townshend’s uncle, for example, 
headed a company of merchants.5 If Townshend was worried about the 
decline of national manufacturing, it is possible that he took his 
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inspiration from the state of industry that he could observe within his 
own county. Though great families like the Townshends and Walpoles 
had apparently turned their gaze in the direction of London and the 
national situation, local issues perhaps still imposed upon their 
peripheral vision.1 
 
The staunch patrons of Norwich, certainly, were not prepared to let go 
of the city as a manufacturing entity, and to settle for the role of corn 
county. They were prepared to convince their MPs to request a ban on 
corn exports and to demand an end to the bounties which they too 
decided had outlived their use, and now served only to skew their local 
economy.2 If it was not enough to design their MPs’ agenda, the patrons 
of Norwich also petitioned the commons directly, hammering home the 
danger that corn exports posed to their manufacturing sector. They 
claimed that 
 
the cost and worth of the labour from the Floore to Shipping by far exceeds 
the value of materials. To obtain this labour upon such terms as not to be 
undersold at foreign markets is a point that your petitioners hope will 
clearly exhibit the dearness or cheapness of the necessaries [of life]… Upon 
the cheapness or dearness, plenty or scarcity of the necessaries of life doth 
depend your petitioners ability to carry the product of British labour to 
foreign markets upon equal terms with… other nations.3  
 
Here the food supply was being likened to the raw material costs of the 
manufacturing process. But for the price of corn and its effects on the 
cost of labour, the industry would be highly profitable. As a result, 
Norwich’s welfare was, the petitioners argued, an indicator of the price 
of food. Ultimately, Norwich, they suggested, was on the frontline of the 
commercial war with other nations. They repeatedly stressed the 
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‘national loss’ that would be suffered should Norwich’s manufactured 
woollens trade collapse.1  
 
The petitioners were keen to demonstrate that they understood and 
shared the goals of the wider whole, but they did not even begin to 
imagine that these goals should not be played out on a local level. In 
their minds Norwich was still of commercial value on a world stage. In 
achieving this end the local economy was mixed. Its labourers were 
engaged in everything from the hands-on manufacture of worsteds, to 
shipyard labour and international commercial pursuits. They 
wholeheartedly believed that Norfolk’s role in the British economy was 
more than that of a food source. The corollary was that, in fact, the 
county needed the corn that grew in its fields to power its own 
manufacturing initiative. They especially could not allow this grain to 
be sent abroad as a subsidy to foreign manufacturing efforts. 
 
Mercantilist principals were as much at work here as they were in the 
writing of Townshend. Nevertheless, the petitioners felt the need to 
reassure their Members of Parliament that Norwich priorities and 
Norwich progress were not ‘incompatible with national welfare’.2 In 
fact they suggested that other industrial towns, amongst which they 
counted themselves, would do well to adopt the same course. The 
combined product of these cities would secure national commercial 
competitiveness. Thus Norfolk was envisioned by its local authorities as 
a unit within a whole, yet it was still thought to retain its economic self-
sufficiency. This self-sufficiency was not to be sacrificed due to demand 
for its raw materials from without. The principal inhabitants of the 
urbanised sections of the region, at least, were not prepared to see their 
entire county turned to corn production and refinement just yet. The 
rhetoric they used was national, but their cause was local. That cause 
was the continued preservation of Norwich’s struggling industry. 
 
                                                         





This struggle for continuity sheds an interesting light back onto the 
riots themselves, which, as mentioned before, were not rebellions of the 
belly, but rebellions of the purse. Weavers and textile workers in the 
city were seemingly bound together by their class-like socio-economic 
experience, as Charlesworth has suggested. They would later have to be 
discouraged from assembling ‘in large bodies unlawfully parading 
about this City and begging’.1 Clearly these unemployed weavers were 
not merely begging: they had formed into something like a pressure 
group based on the framework of their shared occupational hardships. 
The point is that, like J.G. Rule’s Cornish miners (whose rapidly growing 
industry burdened Cornish farmers, who in turn had in fact become 
accustomed to sending their agricultural surplus away via large corn 
factors, instead of allowing for local private purchase first), Norfolk 
weavers were in a position to begin to resent and even try to resist the 
outside demand for the produce of their own back-country.2 Even 
within Britain, specialised industrial zones were in competition with 
one another for resources such as food. The Norwich authorities and 
the owners of Norwich manufactories were also pointedly aware of this 
fact, because it showed up on the bottom line. However, to return to the 
workers, their indignation was bound within the limits of Norwich, or 
Norfolk at the most, and their protest still figured along the lines of a 
moral economy, for this was not yet a matter of class struggle. 
 
Most interesting is that, when faced with the conundrum of how to pay 
for food, they did not lash out at their employers in pursuit of a living 
wage. They attacked the dealers of food, striving for a just price. This 
surely was an assertion of their own entitlement to possess food at a 
price which they could pay, with their wages as a perceived non-
variable in the equation. This sense of entitlement, then, came from the 
localised mind-set of the pre-agrarian capitalist world which saw each 
locality feed its own. After all, many of the official structures which 
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might apply to any of the rioters should they fall even further into 
difficulties – poor laws; vagrancy laws and the laws which forbade 
bastardy and abandoning of wives and children as a charge on the local 
authority – were based on the same attitude of self-sufficiency and 
delimited interdependence within an immobile community. At the most 
simple level they were asking for cheap food. However, what this 
entailed was protection from dealers, not only in the traditional sense 
which meant cracking down on badgers, kidders and other malefactors, 
but also on the factors and dealers who shifted grain away from the 




As a county, Norfolk produced grain, but it was also thought to be home 
to an important industrial centre. Inhabitants of Norfolk, rich and poor, 
clearly felt the pinch of a shared demand for resources, and were not 
prepared to quietly accept the increasingly capitalised and seemingly 
free-market state of the agricultural sector in their own backyard. At 
least not when grain was in short supply. The city-dwelling population 
of Norfolk was not prepared to dissolve into an agricultural community 
which served as a grain production centre for more up-and-coming 
industrial zones. This can be seen in the riots of the poor and the 
defence of industry in parliamentary petitions.  
 
Certainly private interest was at stake here. However, it seems that 
there was an overlap of interests at play. The official response to the 
riots was mild, and a member of the Society for the Encouragement of 
Arts, Manufactures and Commerce even stated of the Norfolk riots that 
‘could the mob act with Distinction, and take only from such 
Engrossers, I think they would do no great harm’.1 Though the popular 
reaction was deemed disorderly and extreme, the grievances of the 
rioting poor were evidently seen as justifiable.  
                                                         





Apparently the moral economy was reformulating itself in a commercial 
context, where low grain prices were now in the interest of more than 
the lowest ranks of society. However, without the strong notion of 
classes or any great geographical mobility of the labouring poor, the 
bonds of interest maintained the strongly community-based air of the 
moral economy. There was a rationality for both the urban elites and 
the poor to campaign for the preservation of their society as it stood 
against the ultimately overwhelming forces of economic integration and 
specialisation. Their evocation of the nation in this case, therefore, 
stood in oposition to one force of national cohesion.  
 
The rhetoric of the elite section of Norfolk society makes for a curious 
overlap of localist and nationalist sentiment, as mercantilist ideas and 
language were strongly present in their underlying case for local 
protectionism. E.S. Furniss argues that employment of the masses was 
understood and guided by the principles of a nationalist system, so that 
the work of common labourers was not recognised as an economic 
activity on behalf of themselves, but rather as an economic duty to their 
nation.1 This is exactly the way in which Norwich’s mayor stated his 
case for the protection of local industry. For this man and his co-signers, 
many of whom were the owners of manufacturing initiatives in the city, 
mercantilism, with its seemingly remote notions of balance of trade and 
zero sum game, was realistic business logic. It seemed perfectly 
applicable to the local case as much as it applied to national prosperity 
and power. 
 
When dealing with Parliament, the interest groups of Norfolk seem to 
have expressed themselves in overtly nationalist terms in a way 
reminiscent of the French and Spanish border village communities 
analysed by Peter Sahlins. Here also ‘the evocation of national 
identities… was grounded in local economic interests, and in a local 
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sense of place’.1 However, Sahlins thinks that it is too simple to see 
national identity as mask applied only for the purposes of fawning to 
the centre. Instead he argues for a coexistence of identities, which could 
serve local interests by, in words he borrows from Ernst Gellner, 
‘keeping options and connections open’.2 This being so, these 
connections were still largely being exploited in order to protect the 
interests and economic ecosystem of local communities. If politically 
they could assume a national or local identity, economically the 
community of Norfolk had rejected at least some features of 
nationhood. 
 
Meanwhile Parliament, as a representative body, was left with the task 
of arbitrating between interests. Even when disputes were taken to the 
Parliament at Westminster in national terms, they were clearly not 
necessarily national in intent. As Julian Hoppit has shown from the 
evidence of the myriad of specific legislation pertaining to economic 
matters and arbitrated by the Westminster and other Parliaments, 
legislation was multifaceted and varied from nation to nation.3 
Meanwhile, general legislation could be employed to favour certain 
areas, equalise imbalances of other measures, and sometimes be 
selectively applied.4 In a similar way, legislation that banned the export 
of grain, for example, appeared national in intent and purpose. 
However, it served the interests of at least one discrete community 
which had campaigned for it. Even if it also served other discrete 
communities elsewhere, a campaign in favour of national legislation 
and participation in national politics does not necessarily confer a 
national economic identity. A community could evidently remain 
economically parochial and adverse to certain economic forms of 
external intervention and integration, even while appealing politically 
to a central authority for help. 
                                                         
1 P. Sahlins, Boundaries (Berkeley &Oxford, 1989), p. 165. 
2 As quoted by Sahlins, Boundaries, p. 165. 
3 J. Hoppit, ‘The Nation, the State, and the First Industrial Revolution’, Journal of British 
Studies, 50:2 (2011), p. 308. 





Chapter 2: Experiencing the French Deregulation 




A developed and integrated economy could help make the nation state a 
possibility, by providing a fiscal base for the state, and also generating 
an ‘awareness of belonging to a nation’.1 Historians are therefore drawn 
to the issue of economic integration, exploring it in various ways. Ernest 
Labrousse, for instance, compared the price of commodities in 
disparate French markets, coming to the conclusion that, due probably 
to the high cost of transportation, grain circulated little on a national 
basis, and prices corresponded to local conditions rather than to a 
national market.2 Likewise Bernard Lepetit evaluated the extent of 
road-building and tried to quantify the volume of inter-provincial 
traffic, arguing that here the circulation of produce on a national basis 
was difficult even as late as the 1840s.3  
  
These accounts have generally emphasised the infrastructural 
difficulties which compromised fledgling national markets. Regina 
Grafe has complained that the historiography of the Spanish economy 
has been distracted by geographical determinism, overlooking a richer 
institutional history of jurisdictional fragmentation, which can 
nevertheless be approached through sensitive economic analysis.4 
According to Grafe, the Spanish monarchy struggled to wrest control 
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over economic matters from the historical territories, which together 
constituted the would-be nation state. This led to disintegrated markets 
and ‘allocative inefficiency’, as local authorities sought to introduce 
slack into regional markets for important commodities. For, although 
inefficient, this action could prevent regional shortage later on.1 Such 
behaviour betrays an intensely local outlook. 
 
Grafe rejected grain as the subject of her analysis because it was the 
only commodity in eighteenth-century Spain which was subject to 
national and not regional regulation.2 Not so in France. Here until 1763 
local authorities had a high degree of control over grain in their 
jurisdictions. It was well within the powers of local officials and courts 
to prevent grain from leaving their region. This slackened the economy, 
perhaps minimising the risk of shortage on a local basis, but causing 
inefficiencies and preventing market growth on a larger scale.3 It could 
be argued that the deregulation of the grain trade, which took place in 
1763 and 1764, was synonymous with an attempt to integrate this 
aspect of the economy.  
 
In terms of economic integration, the testimony of ordinary 
contemporary witnesses is sometimes ignored. Grafe’s work deals 
cursorily with the moral economy, but offers local conditions and issues 
as a rationalisation for parochialism amongst elites.4 It is the local social 
perspective which this chapter seeks to reintegrate into existing 
knowledge about French economic integration, by looking at how the 
deregulation of the grain trade was construed by ordinary people and 
local authorities. For this reason, this chapter, like the previous one, is a 
local case study. It relies particularly on the reports of local officers, and 
the testimonies of rioters and critics that they collected. In order to 
ascertain an idea of the harvest conditions, it also examines price and 
climate data. Moreover, to get a sense of the wider applicability of the 
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findings of the case study, it looks at reports of riots which were 
received from all over the country at Paris. Finally, it carefully examines 
the regulations, mandates and reprimands which returned from central 
government and guided the regulation of the economy on a local basis. 
 
During the eighteenth century there were many ways in which central 
government was attempting to exert a more centralised control over 
France. Michael Kwass, for example, has shown that the parlements, the 
highest law courts in the land, resisted a new taxation scheme as an 
infringement on their jurisdiction.1 Meanwhile, Arnault Skornicki 
demonstrates that eighteenth-century French liberalism was the 
creation of the monarchical agenda of undermining alternative sources 
of authority and power.2 In each case, economic matters became the 
battleground for a violent political campaign by the centre. It is argued 
that the same was true of the grain regulation question in France after 
1763.  
 
The first section of this chapter, then, introduces the shift that French 
grain law underwent in the early 1760s, from a body of comprehensive 
regulations, which gave discretion to local authorities, to a system that 
was free, and also national. The emphasis of this section is on the state-
building elements of the free grain trade in France. Thus, the section 
deals with the nation as a whole, and it is not until the second section 
that the focus shifts onto Tours. This region serves as the subject of a 
case study and as a point of comparison with the examination of 
Norfolk presented in the first chapter. The second section analyses the 
responses of authorities to rioting and takes special notice of the factors 
and causes on which they blamed outbreaks of social unrest. 
 
Section three continues the story of official opposition to deregulation, 
briefly outlining the rebellion of the parlements and the shift in the 
Controller Generalship, which ultimately led to the reinstatement of 
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grain regulation in France. Returning to Tours, it then deals with the 
most severe riot in that region during the period. This, so the argument 
goes, was the result of continued exports of grain which by-passed 
Tours. It was a manifestation of the anxiety on the part of the people 
who would not accept the maritime economy of Nantes, which 
represented economic integration, as a part of their own economic 
system.  
 
Overall it is argued that resistance to the dismantlement of the old 
parochial system was of a similar kind to the institutional resistance to 
the centre that Grafe has identified in the historical territories of Spain.1 
For the fallout from the deregulation of the grain trade not only reveals 
a state of economic disintegration in France, but it could be argued that 
the attempt itself aggravated a national discord of interests in other 
senses.2 Benedict Anderson has claimed that a national economy in one 
commodity, print literature, could help unite a people.3 By comparison, 
it is argued that in France in the late eighteenth-century, one 
commodity, grain, could only emphasise a lack of economic cohesion. 
The tensions of economic disunity strained the political oneness of the 
nation, as national policy, which took little account of economic 
variation, forced common people, bureaucrats and peacekeepers into 
conflict with the national government. 
 
Grain Laws, Deregulation and State-Building 
 
The grain laws of France stemmed back at least to the end of the 
seventeenth century. However, when the laws were discussed and 
challenged in the middle of the eighteenth century, more often than not, 
it was with reference to the antiquated laws passed under Charles VI, 
Charles IX and Henri III in the fourteenth and sixteenth centuries 
                                                         
1 Grafe, Distant Tyranny, p. 243. 
2 Ibid, p. 422. 




together with the more recent laws of 1622, 1632 and 1661.1 These 
seventeenth-century incarnations also tied in with the legislation which 
established the police machinery in Paris and ultimately the rest of the 
nation.  
 
The term police in the old regime sense does not equate to the modern 
conception of a police service.2 It described the intangible strategy and 
procedures of governance, which stemmed from the monarch. Its 
jurisdiction encompassed many of the same local concerns over which 
the traditional English manor courts presided. However, whilst in the 
eighteenth century the dominion of the English manor court was 
shifting away from judicial issues towards more policy-making 
concerns,3 in France the police was flourishing and gaining in 
competencies, both in terms of control over social issues, such as 
prostitution, and in terms of regulation of commercial activity, for 
instance, monitoring the tobacco trade.4  
 
The officers who represented the police purchased their positions. For 
example, in the présidial, or judiciary, of the town of Tours, these 
ranged (excluding the most junior offices) from the relatively affordable 
role of Conseiller, which was sold for 500 livres in 1775, to the title of 
Lieutenant Général, which fetched 100,000 livres a year later.5 With 
fluctuating prices, it was possible to speculate on this market, as offices 
could usually be resold at the incumbent’s leisure.6 However, the 
market for judicial roles in Tours was generally depressed during this 
period, because too many offices had been created, and a taste for the 
rigours of the judiciary was apparently lacking in the region.7 William 
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Doyle has pointed out that, in comparison with the lucrative financial 
offices in which wealthy Frenchman could invest, judicial offices, such 
as the police roles just mentioned, were not that profitable. 
Nevertheless, whenever the monarchy required an influx of ready cash, 
more and more were created, and each with its own little perks. These 
could include the abstract benefits of respect or social prestige. 
However, there were often also material rewards including modest 
interest or wages; a range of important fiscal privileges exempting the 
holder from various taxes; and sometimes fees.1  
 
In Tours it seems that fees were indeed charged by the police for 
obligatory market place activities. In spite of the legal upheaval that this 
chapter describes, the right to collect an average of 600 livres per year 
in fees for official operations pertaining to the grain trade at Mamers au 
Maine, was preserved at least until 1778. By this time, however, it was 
the Duchess of Beauvilliers who collected the dues, the right having 
evidently been merged into a tax farm and sold on.2 The vendible 
privileges of administrative roles served as the means by which the 
monarchy ‘lured tens of thousands of individuals into state service’, 
who bought and sold them like any other stock.3  
 
However, as more and more individuals were drawn into service, 
maintaining control over them became increasingly difficult. In the 
short-term the sale of offices raised revenue for the monarchy. 
However, ultimately venality limited the power of the monarch, as it 
alienated important state functions. As much as officers imposed the 
rule of central government, it seems that, using their own judicial 
authority, they could also oppose and detract from its ministerial 
authority in matters where their own interests diverged from those of 
the centre.4 Moreover, trying to recoup state functions and powers was 
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not easy. In the face of eighteenth-century attacks by the central 
government, venal office holding became something of a ‘bulwark of 
public liberty’ against the arbitrary transgressions of a despotic central 
government.1 The obedience of the officers of the police, therefore, 
could not be taken for granted.  
 
Until the deregulation, French grain laws resembled those in place in 
Britain. Generally, they ruled that all trade in grain was to take place at 
the market and during specific hours, under the supervision of officers.2 
This removed middlemen, as producers were obliged to bring their own 
wares to market and interact directly with consumers, and only 
thereafter with commercial buyers. It also prevented, in the same way, 
potential monopolists from purchasing and hoarding all supplies. 
Finally this measure helped to implement quality control and ensure 
the validity of weights and measures. If implemented strictly, officers 
would weigh each purchase made.3 It was here that some officers 
enjoyed the privilege of charging a fee. Only registered grain merchants 
were to participate in a trade which was more or less under the control 
of the local authorities. The latter had the power to halt the export of 
grain and usher hoarded supplies into the market-place, as well as to 
fiddle with bakers’ profits.4 
 
In many ways, however, this was also machinery for making the 
passage of food provisions at all times ‘legible’.5 The police of the 
marketplace represented an attempt to transform the chaos of national 
provisioning into neat rows of figures. Thanks to the rules of the 
market, local officers all over the country could produce and submit 
reports to the Controller General, who, technically speaking, could have 
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a handle on exactly how much grain was for sale and at what price 
anywhere in the land.  
 
This was possible, but unlikely. For Skornicki has pointed out that the 
problem of subsistence exposed the limits of the supposedly absolute 
government, which in fact had little control over the production and 
distribution of grain.1 Nevertheless, the Paris Procurer General, Joly de 
Fleury, did take a personal interest in the prices and availability of grain 
in the region around Paris until deregulation took hold, receiving 
weekly reports from subordinates.2  
 
Similarly, a little later, the Controller General, De L’Averdy, had the local 
deputies or subdélégués of the Tours region (and probably elsewhere) 
complete forms relating the quality of the harvest each year.3 The 
apparatus betrays an ambition to bring the entire nation under wraps. 
Indeed, Louise Tilly, influenced by Gustav Schmoller and Lionel 
Rothkrug, has suggested that the establishment of the police framework 
was part of the ‘centralising political trend of the seventeenth century’, 
adding that by placing an intendant in each region, the royal 
administration was implementing a policy of state-building.4  
 
Whatever the motives and ambitions of the central law-makers during 
the seventeenth century, by the eighteenth century the actual grain 
laws in France had grown idiosyncratic. Central policy and the rules 
which governed Paris were important, but tensions regarding 
sovereignty and the challenges posed by regional parlements and 
independent-minded intendants also took their toll, not to mention the 
grass-roots level battles for jurisdiction and influence.5 Though the sun 
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was at Versailles, the French political universe was littered with other 
stars exerting their own forces and the realisation of absolutist and 
monolithic administration was hampered by the many different centres 
of gravity at work in the kingdom.  
 
In reality, law making was not top down and certainly it did not seem to 
be perceived that way in the provinces. Often magistrates submitted 
suggestions to the Procurer General for new law adjustments based on 
the situation and coping mechanisms in their own locale.1 One local 
officer wrote ‘we request your approval in passing a similar law [to that 
of 1740 which established a sort of ration] in the two provinces of 
Touraine and Anjou, if not for the entire kingdom’.2 Thanks to this 
organic process, in reality, the law of the trade could vary from town to 
town, so that legally, France’s markets were not necessarily cohesive.  
 
Enforcement was another source of variation. Every law creates a 
crime, and every institution, or bundle of laws in this case, casts a 
shadow.3 Yet the shadow cast by the French grain laws was rather faint, 
simply because of the application of discretion by the grain police.4 This 
discretion was actively encouraged in Dean of Police, Nicolas 
Delamare’s treatment on the subject, which, first published in 1720, 
was to become the handbook of policing grain.5 Judith Miller picks up 
on this feature of the grain laws, arguing that when finally they were 
removed, nothing really changed, because, thanks to the blind-eye 
which officials had turned to the issue, the trade had effectively been 
free all along.6  
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Merchants were continually pushing the boundaries. The Lieutenant 
General was obliged to inform another local officer that the laws 
forbidding sales of grain off-market need not be executed with too 
much ‘rigour’ and that the laws were meant for dire circumstances only. 
He implied that grain merchants could be left to their own resources for 
the rest of the time.1 At the same time, however, there were clearly 
some officers who fretted about implementing the rules enough to 
warrant a letter to their ultimate superior. There are sufficient 
examples like this to suggest that officers took their roles very 
seriously, intervening where they saw fit, according to the most local of 
conditions. 
 
The irksome laws opposed national economic integration in two more 
important ways. Firstly, foreign exports were illegal, though in times of 
exceptional plenty some state sanctioned shipments were made. This 
was similar, and yet opposite, to the British law which rendered export 
legal, unless shortages took hold.2 Secondly, in France, the internal 
circulation of grain was often highly restricted. Local market police 
issued commercially bought grain with a passport, which allowed for its 
resale at one stipulated destination.3 Higher up the scale, it was the 
prerogative of the intendant of a region to place an embargo on grain 
leaving his territory, and when exportation of this sort was allowed, it 
was usually only between neighbouring provinces. This legal (as 
opposed to infrastructural) disruption of internal circulation seems to 
have been based in an often rehearsed maxim, most clearly put by 
Delamare, who insisted that ‘it is just to safeguard our own 
preservation before thinking about that of our neighbour’.4 
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There still remained, however, the issue of the enforcement of these 
two laws, in spite of their centralised origins and apparent national 
applicability. Though the north of the country – the region which 
surrounded Paris – was kept under tight wraps, southern and border 
regions tended to enjoy a little more leeway. At the discretion of their 
intendants, the bountiful Upper Languedoc defied official national law 
and carried on a commercial and international export trade in grain.1 
Likewise, in the lowlands of Provence, grain was customarily imported 
from Italy and North Africa, as the region thrived on its international 
wine trade.2 
 
The watershed came in 1763, however, when the grain trade was set 
free. This meant that anybody could participate in the trade (apart from 
officers of the police), stockpiling grain as they pleased, since 
authorities lost the power to force grain onto the market. Regional 
authorities could no longer prevent the circulation of grain, which no 
longer needed papers or permits to travel within France. In fact, officers 
were no longer in a position, necessarily, to observe sales, as the trade 
could now carry on away from the marketplace and in private. All 
intervention was forbidden and the movement and price of grain was 
now at the mercy of ‘a free and absolute competition’,3 with the 
exception of Paris and its vicinity, which was simply too delicate to 
expose to free trade.  
 
Deregulation diminished the role of the police in the marketplace, and 
meant that they lost any fees which they had formerly collected. 
Moreover, the officers of the police were not alone in losing revenue, for 
keepers of tollgates were now no longer to charge for the passage of 
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grain. In 1761, the Seigneur de Chateauneuf-sur-Sarthe, a member of 
the well-to-do Amelot de Chaillou family, for example, had been 
charging 10 deniers for every 12 septiers of grain which passed through 
the portes marinières, or barge gates, on his estate. This was, however, 
dwarfed by the sum of 45 sols he charged for each shipment of salt that 
passed.1 An officer explained in an accompanying mémoire that the lord 
defended this tariff on the grounds that the barge gates (a precursor to 
the modern lock) required a great deal of expensive maintenance and 
made the river navigable.2  
 
However, it seems that even before important changes were made to 
grain regulation, road and waterway tolls were under threat in Tours. 
For example, in 1752 several rights of tollage were revoked.3 In fact the 
recurring suppression of internal customs on roads and waterways was 
part of a long-term campaign to consolidate the nation within a single 
French territorial boundary.4 It could be argued that the deregulation of 
the grain trade, meanwhile, was another form taken by the same 
process of establishing a single boundary for the entire nation.  
 
Having freed the internal grain trade, the French government waited a 
year before making the exportation of grain abroad legally permissible 
also. The edict of 1764 did not offer merchants absolute liberty in their 
business affairs, as a maximum price value at which grain could be 
exported abroad was put in place. In its form, this supposed failsafe 
against national shortage echoed the British laws.5 Though Britain was 
an enemy and a competitor, its ‘precocious improvement of agriculture’ 
and thriving grain trade was something of a point of envy. 6 The 
example of the British grain trade was raised at the assembly of the 
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Paris Police (which met in 1768) by the Advocate General himself,1 and 
was the subject of research and an essay by the French ambassador, the 
Comte de Guerchy, while he was serving in Britain.2 Still, in its logic, this 
limitation to free-trade seemed to stem from Delamare’s preaching, that 
a region should feed itself before allowing grain to move on. In some 
ways, after the deregulation, the same logic was in place, only now the 
confines of the unit were enlarged to national level and the neighbours 
in question were foreigners, not other French provinces. 
 
These sweeping national declarations certainly tidied up the formally 
confused and regionally varying state of the laws, but Eli Heckscher has 
gone so far as to describe the changes as deliberate economic state-
building, conscious acts of unification, and hence a manifestation of his 
conception of mercantilism.3 Although Steven Kaplan scoffs that 
deregulation was far more subtle than clumsy mercantilism,4 in 
depicting laissez-faire as compatible with a mercantilist outlook, 
Heckscher had a point. Freeing the grain trade was undoubtedly a 
rejection of Colbertism, which tended to favour manufacture above all 
else. Yet the adoption of laissez-faire in the grain trade did not 
constitute any great challenge to the mercantilist rationale which had 
spawned Colbertism.  
 
Having allowed free exports, law-makers, inspired by the Physiocrats, 
expected France to begin to corner a certain share of the trade in grain, 
which was supposed overall to be fixed. With grain passing outwards 
and hard cash inwards, it was thought that France would begin to 
wrestle a greater share of international wealth out of British hands 
especially. The debates over deregulation were also conducted in 
mercantilist language. For example, the parlement of Dauphiné 
complained that without the freedom to export ‘we move the wealth 
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from province to province, but do not augment the amount of money 
within the state’.1 French grain exports, moreover, were only to be 
carried on French ships, thus protecting this segment of the important 
carrying trade from the likes of the Dutch and the British who would 
steal it away, as well as supposedly encouraging the generation of 
French ships and crews.2 A brazenly mercantilist caveat.   
 
Physiocratic doctrine was not adverse to the enrichment and 
empowerment of the state. In fact, their ideas were influential precisely 
because they tended to dovetail neatly with the spirit and anxieties of 
the times. John Shovlin has emphasised the context of patriotism in the 
development of the French political economy, arguing that defeat in 
war was a direct spur to the physiocratic cause.3 Deregulation was 
meant to enrich the nation more evenly than had Colbert’s 
manufacturing initiatives. 4 These had supposedly only served to 
concentrate wealth in the unwholesome and extravagant cities, lining 
the pockets of a few unscrupulous individuals. Thanks to the 
deregulation of the grain trade, virtuous and manly French agriculture 
was to be regenerated, and with it the population which had 
supposedly gone into decline.5  
 
However, according to Skornicki, physiocratic doctrine did not really 
derive its esteem for landowners from the civic humanist moral of love 
for one’s patria. Actually, the emphasis on developing a worthy country 
gentry stemmed from a commitment to the monarchical constitution 
which could raise revenue most easily from fixed property.6 Meanwhile, 
a republic of virtuous citizens was considered an unrealistic prospect 
for a large nation like France.7 François Quesnay himself envisaged no 
great role in government for the landed aristocracy, but emphasised 
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their economic role in empowering France. He advocated a single 
national tax on land to fund the absolute monarch’s regime.1  
 
No doubt in this era of recurrent warfare in France, a fiscal boost was a 
welcome outcome. Charles Tilly has shown how, in the Languedoc, a 
commercial grain trade, with the revenues it could offer the king, was 
just one part of an overall consolidation, political, religious and 
economic, on the part of a succession of intendants loyal to Versailles.2 
With the deregulation of the trade, apparently grain was finally 
subsumed into the economic infrastructure which a modern nation-
state demanded.3 Similarly, Judith Miller argues that the monarchy, 
represented by Vincent Gournay, sought financial independence 
through the revenue which free trade could offer.4 
 
However, this was not merely a matter of finance. Miller contextualises 
the issue in the ‘incendiary battles’ between the monarchical centre and 
the provincial parlements,5 and Skornicki agrees with this strongly 
constitutional element. Laissez-faire was, according to Skornicki, a 
‘government technology’, and the only one which could undermine the 
power of parlements and courtiers alike.6 A free grain trade was 
designed to move this important element of the economy out of the 
judicial sphere, and leave it subject to centralised ministerial power 
only.7  
 
The seemingly civic humanist strand of physiocracy was therefore 
counterbalanced by a jurisprudential emphasis on individual rights and 
the uninhibited freedom to enjoy property. The libéralisation of the 
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grain trade subverted the traditional privileged status of corn and it 
became an ordinary commodity subject to normal property laws. These 
protected the rights of the producers and owners of grain against 
consumers. The latter, meanwhile, were no longer seen as entitled to 
subsistence, but they were offered instead property rights over their 
own labour. In this sense, the deregulation was also supposed to 
eradicate the final vestiges of feudal servitude and afford peasants 
access to markets previously unavailable to them due to 
insurmountable opportunity costs, which were the result of privilege 
and monopoly.1 
 
Therefore, the physiocratic free trade doctrine which informed the 
libéralisation project still relied on a ‘crypto-republican language’, but 
also advanced jurisprudential ideas of property rights. It was implied 
that the members of the French nation were useful and virtuous 
citizens, who needed no higher authority to engage in reciprocal and 
unifying activities such as trade.2 It also undermined pre-capitalist 
power centres and social relationships, which could compromise the 
authority of the central state. Inherent in all these notions, was a single 
and cohesive French nation, which, as we shall see, was in many ways a 
problematic, unrealistic and even unpopular vision.  
 
The Généralité of Tours and the First Years of Deregulation 
 
Not all citizens agreed with the official line on the grain trade pursued 
after 1763. Though riots were by no means unheard of before, in 
comparison to the first half of the century, the number of food riots in 
France doubled in the period after 1763 and up until the revolution.3  
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The généralité of Tours in northwest France serves as a neat microcosm 
of the national situation: from the beginning the period in question, 
1750, and until 1765 no riots occurred. During the following fifteen 
years there were more than forty.1 
 
Généralités were the fiscal districts of the ancien regime, and that of 
Tours was a paradigm of the administrative system before the 
revolution.2 It encompassed parts of the ancient Provinces of Touraine, 
Anjou and Maine.3 As a pays d’élection, Tours was subject to no 
parlement (unlike the pays d’état), and was under the ultimate 
jurisdiction of an intendant.4 Unlike most of those serving in an 
administrative capacity at this time, the intendant did not purchase his 
office. In fact, intendants were supposed to be the crown’s antidote to 
venality, and were expected to monitor local office holders in order to 
keep provincial government in step with central directives.5  
 
Unlike Norfolk, Tours was no paradigm of large-scale commercial grain 
production. Sometimes the region could not even feed its own 
population,6 which, according to François Dumas, numbered around 
1,270,873 in 1761.7 This is not to say that the region was not luscious, it 
had long been known as the ‘jardin de la France’8 and had a strong 
viticulture.9 Crudely categorised, the agriculture of Tours belonged to 
the bocages of the West,10 which generally saw smallish plots 
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interspersed with trees and some forest. This land was worked mostly 
by poor peasant farmers with oxen. The peasants operated a biennial  
crop rotation, true to the tradition of petite culture, which was the thing 
that the Physiocrats frowned upon most of all.1 They preferred grande 
culture, a system that entailed intensive farming courtesy of the 
triennial crop rotation system and the use of horses.2 
 
However, improvement was not thought out of the question for the 
region, at least not by the physiocrat, Charles Richard de Butré, who 
was one of the key mathematical minds behind Quesnay’s theories, and 
a member of the agricultural society at Orléans.3 De Butré bought a 
tract of land in Tours, comprised of five parts vineyard, two pasture and 
three arable farmland, intending to invest in and improve his new 
holdings.4 He wrote copious notes about how to implement the desired 
changes and achieve the ideal of grand culture in a region like Tours.5  
 
Moreover, as agriculturally backward as the region may seem, it was 
perhaps not extraordinary in the French context. The absence of an 
agricultural revolution in France during the eighteenth century to 
match the changes across the Channel has been blamed on the social 
and cultural differences between the two nations, including a lack of 
individualism in France and the propensity of rich French landowners 
to invest in the city rather than their rural holdings.6 However, the 
railway age has been seen by historians such as Xavier de Planhol as the 
game-changer for the French agricultural economy, as it allowed for 
specialisation, that is, the more appropriate use of the varying natural 
environment.7 Fernand Braudel has pointed out that there was already 
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a high volume of traffic within the provinces in the early nineteenth 
century, especially on a local level.1 However, when the highways of the 
eighteenth century were built, they tended only to link provincial 
capitals with Paris, doing little to connect the buzzing local lattices, and 
hence denying early opportunities for national economic integration.2  
 
Situated relatively near the coast, and served by the river Loire and its 
tributaries including the Cher and the Vienne, as well as the river 
Sarthe, the Tours généralité, however, was quite well connected to the 
coast at Nantes and to Paris. Whilst 80 per cent of the population of the 
Touraine region lived in the countryside, this is not to say that the 
region was purely concerned with agriculture and viticulture.3 For, as 
Hugh Clout has put it, in eighteenth century France ‘industrial scenes 
were rural’.4 Indeed, in 1766 the combined non-agricultural product of 
the généralité was worth 15,000,000 livres. Each of the three provinces 
specialised in a branch of the textile industry: in Anjou it was 
handkerchiefs, hemp-cloth and dyed cloths; it was flax, hemp-cloth and 
woollens in Maine; and finally, Touraine was known for its drapery, 
tannery and its silk.5  
 
Tours was in fact France’s second silk producing city after Lyons.6 By 
1800 the population of Tours had grown to over 20,000 inhabitants, 
making it a fairly important provincial city by French standards.7 
During the mid-eighteenth century however, faced with competition 
from silk imported by the French east-indies company and from more 
fashionably demur fabrics such as cotton from across the Channel, the 
silk trade in both French cities encountered difficulties.8 The industry 
was also at the mercy of the weather, as the production of raw silk can 
                                                         
1 F. Braudel, The Identity of France (London, 1990), II, p. 464. 
2 Ibid, p. 467. 
3 Maillard, Paysans, p. 6. 
4 H. Clout, ‘Industrial Development in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries’ in 
idem (ed.), Themes in the Historical Geography of France (London, 1977), p. 451. 
5 Dumas, Tours, p. 7. 
6 J. Feltwell, The Story of Silk (Stroud, 1990), p. 88. 
7 Boutier, Atlas, p. 40.  




be harmed by late frosts which ravage the white mulberry trees and 
their incumbent silk worms.1 In spite of these dangers, during this 
period the Tours silk production zone, located south-east of the main 
city at Loches, suffered during 1772 only.2  
 
According to contemporary observations, the winter of 1771-1772 saw 
slightly lower minimum temperatures than the proceeding five years at 
Paris at least.3 That spring saw two riots, first in Chinon, to the 
southwest of Tours during April, and then in La Haye, south of Tours in 
mid-June. Neither town, however, had much to do with silk production. 
Nevertheless, the towns share an important characteristic, which is that 
they are each situated on the banks of a river, the former on the Loire 
and the latter on the Vienne. Of the thirty identified riot locations 
within the généralité and the period, nineteen were situated on a 
waterway.  
 
Though strictly speaking these riots were rural,4 they often took place 
either at ports or market towns- places where grain was visibly on the 
move. There are about three broad categories of riot for this period, 
though one disturbance could include elements of multiple sorts. These 
were: the entrave, which meant intercepting and abducting grain 
convoys; the taxation populaire or price setting riot; and violence in the 
marketplace or on farms which usually involved physical attacks on 
vendors, farmers or sometimes even local political figures.5 Of all three 
types, the entrave, the interception of grain exports, was the most 
prevalent in Tours. This was typical of France in this period, and 
                                                         
1 Feltwell, The Story of Silk, p. 89. 
2 Ibid. 
3 A. Roux and P.L. Cotte, ‘Daily Weather Observations’, Journal de Médecine, Chirurgie, 
Pharmacie, etc, issues 12-46 (Every November and May 1760-1776), 
http://www.biusante.parisdescartes.fr/histoire/medica/resultats/?fille=o&cotemere
=90145 [accessed 17 May 2014] 
4 According to Maillard’s definition that is. Another historian such as Corfield might 
class them differently given the very low threshold she used to define urban-living in 
Norfolk. Maillard, Paysans, p. 6; P.J. Corfield, ‘East Anglia’ in P. Clark (ed.) The 
Cambridge History of Urban Britain, II (Cambridge, 2000), p. 36.  





outbreaks were concentrated especially in the rural north, where the 
pressure of supplying the great northern cities of Paris, Lyons, Rouen 
and others, together with a social structure which saw many poor and 
landless labourers dependent on wage labour buying grain from 
wealthy farmers, made for conditions especially conducive to rioting.1  
 
Each of around 40 riots in the généralité within the period saw the 
attempted and sometimes successful pillage of grain. In no instances 
that I have found was grain destroyed as in the riot of 1766 at Norwich. 
Indeed, there are some indications that the people who seized grain in 
Tours were in dire need of it. For instance, the local authorities of the 
towns of Angers, Chateaugontier, Le Mans and even of Tours itself 
expressed their concern for the welfare of their communities in times of 
high prices in letters to the intendant.2 In these and other contemporary 
commentaries it was often the rain that was blamed for crop failure and 
ultimately high prices. Figure 7 does indeed testify to a coincidence of 
frequent rainfall and the outbreak of riots in 1768 and 1774.3  
 
Yet there had been ample rainfall before unaccompanied by riots in the 
early 1760s, and in most parts of the généralité the harvest reports of 
1762 blamed rain for a mediocre harvest.4 These claims are 
substantiated by the productivity figures which were gathered for the 
election of Le Mans by an apparently scientifically minded officer, as 
shown below in figure 8. In spite of following on from a harvest 
apparently only half as productive as an average year,5 1763 saw no 
rioting and, according to the price data accumulated for Tours by  
                                                         
1 O. Hufton, ‘Social Conflict and the Grain Supply in Eighteenth-Century France’ in R.I. 
Rotberg and T.K. Rabb (eds.), Hunger and History (Cambridge, 1985), pp. 108-109. 
2 For Angers: AD I&L C96, Letter from the Mayor, Councillors and Principal Citizens of 
Angers, dated 26th August 1769; for Chateaugontier: ibid, Letter from the Mayor and 
Councillors of Chateaugontier, dated 28th February 1769; for Le Mans: ibid, Letter 
from the Mayor and Aldermen of Le Mans, dated 9th September 1769 and for Tours: 
AD I&L C94, Letter from the Mayor and Aldermen of Tours, dated 6th October 1768. 
3 It has to be admitted that the data used here was collected in Paris and only provides 
the number of days of rainfall per month; it has nothing to say about the intensity and 
hence the quantity rain. 
4 All of these reports are to be found together though not in sequence in AD I&L C82 
and C83. 
5 AD I&L C83: ‘Produit des Récoltes des cinq derniers Années antérieures a 1763’. 
   Figure 7: Parisian Rainfall and Riots in Tours, 1760-1780 
Source: M.E. Renou, ‘Études sur le Climat de Paris’, Annales du Bureau Central Météorologique de France (Paris, 1885), I, p. 272. I have seasonally adjusted this data 
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central administration after the revolution and reproduced by 
Labrousse,1 it saw little in the way of price rise. By contrast, 1765 saw 
both, even though the preceding harvest was better than that of 1762. 
This begins to suggest that the rioters of Tours had more to grieve than 
the mere unfortunate concurrence of exogenous climatic and socio-
economic factors, or that they perceived it this way.  
 
In fact, even the central authorities of the time tended to identify a 
political dimension to the tumults which disrupted the free-trade of 
official policy, advocating the severest punishment for rioters acting out 
of ‘prejudice’. Controller General De L’Averdy, for instance, wrote to the 
intendant of Tours warning him  
 
how important it is to prevent the people giving themselves up to 
prejudice or to preventions of such a useful law and I would invite you 
firstly not to neglect to acquaint them with all of its advantages… and 
secondly, principally to remove in its entirety that which could spoil 
dispositions towards liberty.2  
 
After a riot, therefore, the best way to exonerate participants was to 
emphasise their political innocence. Thus in one case a clergyman 
interceded on the part of rioters at Sens claiming they acted only out of 
genuine hunger.3 The local officer affirmed that high prices were to 
blame, and not ‘the ancient prejudices which have long existed against 
the liberalisation of the grain trade’.4 Where physiocrats and the 
administrators who invested in their ideas strived apparently for a new 
and scientific liberty,5 popular complaints were treated either as a 
                                                         
1 AN F20 105: ‘Prix Commun du Froment dans les 32 Généralités et la Ville de Paris’, 
reproduced in Labrousse, Esquisse, I, pp. 106-113. See also p. 16, n 31. 
2 AD I&L , C94, f. 68: Letter to Intendant L’Escalopier from De L’Averdy, dated 7th July 
1764. 
3 BNF, JdF, 1132, f. 4: Letter to the Lieutenant General from the Clergy at Sens, dated 
22nd September 1766. 
4 Ibid, f. 12, Letter to the Lieutenant General, dated 22nd September 1766. 
5 C. Larrère, L’Invention de l’Économie au XVIIIe Siècle (Paris, 1992), p. 222. 
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simple reaction to hunger (classic ‘crass economic reductionism’1), in 
which case hanging might be averted, or else they were the expression 
of plebeian backwardness and stubborn resistance to improvement. 
Where there was a certain begrudging tolerance for the idea that 
starving people were in fact entitled to food, resistance to policy 
changes was less forgivable.  
 
Initially, unlike the clergyman and deputy at Sens, the line taken by 
most officers of the généralité of Tours was the hard one, and it seems 
rare in the first few years of deregulation that excuses were made for 
rioters. Instead officers reported the fact that rioters were determined 
in their assault on the supposedly inviolable rights of property lately 
accorded to the merchants, which the officers themselves protected. 
Often they would add in their reports that the liberty of the grain trade 
had been restored. One officer even took the time in his procès-verbal to 
explain the dangers which rioting – in this case at the river port-town of 
Cormery – could pose by scaring away the itinerant merchants who 
furnished the local and national market with grain.2 Some, therefore, 
seemed to be convinced of the judiciousness of the new laws.  
 
Others, however, made no comment on the wisdom of the laws, and 
probably were merely keeping the peace and upholding the law, as was 
their purpose. Free-circulation had been proclaimed by royal edict, so 
that compromising the freedom of the trade compromised also the 
authority of the king. This attitude on the part of officers is sometimes 
made evident in the terms they applied to the disturbances which they 
were charged with putting down. Where émeute or perhaps even more 
sympathetically, émotion populaire, are the normal French words for a 
riot, they used the term sédition or even rébellion. They also routinely 
reminded rioters of the laws which rendered their behaviour, and not 
that of the middlemen or exporters, illegal. The Procurer Fiscal of the 
                                                         
1 E.P. Thompson, ‘The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth 
Century’, P&P, 50 (1971), p. 78. 
2 AD I&L C94, f. 224: Procès-Verbal by the Lieutenant of the Maréchaussée at Tours, 
dated 24th April 1768. 
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Bailiff's Office of Sable, for instance, reported that he had informed the 
crowd ‘that the king had permitted the exportation of grain and that 
this sort of émotion populaire was a rébellion against his orders, that 
this was a capital offence’.1  
 
The rereading of the laws was normally an educational activity or an 
attempt to bring the people round to the reason which guided the 
enlightened lawmakers.2 However, in this case it was clearly also a 
threat and a reiteration of the monarchical authority behind the 
disputed changes. The crowd was having none of it and pelted him with 
stones until he was forced to retreat, in a manner reminiscent of the 
Norfolk rioters in 1766.3 In both cases the crowd seems to have been 
rejecting the idea that their behaviour was treasonous or even 
inappropriate. However, in emphasising the shift from émotion 
populaire to full blown rebellion, the officer was implying that suddenly, 
rioting, which perhaps used to constitute a sort of dialogue on a local 
level, could be interpreted as a political affront to the king and state on 
a more general level.  
 
However, as time wore on and conditions deteriorated, alarm bells 
began to sound amongst various authorities. The local authorities of 
various towns mentioned above began to raise their concerns to the 
higher powers. At Angers they asked for the Procurer General’s aid to 
provision the provincial markets, likewise at Le Mans. At 
Chateaugontier the mayor and aldermen wished to establish a bureau 
of charity.4 The mayor and aldermen of Tours, however, took a more 
upfront approach. In October 1768, some months after a spate of riots 
that spring, but at a time when prices were probably at a peak, they 
                                                         
1 Ibid, f. 87: Procès-Verbal by Procurer Fiscal of the Bailliage of Sable, dated 10th 
August 1765. Emphasis added. 
2 Larrère, L’Invention, p. 227. 
3 AD I&L C94, f. 87: Procès-Verbal by Procurer Fiscal of the Baillage of Sable, dated 
10th August 1765. 
4 For Angers: AD I&L  C96: Letter from the Mayor, Councillors and Principal Citizens of 
Angers, dated 26th August 1769; for Chateaugontier: ibid, Letter from the Mayor and 
Councillors of Chateaugontier, dated 28th February 1769; for Le Mans: ibid, Letter 
from the Mayor and Aldermen of Le Mans, dated 9th September 1769. 
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wrote to the Controller General himself, begging his permission to 
assemble public magazines and to halt the export of grain from the 
region. Though they claimed to understand and appreciate the 
shrewdness of a free grain trade, they explicitly blamed the foreign 
export of grain via Nantes for the excessive price of vital supplies.1  
 
They were not the only ones in a position of authority to think so either. 
As early as 1765, an officer of the police at Richelieu, south-west of 
Tours, had written to the intendant asking him to put a stop to 
exportation.2 Then, by 1770, Controller General Joseph Marie Terray 
was obliged to write to the Intendant, François-Pierre Du Cluzel, 
censoring the conduct of some judges at Tours. The judges had ordered 
two boats conveying flour to Nantes to be unloaded and for this flour to 
be sold to the local people at a fixed price. They needed to be made 
aware, Terray wrote, of ‘the utter irregularity and the dangers of their 
conduct, which must be more moderate in the future, they must not 
stop a single boat or wagon of grain’.3  
 
It is possible, of course, that the judges also had their own interests in 
mind, and regretted the loss of various fees and tolls chargeable on the 
grain proceeding downriver towards Nantes. However, generally, local 
authorities had initially tended to support the deregulation. It was only 
later, when times grew difficult, that they began to interfere. Either 
way, these judges were wresting back local control from an unregulated 
but national market, but also from a central authority, since earlier, 
with their general intolerance of rioting, they themselves had shown 
that to oppose the laws was to come into direct dispute with the central 
French government.  
 
                                                         
1 AD I&L C94: Letter from the Mayor and Aldermen of Tours, dated 6th October 1768 
and accompanying ‘Report of the Mayor and Aldermen of the City of Tours on the 
Subject of the High Price of Grain’. 
2 AD I&L C83: Letter from an Officer at Richelieu to the Intendant, dated 16th July 
1765. 
3 AD I&L C96: Letter from Terray, dated 15th May 1770. 
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Usually these authorities gave explanations for their interference that 
were framed in terms of altruism and their duty to ensure the 
subsistence of the people under their authority. Unlike the Norwich 
authorities, they made no mention of the economic role of the people 
they intended to support, even in the city of Tours. In Norwich the 
mayor seems to have been in league with the manufacturers, which was 
not the case in Tours. On one occasion, however, a group of 
manufacturers from the généralité made an appeal on their own part. In 
September 1769 a group of the owners of eight separate manufacturing 
initiatives at Cholet addressed a letter to Du Cluzel, to inform him of the 
rarity and high prices of grain and the stagnation of their trade,1 which 
was probably handkerchiefs, hemp-cloth or dyed cloths, given that 
these were the key products of their province, Anjou.2 All together, they 
implored, circumstances had reduced the poor textile workers to the 
‘last misery’,3 which had driven the owners to appeal for an emergency 
shipment of grain from Nantes or Chalonne.  
 
This they could not afford on their own account due to the excessive 
cost of haulage and also multiple bankruptcies, but they could, with the 
assistance of the state ‘relieve as far as possible their poor fellow 
citizens’.4 In spite of their obvious interest in manufacturing, however, 
the interest group made no explicit reference to any relation between 
food prices and wages, as had the mayor and manufacturers of 
Norwich. Nor did they set their plight within the wider context of 
nationalistic efforts in a mercantilist vein. They too only emphasised the 
humanitarian cause and the notion of co-citizenship with the people 
who must have worked for them in a cottage-industry setting. There 
was no strong vision, as in Norwich, of the role which the region might 
play in the national economy. 
 
                                                         
1  AD I&L C96, ‘Humble Supplication to the Intendant from the Inhabitants of the 
Parish of Notre-Dame de Cholet’, dated 8th September 1769. 
2 Dumas, Tours, p. 7. 
3 AD I&L C96: ‘Humble Supplication’, dated 8th September 1769. 
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Meanwhile, by the end of the 1760s, France was facing a general 
subsistence crisis. Tours was not the only place where the people, and 
the authorities too, were undermining the liberty of the trade. Miller 
has shown how in Normandy many officers attempted to reinstitute the 
essence of the former laws, usually by manipulating the tarif, which 
dictated bakers’ profit margins. In this way they clandestinely 
subsidised food prices for the poor, whilst ostensibly supporting the 
official policy of free trade.1 There were nevertheless enthusiasts for 
the new laws, such as the young Anne-Robert-Jacques Turgot, then the 
intendant of the barren généralité of Limousin, who found ways of 
alleviating the plight of the hungry, without intervening in the grain 
market.2 Others, however, would not stand for legislation which they 
considered damaging and dangerous, and soon several of the 
parlements were to come out in flagrant mutiny. 
 
The End of Deregulation and Continued Unrest at Tours 
 
The parlement of Rouen, which presided over the three généralités of 
Caen, Alençon and Rouen, was rocked by violent rioting and hostility to 
deregulation which materialised in Normandy in the spring and 
summer of 1768.3 The court soon decided to reinstate police 
supervision of purchases within its jurisdiction, and to allow officers to 
force hoarded grain onto Norman markets.4 Central government 
responded by issuing a reiteration of the legislation of 1763 and 1764, 
politely ignoring the parlement’s glaring defiance.5 Kaplan suggests that 
the government hoped to avoid excessively authoritarian gestures, 
which would probably only strengthen the resolve of the Rouennais. 
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However, a lengthy battle ensued, which saw the parlement of Rouen 
address, and illicitly publish, letters of remonstrance to the king.1 
 
These letters were normally phrased in ostensibly humble yet quietly 
insistent terms, and tended to appeal to the king’s paternal function, as 
had those from Tours. For example, in May the parlement pointed out 
that ‘there is no difference between a father and a king’. The letter 
highlighted the suffering of the industrial labourers of the town of 
Rouen in particular.2 Moreover, like the authorities at Tours, the 
parlement seems to have made no reference to the marketability of the 
goods which these workers produced or to commerce in general. 
 
The court did, however, challenge the deregulation on the grounds of 
their original promise of national prosperity: 
 
[Misery] will be the only result of an exportation which, far from drawing 
the wealth of nations [les richesses des nations] into France, only generates 
monopoly, only produces famine and the emigration of our workers.3 
 
Rather than lingering on the implications of emigration, however, the 
letters dwelled on the mercantile abuses which free trade apparently 
allowed. The court complained, in fact, that the laws of 1763 and 1764 
had only established an ‘illusory’ liberty. Initially the parlement had 
supported the deregulation of the grain trade. It understood the 
benefits of a system which could ‘give everybody the right to prevail 
according to their fortune and designs’.4 However, the parlement 
argued that this literal meaning of the law had not taken hold in 
practice, because consumers were left vulnerable to predatory 
businessmen with inexhaustible credit. In this way, the court continued, 
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laws intending liberty gave rise to the opposite: monopoly.1 Therefore 
the parlement of Rouen did not condemn liberty per se. For though the 
court had lost its confidence in the idea of an autonomous and 
beneficent economic system, it maintained that liberty was a 
constitutional ideal.  
 
Kwass has also charted the changing use of terms such as ‘despotism’ 
and ‘liberty’ in the language and arguments of the Rouen parlement. In 
particular, he observed how the terms were transferred from the 
religious sphere, where they were used to assert the right of Catholics 
to take communion, to fiscal matters, where they were deployed against 
general taxation. Thus the term liberty ‘came to stand for the general 
principal of judicial consent to legislation.’ 2 Evidently this had to do 
with preserving the Rouen parlement’s right to exercise authority over 
its own jurisdiction. However, the parlement also articulated these 
matters in relation to individual citizens’ rights to property that was not 
automatically subject to state intervention.3 In this sense, the idea of 
liberty was not necessarily placed in opposition to absolutism, but it 
was seen to be in disagreement with arbitrary interventionism. It had 
much to do with the parlement’s own ability and right to administer 
justice – and hence also manage issues such as the grain trade fairly – in 
the Normandy region. 
 
Meanwhile, the Parisian parlement had also grown gradually sceptical 
of liberalisation, and became increasingly vocal in its criticism, as 
prices, unrest and rumour escalated in the capital. By the end of 1768, 
the parlement had arranged a General Assembly of Police, where 
representatives from the police of Paris, but also other institutions such 
as the city’s guilds, were invited to express their views on the causes of 
and possible solutions for the critically high prices of provisions in the 
capital.4  
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As in Rouen, members of this assembly were not necessarily 
ideologically opposed to the liberalisation of the grain trade or to the 
exportation of grain from France. Kaplan has identified the fact that at 
Paris, as well as in Rouen, authorities tended to attribute the high price 
of grain not to liberalisation itself, as much as to the abuse of that 
freedom on the part of monopolists, thus avoiding criticism of the 
liberal legislation on theoretical grounds.1 Overall, the idea of liberty 
itself was not on trial in France’s sovereign courts.  
 
However, at the Parisian assembly there were also criticisms beyond 
monopoly levelled at the legislation, or rather its implementation. One 
of the key faults which the Advocate General, Antoine-Louis Seguier, 
found with the liberal system was that it treated France as a 
homogenous block. He argued, however, that ‘the interior of the 
kingdom cannot be governed by the same system as the maritime 
provinces’.2  
 
This assessment has much in common with the conclusions of 
historians of French geography and the economy, such as Braudel, Clout 
and Planhol: infrastructure was wanting. For the Advocate went on to 
compare the continental situation of France with the island nation of 
Britain, where apparently, ‘the cultivation of grain… is the sole 
occupation of the country people. The transport which carries it 
outwards is a sensitive use of the nation’s navy’.3 Evidently, the ease of 
exchange in Britain and coastal France, which allowed for economic 
specialisation and integration, was not mirrored in the French interior, 
where local economies and self-sufficiency were more appropriate. In 
fact, trying to govern these regions in the same way, given their poor 
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communications systems, led to distribution problems, and this was 
obvious to some observers of the time.1 
 
More subtly, however, the Advocate General was also criticising the 
anglomania of the 1760s. He appreciated British policy only insofar as it 
seemed to suit the island characteristics of the nation.2 He argued that 
French policy needed to be tailored to the nation’s specific 
characteristics, rather than merely borrowed from a successful rival. He 
even suggested that, for France, liquors might be a more suitable 
national agricultural product.3 The French nation and its people, he was 
saying, had their own distinct characteristics which had to be taken into 
account when designing political economy. This was a problem which 
he thought the parliament at Westminster did not face. Perhaps he did 
not know that wheat production, which was rewarded with bounties, 
was heavily concentrated in the southeast of England and that there 
were less productive regions, such as those in Scotland which barely 
participated in this trade.4 Either way, this was a rejection of the notion 
of an English panacea, for nothing so universal could remedy France, 
which, in his imagination, was defined by its variability.  
 
In the end, the assembly concluded that some of the powers of the grain 
police needed to be reinstated and other parlements tended to agree.5 
By January 1770, the Bordeaux parlement, long sceptical of the 
deregulation project, had forced all available grain within its 
jurisdiction onto the market and banned sales anywhere except the 
marketplace. By the end of that year the parlements of Dombes, Alsace, 
Lorraine and Metz had forbidden grain from leaving their jurisdictions, 
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with other parlements taking similar, though less radical, courses to try 
to control the subsistence situation.1  
 
On his appointment as Controller General, Terray initially made it his 
mission to crack down on these acts of legislative rebellion, just as he 
rebuked the Tours judges who would interrupt free trade to furnish a 
local market.2 However, mutiny and rioting continued and in December 
1770 Terray rescinded the freedom of the grain trade, returning almost 
to the status quo ante. He preserved only the liberty of internal trade.3 
In Tours upon the receipt of the new laws, the officers duly went about 
registering dealers in grain.4 
 
The reinstatement of the laws did not spell the end of the troubles in 
Tours. There was rioting again throughout the autumn and winter of 
1771-2 and a small outburst in spring 1773. However, the worst of the 
rioting in Tours was still to come. This broke out on Saturday 19th 
February 1774, lasting four days until Tuesday 22nd February. 
Notwithstanding its urban setting and participants, this riot did not, 
nevertheless, break with the pattern which had been established in the 
généralité over the past decade: most of the events took place at various 
points on the riverbank.5 It all started at Vallièrres, some distance to the 
south-east of the city of Tours. Here, according to the police 
commissioner who did not arrive on the scene until late the next day, a 
mob of 1200 people had descended with ‘considerable prejudice’ on the 
port, pillaging three boats loaded with grain. The officer was informed 
that the boats had been forced to moor the night before by a crowd 
armed with sticks and pistols.6   
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News was slow to arrive at the city, but it met with ‘excitement’, 
especially, in the more populous districts in the south where the silk-
workers lived.1 Thus, on his way down river to Nantes, as late as 9 or 
10pm the haulier, Pierre Touchet, complained that he was menaced by 
a large crowd of men and women on the left bank near the levee by St 
Cyr to the west of the city centre. At the nearby church of Saint-Anne, 
the bells sounded.2 A woman told the officer, when he arrived, that they 
had not intended to pillage the grain on this boat, but that the rioters 
‘could not bear to see it ferried any further’.3 They had, she implied, 
been forced to commit a crime to prevent a travesty. Ultimately the 
officers, blaming a lack of reinforcements (though they had arrived with 
three brigades) were forced to retreat under a hail of stones thrown by 
the now 2000 strong crowd.4 The next day, Monday 21st February, the 
grain was spirited away to the port of l’Ecouerie, where it was illicitly 
sold to the crowd.5  
 
Some of the women from Saint-Anne made their way over the bridge 
towards St Avertin on the river Cher to the south of the city. Here again 
the bells began to toll, bringing people from their homes to join the 
mob. Two more boats were completely pillaged, but one man was 
arrested whilst making-off with a sack of grain.6 Meanwhile, the attacks 
on boats continued throughout the next day, with a largely male crowd 
attacking the two boats of René le Duc and taking 82 barrels of flour 
and some wine.7 Likewise Phillipe Marchau lost 60 barrels at St 
Symphorien on the right bank8 and Andres Badiu lost 100 barrels of 
Orléans flour, whilst the rest of his merchandise, including a shipment 
of glass, suffered heavy damage.9  
                                                         
1 Ibid: Letter to the Procureur du Roi from the Prévôt Général , dated 22nd February 
1774; B. Maillard, ‘Une Émeute de Subsistances à Tours au XVIIIe Siècle’, Annales de 
Bretagne et des Pays de l'Ouest, 92:1 (1985), p. 29. 
2 AD I&L 175B 78: Letter to the Procureur du Roi from the Prévôt Général . 
3 Ibid: Testimony of Pierre Touchet, dated 20th February 1774. 
4 Ibid: Letter to the Procureur du Roi from the Prévôt Général . 
5 Ibid: Second Testimony of Pierre Touchet. 
6 Ibid: Letter to the Procureur du Roi from the Prévôt Général . 
7 Ibid: Testimony of René le Duc, dated 21st February 1774. 
8 Ibid: Testimony of Phillipe Marchau, dated 21st February 1774. 
9 Ibid: Testimony of Andres Badiu, dated 21st February 1774. 
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These hauliers were in a state of distress because the goods that they 
were shipping were not theirs to lose, and were expected down-river at 
Nantes. One company of merchants from Orléans who did actually own 
the merchandise wrote angrily to inform the Provost General at Tours 
that the lost grain had been purchased both legally and publicly at the 
markets of Orléans and Beaugeny and were destined to feed lower 
Brittany via the entrepôt at Nantes.1 In other words, the merchants 
were declaring that they had behaved legally and morally, and that the 
crowd from Tours and the surrounding country could claim little 
legitimacy in its actions. 
 
Many of the people, however, seemed to be convinced of the legitimacy 
of their own actions, as, on the morning of Tuesday 22nd February, a 
very large crowd of around 3000 armed with sticks and stones amassed 
at the prison of the maréchaussée, or constabulary, intending to free one 
of their number who had been arrested. The mob forced the church 
door and once again the bells rang out.2 It was the boldness of this 
assault on authority, and not the frustrated attacks on the boats, which 
finally induced the officers to quash the riot, rather than merely to 
intervene.3 30 sword-bearing chevaliers on horseback dispersed the 
crowd by firing four rounds of blanks, making 21 arrests.4 
 
The majority of these arrests were of men, and of these six were 
artisans; six worked on vineyards; two were day labourers; one was a 
mariner and one was himself in the haulage business. For the five 
women, no occupations were given, but we know that one was married 
to an absent sailor; one was the wife of one of the aforementioned 
artisans; two lived with their widowed mothers and one lived with her 
grandmother.5 Two of the women were released without sentencing, 
                                                         
1 Ibid: Letter to the Prévôt Général at Tours from Charles Lassailly & Son, undated. 
2 Ibid: Letter to the Procureur du Roi from the Prévôt Général . 
3 Maillard, ‘Une Émeute’, p. 30. 
4 AD I&L 175B 78: Letter to the Procureur du Roi from the Prévôt Général . 
5 Ibid: Interrogations, 24th-28th February 1774. 
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which took place soon after the riot, on 1st March 1774. The others 
were variously sentenced: to death; to life on the galleys; to flogging 
and an hour in the stocks plus three years banishment; just to an hour 
in the stocks; and to public admonition.1 The women were handed the 
lighter sentences. However, Brigitte Maillard has shown that after 
further questioning, many of the sentences were reduced owing to a 
sort of plea-bargaining. In the end, three ringleaders were hanged and 
two sent to the galleys for nine years.2 This implies that the authorities, 
rather than wishing to make a big example, were simply keen to be rid 
of supposed troublemakers. In fact, they also offered an amnesty to 
rioters who were hiding out in the woods.3 Overall, the authorities seem 
to have approached the matter of dealing with the riots with some 
ambivalence.  
 
Nevertheless, the people of Tours were on the receiving end of some 
censure. In this unusual case, the merchants themselves (mostly from 
Tours, but with several also from Orléans), convinced as they were that 
they were in the right, were not prepared to cut their losses. They sued 
central government through the Provost-General, the head officer of the 
maréchaussée at Tours, for compensation to the value of the goods they 
had lost. This the government granted. After a few weeks the supreme 
court, known as the Conseil d’État, issued a printed ruling. The officials 
of Tours, who had already apparently recovered some of the stolen 
supplies and liquidated them, were to share the 7000 livres which these 
sales had raised between the merchants.4  
 
This, however, only constituted about 18 per cent of the total damages, 
leaving the merchants short of over 33,000 livres. This, the court ruled, 
stood to be paid to the merchants by the all inhabitants of Tours and 
several of the surrounding parishes in equal parts regardless of status. 
This was to take place over the course of the next two years, with 
                                                         
1 Ibid: Condemnations, 1st March 1774. 
2 Maillard, ‘Une Émeute’, pp. 31-2. 
3 Ibid. 
4 AD I&L 175B 78: ‘Extract from the Registers of the Conseil d’État’, 23rd March 1774. 
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interest payable at eight deniers per livre.1 The merchants were, 
ironically, helped by the recently reinstated regulation of the market, as 
each shipment had its own certificate detailing the exact amount of 
grain and other goods that it was carrying. Hence they could prove 
exactly the value which needed to be extracted from the community in 
reparations. The intendant, Du Cluzel, was left with the task of 
orchestrating the collection of the money.2 
 
Evidence of reparations paid to merchants as victims of riots is very 
rare, and it would seem that it hardly ever happened in this period, in 
Britain as well as France. A notable exception is the Gordon Riots, 
where some £63,269, 6s. 1d. was granted to private individuals whose 
property was damaged, and where the rioting was construed in part as 
a failure of policing.3 It seems that in the Tours case the merchants 
garnered sympathy for their cause from both the senior authorities at 
the constabulary and central government, which formally approved 
their conduct and censured that of the crowd. These merchants, the 
ruling pointed out, were in the right, because they ‘conducted the grain 
trade in the manner permitted by the law of 23rd December 1770 and 
the Letters Patent modifying it’.4 
 
At the same time, however, the fact that junior officers were seizing 
back what supplies they could, and then ‘liquidating’ them within Tours 
suggests sympathy for the crowd’s plight and for their initiative to stop 
those supplies from going any further than Tours. Meanwhile, it seems 
that unofficial sales, or taxations populaires were also taking place, as 
local priests recorded the anonymous return of sums of money – as 
well, however, as pouches of flour – from members of the community in 
response to the merchants’ demands for compensation.5  
 
                                                         
1 Ibid. 
2 AD I&L C98, f. 40: Letter from Terray to Du Cluzel, dated 21st June 1774. 
3 G. Rudé, ‘The Gordon Riots’, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society (Fifth Series), 
6 (1956), p.100. 
4 AD I&L 175B 78: ‘Extract from the Registers of the Conseil d’État’, 23rd March 1774. 
5 Ibid: Undated Letter addressed to the Prévôt Général . 
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From the sheer value of the compensation payments, it is clear that 
significant quantities of grain were being transported through the city 
of Tours. Figure 9 below shows that after deregulation in 1764 the 
average price of grain was growing more and more unpredictable from 
year to year, surely rendering life more unstable for anybody reliant 
thereon. However, rioting was not merely a function of high price, 
because riots did not necessarily occur in peak-price years. It was, in 
Tours as in France generally, a function of demand from outside the 
community.1 For those struggling to pay the high prices demanded at 
their local market, the rate of the movement of this grain was clearly 
perceived of as unsustainable. 
 
Figure 9: Wheat Prices and Riots in the Généralité of Tours, 1756-1780 
 
Source: AN F20 105: ‘Prix Commun du Froment dans les 32 Généralités et la 
Ville de Paris’, reproduced in E. Labrousse, Esquisse, I, pp.106-113 ; AD I&L C82 
& C83. 
 
As mentioned above, the merchants, Charles Lassailly & Son, were very 
keen to point out that their grain was destined for another struggling 
French region.2 They wanted to justify their actions in the face of the 
angry populace of Tours, by drawing on the notion of patriotism, or at 
least of shared suffering. During the period of deregulation others had 
                                                         
1 Tilly, ‘The Food Riot’, p. 26. 
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taken recourse to the same notion, distinguishing foreign from 
domestic demand for grain. One officer had written indignantly of the 
riotous poor under his jurisdiction, whose antics suggested to him that 
‘the populace is not interested in the general good of the state, because 
they go ahead and interrupt the course of trade, as well as the liberty 
and the safety of the great roads’.1 His sentiments are similar to some of 
those expressed at the police assembly of 1768, where, for example, the 
Councillor of the First Chamber claimed that ‘no good citizen would be 
vexed to eat bread at a slightly higher price in circumstances where this 
little price increase... will prevent another province peopled with 
[fellow] citizens from languishing in the horrors of famine’.2 
 
The people of Tours, however, were not especially concerned with the 
‘general good of the state’ or of their compatriots. Their only concern 
was the security of their own locale. It seems that the spectre of Nantes 
loomed large, because it represented that integrated maritime 
economy, in which the people of Tours were only willing to partake 
within tight limits when the going was good. Their vision of the 
appropriate extent of the economy was limited, and, judging by the 
ambivalence which characterised the responses of the authorities, this 




The 1760s saw an attempt on the part of central government to unify 
the French economy by freeing the grain trade. The trade was freed 
with a perhaps inflated confidence in the productive capacity and the 
infrastructural capabilities of France. The territory was now expected 
to behave, economically speaking, like a unilateral nation, rather than a 
bundle of regions with the capacity for their own trade restrictions and 
tolls. With this move towards economic freedom, the French 
                                                         
1 BNF, JdF, 1134, f. 99: Letter to the Lieutenant General from an officer at Soissons, 
dated 20th July 1766.  
2 AN K1022: Minutes of the General Assembly of Police, November 25th 1768. 
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government seemed to promote more economically nationalistic, or at 
least patriotic, behaviour. 
 
Thus the French government’s relationship with mercantilism, 
especially in regard to its changing grain policy, is somewhat 
complicated. France was expected to make gains in a trade thought to 
be unjustly dominated by France’s economic arch-rival, Britain. 
Participation in an international grain trade was supposed to unlock the 
French nation’s potential for enrichment. As the declaration itself 
trumpeted, the central government was at pains to indulge ‘the 
cultivation of the land, the produce of which is the most authentic and 
the most certain source of the wealth of a state’.1 Even when preparing 
to allow the export of a raw material of absolute necessity for its own 
people and essentially instigating laissez-faire in that commodity, the 
French government was still considering the ultimate outcome in 
mercantilist terms, which would see the British deprived of a share of 
an important market and all the riches it brought.  
 
In Tours, the measures were resisted by the common people, who 
intervened in the shipping of grain downriver towards Nantes. Owners 
of manufacturing enterprises also eventually campaigned to bring 
supplies back upriver to support the people who would fashion their 
wares. Later local authorities likewise blamed the changes for shortage 
and suffering. In several cases, these authorities simply decided to defy 
them. Their grounds for this action were much the same as those of the 
crowds who pillaged the boats: concern for the survival of a local 
system of subsistence and perhaps privilege.  
 
Jean Nicolas warns against overstating the notion that local authorities 
and consumers were strongly united. Their cooperation, he continues, 
only lasted as long as their interests corresponded, otherwise cracks 
quickly appeared in this apparently united front. The most he will allow 
                                                         
1 ‘Edit concernant la Liberté de la Sortie et de l’Entrée des Grains’, dated 27th July 1764 
in Isambert et al. (eds.), Recueil, XXII, p. 403. 
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was that subsistence problems gave consumers an opportunity to 
participate in policy.1 However, local privilege and subsistence, as Grafe 
has also shown, were generally not incompatible. Though the economic 
costs of a reluctance to participate in a national economy are evident 
now, at the time the apparent mutual benefits of a locally regulated 
economy, replete with fees and levies for local authorities, probably 
seemed quite alluring, not to mention comfortably traditional.2 
Moreover, the evidence seemed to prove the point that subsistence was 
too complex to be left to chance, and had to be regulated according to a 
local and not a national rationale.3  
 
This was the flaw that the Rouen parlement also identified in the 
system of free trade. Although the court maintained that liberty was 
desirable, it was argued that deregulation had failed to achieve it. 
Thanks to marketplace abuses, consumers could not exercise their 
rights in the conditions provided by the laws of 1763 and 1764. The 
court implied that, when it came to eliminating monopoly, which was 
the ultimate enemy of liberty, a carefully regulated economy was 
actually more adept than deregulation. Therefore in this instance 
parochial judicial authority apparently trounced centralised ministerial 
authority again. Regulation of the grain trade was duly added to a 
growing list of parochial competencies.  
 
This was not a new condition, but it had to be restated anew in the light 
of the failed liberalisation project. The failure of this project thus gave 
consumers and local authorities another arena in which to state their 
case together against a menacing central government. The benefits of a 
free trade in grain for France as a nation would have to be shelved, 
because the policy disrupted the smooth operation of society on a much 
more local basis. 
 
                                                         
1 Nicolas, La Rébellion Française, p. 422. 
2 Grafe, Distant Tyranny, p. 201. 
3 Skornicki, L'Économiste, p. 321. 
Daisy Gibbs  124 
  
Besides this, the people of Tours did not relate their agricultural and 
industrial efforts to the overall economic situation of France. Even the 
manufacturers did not seem to contextualise their enterprises within a 
national mission for economic dominance, as the Norwich 
manufacturers had. Nor did the parlement of Rouen discuss at length 
the commercial repercussions of high grain prices. Indeed, the Norwich 
manufacturers had been remarkably attuned to the nationalistic 
mercantilist message, in a way that, from the French government’s 
perspective, many of its people at this time, it seems, were not.  
 
Though a tendency towards the teachings of mercantilism informed 
policy-making at the highest levels in France, it had not insinuated itself 
into the dialogue between central authority and petitioners at a local 
level as it had in the British case. In France, local authorities were more 
inclined to articulate the economic dislocation caused by a free-market 
grain trade through the language of welfare and the moral value of state 
– and especially monarchical – responsibility for the deserving poor, 
rather than the economic value which the labouring poor could offer 
the nation.  
 
For local authorities and the people they served, the laws which had 
been removed in 1763 represented justice not parochialism. In crisis 
situations, the unhesitating knee-jerk reaction of the people and the 
local administration was to reinstate former regulation in a vigilante 
fashion because they did not trust the market, such as it was, to provide 
for their needs. Repeated attacks on grain shipments suggest that they 
suspected the merchants of greedily and immorally depriving them of 
their due share. All things told, they were not prepared to withstand 
price increases for the good of the nation at large, perhaps due to a deep 
mistrust of grain merchants, who, for their part, seem to have been at 
pains to absolve themselves from guilt.  
 
The liberalisation of the grain trade in France had been heralded as an 
initiative of great national importance. French policy-makers, 
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influenced by mercantilist ideas and considering the issue only on a 
national level, tried to force an ultimately inappropriate policy on an 
immature economy by using patriotic rhetoric and chauvinistic 
deterrents. In the end, the failure of a free grain trade in France at this 
time was probably due to real structural economic factors. The French 
economy was unfortunately not that coherent, its inter-regional 
infrastructure being inadequate. It could be argued that these factors 
were not merely underlying, but that they were picked up on and 
understood by the people, and then expressed in the way that they 
knew: food riots which aimed to prevent export, local scarcity and 
ultimately punitively high food prices. However, it was the way in 
which the changes had been politicised which made this resistance into 
a feat of anti-patriotism, or localism, where perhaps otherwise it could 
only have been construed as anti-capitalism. 
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Chapter 3: Economic Regulation and Identity in the 




This chapter examines the grain trade and other commercial pursuits of 
Britain and France in their Atlantic context. While the Atlantic was 
understood as ‘a series of national and competitive spheres of activity’,1 
J.H. Elliott has pointed out that international boundaries in this arena 
were, by their nature, fluid. This was above all a maritime space, where 
shared experiences and interests, helped by geographical determinants, 
could spill over the official barriers of nationality and language.2 This 
chapter, then, explores the dynamic between the lines drawn in the 
sand by official policy, and the tides of interest and pragmatism which 
often washed over them.  
 
It does this by focussing on the competing forces that acted upon the 
metropole when it came to colonial law-making and regulation. It 
explores how trading regulations often sought to enshrine national 
values by generating and protecting unilateral shipping ties and the 
ways in which this was sometimes challenged by the realities of profit-
making and economic rationality. By examining contemporary 
approaches to globalisation and the division of labour through 
complicated systems of protectionism on the part of both Britain and 
France, the chapter attempts to further understand the issue of 
economic identity in each nation.  
 
                                                         
1 J.P. Greene and P.D. Morgan, ‘Introduction’ in idem (eds.), Atlantic History: a Critical 
Appraisal (Oxford, 2009), p. 22.  
2 J.H. Elliott, ‘Afterword: Atlantic History: A Circumnavigation’ in D. Armitage and M.J. 
Braddick (eds.), The British Atlantic World, 1500-1800 (Basingstoke, 2002), pp. 245-6. 
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As far as the traditional story of British imperial policy goes, the first 
British Empire, characterised by a system of commercial regulation, is 
understood to have come into being with the Navigation Acts of 1651.1 
Between 1675 and 1700, the settlers of the North American and West 
Indian colonies were purposefully made conscious of their new ‘more 
circumscribed role’ within the empire.2 This meant breaking the 
autonomy of the ruling factions which had established themselves 
overseas, and constructing a new Anglo-American political system.3 
However, it seems that the initiative was short-lived, and the colonies 
were left to their own devices for much of the eighteenth century. 
Hence, James Henretta’s use of the label ‘salutary neglect’, which he 
borrowed from Edmund Burke, to describe the period from 1688 to 
1752.4 
 
Henretta’s work explored the reasons for a relative lack of colonial 
legislation in the first half of the eighteenth century. However, a slightly 
critical review suggests that rather than neglect per se, the period 
evidences the ‘low priority’ of colonial affairs in London.5 Though 
politicians were distracted by their own private ambitions and by a 
wider political struggle between crown and Parliament after 1688, the 
mercantile system continued to be calibrated, for example by the Hat 
Act of 1732. This act is explained by Henretta as passing in a rare phase 
of active parliamentary engagement with the colonies. The 
Parliamentary debate of this act, relating to an attempt to amend the 
bill upon its third reading, was apparently a ‘first tentative effort to 
                                                         
1 P.J. Marshall, ‘The First British Empire’ in R.W. Winks (ed.), The Oxford History of the 
British Empire, V (Oxford, 1999), p. 47. 
2 R.M. Brown, ‘The Anglo-American Political System, 1675-1775: A Behavioral 
Analysis’ in A.G. Olson and R.M. Brown (eds.), Anglo-American Political Relations, 
1675-1775 (New Brunswick, NJ, 1970), p. 15. 
3 Ibid, p. 17. 
4 A.D.M. Beaumont, Colonial America and the Earl of Halifax, 1748-1761 (Oxford, 2014), 
p. 42. 
5 W.J. Gates, ‘Review: “Salutary Neglect”. Colonial Administration under the Duke of 
Newcastle’, Pennsylvania History, 41:1 (1974), p. 98. 
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come to grips with the realities of a mature colonial system’, an issue 
that, in the 1730s at least, was otherwise generally ignored.1 
 
Henretta locates the close of his period of neglect in the 1750s, when 
military and fiscal needs demanded greater command of the colonies 
from the centre, particularly under the influence of the Earl of Halifax.2 
In spite of Halifax’s efforts the metropole grew complacent and 
reversed his careful reforms, allowing the colonies to revert to their 
former flawed systems of governance. Then, in the post-war scrabble to 
recoup the financial demands of mobilisation, it drove the wedge 
between the centre and the fledgling political entities.3 This shift from 
mercantilism to outright imperialism apparently grated on the colonial 
institutions which had been enjoying an autonomy seemingly 
consistent with the supposedly British ideal of freedom.4 For this 
reason, rebellion ensued, and the First British Empire fell apart.  
 
The Second Empire issued from British interests in the East, with a very 
different ideology. However, in two hefty tomes, Vincent Harlow 
contended that this change predated American independence by about 
thirty years, as the thrust of British colonial policy was already 
changing. A preoccupation with trade and not dominion had already 
drawn the gaze of the British legislature away from the Atlantic and 
towards the East, and thus justified the supposedly generous terms of 
the secession of the American colonies.5  
 
Harlow’s argument has also found its own critics, for it assumes a 
confidence in British industrial prowess, which was not yet necessarily 
all pervading. The argument takes for granted that businessmen and 
manufacturers were now sufficiently confident to relinquish the crutch 
                                                         
1 J.A. Henretta, ‘Salutary Neglect’. Colonial Administration under the Duke of Newcastle 
(Princeton, 1972), p. 102.  
2 Ibid, p. 347. 
3 Beaumont, The Earl of Halifax, p. 227. 
4 Marshall, ‘The First British Empire’, p. 48.  
5 V.T. Harlow, The Founding of the Second British Empire, 1763-1793 (London & New 
York, 1952), I, pp. 5-6. 
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of protective regulation.1 There have also been doubts about the exact 
timing of the ‘swing to the East’, since Harlow did not overly concern 
himself with trade statistics. These in fact show that the Atlantic trade 
area had yet to be economically displaced by the East even at the close 
of the eighteenth century.2  
 
At the same time, Harlow has been praised for his focus on the 
continuity of thought of policy-makers across the traditional 
historiographical divide between the first and second British Empire. 
Since he focused on the centre, Harlow therefore tended to treat the 
empire as a whole, shedding light on how understandings of empire and 
imperialism developed.3 This thread of his work has been picked up by 
more recent historians, such as Anthony Pagden, who also documents a 
change in mentality towards empire in the middle of the eighteenth 
century.4 It is on this historiographical thread that this chapter builds, 
identifying a shifting sense of Britain’s role and potential in the wider 
world. 
 
The political economy of the French Atlantic has a strong traditional 
historiography also. Again, accounts centre on mercantilism, 
particularly that of Jean-Baptiste Colbert, and the eventual 
establishment of what is now known as l’Exlusif. This was a bundle of 
economic regulations dating from 1717 and 1727, which can be neatly 
summed up as ‘France’s answer to England’s Navigation Acts’.5 On this 
subject, Jean Tarrade remains the undisputed authority, and depicts a 
strongly mercantilist system of trade, which was nevertheless 
challenged from its very inception by smugglers, who quickly 
established a profitable contraband trade, or interlope.6 In this sense, 
                                                         
1 R. Pares, ‘Review: The Founding of the Second British Empire, 1763-1793’, English 
Historical Review, 68:267 (1953), p. 284. 
2 P.J. Marshall, ‘Britain without America- a Second Empire?’ in idem (ed.), The Oxford 
History of the British Empire, II (Oxford, 1998), p. 577. 
3 W.R. Louis, ‘Introduction’ in R.W. Winks (ed.), The Oxford History of the British 
Empire, V, p. 36. 
4 A. R. Pagden, Lords of all the Worlds (New Haven, 1995), p. 179-80. 
5 P. Cheney, Revolutionary Commerce (Cambridge, MA, 2010), p. 168. 
6 J. Tarrade, Le Commerce Colonial de la France à la Fin de l’Ancien Régime (Paris, 
1972), I, p. 96.  
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the criticism levelled by Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker that 
French historiography has remained a prisoner of l’Exlusif and the 
flawed though apparently ‘unquestioned’ framework of the nation-state 
is unfair.1 For Tarrade explores in some depth the clandestine Atlantic 
economy which developed in opposition to official French trade, and 
argues that it ultimately had a role to play in the eventual relaxation of 
French commercial legislation.2 L’exclusif was also, of course, 
undermined by physiocratic free-trade fervour.3  
 
Merchant disapprobation of the trading restriction has, however, been 
questioned in more recent historiography. Initially, at least, private 
merchants campaigned in favour of the regulation, highlighting the 
complex interplay of interests which informed colonial political 
economy in particular. It is well to remember that, in spite of free trade 
sentiment, enthusiasm for mercantilist regulation, or even a mixture of 
the two apparently conflicting ideas, existed simultaneously.4 Paul 
Cheney also highlights metropolitan merchant opposition to the 
relaxation of trade regulation. This generally centred on the protection 
of the French ‘commerce national’.5 Again, the issue of where the 
national interest lay became a point of debate on which arguments for 
and against changes to political economy rested.  
 
Cheney however, chimes in with Tarrade’s narrative when it comes to 
opposition to l’exclusif, which he also argues was endogenous to the 
restrictive regime.6 The Seven Years’ War, and the lack of resistance to 
British occupation displayed by the French inhabitants of some West 
Indian islands is seen by Tarrade and Cheney as the turning point in the 
                                                         
1 P. Linebaugh and M. Rediker, The Many-Headed Hydra (London, 2000), p. 7; C.L. 
Miller, The French Atlantic Triangle (Durham, NC, 2008), pp. 31-2. 
2 Tarrade, Le Commerce Colonial, I, pp. 331-2. 
3 P. Røge, ‘A Natural Order of Empire: The Physiocratic Vision of Colonial France after 
the Seven Years’ War’ in S.A. Reinert and P. Røge (eds.), The Political Economy of 
Empire in the Early Modern World (Basingstoke, 2013), pp. 46-7. 
4 J. Howes Webster, ‘The Concerns of Bordeaux’s Merchants and the Formation of 
Royal Commercial Policy for the West Indies’, Proceedings of the Western Society for 
French History, 2 (1974), p. 12. 
5 Cheney, Revolutionary Commerce, p. 170. 
6 Ibid, p. 169. 
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attitude of the French government. For the apparent defection of 
colonials caused alarm in the metropole.1 As with the Channel Islands in 
this period, island allegiances had the disturbing potential to ‘oscillate’ 
as their own interests demanded.2 This chapter carefully examines 
some of the particulars of the relaxation of French economic regulation 
after 1763. It concludes that the attitudinal shift on the part of the 
French government was, however, limited by its own faith in French 
production and commercial capacities.  
 
Overall, the chapter argues that national sentiments in the colonies had 
long been compromised by stringent economic regulation that stifled 
local economic interests. However, in both the British and the French 
case, local authorities attempted to articulate the problem in patriotic 
terms, as Renaud Morieux has shown was also the norm in the context 
of the Channel Islands and Dunkirk.3 Often they repeated mercantilist 
claims about the national good, but also referred to the indispensability 
of free trade when it came to the survival of overseas territories. Still 
implicit was the importance of the colonial contribution to the national 
good. Meanwhile, the attitudes of the two metropoles were not always 
sympathetic, particularly in wartime.  
 
It is argued that in Britain, however, a shift was taking place, as 
confidence in the national capacity to produce and sell its wares abroad 
increased, in policy-making circles at least. In this sense, the chapter 
agrees with Harlow’s timing of the founding of the second empire. 
Meanwhile, although the French legislature was also relaxing economic 
regulation after the Seven Years’ War, it seemed to place its confidence 
in quite different competencies. The French ministry was particularly 
unwilling to admit potential limits to its capacity to produce a sufficient 
supply of grain for the metropole, the colonies and beyond. Therefore, 
                                                         
1 Ibid, p. 178. 
2 R. Morieux, Une Mer pour deux Royaumes (Rennes, 2008), p. 245. 
3 Ibid, p. 252.  
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the regulatory changes documented in this chapter offer an insight into 
the changing perceptions of the economic identity of the two nations.  
 
In order to understand the colonial predicament, the first section 
outlines the productive capacity of the West Indies, and the dependence 
of white populations in particular on food imports, especially flour. It 
sketches the plight of the French West Indies, which were unable for 
practical reasons to depend on a grain trade with the French mainland 
colonies, and for legal reasons on British trade. They often turned to 
smuggling, which is the focus of the second section. Having considered 
some of the key influences on the French legislature in the first section, 
it is the sway and preferences of various interest groups on the British 
side that are explored in the second. This section develops the idea of 
economic freedom in relation to obedience to the centre, and the 
dilemma which colonials faced when their rational interests failed to 
align with national allegiance. The final section considers arguments in 
favour of and against deregulation and free ports in the British and 
French colonies after the Seven Years’ War, particularly in terms of the 
limits of the so-called national good. Therefore, the chapter develops 
the idea of interest and national cohesion discussed in the previous two 
chapters, and begins to explore how these issues could inform ideas of 
national identity and inclusion (or exclusion).  
  
The Sugar Island Situation 
 
By the mid-eighteenth century the Caribbean island colonies of both 
Britain and France found themselves in much the same predicament: 
they were unable to produce their own livestock, meat, wheat flour, or 
lumber.1 The islands enjoyed a tropical climate, which was unsuitable 
for the production of European staple crops. However, because of this 
hot and humid weather, the French and British West Indies could 
                                                         
1 C.P. Gould, ‘Trade Between the Windward Islands and the Continental Colonies of the 
French Empire, 1683-1763’, The Mississippi Valley Historical Review, 25:4 (1939), p. 
473. 
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produce tropical goods, often sugar cane, but sometimes indigo, cotton, 
cocoa or coffee.1 The islands could achieve a level of productivity out of 
proportion to their size and population thanks to the exploitation of 
slave labour, and the fact that the islands were generally given over to 
monocultural production of cash crops.2  
 
This meant, therefore, that the food of the slaves and of the plantation 
owners or managers mostly had to be imported. Generally, however, 
planters also gave a little of the least productive land over to the 
cultivation of tropical food crops. These included yams; peas; plantains; 
and cassava, also known, especially in French, as manioc.3 Provision 
grounds were especially prevalent on large islands with hilly terrain 
unsuited to sugarcane cultivation, such as Jamaica.4 Food crops were 
grown to supplement slave diets, which otherwise mainly consisted of 
imported rice or corn, plus salted meat or low-quality fish provisions 
for their protein value.5  
 
The white population, by comparison, was dependent upon on flour, 
fresh meat and other higher-quality foodstuffs, which had to be 
imported onto the islands. They depended also on imports for 
manufactured goods, clothing and plantation equipment.6 This 
predicament was, as Clarence Gould has shown, easily solved in the 
case of the British West Indies, thanks to the establishment of stable 
colonies on the American mainland.7 The port books of Jamaica and 
Barbados attest to the healthy exchange between the islands and the 
                                                         
1 Tarrade, Commerce Colonial, I, pp. 26-28. 
2 B.F. Tobin, ‘“And there raise Yams”: Slaves’ Gardens in the Writings of West Indian 
Plantocrats’, Eighteenth-Century Life, 23:2 (1999), pp. 164-5. 
3 M. Mulcahy, Hurricanes and Society in the British Greater Caribbean, 1624-1783 
(Baltimore, 2006), p. 104; B. Mandelblatt, ‘A Transatlantic Commodity: Irish Salt Beef 
in the French Atlantic World’, History Workshop Journal, 63:1 (2007), p. 20. 
4 A.J. O’Shaughnessy, An Empire Divided (Philadelphia, 2000), p. 59.  
5 R. Bean, ‘Food Imports into the British West Indies: 1680-1845’ in V. Rubin and A. 
Tuden (eds.), Comparative Perspectives on Slavery in New World Plantation Societies 
(New York, 1977), p. 587. 
6 Tarrade, Commerce Colonial, I, p. 29. 
7 Gould, ‘Trade Between the Windward Islands and Continental Colonies’, p. 473. 
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mainland, which saw copious supplies of flour and other provisions 
ferried to the islands especially from Philadelphia and New York.1  
 
However, the French island planters could not rely on a similar 
relationship with French colonies in Canada and elsewhere. This was 
because powerful lobbying by the merchants of the French Atlantic 
ports had pressurised the French government into discouraging 
Canadian exportation of any product that France could supply.2 Besides 
this obstruction, however, it seems that a long-term subsistence trade 
between Canada and the island colonies was unprofitable for the 
islands. It was unbalanced as, collectively, plantation owners struggled 
to offset their own massive demand for foodstuffs against the relatively 
small Canadian demand for West Indian products such as molasses and 
rum.3  
 
Moreover, although Canada had once been regarded by the French 
metropole as a potential recourse for the island colonies in times of 
emergency and shortage,4 Canada’s own agricultural economy was not 
that stable. In 1752 Canada’s French settlers were obliged to import 
approximately 6,728 barrels together with 11,000 quintals of flour 
from Bordeaux for their own consumption.5 Canada was never able to 
fulfil the role in the French imperial economy that the Thirteen Colonies 
offered to the British by supplying the Caribbean islands. 
 
Legally, however, the French planters of the West Indies were not 
supposed to turn to foreigners to supply their subsistence needs either. 
Under the supervision of Colbert as Ministre de la Marine (essentially 
the secretary of state for naval and colonial affairs), laws of 1670 and 
                                                         
1 In 1763, for example, New York and Philadelphia officially shipped over 18,000 
barrels of flour and 4000 barrels of bread to Jamaica. TNA CO 142/18: Shipping 
Returns, Jamaica, 1762-5. 
2 Gould, ‘Trade Between the Windward Islands and Continental Colonies’, p. 478. 
3 B. Mandelblatt, ‘How Feeding the Slaves shaped the French Atlantic’ in Reinert and 
Røge (eds.), The Political Economy of Empire, p. 205. 
4 D. Miquelon, ‘Canada’s Place in the French Imperial Economy’, French Historical 
Studies, 15:3 (1988), p. 436. 
5 ‘Annexe E’ in L. Dechêne, Le Partage des Subsistances au Canada sous le Régime 
Français (Montreal, 1994), p. 203. 
Daisy Gibbs  135 
  
1671 rendered direct trade between the French colonies and foreigners 
illegal.1 Seeing commerce as ‘war by other means’, Colbert aimed to 
ensure that France dominated colonial trade, depriving competitors, 
such as the Dutch, of their share in this supposedly fixed and sugary 
cake.2 
 
Regulations such as these also stemmed from an approach to empire 
which determined that the main role of the colonies was to enrich and 
empower the metropole. Supporters of the restriction of colonial trade 
could always fall back on the writings of Montesquieu, who had alluded 
to this justification for trade restrictions placed on the colonies.3 In The 
Spirit of the Laws, he argued that, in spite of the ancient mode of 
settlement, contemporary European colonies were designed for one 
purpose: 
 
…trade under better conditions than could be had with neighbouring 
peoples, with whom all advantages are reciprocal. It is established that the 
metropole alone may trade with its colonies; and this is with good reason, 
because the aim of their establishment was the enlargement of trade, and 
not the foundation of a town or a new empire.4  
 
The benefits, however, were apparently not all one-sided. In exchange, 
the centre offered protection, patronage, and survival to the colonies: 
 
the disadvantage of the colonies, which lose freedom of trade [la liberté du 
commerce], is visibly compensated for by the protection of the metropole, 
which defends them with its weapons, or maintains them with its laws.5 
 
                                                         
1 Mandelblatt, ‘How Feeding the Slaves shaped the French Atlantic’, p. 198. 
2 K.J. Banks, Chasing Empire across the Sea (Montreal, 2002), p. 24;  
3 This was a false interpretation according to Tarrade, Commerce Colonial, I, p. 87; 
Cheney, Revolutionary Commerce, p. 181. 
4 C.-L. de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu, De l’Esprit des Lois [1748], ed. R. Derathé 
(Paris, 1973), II, p. 60. 
5 Ibid , II, p. 60. 
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According to Montesquieu, European colonies were little more than 
trading posts, which owed their establishment and survival to their 
usefulness to the metropole. This attitude had clear iterations in 
practice and was rehearsed in the correspondence between the centre 
and colonies.1 
 
This position was elaborated upon even in the Encyclopédie, the ‘opus of 
the Enlightenment’, by François Véron de Forbonnais.2 Here he argued 
that the American colonies had been established only for the benefit of 
the metropole. It followed, he argued, that the founders were entitled to 
the profits of the colonies. These comprised of the fruits of colonial 
consumption of metropolitan goods and of the profits generated in their 
freight, together with all useful colonial products and all surplus 
generated by the exportation of these.3 The metropole therefore 
required exclusive trading rights in the colonies, which also had to 
remain directly dependent upon it and under its protection. This was 
because he thought that 
 
colonies would no longer be useful if they could survive without the 
metropole. Thus, it is a law inherent in the nature of the thing that the arts 
and cultivation in a colony must be limited to such and such objects, 
according to the convenience of the governing country.4 
 
Maintaining a metropolitan monopoly of the French Caribbean flour 
trade conformed precisely to this principle. The colonies were only 
useful in as far as they were obliged to make returns to the metropole, 
and without essential connections like that established by the 
exportation of French flour, this obligation was in danger of being 
forfeited.  
 
                                                         
1 ANOM, FM F2b 8, f. 75: Controller General to Montaran, dated 17th April 1765. 
2 Røge, ‘A Natural Order of Empire’, p. 46. 
3 F.V. de Forbonnais, ‘COLONIES’ in Encyclopédie, ou Dictionnaire Raisonné des 
Sciences, des Arts et des Métiers, par une Société de Gens de Lettres [1753], III (Geneva, 
1772), p. 650. 
4 Ibid. 
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Forbonnais reasoned further that to exchange colonial goods with 
anyone but the metropole, or to otherwise allow the wealth that they 
could generate to fall into the hands of foreigners constituted ‘theft 
from the metropole’.1 He moved the argument on slightly from 
Montesquieu’s simple explanation of the purpose of colonies. Distant as 
they were, in this discourse the West Indian sugar islands constituted 
French territory in a very real way; the product of the islands was 
French in as much as was the produce of Bordeaux or Picardy. This was 
borne out in practice by the relatively relaxed colonial tax regime2 and 
by grain regulation too. For although French grain law forbade the 
exportation of grain in any form to foreign nations until 1764, it 
implicitly allowed for the shipment of grain to the colonies to support 
the French people who lived there. In this sense, the national belonging 
of transatlantic subjects was confirmed in their entitlement to a share 
of this precious commodity from the metropole. The colonies, as a 
composite part of the nation, therefore, had to work in its interest. This 
meant sending valuable goods back to the metropole and not to rival 
nations.  
 
In his article on colonies, Forbonnais did not so much as refer to the 
slaves who were responsible for French plantation production.3 He 
simply failed to take the enslaved inhabitants of the sugar islands into 
account when he considered colonial population. Elsewhere, however, 
he referred to them as ‘unfortunate Africans’, and ‘another sort of 
population’ on the plantation islands.4 He agreed that slaves played a 
pivotal role in the productive capacity of the islands. He even admitted 
that they boosted the metropolitan economy by consuming French 
goods.5 However, it was becoming more and more important to justify 
their condition, and so he claimed that it was the law of African 
                                                         
1 Ibid. 
2 P. Butel, Histoire des Antilles Françaises (Paris, 2002), p. 125. 
3 M. Dobie, Trading places: Colonization and Slavery in Eighteenth-Century French 
Culture (Ithaca, 2010), p. 212.  
4 F.V. de Forbonnais, Élémens du Commerce (Leyde, 1754), II, pp. 32-3. 
5 Ibid, II, p. 33. 
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societies which gave ‘commerce the right to put a price on liberty’.1 The 
assumption was that civilised Europeans could not be enslaved and 
sold. The slaves, therefore, could not be French in spite of their 
contribution to the colonial system, which even Forbonnais 
acknowledged. 
 
These attitudes towards empire, together with Colbert’s laws formed 
the pattern for l’exclusif. This anachronistic term, which in fact has 
negative connotations similar to Adam Smith’s use of the term 
Mercantile System,2 has come to represent France’s system of colonial 
trading policy, enacted by letters patent of 1717 and 1727. This new 
legislation established a number of privileged French ports, the villes 
maritimes, from where trade with the French colonies was to be 
conducted exclusively and on a linear basis.3 Even supplies of Irish salt 
beef, on which the slave populations of the French sugar islands largely 
subsisted, had to be shipped via France in French ships.4  
 
This, coinciding with the termination of the monopoly rights of the 
French West India Company, suited the merchant communities who 
resided in the villes maritimes. These merchants made nothing of the 
apparent paradox between their disdain for the monopoly of the 
preceding system and their enthusiasm for regulations that restricted 
colonial commerce more or less to their own ships. In fact they liaised 
with the state through the ‘plunder’ of privileged companies in order to 
develop colonial commercial ties, which could never have been entirely 
privately funded.5 According to Charles Woolsey Cole, contemporary 
forays into free trade could only exist within a ‘mercantilist matrix’. 6  
Private traders advocated whatever mix of freedom and protection 
might foster their enterprises the most effectively. This same paradox 
                                                         
1 Ibid. 
2 Tarrade, Commerce Colonial, I, pp. 85-6. 
3 Cheney, Revolutionary Commerce, p. 168. 
4 Mandelblatt, ‘How Feeding the Slaves shaped the French Atlantic’, p. 202. 
5 P.H. Boulle, ‘French Mercantilism, Commercial Companies and Colonial Profitability’ 
in L. Blussé and F. Gaastra (eds.), Companies and Trade (Leiden, 1981), p. 116. 
6 C.W. Cole, French Mercantilism, 1683-1700 (New York, 1943), pp. 236-7.  
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seemed to characterise the relationship between entrepreneurialism 
and the state in other areas of the French economy, as Philippe Minard 
has shown in the case of French textile guilds.1  
 
When it came to shaping policy, the French merchants who served the 
West Indies had certain advantages. The value of their connections was 
made obvious by the wealth they derived from them. Trading links 
stimulated their personal enrichment and that of the privileged ports 
from where they conducted their operations. For example, Bordeaux, 
which played an important role in the triangular traffic that supplied 
the West Indies with provisions and slaves and returned to France 
loaded with sugar and other colonial articles, grew at an astonishing 
rate: where in 1700 the population stood at 45,000, by the end of the 
Old Regime it had grown to 110,000.2 The West Indies were especially 
prized amongst colonial possessions, on the part of the British 
metropole as well, simply because of the value of their products on the 
European continent. Here demand for goods such as sugar could only 
increase.3 In both cases the state, therefore, tended to be highly 
concerned with their prosperity. 
 
Unlike their colonial counterparts, the French merchants were in a 
position to form a powerful lobby, which played an important part in 
influencing French policy. Through local committees, known as the 
Chambers of Commerce, prominent merchants could reach the ear of 
the king himself, and the eighteenth century saw an increase in such 
communications, especially those pertaining to colonial matters.4 
Gould’s example of the merchant lobby’s success in thwarting the very 
possibility of a subsistence trade with Canada after 1708 reveals their 
strength and influence at the French centre.5 
 
                                                         
1 P. Minard, La Fortune du Colbertisme (Paris, 1998), p. 294. 
2 Butel, Histoire des Antilles, p. 118. 
3 Ibid; J.A. Henretta and G.H. Nobles, Evolution and Revolution (Lexington, 1987), p. 76. 
4 H.L. Root, The Fountain of Privilege (Berkeley, 1994), p. 27. 
5 Gould, ‘Trade Between the Windward Islands and Continental Colonies’, p. 490. 
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The right to export French sugar was not coveted on the basis of the 
value of the product alone. Trade for valuable colonial goods needed to 
be two-way, or else it would see French ships travelling outwards in 
ballast, rendering the entire trip less profitable. L’exclusif echoed the 
British Navigation Acts, in the sense that it demanded that French 
goods be carried in French ships. It has been shown that the key 
characteristic of the goods enumerated under the British Acts was their 
bulk and value, so that this regulation had more to do with the 
domination and monetisation of the shipping aspect of trade than of 
trade itself.1 Likewise, an important initial impetus for Colbert’s 
legislation in the area, after all, had been to exclude the Dutch from the 
carrying trade between Europe and the West Indies.  
 
In the immediate aftermath of the implementation of the new 
restrictions, faced with a shortage of food and diminished options for 
the sale of their own goods due to a lack of French shipping, however, 
the planters of Martinique could be heard to cry ‘long live the Dutch!’2 
Violent uprisings broke out on other islands in reaction to the 
restrictive legislation, which ultimately pushed up the price of 
subsistence on the islands, whilst depressing French sugar prices.3 
Resistance also manifested itself in more subtle ways, such as 
contraband trade. The French government and metropolitan merchants 
therefore faced strong opposition from the West India planters in their 
efforts to command transatlantic trade.  
 
However, the exclusive reliance of the colonies on France for their 
entire legal food supply could sometimes elicit opposition in the 
metropole, where colonial buyers were not always welcome. Even in 
years of abundant or normal supply, just the rumour that colonial grain 
acquisitions were to be made in a French region could cause disquiet. 
Thus when reports of colonial purchases at local markets began to 
                                                         
1 L.A. Harper, The English Navigation Laws (New York, 1939), p. 54. 
2 Butel, Histoire des Antilles, p. 53.  
3 Mandelblatt, ‘How Feeding the Slaves shaped the French Atlantic’, p. 203; Cheney, 
Revolutionary Commerce, p. 169. 
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circulate in Anjou in 1751, the Attorney General was forced to 
intervene. Confusion amongst different departments of state seemed to 
reign, and an administrator serving under the Ministre de la Marine had 
to explain that no commissions had been made for the colonies. He 
supposed that the colonial merchants were speculating on their own 
accounts, based on rumours of potential shortage.1 
 
Tensions already ran high when harvest failure merely appeared 
imminent. There were obvious fears that a scramble for resources 
might ensue. Nevertheless, throughout the very real subsistence crisis 
of the mid- to late-1760s, the records reveal continuing shipments of 
flour to Martinique, though there was some reaction to price shocks 
after 1766 as figure 10 below shows. 
 
Figure 10: Flour imported Legally at Martinique, 1765-1773. 
 
Source: ANOM FM C/8B/21 for 1765; C/8B/12 for 1766 and C/8B/18 for the 
years 1767-1773. Grain Prices from AN F20 105: ‘Prix Commun du Froment 
dans les 32 Généralités et la Ville de Paris’. 
 
This stands in stark contrast to the British case, where in times of 
dearth official export ceased and the encouragement provided by the 
bounty (which could be redeemed on grain shipped to British overseas 
possessions) was stopped.2 Clearly the French commitment to 
                                                         
1 BNF, JdF, 1129: Letter from Bouille to the Procureur Général, dated 14th August 1751. 
2 BL Add Mss 38387, ff. 33-52: ‘Account of the Quantity of the Different Species of Corn 
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provisioning its colonies was serious enough for it to continue even 
when the nation struggled to feed itself. However, these efforts were 
insufficient, and could not meet the needs of the plantations. The task of 
provisioning the colonies had become an important profit-making 
enterprise for merchants, which put them into conflict with colonials 
who would benefit profoundly from foreign intervention and 
competition in the market. These in turn sought other clandestine 




Forsaking French commerce, French planters found that they could 
supply their needs through a clandestine trade with the British, Dutch 
and other European traders who roamed the Caribbean in small ships.1 
Comparatively cheap sugar, the French found, was especially attractive 
to the British North Americans, whose surpluses of European-style 
agricultural staples were vast and growing.2 By the mid-eighteenth 
century, Paul Clemens has shown that the former tobacco planters of 
Maryland were beginning to diversify into grain, particularly wheat, 
production. This, he argues, can be accounted for by the stimulus of a 
growing demand for grain. This demand remained steady, where 
tobacco prices were often subject to worrisome fluctuation.3  
 
Clemens also discovered a large discrepancy between surplus grain 
production in the region and export figures from ports.4 Evidently, 
though some of the grain was perhaps travelling overland to other 
British settlements, some was probably being dealt clandestinely to the 
French. By the middle of the Seven Years’ War, the Maryland assembly 
felt the need to raise a petition outlining the ‘hardships’ which 
                                                         
1 C.C. Goslinga, The Dutch in the Caribbean and in the Guianas, 1680-1791 (Assen, 
1985), p. 190. 
2 T.M. Truxes, Defying Empire (New Haven, 2008), p. 3. 
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apparently resulted from rigid prohibitions placed by the Flour Act on 
the provisions trade with the French.1 The Board of Trade referred the 
matter to the Privy Council, which permitted provisions to be exported 
from Maryland to Madeira and to the territories of British allies, though 
crucially not to the French.2 
 
Generally, therefore, the British mainland colonies of North America, 
unlike the French equivalent, were able to supply the British West 
Indian islands with the grain supplies required to support the free and 
slave populations, and still have a surplus to carry on the so-called 
interlope trade with the French.3 Moreover, it seems that they were all 
too happy to oblige, given that there was no restriction on selling grain 
to foreigners before the Seven Years’ War.4 For, though grain was 
enumerated on the list of restricted European products (so that its 
import into Britain was restricted), it did not appear on the colonial 
list.5  
 
Nevertheless, trouble did arise when North American traders received 
French sugar and rum in exchange for these provisions. In a reversal of 
the French situation, where it was the merchants of the villes maritimes 
who played an active role in policy making, it seems that the interests of 
the British West Indian planters were those best represented in the 
British legislature. Their influence resided with absentee planters and 
those with commercial interests in the islands; the professional agents 
of colonial governments; and commission agents or London based 
merchants.6  
 
                                                         
1 Great Britain: Board of Trade, Journal of the Commissioners for Trade and Plantations 
(London, 1933), 1754-1758, p. 414. The Flour Act was imposed under 30 Geo II, c 9. 
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3 D. Watts, The West Indies (Cambridge, 1987), p. 275. 
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6 A.J. O’Shaughnessy, ‘The Formation of a Commercial Lobby’, HJ, 40:1 (1997), p. 72. 
Daisy Gibbs  144 
  
All of these were in a position to seek political influence through 
governmental back channels and early forms of lobbying. The sugar 
merchants of London, for instance, charged the representative of the 
West Indian planter interest, John Sharpe, with handing a ‘Memorial of 
the Sugar Planters, Merchants and Others interested in and trading to 
the Sugar Colonies, relating to the Illicit Trade carried on from the 
Northern Colonies to the French and Other Foreign Sugar Colonies’ 
directly to the Board of Trade for its consideration in 1750.1  
 
Merchant interests in the metropole were not always united with those 
of the planters however. Although commission merchants were a 
powerful force on the side of the planters, Sheridan reveals that by 
1713 many other metropolitan middlemen also were embroiled in 
contraband trade with France. This was because the growing demand 
for sugar in Britain outpaced the production efforts of British 
plantations, which also trailed behind the rapidly expanding 
productivity of the French sugar islands. Metropolitan sugar merchants 
therefore encouraged their agents to smuggle cheap foreign-produced 
sugar onto the British islands in exchange for manufactures and 
plantation supplies. The foreign sugar was then imported into Britain 
under the false auspices of having been produced on the islands from 
where it was shipped.2 As more planters turned to commission agents 
to make their overseas sales for them, however, the number of 
independent metropolitan sugar merchants with an interest in 
contraband declined, especially in London.3 
 
Nevertheless, it was noted by a West Indian representative that illicit 
French trade was ‘prejudicial to our own sugar colonies’, simply due to 
the competition the enemy islands posed.4 It was for this reason that 
the planters petitioned for an outright ban on French sugar, which 
                                                         
1 Great Britain. Board of Trade, Journal of the Commissioners for Trade and Plantations 
(London, 1932), 1749-1753, p. 103. 
2 R.B. Sheridan, ‘The Molasses Act and the Market Strategy of the British Sugar 
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3 Ibid, p. 79. 
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Daisy Gibbs  145 
  
would go further than the Molasses Act of 1733. This act had placed 
duties on foreign sugar imported into the North American colonies. 
Although the consumption of British sugar increased as a result of the 
Molasses Act, it was feared that this market continued to be 
undermined by smuggling.1  
 
According to John Sharpe, the trade between the American colonies and 
the French sugar islands was prejudicial to Britain in more than one 
way. It not only saw duties avoided, but also meant that the mainland 
colonies were exposed to sailcloth; linens; silk; spices; China; and other 
goods carried by French and Dutch, and not British, trade.2 Daniel 
Moore, an eyewitness to the illegal traffic at Saint Eustatius, suggested 
that it would only take four smallish vessels to strangulate the illicit 
trade carried on from Rhode Island and New England.3 Sharpe agreed 
that it would be relatively simple to clamp down on contraband trade, 
so long as the navy were empowered to make invasive searches of 
merchant vessels, and customs officials were steered by stricter 
controls and more enticing rewards.4  
 
However, it seems that the Lords of Trade took seriously their task of 
arbitrating between the varied colonial interests, inviting 
representatives of the northern colonies to make their case also. The 
agent of Massachusetts Bay, William Bollan, argued that the planters’ 
proposals ‘tended to the destruction of all North American trade, 
whether legal or illegal’.5 Meanwhile the agents for North Carolina and 
New York looked upon a ban on trade with the French as a ‘monopoly 
prejudicial to Great Britain and destructive of the birth right of the 
people of North America’.6 Generally, the North American agents were 
in agreement that the Molasses Act as it then stood was sufficient 
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regulation of the trade, so long as it was properly enforced. They mostly 
played down assertions of the level of smuggling in the region.1 
 
In general the West Indian interest drew on patriotic rhetoric, 
emphasising the French threat in the West Indies, and depicting 
smugglers of French sugar as traitors or ‘an enemy to his country… 
unworthy to be a member of civil society’.2 The losses incurred in 
Britain directly, by the evasion of tax, and, indirectly, through foreign 
penetration of a captive market for British goods, were exaggerated. 
The North Americans, on the other hand, tried to exonerate themselves 
from commercial malpractice, whilst emphasising the commercial 
needs of their own colonies and the dangers of monopoly there. 
Ultimately in this case, the board opted not to supersede the Molasses 
Act with even more restrictive regulation. The West Indian influence on 
the Board of Trade, therefore, was not invincible.  
 
In fact, the precise strength of formal West Indian representation 
within Parliament itself is also subject to debate. Estimates depend on 
how West Indians in Parliament can be defined; those at the lower end 
have tended to limit the category to those who had been born or spent 
time on the islands.3 Sheridan, however, included any member with a 
link to the islands, such as absentee owners or London based 
merchants who dealt with the islands. He estimates therefore that the 
interest was represented by some seventy MPs between 1730 and 
1775.4 Likewise, contemporary opinion, though subject to some 
possible exaggeration, tended to agree with less conservative estimates 
such as this. A Massachusetts Bay agent complained that the West India 
group could ‘turn the balance on which side they please’.5 The punitive 
                                                         
1 Ibid, p. 139. 
2 Quoted by R.B. Sheridan, Sugar and Slavery (Barbados, 1994), p. 57. 
3 B.W. Higman, ‘The West India “Interest” in Parliament, 1807–1833’, Historical 
Studies, 13:49 (1967), p. 4. 
4 Sheridan, Sugar and Slavery, p. 60. 
5 Quoted in L.M. Penson, The Colonial Agents of the British West Indies (London, 1924), 
p. 228. 
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Molasses Act, which was passed in 1733 largely at their behest, can be 
seen as a proof of their influence.1  
 
The merchant interest, however, was treated as somewhat suspect. 
Merchants were thought to consider solely their own commercial 
motives, where MPs, by comparison, were expected to be naturally 
more concerned with the good of the nation. Daeryoon Kim goes on to 
suggest that the idea of self-interest also informed Thomas Pownall’s 
understanding of a ‘general commercial interest’ which he supposed 
spawned the transnational market synergies of the New World.2 Clearly 
there were contemporary concerns that the loyalties of merchants and 
colonials could well be tested by their exposure to potentially free 
markets and trumped by their innate entrepreneurialism or greed. 
 
Pownall, for his part, contended that power over the colonies had to be 
found in linking the forces of patronage with executive power over 
colonial affairs.3 At the time of his writing, colonial patronage was a 
right which the Board of Trade – now deprived of its erstwhile leader, 
the Earl of Halifax – had lately lost. This, Pownall lamented, and Arthur 
Herbert Basye agrees, signalled the end of the board’s brief spell of 
influence and autonomy.4 Likewise, on the French side, Kenneth Banks 
seems to be in agreement that colonial administrators exchanged their 
services for patronage and deferred to the king. In the French case, the 
power to appoint and dismiss governors and intendants, as well as the 
various clerks and officers of the colonial administration, resided 
permanently with the Ministre de la Marine. His ministry also designed 
policy for the colonies, and was essentially a model of the integrated 
colonial executive, similar to how Halifax had striven to refashion the 
Board of Trade.5 
                                                         
1 Sheridan, Sugar and Slavery, p. 68. 
2 D. Kim, ‘Political Convention and the Merchant in the Later Eighteenth Century’ in P. 
Gauci (ed.), Regulating the British Economy, 1660-1850 (Farnham, 2011), p. 126; T. 
Pownall, The Administration of the Colonies (London, 3rd edn. 1766), p. 8. 
3 Pownall, Administration, p. 16. 
4 A.H. Basye, The Lords Commissioners of Trade and Plantations (New Haven, 1925), p. 
83.  
5 Banks, Chasing Empire, p. 187.  
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Nevertheless, this structure did not necessarily ensure obedience. 
Adherence to colonial policy depended upon the appeal of the 
metropolitan reward structure, which bound colonial officials to the 
homeland, and upon their alienation from the colony where they 
served. Initially Colbert had tried to ensure that the metropolitan 
representatives on the islands had no private interests there. If their 
interests grew homogenous with those of the créole population, then 
their loyalty to France could be questionable. There were evident 
qualms about the mutability of national sentiment, which apparently 
was not necessarily fixed at birth, but could eventually be shaken off or 
overawed by private interest.1  
 
Paul Butel suggests that the entanglement of colonial governors in the 
network of clandestine trade was part of that exact process of 
créolisation which Colbert had sought to avoid.2 Governors or 
intendants of the French islands occasionally attempted to make 
explicit exceptions to trading restrictions, by issuing so-called 
permissions. These allowed the entry of certain foreign goods in 
exchange for syrup and other colonial goods. In order for these 
documents to be ultimately approved, colonial authorities needed to 
convince the metropolitan government that they faced severe shortage 
and emergency.  
 
It seems, however, that these were still usually treated with suspicion 
in the metropole. In one instance, the governor of Guadeloupe, Nolivos, 
begged permission to import New England salted goods to address a 
critical shortage on the island. The central response, clearly suspecting 
fraud, was an inquiry into the reasons for the high price of salted beef in 
the first place, and the suggestion that, if beef was to be imported at all, 
it should at least be from Spanish territories.3 Later, a devastating 
                                                         
1 Morieux, Une Mer pour deux Royaumes, p. 256. 
2 Butel, Histoire, p. 133. 
3 ANOM, FM C7a27, f. 172: Letter to Minstre de la Marine Praslin from the Governor 
and Intendant of Guadeloupe, Nolivos and Moissac, dated 20th September 1766. 
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hurricane on Martinique would be used as a pretext for free trade in the 
French West Indies.1 The basic survival of the colonies was their key 
justification.  
 
Nevertheless, the governors and intendants of the French islands who 
did make certain exceptions to the rules seem to have been careful to 
restrict the practice to certain goods. Thus in 1750 Guadeloupe’s 
governor and intendant excused themselves for issuing permissions to 
import wood and other building materials from New England. They 
were sure to add, however, that they had known better than to permit 
salt-beef from the British colonies to land on the islands, and had taken 
special precautions to avoid this.2 Meanwhile, the syrup which they had 
offered in exchange was relatively useless in France, as its use in the 
production of liquor was banned in order to protect the brandy 
industry there.3 Evidently, though local authorities were trying hard to 
institute exceptions to l’exclusif even before the Seven Years’ War, this 
was only with regards to goods in which they believed the metropole 
had no special interest. Overall, it seems that there was greater 
emphasis in mercantile rhetoric and in the legislative reality on some 
commodities than others, and flour numbered with salted beef amongst 
those cherished by French protectionist political economy. 
 
Even contraband trade took place with the complicity of local 
government or customs officials, through the falsification of official 
paperwork. For example, French colonials could hide contraband trade 
through the use of loopholes in the legislation which established 
l’exclusif. Banks has shown that, after the laws were imposed, there was 
a marked increase in the number of apparently storm-damaged foreign 
ships seeking emergency refuge in the French West Indian island ports. 
Landing for repairs was permitted on a technicality under l’exclusif. In 
                                                         
1 Tarrade, Commerce, I, p. 306. 
2ANOM, FM C9a 83: Letter from Conflans and Maillart to the Ministre de la Marine, 
dated 6th July 1750. 
3 A-P. Blérald, Histoire Économique de la Guadeloupe et de la Martinique (Paris, 1986), 
p. 18. 
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spite of apparent outward compliance with the rules, such as the 
commissioning of new frigates to patrol the shores,1 island officials 
were obviously conspiring to falsify the records and usher in 
clandestine trade.2 Likewise the books were also sometimes 
manipulated to allow French ships to trade on the neutral Dutch 
entrepôt islands of St Eustatius and Curacao, which served as 
cosmopolitan meeting points for traders of all European settlements in 
the region.3 
 
All of this smuggling was much to the chagrin of the legally authorised 
French merchants. They advanced petitions and letters of complaint to 
the Ministre de la Marine, usually calling for tighter controls of the 
region. In 1754, one of these complained that at Guadeloupe  
 
large and small ships, English and Dutch, come directly to the island, and 
load up with raw sugar, syrups, tafias, coffee and ginger in exchange for 
rejected slaves, poor quality cod for the slaves, salted mackerel, beef, 
butter and flour.4 
 
The petition emphasised not only the lost trade, but also the types of 
ships involved. As Klooster has put it, ‘it takes two to smuggle’,5 and in 
this case, the contraband trade, so the merchants argued, was not the 
preserve of small boats conducting covert operations. Large British and 
Dutch ships were directly approaching the coastline, apparently 
unopposed. The islanders, they implied, were so embroiled in the affair 
that they hardly bothered to keep it clandestine.  
 
                                                         
1 ANOM, FM C9a 83: Letter from Maillart to the Ministre de la Marine, dated 6th July 
1750. 
2 Banks, Chasing Empire, p. 177. 
3 K.J. Banks, ‘Official Duplicity. The Illicit Slave Trade of Martinique’ in P.A. Coclanis 
(ed.), The Atlantic Economy during the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries 
(Columbia, SC, 2005), p. 236. 
4 ANOM, FM C7a 17, f. 106: ‘Mémoire sur le Commerce Prohibé de la Guadeloupe’, 
dated 1754. 
5 W. Klooster, ‘Inter-Imperial Smuggling in the Americas, 1600-1800’ in B. Bailyn and 
P. Denault (eds.), Soundings in Atlantic History (Cambridge, MA, 2009), p. 141. 
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This interloper trade was carried on, the merchants continued, ‘in beef 
and flour to the detriment of French commerce’.1 Clearly there were 
personal gains at stake here. For example, a French merchant pined 
over the indigo bounty payments that he had lost as a result of the 
clandestine trade in that commodity.2 However this particular mémoire 
was addressed to a fellow merchant in Dunkirk, and had only come 
unexpectedly into the hands of the minister. In official papers, 
merchants generally chose their words carefully. In the Guadeloupe 
case they played on the losses sustained by the French metropolitan 
economy when its colonies, which they thought ought to have been 
captive markets, chose to purchase goods from rival nations.  
 
The international shipping trade, by virtue of simple engineering and 
the laws of physics, had to be a two-way street and the merchants’ 
concerns had to do with that element of commerce in general. The 
interloper trade was not only potentially injurious to the specified 
French trades, but to the entirety of their operations, as they needed 
products which they could exchange with the island planters for 
valuable colonial produce. They seem also, therefore, to have been 
insinuating that France’s commercial infrastructure, that is, French 
shipping itself, was at risk.  
 
Hence the merchants were also perhaps appealing to the notion of 
naval dominance. For the French saw the efforts of their merchants and 
their fishermen at sea (as did the British) as the foundation of a cheaply 
maintained yet strong and easily accessible naval force.3 With the 
islanders trading their own coveted produce with the Dutch and British 
in exchange for flour, the merchants of the Villes Maritimes clearly 
feared that they would soon be cut out of a very profitable loop. 
                                                         
1ANOM, FM C7a 17, f. 106: ‘Mémoire sur le Commerce Prohibé de la Guadeloupe’, 
dated 1754. 
2 ANOM, FM F2b 2: ‘Memoire au Sujet du Commerce Illicite que font les Navires 
Anglais et Hollandais aux Colonies Français’, dated 5th November 1749. 
3 J.-F. Brière, La Pêche Française en Amérique du Nord au XVIIIe Siècle (Montreal, 
1990), p. 247; I. Land, War, Nationalism, and the British Sailor, 1750-1850 (New York, 
2009), p. 84. 
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Nevertheless, they framed the issue as a national one, which threatened 
certain specific French outbound trades and its power particularly in 
wartime, and not one that concerned their private interests alone. 
 
When it came to wartime, the clandestine trade in flour and grain 
between British and French colonials became politicised in new ways. 
New York and other northern colonies, such as Massachusetts Bay and 
Rhode Island, had grown notorious for their smuggling.1 By 1756 the 
governors of the colonies were formally instructed by the Board of 
Trade to prevent provisions from leaving North America for French 
territories, a measure which many of the colonies ostensibly 
supported.2 For example, in 1755, the new governor of New York, 
Charles Hardy, was ordered to stifle the trade between ‘His Majesty’s 
subjects in the province of New York… and the French settlements in 
America’.3 Hardy was a military man, but even his immediate 
predecessor had been taking steps to suppress the trade.4 Anti-French 
sentiment, therefore, ruled in the top echelons of colonial authority. 
 
Over the course of the war, French shipping was driven off the seas, and 
the British aimed to push home the advantage by cutting off the French 
sugar islands from all lifelines. The French therefore resorted to neutral 
shipping,5 and it was here that one of the key weaknesses in the British 
enforcement of trade regulation was to be found. French planters now 
had no choice but to purchase their provisions at neutral entrepôts, 
such as the Dutch island of Saint Eustatius, which were supplied by 
North American merchants.6 The Board of Trade responded in 1757 
with an embargo, known as the Flour Act, on trade in provisions 
between British colonies and these islands. Colonial merchants had to 
pay exorbitant bonds to guarantee their arrival at British ports.7 The 
                                                         
1 Klooster, ‘Inter-Imperial Smuggling’, pp.142-4. 
2 Beer, British Colonial Policy, pp. 76-81. 
3 TNA CO 5/1128: ‘Instructions to Sir Charles Hardy as Governor of the Province of 
New York’, dated 3rd April 1755, instruction no. 85. 
4 Truxes, Defying Empire, p. 48. 
5 M. Schumann and K.W. Schweizer, The Seven Years War (London, 2008), p. 105. 
6 Truxes, Defying Empire, p. 59. 
7 Ibid, p. 73. 
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thrust of this new body of legislation, all of it carrying heavy penalties, 
was to ‘answer his Majesty’s intension of distressing the enemy’.1  
 
Merchants and corrupt customs officers, however, found ways of 
falsifying the official documents. Hardy, on his departure from the 
colony and his return to naval service, could only recommend that navy 
vessels be used to patrol the shores in order to catch their own 
countrymen in violation of the embargoes.2 The problem persisted 
under the strict Lieutenant-Governorship of Cadwallader Colden, who 
enthusiastically dealt with those traders who supplied the enemy 
because, he claimed, they ‘consider nothing but their private profit’.3  
 
It was only after 1760, when a significant number of ships could be 
spared, that the Royal Navy, as Hardy had suggested, began to be able to 
stem the problem.4 The emphasis of British attempts to control 
international trade in the region had shifted from restricting 
competition to compromising the very survival of the French colonies. 
Legislative attention had been redirected from sugars under the 
Molasses Act before the war, to grain under the Flour Act during the 
conflict, while justifications for the regulation of trade between British 
and French settlements became more concerned with tactical and 




With the conclusion of the Seven Years’ War, the British government 
and traders of the British colonies again began to anticipate the 
expiration of the Molasses Act of 1733, due in 1764.5 This offered the 
                                                         
1 ‘Lords of Trade to the Governors in America’, dated 9th October 1756 in E.B. 
O’Callaghan (ed.), Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York 
(Albany, NY & New York, 1856), VII, p. 162. 
2 ‘Sir Charles Hardy to the Lords of Trade’, dated 10th July 1757 in O’Callaghan (ed.), 
Documents, VII, p. 272. 
3 Lieutenant-Governor Colden to the Lords of Trade, dated 11th May 1762 in 
O’Callaghan (ed.), Documents, VII, p. 499. 
4 R. Middlekauff, The Glorious Cause (Oxford, 1982), p. 60. 
5 J.C. Miller, Origins of the American Revolution (Stanford, 1959), p. 99. 
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opportunity for North Americans to state their case in favour of a freer 
trade with foreign colonies. Thus Stephen Hopkins, governor of the 
Rhode Island and Providence plantations, duly petitioned the Board of 
Trade not to renew the act. This would allow the free importation of 
French molasses in exchange for British provisions and manufactures. 
The mainstay of his argument concerned the survival of the Rhode 
Island colony. Rhode Island, he argued, produced no staple exports, but, 
by virtue of the ‘goodness of its harbour and its convenient position for 
trade agreeing with the spirit of industry of the people hath in some 
measure supplied to the deficiency of its natural produce’.1  
 
Hopkins reasoned that a trade with the French for molasses could do no 
harm to either the trade of the British West Indies, nor of Britain itself. 
This was because, firstly, the colony received very little in the way of 
molasses from the British islands. Citing the Newport Customs House 
books for the previous year, Hopkins showed that only about 18 per 
cent of molasses imported came from British plantations. This was not 
a sufficient quantity to keep Rhode Island afloat in its vital exchanges 
with other colonies.2 Besides this, he contended that the French were 
not permitted by their own government to sell sugar, the main product 
of the British islands, to the British. The molasses trade therefore 
complemented, and did not compete with, British West Indian sugar 
production.3  
 
Secondly, he argued, these exchanges were generally favourable for 
British trade. This was because a significant proportion of the molasses 
imported into Rhode Island was traded with other British colonies for 
products manufactured in the metropole. The rest of the molasses was 
distilled into rum, and this was traded in Africa for slaves. He argued 
that here the Rhode Island rum had in fact supplanted a market for 
French brandy. Meanwhile, the slaves who were brought back to the 
                                                         
1 TNA CO 5/1276, f. 349: Governor Stephen Hopkins to the Board of Trade, 3rd 
February 1764. 
2 Ibid, f. 350. 
3 Ibid, f. 354. 
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Caribbean were often worth more than the molasses which the foreign 
islands could supply, which meant that the Dutch in particular were 
forced to offer Bills of Exchange, a ‘means of drawing from that 
Republic so much cash yearly into Great Britain as their bills amount 
to’.1 
 
Hopkins added that the colony was labouring under a massive debt as a 
result of its contribution to the war, ‘in which they manifested a spirit 
and loyalty far exceeding their ability’.2 The colony required a buoyant 
entrepôt trade in order to survive and to pay off the debts it had 
incurred in service to the centre. He concluded that without French 
molasses and the valuable rum it yielded, Rhode Island merchants 
would go bankrupt, and ‘a nursery of seamen at this time consisting of 
two thousand, two hundred in this colony only will be in a manner 
destroyed’.3 Meanwhile, the French had no metropolitan outlet for their 
molasses and the rum distilled from it, as it was banned in France in 
order to protect the brandy trade. However they could trade it with the 
Native Americans, thereby establishing stronger alliances and a tactical 
advantage there. Likewise, the fish which the French received in 
exchange for their molasses also checked any concerted effort on their 
part to develop fisheries that could serve as naval nurseries.4  
 
Hopkins’ appeal to patriotic and military values was unveiled. However, 
in his depiction of the Rhode Island colony as an entrepôt, he was also 
alluding to a different kind of economic activity and even identity to the 
one epitomised in the Molasses Act. Thomas Pownall was also aware of 
a disjuncture between what he called the ‘natural state’ and the 
‘artificial or political state’ of the American and West Indian colonies of 
Britain, France and others.5 In spite of their efforts, Pownall argued, the 
metropolitan governments could not restrain the natural state of the 
                                                         
1 Ibid, f. 351. 
2 Ibid, f. 352. 
3 Ibid, f. 352. 
4 Ibid, f. 354. 
5 Pownall, Administration, p. 7.  
Daisy Gibbs  156 
  
colonies, which would see them engaged in trade because of their 
inherently interconnected needs and interests. This was a force which 
compelled merchants to disobey their national governments, who in 
turn would in fact do best to 
 
…profit of, to possess, and to take the lead of it already formed and arising 
fast into dominion; it is our duty so to interweave those nascent powers 
into, and combine their influence with, the same interests which actuate 
our own government.1 
 
Ever the mercantilist, Pownall’s concern was for which European 
power would, essentially, be flexible enough to dominate and reap the 
benefits of what was basically already a de facto free trade situation.2 
His personal solution was to extend Britain into a ‘grand maritime 
dominion … united into one Empire, in one centre, where the seat of 
government is’.3 According to Pownall, colonies were no longer to play 
a subsidiary role, but ought to be placed on equal footing with the 
metropole, which was to extend full citizenship to colonials. 
 
This view had its echoes in his attitude to the regulation of the British 
grain trade. It was Pownall who, on 15th April 1772, brought the ‘Bill to 
Regulate the Importation and Exportation of Grain’ before the House of 
Commons on the part of a committee which had been considering the 
prolonged shortage of grain.4 A key point in the parliamentary agenda 
generally at this time was to put an end to the uncertainty of the 
current system of annually reviewed acts.5 Pownall himself strongly 
encouraged the simplification of the legislation regarding the grain 
trade and bounties, in order to reduce confusion and the opportunity 
                                                         
1 Ibid, pp. 8-9. 
2 Ibid, p. 9. 
3 Ibid, pp. 9-10. 
4 Great Britain Parliament, The Parliamentary History of England from the Earliest 
Period to the Year 1803 (London, 1813), XVII, p. 475. The bill became law under 13 
Geo III ch. 43. 
5 D.G. Barnes, A History of the English Corn Laws 1660-1846 (London, 1930), p. 41. 
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for fraud.1 However, in Parliament he also argued that the prevailing 
shortage of grain was in fact due to an increase in consumption. This 
was caused by growth in the manufacturing, retail and service sectors 
of the economy. Evidently he envisioned the metropole as a burgeoning 
tertiary economy, and one which could amply supply its colonies with 
manufactures.2 
 
However, he also argued in favour of encouraging the agricultural 
sector in order to continue to supply both the domestic market and the 
European market with grain. Although he recognised that the 
importation of grain had a role to play in the stabilisation and growth of 
the British economy, he was keen that these imports should not 
‘interfere with our own corn’.3 In fact, it was very important to Pownall 
that ‘British markets’ were established on as many foreign shores as 
possible, and he extended this ambition of market penetration to 
colonial trade. As far as he was concerned, the colonies could easily 
‘become an occasion of establishing that British market in foreign 
countries’.4 He therefore encouraged colonial trade with foreigners on a 
laissez-faire basis, as long as proper duties were paid. For this he 
vaguely advocated the establishment of a ‘British House’, a sort of 
trading post cum customs house, installed on foreign shores, through 
which colonial and British trade would be channelled. 
 
The ultimate expression of mercantilist projections for colonial free 
trade, however, manifested itself in schemes for free ports. Pownall did 
not mention them, but in a propaganda piece justifying the recent 
Caribbean acquisitions after the Treaty of Paris of 1763, John Campbell 
briefly considered the issue.5  His analysis addressed the Dutch 
example. He suggested tentatively that the free port system was useful 
                                                         
1 T. Pownall, ‘Memoir drawn up and laid before the Lords Commissioners of the 
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3 Pownall, ‘Memoir’, p. 311. 
4 Pownall, Administration, p. 185. 
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in the context of Dutch trading patterns and commercial economy, but 
that for an industrious and production oriented economy like that of 
the British, the system may not be suitable. ‘The Dutch’ he argued ‘are 
gainers by their commerce, we by our plantations. They thrive by the 
labour of other nations, we are become rich and potent, by the industry 
of our own’.1 Evidently Campbell preferred to err on the side of caution, 
and the side of the West-Indies plantation owners, who would tend to 
argue that the freedom of commerce exemplified in a free port was a 
dangerous prospect. 
 
However, the Dutch model was also the basis for Campbell Dalrymple’s 
free port scheme. As Governor of Guadeloupe during the British 
occupation, he was inspired by the commercial activity which he 
observed on the Dutch entrepôt island of Saint Eustatius. The island had 
apparently ‘imported more sugars into Europe during the last six years, 
tho a barren rock, than the most fertile colony’.2 This was because of the 
desperation of the French planters, who sold their produce illegally 
there. As another projector put it, they were ‘bred to smuggle’ and the 
officials on French islands could be easily induced to ‘relax in their duty, 
they being mostly the neighbours & relations of these Adventurers [i.e. 
smugglers], & are themselves planters’.3 Such a description, which 
emphasises the uprooted and discarded nationalism of participants in 
contraband trade, echoes justifications of dealings with British 
smugglers on the French coast documented by Morieux.4 The fact that 
the French were subverting and even betraying their own government 
seems to have helped to moderate their status as enemies.  
 
However, the point of the free ports was to allow not just the French, 
but traders and ships of any nationality free entry to the market. Here 
foreign sugars were expected to be exchanged for British manufactures 
                                                         
1 J. Campbell, Candid and Impartial Considerations on the Nature of the Sugar Trade 
(London, 1763), p. 150. 
2 Add Mss 38200, f. 260: Dalrymple to the Earl of Bute, 27th February 1763. 
3 Add Mss 33030, f. 253: ‘Thoughts on the Expediency of opening the Ports of 
Dominique, by a Person who resided some Years at St Eustatius’. 
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and North American provisions and lumber. The sugar would then be 
exported to Europe in British ships, paying a duty, by which Dalrymple 
expected the British to ‘reap all the advantages of their islands without 
conquering them’.1 In the aftermath of the burdensome Seven Years’ 
War, it was Dalrymple’s intension to advance useful applications for the 
relatively undesirable islands which Britain had retained at the expense 
of returning the bountiful islands of Martinique and Guadeloupe to the 
French. The West Indian islands had proven expensive to conquer and 
defend, but Dalrymple proposed to enjoy the benefits of the more 
productive islands without the setbacks of defence. He emphasised also 
the tactical advantages of providing the French islands with their sole 
lifeline for vital supplies.2 Apparently he overlooked the difficulties 
with which British authorities in the North American colonies were met 
when they had tried to cut off the subsistence trade during the war.  
 
The idea met with little success under the Bute ministry, but fared 
better under Rockingham. Frances Armytage suggests that this can 
perhaps be explained by the willingness of government under that 
ministry to properly consult merchants for the first time. This was 
certainly, she explains, the reasoning offered by Edmund Burke.3 The 
merchants of the North American colonies, and those with interests 
there, also linked up their own concerns with those of British 
manufacturing interests in Bristol, Liverpool, Lancaster, Manchester 
and London, who submitted their own petitions.4  
 
Though the free port scheme seems to have been genuinely popular 
with merchants,5 this strategy in fact resembled one employed by West 
Indian merchants when tackling the monopolies of chartered 
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companies almost a century before. In this case the lobbying group 
resorted to linking up with independent British petitioners and 
insisting, essentially, on every free British person’s right to be 
productive and profitable, associating free trade with the rights of a 
subject in a non-absolutist constitution.1 Interestingly the French 
merchants who had challenged the monopoly of the Compagnie de la 
Guinée and the Compagnie de l’Occident at the beginning of the century 
had also tended to align themselves with public liberty and gain, even 
within an apparently absolutist setting.2 In both cases, freedom to 
participate in trade and self-interest were depicted as new and 
emerging approaches to securing the public good of the metropole in a 
now established colonial situation.  
 
Pownall’s new allegiance to free trade, in particular, has been counted 
by Anthony Pagden as part of an intellectual trend of the Enlightenment 
which transformed inclinations towards colonial subjugation into a 
preference for a federal relationship.3 As Paul Cheney has also shown, 
as the wealth generated by the colonies grew ever more important to 
the metropole, the exclusive rights of the centre became harder and 
harder to justify.4 Soon the right to gain was repeated by the British 
North Americans, who considered themselves entitled to the same, and 
by French colonials and physiocrats alike. François Quesnay, for 
instance, under the nom de plume of M. de l’Isle, envisioned an 
unrestricted trading zone within a ‘monarchical empire’ where all 
subjects could enjoy equal economic privileges.5 In these accounts, 
therefore, the national good shifted beyond metropolitan concern and 
was encapsulated in the right of all subjects everywhere to profit. 
 
                                                         
1 W.A. Pettigrew, Freedom’s Debt (Chapel Hill, 2013), pp. 73; 87-9. 
2 Cheney, Revolutionary Commerce, p. 172.  
3 Pagden, Lords of all the Worlds, p. 155. 
4 Ibid, p. 184. 
5 ‘Lettre de M. de L'Isle et Remarques sur l'Opinion de l'Auteur de l'Esprit des Lois 
concernant les Colonies’ in A. Oncken (ed.), Oeuvres Économiques et Philosophiques de 
F. Quesnay (Frankfurt, 1888), p. 433. 
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According to Pagden, ideas of freedom, commerce and federation all 
quickly became very closely connected. Commerce and productivity 
were seen to be best encouraged by personal freedom within a republic, 
which itself had to be free to engage properly in commerce.1 Sallust and 
Machiavelli had long ago established this link maintaining that, without 
a jealous king to sustain, citizens were free to pursue the common 
good.2 Unfortunately, this salutary effect was soon overwhelmed by the 
pursuit of personal gain and glory, which ended in a renewed tyranny 
of the individual. This was particularly manifest in the example of 
Lucius Sulla, whose oversized army, afforded by and drunk on the 
proceeds of foreign conquest, returned to subjugate Rome.3 Freedom 
and empire were not altogether, therefore, a stable coupling. As 
imperial domination crumbled, the links between centre and periphery 
had to be based instead on ‘loyalties sustained by a common cultural 
identity and a common purpose’.4 
 
However, though British schemes for free ports would seem to have 
embraced these principles, they nevertheless continued to rely on a 
certain assumption of the primacy of the metropolitan economy. The 
most important scheme for a free port system in the Caribbean was that 
penned by John Huske, formally a Boston merchant and the MP who 
eventually brought the bill.5 Here he echoed the notion already put 
forward by Stephen Hopkins that the North American colonies required 
access to foreign colonial sugar markets in order to pay for their basic 
dependence on British goods. In fact, he argued,  
 
there is not a period since the establishment of the Northern Colonies in 
which they would not have demanded much more [British goods] than 
they have done, could they have found out ways to have paid for such 
demand.6  
                                                         
1 Pagden, Lords of all the Worlds, p. 191. 
2 Q. Skinner, Liberty before Liberalism (Cambridge, 1998), p. 62. 
3 Ibid, pp. 64-5. 
4 Pagden, Lords of all the Worlds, p. 191. 
5 Armytage, The Free Port System, 37; Basye, The Lords Commissioners, p. 153.  
6 Add Mss 33030, f. 318: ‘Mr Huske’s Scheme for Free Ports in America’, undated.  
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This was also an acceptance of the economic system as described by 
Pownall, where the production oriented metropole sold goods to a 
captive market, which funded this more or less one-way consumption 
through independent economic activity within its own sphere of 
operations: the Caribbean. The key point was that the ‘Interest of 
England & Her Colonies [were] one’.1 However, this was because the 
wealth generated by essentially independent colonial interests was 
supposedly transferred back to the centre in exchange for 
manufactures. It was the expected returns that made a system of two or 
more separate economic identities and interests within one empire an 
acceptable prospect to the metropole, and which justified free trade.  
 
Later, for Josiah Tucker it was not even essential that the metropole and 
colonies should remain connected by their ‘imaginary Tie of an Identity 
of Government’.2 He argued that an independent America could remain 
a market for British goods, ‘because it is evident, that the Colonies could 
not purchase Goods at a cheaper rate at any other European Market’.3 
Thanks to smuggling, Tucker argued, the American colonies enjoyed a 
free trade already.4 It was only Britain’s prowess in manufacture and 
navigation that granted the centre a market in its colonies at all. Tucker 
conceived of an independent America where, nevertheless, a colonial 
situation – one where the metropole exploited the enterprise of its 
dependents – would persist even under a free trade arrangement.  
 
The act was rushed through Parliament in the dying days of the 
Rockingham ministry, though much deliberation took place outside 
Parliament. In fact a preliminary agreement between North American 
and West Indian merchant groups had been signed in the King’s Arms 
                                                         
1 D. de Berdt (London agent of the Massachusetts House of Representatives, from 
November 1765 to April 1770) to William Smith, dated March 1766 in Publications of 
the Colonial Society of Massachusetts, 13 (1912), p. 314. 
2 J. Tucker, ‘Four Tracts, Together with two Sermons, on Political and Commercial 
Subjects’ [1774] in The Collected Works of Josiah Tucker (London, 1993), II, p. 209. 
3 Ibid, pp. 198-9.  
4 Ibid, p. 200. 
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Tavern on March 10th 1766.1 The West Indian interest agreed to the 
free port compromise, as the planters themselves were eager to allow 
Spanish vessels loaded with bullion into West Indian ports.2 Even then 
the agreement read that ‘the Freeport at Dominica for Goods of foreign 
American Growth etc.’ was ‘to be proposed for consideration but not 
absolutely determined whether to pass it or not this Session’.3 Free 
trade, self-interest and the stability of the colonies were apparently not 
the irresistible forces of nature that pamphleteers and others tried to 
portray, and the West Indian planters remained uncertain about 
surrendering their claim to monopoly.  
 
Colonial freedom to trade with foreigners was also increasingly an issue 
for the French metropole. Cheney has highlighted in particular the 
commercial freedom under British rule which some French West 
Indians, particularly the planters of Guadeloupe under Dalrymple, 
enjoyed during the Seven Years’ War. Not only had the planters 
experienced freer trade, but they had also witnessed the failure of the 
centre to provide protection from the enemy.4 This spell of British rule 
and the new and cherished trading links which accompanied it, was 
apparently a period of ‘treason or benevolent neutrality’ on the part of 
the planters.5 After the war, the commercial or economic bodies on the 
islands, which had taken on new importance during the occupation, 
were reproached for their collaboration with the enemy and some were 
dissolved.6  
 
The economic independence of the islands was clearly a matter of 
concern for the metropole. After the war even the cultivation of manioc 
crops on the part of slaves in Guadeloupe came in for official censure.7 
                                                         
1 Armytage, The Free Port System, p. 42. 
2 Ibid, pp. 31-2. 
3 Add Mss 33030, f. 243: ‘Agreement of the West Indian Committee. Endorsed by 
House of Commons, May 8th 1766’. This noncommittal appendage was, however, 
omitted in the fair copy, Add Mss 33030, f. 245. 
4 Cheney, Revolutionary Commerce, p. 177. 
5 S.L. Stein, The French Slave Trade in the Eighteenth Century (Madison, 1979), p. 31. 
6 Banks, Chasing Empire, pp. 207-8. 
7 ANOM, FM C7a27: ‘M. Moissac rend Compte a Monsieur par sa Lettre du 28. Mai 
dernier de la Tournée qu’il a faite dans toute la Colonie’, dated 8th August 1766. 
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The Ministre de la Marine condemned the practice of giving slaves time 
on Saturdays away from sugar production for this purpose on the 
grounds that it might lead to slave-rebellion. Evidently the link between 
self-sufficiency and rebellion was not lost on the metropolitan 
authority. 
 
French colonials, including governors, however, often looked upon and 
portrayed foreign trade as something of a vital lifeline. The 
controversial créole observer, Hilliard d’Auberteuil, even claimed that 
the survival and war effort of the island of Saint-Domingue, which was 
not occupied by British forces during the war, had depended on 
contraband grain. For ‘it was on the flour landed by Dutch and English 
ships that the soldiers were fed as long as the war lasted’.1 In this way, 
d’Auberteuil implied that grain could be secured from other sources 
apart from France, without compromising the loyalty of the island 
population.  
 
Financially, the crown’s commitment to colonial subjects was also 
evidently less than credible. In the course of the Seven Years’ War, the 
crown failed to honour over half of its debt issued in Canadian bills of 
exchange, ultimately paying only 37,607,000 livres of the 90 million it 
owed. The costs of warfare in the region had spiralled out of control. 
Not only had the government to pay for the troops and their costs, but 
this was also compounded by the increasing costs of shipping in 
wartime conditions and inflation of the bills due to the crown’s less 
than perfect track record of redeeming them. However, Jean-Francis 
Bosher shows that the authoritarian apparatus of state was employed 
to discredit both the creditors and the debt itself, as prominent 
Canadian officials were accused and condemned for corruption.2  
 
                                                         
1 H. d’Auberteuil, Considérations sur l’État Présent de la Colonie Francaise de Saint-
Domingue (Paris, 1776), I, p. 285. 
2 J. F. Bosher, ‘The French Government’s Motives in the Affaire du Canada, 1761-1763’, 
English Historical Review, 96:378 (1981), pp. 73-8. 
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With the final loss of Canada, the French subjects of the West Indies had 
more of a case than ever before against the notion that French and 
inter-colonial trade alone could provide for their every need. This was 
especially plain to see when it came to cod. Cod had long been a 
controversial commodity, and after the Seven Years’ War, foreign cod 
had briefly been allowed into the colonies.1 The post-war Intendant of 
Guadeloupe, Jean-Louis-Honoré d'Hesmivy, baron de Moissac, 
commented on the trade returns, observing pointedly in March 1766 
that ‘the French merchants have not sent a single quintal of cod in the 
last three months, and yet the English have shipped 6,557 quintals 
here’.2 Throughout the period there were initiatives to protect the cod 
trade, which was seen as a source of French wealth, but also as a way of 
nurturing the French navy. However, the French cod trade, like the 
grain trade, was somewhat out of its depth when it came to providing 
for the colonies in the Antilles. In spite of a bounty scheme, France 
simply did not have the resources available in that region to feed the 
growing demand for cod there.3 
 
Moreover, this was not the only commodity for which the colonies 
wanted. In his letters, Moissac also urgently requested more shipments 
of salt beef and flour, apparently without much success, and later he 
complained that 
 
the commerce of France has almost entirely abandoned the colony, vital 
supplies are entirely lacking; flour and salted beef are at excessive prices; 
foreign cod is very rare and the bakeries are closing… if some French ships 
do not arrive soon we will be obliged to turn to foreigners.4  
  
                                                         
1 Tarrade, Commerce Colonial, I, p. 288.  
2 ANOM, FM C7a27: ‘Extrait de la Lettre écrit à Monsieur par M. de Moissac’, dated 8th 
March, 1766. 
3 J.-F. Brière, La Pêche Française, pp. 247-259. 
4 ANOM, FM C7a27, f. 115: ‘Extrait de la Lettre écrit à Monsieur par M. de Moissac’ 
dated 7th March, 1766; ANOM, FM C7a27: ‘M. Moissac rend Compte’, dated 8th August 
1766. 
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In spite of this, it seems that after the war the French metropole had 
been making renewed efforts to supply its colonies specifically with 
flour. The post-war period apparently saw an increase in French 
exports of wheat flour to the colonies: where in 1750 flour had made up 
just 5.7 per cent of the value of French cargoes, in 1765 this figure 
reached 12.1 per cent and hovered around this level for the next three 
years, in spite of metropolitan shortage at that time.1 In addition, more 
precautions were taken to provide stocks of flour for the King’s cache 
on Guadeloupe and to improve their shelf life by tarring the barrels or 
mixing their contents with salt.2 These supplies were supposed to 
support colonial resistance in wartime, removing the need for the 
colonists to resort to foreign grain.  
 
Meanwhile, shortly after the war and the loss of Canada, the then 
Minister of Foreign affairs, César Gabriel de Choiseul, duc de Praslin, 
orchestrated a new attempt to form a colony at Guiana. This ended in 
disaster, with the loss of more than fourteen thousand lives and almost 
thirty million livres.3 This failure proved all the more injurious when 
further catastrophe, in the form of a severe hurricane, struck the colony 
of Martinique. This time, with no viable alternative, the authorities of 
the island were forced to seek foreign assistance, particularly for 
supplies of flour and biscuit.4 When relief was not forthcoming from 
France, the island authorities spared no criticism in their letters: 
 
                                                         
1 ANOM, FM C7a16: ‘État des Bâtiments Marchands arrivés de France à la Guadeloupe 
pendant l'Année 1750 et des Marchandises et Denrées qu'ils y ont apportés’; ANOM, 
FM C7a25:‘État Général du Commerce de la Guadeloupe pendant l'Année 1765’; 
ANOM, FM C7a27: ‘État Général du Commerce de la Guadeloupe pendant l'Année 
1766’; ANOM, FM C7a28: ‘État Général du Commerce de la Guadeloupe pendant 
l'Année 1767’; ANOM, FM C7a29: ‘Etat Général du Commerce à la Guadeloupe pendant 
l'Année 1768’. 
2 ANOM, FM C7a27, f. 138: ‘Extrait de la Lettre écrit à Monsieur par M. de Moissac’, 
dated 20th February 1766.  
3 J.R. Hyles, Guiana and the Shadows of Empire (Lanham, 2014), p. 57. 
4ANOM, FM C8a 68, f. 57: ‘Ordonnance de MM. d'Ennery et de Peynier portant 
Permission, à la Suite de l'Ouragan du 13 Août, d'Introduire à la Martinique de la 
Farine et des Biscuits d'origine Étrangère’. 
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Four months passed, after the writing of our last letter, without a single 
French ship landing here; those which later arrived in succession had so 
little flour in their cargoes, that the colony could not feel the benefit of it.1 
 
Tarrade points out that this lack of support was hardly exceptional, and 
argues that it was the genuine needs of the colonists which led to 
something of a turning point in metropolitan policy.2 However, when in 
the Summer of 1767 the exclusif mitigé came into being under Praslin, it 
was essentially a compromise, which allowed the colonies to import 
certain foreign goods in exchange for rum, syrups and imported French 
manufactures. In fact, trade was still highly restricted and had to be 
conducted at the two newly established French entrepôts of Carénge on 
Sainte-Lucie and Môle Saint-Nicolas on Saint-Domingue.  
 
Though these ports now bore some resemblance to the Dutch and 
British free ports, they were not known by the equivalent French term, 
the port franc. In fact, Montesquieu had indicated that though free ports 
could work for republics, in extravagant monarchical societies like 
France they were ‘opposite to reason; for they could have no other 
effect than to free [the enjoyment of] luxury from the weight of taxes’.3 
Duties and regulations remained the order of the day. 
  
The new law was accompanied by two further pieces of legislation, one 
which removed several of the privileges of the Compagnie des Indes, and 
another which encouraged the French Atlantic cod trade. Where the 
first law which established the free-ports and the new system of 
l’exclusif mitigé had been a concession to the colonies, these two other 
laws passed on the same day were strongly in the favour of the 
metropole.4 The periphery therefore still did not gain an equal footing 
                                                         
1ANOM, FM C8a 68, f. 286: Letter from Ennery and Peynier, Governor and Intendant of 
the Windward Iles to Praslin, dated 8th May 1766. 
2 Tarrade, Commerce Colonial, I, p. 310. 
3 Montesquieu, Esprit des Lois, II, p. 10.  
4 Tarrade, Commerce Colonial, I, pp. 320-2. 
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with the centre, and the ‘rights of the colonies to prosperity’1 were far 
from absolute. 
 
At its base, l’exclusif mitigé, rather than a declaration of colonial rights, 
was an acknowledgement of French shortcomings. The wording of the 
preamble to the new regulation is interesting, because it explicitly 
admitted to the incapacity of the French metropole to provide 
everything its colonies could need. Thus it read: 
 
The French islands and colonies form the most important branch of the 
commerce of the kingdom; but they cannot be truly useful except by the 
prohibition of foreign trade and shipping on the aforementioned islands 
and colonies… it has nevertheless become indispensible to procure for 
these colonies the means of having certain merchandise of the first 
necessity, which the commerce of France cannot provide for them; and to 
open up several commodities which are useless to that same commerce.2 
 
However, the catalogue of merchandise which the French commerce 
could not provide, and which colonials were to procure from foreigners, 
was very limited. The new legislation restricted foreign purchases to 
livestock; skins; furs; leather; tar; and wood.3 Foreign grain and flour 
did not, therefore, number amongst the permissible goods. If the French 
government was prepared to admit that there were some items that it 
could not supply for its colonies, it was nevertheless implicitly 
upholding its exclusive right and reasserting its alleged capacity to 
supply all other commodities. This legislation placed grain together 
with cod, salt-beef and slaves within the metropole’s sphere of 
competence, revealing the metropolitan vision of the role of France’s 
economy within a global system. 
 
                                                         
1 G. Chaussinand-Nogaret, Choiseul (1719-1785) (Paris, 1998), pp. 212-3. 
2 Reprinted in M.L.E. Moreau De Saint Méry, Loix et Constitutions des Colonies 
Françoises de l’Amérique sous le Vent (Paris, 1784), V, p. 121. 
3 Ibid, p. 122. 




This period apparently saw the gradual relaxation of economic and 
commercial regulation of the British and French colonies. In the British 
case, the economic role of the colonies was indeed somewhat redefined. 
Here the shift from the Molasses Act of 1733 to the Free Port legislation 
enacted in 1766 would seem to represent the extension of British rights 
to the colonies and the inclusion of North America within that sphere of 
economic freedom.  
 
However, contemporary depictions actually portrayed the new freedom 
as a redefinition and separation of the economic roles and identity 
within the empire. Where previously colonies were basically expected 
to channel all of their resources directly to the metropole, now they 
were offered some independence to engage in their own transactions, 
so long as they ultimately relayed the wealth generated in this way back 
to Britain. The common cause that united them, the republican 
commitment to the increase of the commonwealth, was left more flimsy 
by the realisation of individual rights and the resultant divergence of 
their perceived economic culture.  
 
The relaxation of the rules regarding trade particularly between the 
North American colonies and the French Caribbean was the result of a 
new importance placed on relations with the thirteen colonies in the 
face of the first inklings of rebellion, together with agreements between 
the warring merchant factions of North America and the West Indies. 
However, an altered conception of the role of the metropole in colonial 
and global trade generally was also coming into play. This conception 
saw the centre as a strong and competent manufacturing hub, which 
was supported by economically independent cash-generating satellites. 
Representatives of the colonies had argued that their survival depended 
on an exchange based economy. Where a production and 
manufacturing based economy could maintain the British metropole, 
participating exclusively in the same could only serve to drain 
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plantations like Rhode Island. In the British metropole, it was finally 
decided to leave the colonies to their ‘natural state’,1 which, in a sense, 
was understood as being more like that of the commercial Dutch than 
the industrious British. 
 
Meanwhile, the home market and the carrying trade remained 
protected from foreign importers, as, no matter its origins or 
destination, molasses still had to be imported into Britain on British 
ships, paying the appropriate duties. Likewise, merchants were obliged 
only to offer certain goods, especially British manufactures, in exchange 
for foreign rum and molasses.2 Free trade in some markets and 
industries was therefore underpinned by a confidence in the restriction 
of others. These restrictions tended still to protect the chosen 
competencies of the centre. 
 
The French seem to have feared even more the notion of free trade for 
the colonies than the British. The loyalty of the islands of Guadeloupe 
and Martinique had been tested in the Seven Years’ War, and the results 
were not altogether encouraging to the metropole, which thereafter 
made efforts to preserve restrictions. Throughout this period colonials 
had treated certain goods, particularly flour, cod and salted meats, with 
special trepidation, indicating the perceived importance of such items 
to the metropole. Ultimately the French government insisted on being 
the sole supplier of these things, in spite of relaxing restrictions on 
other commodities. This highlights again the notion that the economic 
regulation of the colonies strongly reflected the imagined strengths and 
therefore identity of the metropolitan economies. In the French case, 
there was evidently less faith in the national manufacturing capacity, 
but a strong belief in France’s agricultural and cod-fishing competence.  
 
The law-makers of Britain and France, therefore, were compiling 
detailed estimations of the economic strengths and weaknesses of their 
                                                         
1 Pownall, Administration, p. 7. 
2 Armytage, The Free Port System, p. 2. 
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respective nations. These tended to tie in with the old economic 
stereotypes of a commercial Dutch, industrious British and agricultural 
French national character. However, in the British case, room for 
specialisation was developing, so that various economic characteristics 
and identities within the empire existed in different spheres of activity, 
without necessarily challenging fellowship of the nation overall. 
Nevertheless, the accustomed prioritisation of the metropole remained 
intact, and it was the good of the centre in both the British and the 
French case which seemed to constitute the ‘national good’. This was an 
ideal towards which colonial subjects were expected to work, even 
when they were released from some traditional economic constraints. 
The national good, therefore, did not seem to reside in parts of these 
empires or their people, but in metropolitan gain. What this could 
perhaps ultimately engender was the exclusion of external and 
diverging enterprises from a redefinition of national belonging.  
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The challenge which national consolidation posed to old frameworks, 
particularly in times of crisis, was not always welcome. Consolidation 
could interfere with alternative coping systems and cause conflicts of 
interest, a term which was developing new meanings in the eighteenth 
century. Economic writers were left to cope intellectually with an 
institutional shift from a paternal system of social relations to a 
capitalist one, as well as with a conceptual shift wherein ambition for 
private economic gain began to be admired over the older values of 
individual honour and virtue.1  
 
Sometimes the course of economic thought in this period is presented 
as a smooth and unhindered transition into modernity. Historians of 
economics have tended to elevate certain authors from their context, 
placing them into an intellectual procession.2 Alternative strands of 
thought meanwhile, are disinherited. Therefore Jean-Claude Perrot 
suggests that though the efforts of J.J. Spengler and J.A. Schumpeter 
purport to be ‘history’ they only amount to a ‘genealogy of recent 
analyses’.3 Intellectual history is supposed to include context as well as 
lineage.  
 
Some of the disinherited have been accommodated under the all-
embracing title of mercantilism. However, part of the problem with the 
term, as we shall see, is that it can serve to merge economic thinkers 
                                                         
1 A.O. Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests (Princeton, 1977), p. 42; J.G.A. Pocock, 
Virtue, Commerce, and History (Cambridge, 1985), p. 69. 
2 E. Rothschild, Economic Sentiments (Cambridge, MA and London, 2001), p. 41. 
3 J.-C. Perrot, Une Histoire Intellectuelle de l’Économie Politique (Paris, 1992), p. 8. 
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into schools or priesthoods, in a way that they themselves would have 
considered sacrilegious.1 This chapter considers two such authors, Sir 
James Steuart (1713-1780) and Jacques Necker (1732-1804), and their 
ambivalence towards the idea of liberty in the grain trade and 
otherwise.  
 
Both ultimately rejected the idea of a free grain trade, arguing instead 
that national limitations be imposed. This chapter explores their 
thoughts about the role of the state in the nation, and their appraisal of 
the value of civic freedom in respect of the supposed security of 
subjugation. It is especially concerned with their attempts to find a way 
to balance and even control the private interests of individuals, in order 
to establish and promote a national interest. 
 
The first section takes on the idea of mercantilism directly, and aims to 
locate Steuart and Necker within the various interpretations of the 
term. It disputes the applicability of the concept, given the two authors’ 
strong views on systems of thought. Both Necker and Steuart 
disapproved of and criticised the idea of excessively systematic thought 
in relation to their subject, political economy. This is important 
because, as outsiders and foreigners in the countries in which they 
came to reside, they argued that every nation had to be treated as an 
individual case.  
 
This led to policy suggestions with interesting implications for the idea 
of national belonging, which are explored in the second section. At the 
same time, this section begins to open up the idea of the nation and the 
definitions of the national good which Steuart and Necker offered. It 
examines the role of the statesman that they outlined in securing it. The 
final section further develops the character of this statesman, by 
examining the depictions rendered by Steuart, Necker and a third 
author, Simon-Nicolas Henri Linguet (1736-1794), of the social changes 
                                                         
1 A.V. Judges, ‘The Idea of a Mercantile State’, in D.C. Coleman (ed.), Revisions in 
Mercantilism (London, 1969), p. 35. 
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which followed the decline of classical slavery and feudalism. Both 
Steuart and Necker exhibited some nostalgia for the old system of 
feudal jurisdiction, even while they warranted – and, in Necker’s case, 
participated in – the dismantling of old structures in favour of an 
integrated nation. This meant that they had to cope with the decline of 
old parochial systems of social relations and welfare. Their endeavours 
to amalgamate the dislocated poor into a centralised state led them to 
discuss ideas of liberty, citizenship and subjecthood.  
 
The chapter concludes that the ideas of Steuart and Necker about state 
intervention in the grain trade were owing to the reciprocal bonds 
which they perceived in society. For Steuart, these bonds were basically 
economic, and to be found in the self-interest of luxury as well as 
essential consumption. Meanwhile, for Necker, they were forged in the 
political relationship between king and subject. However, in both cases, 
the statesman was responsible for maintaining economic and hence 
political stability. For this reason, the nation had to have its limits, and 
so too did the autonomy of those who depended upon the state for their 
survival. 
 
Though the two authors considered in this chapter certainly shared 
attitudes and some influences, particularly the likes of Cantillon and 
Montesquieu, and clearly were writing in opposition to some of the 
same contemporary trends in economic thought, they do not seem to 
have been profoundly influenced by one another. Though Steuart’s 
Inquiry into the Principles of Political Œconomy was originally published 
in 1767, its journey across the Channel was somewhat laboured, and 
the work was not properly ‘discovered’ in France until the Revolution.1 
Of course, Necker may have perused its pages in English, as his friend 
and antagonist, Morellet, apparently did.2  
 
                                                         
1 M. Albertone, ‘Steuart’s Difficult Reception in France’ in R. Tortajada (ed.), The 
Economics of James Steuart (London, 1999), p. 4. 
2 H.C. Clark, Compass of Society (London, 2007), p. 318.  
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By comparison, Necker’s Sur la Législation et le Commerce des Grains, 
was promptly translated into English in 1776 just a year after original 
publication.1 However, its appearance in English was accompanied the 
same year by Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations, and by 1777, a 
disaffected Steuart was turning from political economy.2 Perhaps the 
two authors knew of one another, but it was in keeping with their 
alleged convictions that they tried, ostensibly at least, to keep their 
work their own. 
 
The Mercantile and other Systems in Economic Thought 
 
According to Gustav Schmoller, who coined the new term, mercantilism 
means ‘state making – not state making in a narrow sense, but state 
making and national-economy making at the same time’.3 Tariffs and 
protectionist laws were merely the practical forms that the subjugation 
of economic issues to a political vision took. 4 The vision in question was 
that of the nation state. This required a recalibration of the economy, 
which would transform commercial activity from a local to a national 
enterprise. The vision was not without opposition from towns, districts, 
various estates, corporations, and others, and therefore mercantilism 
took the form of a conscious programme of state building.  
 
The process therefore had to do with building national sentiment, 
recalibrating the meaning as well as the apparatus of the economy. 
Schmoller emphasised the importance of the idea of a ‘national 
interest’, braced against foreign competition, in his system. ‘General 
postulates’, he suggested, functioned as ‘rallying points’ for public 
opinion, and served to furnish a sense of ‘collective interests’.5 
Ultimately, he argued, ‘the feeling and recognition of economic 
                                                         
1 J. Necker, On the Legislation and the Commerce of Corn (London, 1776). 
2 A. Skinner, ‘Introduction: Biographical’ in J. Steaurt, An Inquiry into the Principles of 
Political Œconomy, ed. A. Skinner (Edinburgh, 1998), I, p. lxii.  
3 G. Schmoller, The Mercantile System and its Historical Significance (New York, 1896), 
p. 50. 
4 Ibid, p. 51. 
5 Ibid, p. 59. 
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solidarity, in regard alike to those within and those without, necessarily 
created at the same time a corporate egoism’.1 Part of the task of 
Schmoller’s mercantilism, therefore, was creating an economic 
solidarity of interests on a national level. 
 
However, since Schmoller, the term mercantilism has developed a 
negative reputation and new meanings. The idea of mercantilism as 
coherent and calculated procedure on the part of statesmen has now 
been all but entirely discredited. Joyce Oldham Appleby, Charles Wilson 
and Barry Supple all imply that what is now known as mercantilism 
was by no means systematic in its day, when actually it was a string of 
separate but conventional beliefs or reactions to a spate of individual 
but similar problems.2 Thus Supple wrote that ‘if these men had their 
faults then they are largely those of any group desperately involved in 
an economic crisis. The whole tenor of what has come to be known as 
mercantilist literature owes not a little to this involvement’.3 According 
to this train of thought, mercantilism is a fallacy and an anachronism: 
the semblance of a coordinated system is only perceivable in hindsight, 
even if contemporary approaches were dictated by convention. 
Mercantilism itself became little more than the economics of 
depression.4 
 
To this day the term remains in use, only now it can be used to signify 
anything from a strict ideology; to a prominent Weltanschauung of the 
early modern period; to something which never really existed and is 
simply part of the historian’s ‘equipment’ for categorising and handling 
features of the past.5 It can even sometimes be used in periodization to 
denote an era of close international competition, especially in 
                                                         
1 Ibid, p. 77. 
2 D.C. Coleman, ‘Mercantilism Revisited’, HJ, 23:4 (1980), pp. 773-4; J.O. Appleby, 
Economic Thought and Ideology in Seventeenth-Century England (Princeton, 1978), pp. 
5-6; C. Wilson, England’s Apprenticeship, 1603-1763 (London, 1965), p. 57. 
3 B.E. Supple, Commercial Crisis and Change in England (Cambridge, 1959), p. 221. 
4 D. Vickers, Studies in the Theory of Money, 1690-1776 (Philadelphia, 1959), p 311. 
5 A. Finkelstein, Harmony and the Balance (Michigan, 2000), p. 251; quote from Judges, 
‘The Idea of a Mercantile State’, p. 55. 
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commerce and supported by government policies.1 Though the term 
has been exposed as ‘an incoherent frame of analysis’ it still lives on as 
a way of describing the intellectual milieu of the early period in the field 
that became economics.2 It is so vague, and yet versatile, that it 
seemingly cannot be killed, at least not permanently.  
 
The opportunity to revise the concept has led to an impulse on the part 
of some historians to rescue their pet early-modern economic writers 
from being counted among this elusive ‘priesthood’.3 For instance, 
several historians have sought to redefine the economics of Necker, 
who had formerly been accused of being a mercantilist. Already in 
1847, in a reprint of Necker’s Sur la Législation et le Commerce de 
Grains, editors Gustave de Molinari and Eugène Daire typified the 
overall intellectual persuasion of the work as ‘nothing other than the 
mercantile system’, though they did qualify this charitably enough by 
adding ‘with some variations’. However, they pressed home the point 
that the ‘protection of manufactures was the obligatory corollary of the 
system’, which apparently made Necker a mercantilist.4  
 
Later, Henri Grange reassigned Necker far more innocuously as a 
primitive socialist and intellectual predecessor of Marx, drawing on his 
apparent attention to class struggle and appreciation for the 
predicament of the worker.5 Likewise Joseph Spengler opted to 
describe both Necker and the French writer, Linguet, as pre-Marxist, 
because of their attitudes to property. However, he ignored or avoided 
the other term, despite the fact that both of these French writers have 
been characterised as mercantilists in the Colbertian tradition.6 
Meanwhile, Robert Harris came to the conclusion that Necker cannot be 
properly accommodated under the denomination of either mercantilist 
                                                         
1 D. Ormrod, The Rise of Commercial Empires (Cambridge, 2003), p. 6. 
2 P.J. Stern and C. Wennerlind, ‘Introduction’ in idem (eds.), Mercantilism Reimagined 
(New York, 2014), p. 3. 
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4 G. de. Molinari and E. Daire (eds.), Mélanges d’Économie Politique (Paris, 1847), p. 
225, n. 1. 
5 R.D. Harris, Necker: Reform Statesman of the Ancien Régime (London, 1979), p. 55. 
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or proto-socialist. Instead, he elected to consider Necker as a 
pragmatist whose most important influence was the economics of the 
physiocrats, which he took such extensive pains to challenge.1  
 
The practice of reclassifying the author persists even in more recent 
literature and in light of further revisions or rehabilitations of the term 
mercantilism. Thus Léonard Burnand basically justifies Necker’s 
interventionist stance on grain, arguing that it did not stem from a 
mercantilist emphasis on national power or grandeur, but from a 
humanitarian concern for assuring the basic needs of the French 
population.2 Many of the policies that Necker endorsed and 
implemented might be characterised as mercantilist because of their 
protectionist slant. However, in Burnand’s analysis, Necker’s apparent 
humanitarian goals save the man himself from this supposed slur. 
 
Certainly all of this has to do with dismantling a term which has in 
many ways become too vague as to serve a useful purpose. Such 
lumping can result in an oversimplification that deprives our sense of 
the past of the detail it deserves. This is why Nancy Koehn complains 
that the deep economic understanding demonstrated by another key 
subject of this chapter, James Steuart, and others, has been overlooked 
by historians too keen to ‘label all of Adam Smith’s predecessors as 
mercantilists’.3  
 
As with Necker, Steuart’s work has undergone multiple reappraisals. 
Initially typified as a mercantilist, Steuart was later re-categorised in 
the light of the Keynesian Revolution as something like a classical 
liberal.4 This rediscovery particularly after 1936 saw Steuart’s writings, 
which had formerly been described as ‘unfortunate’,5 taken seriously 
for perhaps the first time since Adam Smith somewhat cruelly chose to 
                                                         
1 Harris, Necker, p. 56. 
2 L. Burnand, Les Pamphlets contre Necker (Paris, 2009), p. 28. 
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ignore them entirely in Wealth of Nations.1 John Maynard Keynes stated 
outright that he wished to ‘do justice to schools of thought which the 
classicals have treated as imbecile for the last hundred years’.2 Still 
looking upon mercantilism as a school, Keynes restored the possibility 
of rationality in the works of the authors who fell under the title, and, in 
a way, added himself to their ranks as a long-lost heir to the tradition. 
Unlike Necker therefore, Steuart remained typified as a mercantilist, 
only the system to which he belonged was no longer necessarily flawed. 
 
Whether Steuart is diagnosed with it or not, evidently mercantilism had 
also therefore become synonymous with being wrong or backward in 
respect to economics, in just the way that Adam Smith originally 
envisioned this supposedly counterproductive system. Even Eli 
Heckscher wrote of his subject that  ‘there are no grounds whatsoever 
for supposing that the mercantilist writers constructed their system… 
out of any knowledge of reality however derived’.3 Correction and 
replacement of misguided doctrine, it has been suggested, was in fact an 
important element of the genesis of systems and isms as rhetorical 
devises and of the etymology of ism especially.4 In this sense, the term 
has become more scandalous libel than analytical label.  
 
The Keynesian revolution went some way amongst economists to take 
the sting out of the term. However, Ronald Meek has suggested that 
these sorts of reinterpretations tend to take place ‘ex post rather than ex 
ante’, and that the rehabilitation acts almost as a sort of justification or 
corroboration of a new theory post factum.5 His article exposes the 
possible flaw with such rehabilitations, in the sense that they are prone 
to take certain authors out of context and backdate progress in 
economic thought, making the whole process seem a teleological 
                                                         
1 D. Winch, ‘Scottish Political Economy’ in M. Goldie and R. Wokler (eds.), The 
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procession towards enlightenment.1 Again, therefore, mercantilism was 
in danger of becoming a misrepresentative and even more 
anachronistic term, without even having lost the vague and lumping 
quality which makes it a blunt and clumsy tool eternally to hand, but 
never that helpful. 
 
Reinterpretations of the one author and school, meanwhile, may also 
have the knock-on effect of inspiring a reassessment of whatever came 
before or followed. At the same time as Steuart made his comeback, 
Smith’s work also underwent a reappraisal. This was suddenly 
portrayed as less than ground breaking, and it was Steuart who was 
now the real stick in the mud. For example, in Meek’s account, Smith’s 
theory merely ‘corresponded better with the zeitgeist of his time’. By 
comparison, Steuart’s mercantilist approach had ‘had its day’.2 Both 
Steuart and Smith therefore are portrayed here as belonging to and 
defining one of two consecutive movements or schools.  
 
All of this is highly ironic, given the fact that the two mercantilists in 
question considered their own work relatively original and free of 
systematic thought. Necker, for example, was extremely critical of those 
whom he believed would approach the issue of political economy by 
espousing general rules. These ‘charlatans’, ignorant of the finer points 
of political economy, offered one or the other of ‘the two extremes, 
sustained prohibition & liberty [prohibition & liberté constantes]’.3 This 
was at best lazy administration, on the part of those who were unable 
or unwilling to intercede with the constant attention and intervention 
which the economy really needed.4 Necker used a medical analogy here, 
probably aimed at Quesnay, a physician by training, but which was 
echoed in remarkably similar terms by Adam Smith: if the economic 
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woes of the nation were a range of maladies attacking that body, then a 
simple cure-all was unlikely to help.1 
 
Necker applied the term ‘system’ to both approaches for managing the 
grain trade, and pointed out that when each was implemented to the 
extreme, it failed. ‘Each party’, he wrote, ‘can easily gather anecdotes 
amenable to the system which they support, or at least contrary to the 
one they are attacking’.2 He used terms such as ‘liberty’ and 
‘prohibition’ to describe systems of policy, but not for the ‘parties’ or 
factions who proposed them. This was not unusual. As far as David 
Todd could discover, the earliest use of the term protectionniste was by 
Frédéric Bastiat in reference to the British Anti-Corn Law League in 
1845. He points out that, even by the nineteenth century, advocates of 
regulation still avoided the term ‘protectionist’.3  It remained, therefore, 
the system rather than its advocates that carried the label. In keeping 
with this convention, Necker used the idea of system in the Smithian 
manner, to describe a set of policies. 
 
Therefore, Necker’s depiction of systems as almost tangible 
frameworks of legislation differed slightly from that of Jean-François 
Melon, who had defined them as ‘the assembly of several propositions 
bound together, of which the consequences tend to establish a truth or 
opinion’.4 This interpretation bore greater resemblance to a doctrinal 
approach, rather than, as Necker had it, the results of doctrine or belief 
in the form of concrete policy. Yet at the same time, Necker actually 
attributed adherence to these systems to an undue faith in their basis in 
systemic assumptions of how the world functioned. In other words, to 
an excessive and perhaps uncritical reliance on ideas apparently 
deduced from logic and not based on experience. Arnault Skornicki has 
even gone as far as to suggest that Necker considered his physiocrat 
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opponents as ‘prisoners of the model of rational economic interest’.1  
Necker reproached them for ignoring the vital role which he continued 
to assume that passion played in economic behaviour, particularly that 
of the crowd. 
 
Necker’s Sur la Législation et le Commerce des Grains was first published 
in the spring of 1775. Its publication coincided with the spate of riots in 
France known from that time onwards as the Guerre des Farines. The 
chaos which ensued ended both Anne-Robert-Jacques Turgot’s policy of 
a free grain trade between 1774 and 1775, and his career as Minister of 
Finance. In general, the book accused Turgot, and those of the 
physiocratic persuasion, of applying an overly simplistic and systematic 
solution to what Necker saw as the constantly shifting terrain of the 
grain trade.2  
 
Generally Necker’s approach to the physiocrats and their doctrine was 
relatively respectful. He claimed deferentially that ‘it is on principles 
absolutely contrary to those which I advance, which the famous 
calculations of net product, so famous in the works of the économistes 
are founded… [however] we cannot applaud enough the pure and well-
known zeal of those infinitely honest people, who distinguish 
themselves by their attachment to those opinions’.3 Though he admired 
the effort that was put into the theories, what Necker opposed was a 
tendency to place faith in ideas which did not come from observation 
and experience, but stemmed from principles which only seemed 
logical.  
 
Physiocratic systems, usually based on Quesnay’s celebrated Tableau 
Économique, ingenious as they seemed, relied, he thought, on certain 
miscalculations and fallacious deductive reasoning. The Tableau was an 
illustration of the net product theory, that all surplus came from 
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agriculture alone, and from there was merely manipulated by artisans, 
merchants and others.1 Necker argued, however, that this was just so 
much misdirection. He complained that the ‘internal arithmetic, which 
makes high prices equate to wealth, is, of all measures the most false 
and the most deceitful’.2  
 
Véron de Forbonnais, had also criticized the Tableau Économique more 
explicitly, yet in a similar way, for he too used the imagery of deceit to 
suggest that the system was bogus. He argued that the Tableau was 
itself merely an elaborate construction designed to perpetuate an 
underlying falsehood.3 Voltaire, Grimm and Mably had also reproached 
the physiocrats for their unscientific ways.4 As Skornicki points out, the 
frivolous and fictive order posed by physiocratic reasoning could, for a 
while, be effectively dismissed as simple ‘enthusiasm’ by proponents of 
Galilean experimental philosophy. This was the particular standpoint of 
yet another expat commentator, the Neapolitan, Fernandino Galiani.5 
 
Because of their adherence to doctrine, physiocratic writers have been 
consolidated into a sect or a school, although Loïc Charles and Christine 
Théré have challenged this notion. Evidently physiocracy is another 
term which historians have begun to see as in need of unpicking, in 
order to do justice to the individual thinkers involved.6  However, at the 
time, critical contemporaries of the physiocrats used the theoretical and 
systematic or derived aspects of their doctrine to detract from their 
arguments and policies. 
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Similarly, in An Inquiry into the Principals of Political Economy, James 
Steuart attacked theories of political economy which he specifically 
referred to as systems. Using the term in a very similar sense to Melon,1 
and admitting to having assimilated the term from the French, the well-
travelled Scotsman wrote that: 
 
These are no more than a chain of contingent consequences, drawn from a 
few fundamental maxims, adopted, perhaps, rashly. Such systems are 
mere conceits; they mislead the understanding, and efface the path to 
truth. An induction is formed, from whence a conclusion, called a principle, 
is drawn; but this is no sooner done, than the author extends its influence 
far beyond the limits of the ideas present to his understanding, when he 
made his deduction.2 
 
Steuart hoped to assemble a series of economic principles, but to avoid 
falling into what he considered the trap of rushing into oversimplified 
assumptions or general rules. He also deplored irrelevant arguments 
caused ultimately, he supposed, only by confusion of terminology.3 
Most of all, he maintained that arguments ought not to be believed on 
the basis of the presumed authority of their progenitor, but rather on 
the basis of personal experience or evidence.4 Therefore, although 
Steuart aimed to systematise his work so that it formed a coherent 
body, or a ‘regular science’, he placed great emphasis, in scientific 
fashion, on observation and experience.5  
 
This meticulous method has been blamed for the convoluted style of the 
overall work, which seems all the more cumbersome beside Adam 
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Smith’s sleeker model.1 Yet Steuart’s suspicion of systems possibly 
precluded his investment in such a model. In spite of his labours, 
ultimately Steuart shied away from presuming to have created a system 
in its entirety. His mission, he claimed, was actually only to reveal a 
number of evident truths, or ‘a succession of principles’,2 upon which 
perhaps a system might be developed. Steuart himself was not 
prepared to make the leap from his supposedly empirical principles to 
the conjectural models to which he had taken exception. Though he 
seemed to accept that political economy could be dissected and 
examined piece by piece to produce something like an anatomy, and 
that a cure could be offered for certain maladies, like Necker, he did not 
claim to have concocted an infallible panacea for the ailments of the 
political and economic system.3 
 
Each author therefore claimed that his work was, as much as possible, 
free from systematic – or perhaps deductive or conjectural – thought 
and generalisations, and from a seemingly oversimplified approach to 
government. As foreigners and onlookers, both were inclined to present 
observed particulars in preference to the general similarities of human 
society which others were keen to pronounce.4 In this sense, their 
approach was Baconian in its preference for experience and rejection of 
axioms and cold Cartesian reason that supposedly guided French 
political economists in particular.5 
 
Each of the books under consideration contained a certain amount of 
political arithmetic or similar. Necker, for instance, calculated that the 
annual exports of French grain in the period after 1764 when 
exportation was permitted amounted roughly to the subsistence of 
250,000 people for that year.6 Meanwhile, Steuart regularly attempted 
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to explore his topic, especially the demographical elements, by using 
statistical data, unreliable as it might have been.1 Sometimes he used 
quite scanty evidence to make calculations, but he always prioritised it 
over his own assumptions. For example, in a later edition of his work 
Steuart used data from Charles Smith’s reputable pamphlet to correct 
an earlier calculation, in which he had used figures from the London 
papers. He defended the original decision to use the untrustworthy 
evidence because ‘though I felt very strongly the consequences of my 
own reasoning, I was so far overawed by the force of popular opinion, 
that I durst not venture to rate either the surplus or the deficiency 
otherwise than found in the text [of the London papers]’.2  
 
Beyond political arithmetic, the two authors were concerned with 
information and the way it was gathered and deployed. Steuart, for 
instance, maintained that merchants were in a position to monopolise 
useful information and knowledge, but that it was the statesman’s role 
to become equally informed in order to redress the imbalance of 
knowledge between consumer and supplier.3 Likewise Necker believed 
that the statesman had to take charge of the market because the social 
system, with its uneven distribution of property and hence opportunity 
for study and information, forever precluded the enlightenment of the 
masses.4 In each case, knowledge was an unfair advantage garnered by 
merchants in the course of their dealings, while the lower classes of 
people remained in the dark. For these reasons, part of the role of the 
idealised statesmen, according to both Steuart and Necker, was to 
intervene on behalf of the uninformed masses. In each depiction, the 
market could not possibly be a fair and beneficent place, simply because 
consumers were so vulnerable to exploitation at the hands of 
merchants possessed of useful commercial knowledge. 
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The approach of the two authors to the grain trade, and to political 
economy generally, was perhaps influenced by certain background 
characteristics that they shared. Both were foreigners in the nations for 
which they wrote. As a former Jacobite exile, Steuart encountered some 
disapprobation regarding his chequered (or plaid?) past and 
‘Continental notions’.1 He had begun his studies of political economy 
while exiled in France. Later he moved his family to Frankfurt am Main, 
and from there to Tübingen. It was here that he began to write his great 
Inquiry into the Principles of Political Œconomy.2 According to Deborah 
Redman, he became deeply immersed in the intellectual life of the 
German university town, and his thought was ultimately heavily 
influenced by Cameralism in addition to French économie politique.3  
 
 It was only in 1771 that the perceived misdemeanours of Steuart’s 
youth were officially pardoned and he could return permanently to 
Britain.4 Steuart’s extensive travels furnished him with a wealth of 
experience, which manifested itself in a multiplicity of foreign case 
studies.5 He himself, perhaps drawing on Montesquieu, maintained that 
the experience which he gained on his travels attested to the 
impartiality of his thought.6 Steuart was possibly also influenced by that 
‘citizen of the world’, David Hume, for he too placed emphasis on the 
manners and customs of a people, in relation to their propensity to 
spend or save financial resources as a nation.7 
 
Necker’s path, meanwhile, was somewhat easier, and though he was an 
expat, he was less of a traveller than Steuart. A commoner and a 
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Protestant hailing from Geneva, but with Prussian ancestry, Necker’s 
success in the French court was somewhat usual. However, it came only 
after a long career in banking and a spell in diplomacy.1 Though he 
reached high office in 1776, having usurped Turgot through the 
possibly strategic publication of Sur la Législation et le Commerce des 
Grains in 1775, certain marks of his origins remained. As a Protestant, 
his presence at the French royal council was officially forbidden, and he 
was offered the new title of directeur-général, though he performed the 
role normally known as contrôleur-général.2 Deprived of the authority 
of this office, he initially found his power checked when his direct 
subordinates, the Intendants of Finances, ignored his orders. His 
answer was a programme of consolidation. This included the complete 
abolition of the venal office of Intendant of Finance, eliminating the 
uncooperative incumbents.3 
 
Necker’s critics, however, also latched onto his obvious status as an 
outsider, which led them to question his motives. They insisted that, as 
his inspiration could not have been the patriotic love of the homeland 
that supposedly drove native statesmen, it had, therefore to be greed 
and the pursuit of personal enrichment or glory that inspired him.4 
Although Necker shared his faith with the illustrious former Minister of 
Finances, Maximilien de Béthune, Duc de Sully, it was Colbert whom he 
chose to eulogise a few years before taking office, perhaps in an effort 
to prove his allegiances.5  
 
A shared foreign status perhaps explains the preoccupation with 
national variation in the work of Steuart and Necker. They believed that 
good political economy had to be tailored to national character. For as 
we shall see, Steuart concluded that opening ports to allow grain 
imports could be beneficial in England where agriculture was strong, 
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but that the same policy could ruin Scotland.1 Meanwhile Necker 
concluded exportation was ‘incompatible with the population of France, 
with its wealth, with its government and with its customs’.2 
 
Labourers and Morality in a System of Nationalism 
 
Before he tackled regulation, Steuart was careful to note that the 
agricultural surplus of a nation was not simply the combination of 
individual farmers’ commercial harvest. Actually it was the grain that 
exceeded the subsistence needs of the entire nation, and ought to be 
exported if possible. A statesman, he argued, who confounded the 
agricultural surplus with crops needed for national subsistence could 
well deprive his citizens of the food they needed to survive.3 However, 
so long as the distinction was understood, and only that which 
surpassed the needs of the entire national community left the country, 
exporting grain could be a useful and profitable enterprise.   
 
On this fundamental point, Necker disagreed. This kind of a surplus, he 
argued, was symptomatic of an imperfect population.4 Like Steuart 
eight years earlier, and Adam Smith just a year later, Necker took a 
stadial approach to economic development and growth. Grain exports 
were normal and desirable in underdeveloped agricultural economies 
which needed to kick-start their foreign trade.5 Even the characteristics 
of Britain and the Netherlands rendered an entirely free grain trade 
acceptable, because, he supposed, their coasts were extensive and their 
populations relatively small.6 However, he argued that in a matured 
economy with an uneven distribution of property like France, the 
demand caused by concentrated industrial labour, together with the 
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desire on the part of proprietors for new luxury goods, prompted 
investment and stimulated agriculture without recourse to grain 
exportation.1 Increasing the agricultural surplus encouraged industry, 
which in turn stimulated agriculture, as the two facets of the economy 
grew interdependent.  
 
Steuart’s views on agricultural stimuli were similar: in certain nations, 
society had moved from a state of simplicity (or subsistence farming) to 
a state of luxury, as farmers’ preference for manufactured goods over 
leisure drove them to increase productivity.2 In an economy where 
surplus food production was possible, increasing manufacturing was 
‘the only method (in a free state) of procuring additional food, and of 
distributing it through the society’.3  It was the reciprocity which 
desirable manufactured goods ingrained on society that bound it and 
made it stable. Material interdependencies made for an organised 
population which could function as a cohesive community.4 Like 
Necker, Steuart proposed that population growth was the cause, and 
not the result of increased agricultural productivity.5 Necker and 
Steuart therefore remained in agreement that a large and comfortable 
population was desirable.6  
 
Both certainly praised at one time or another the population theory of 
Colbert.7 In fact their approaches to population exhibit strong 
tendencies towards the nationalistic causes examined by E.S. Furniss. 
According to Furniss, labourers were seen as profoundly important, 
because their efforts allowed nations to derive wealth from 
participating in and dominating international trade. The individual 
labourer’s efforts were a force to be harnessed for a greater good, but 
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2 A. Brewer, ‘The concept of Growth in Eighteenth-Century Economics’, History of 
Political Economy, 27:4 (1995), p. 626. 
3 Steuart, Principles, I, p. 46. 
4 Ibid, p. 101. 
5 Ibid, p. 134. 
6 Brewer, ‘The Concept of Growth’, p. 611; Spengler, French Predecessors, p. 324. 
7 Steuart, Principles, I, p. 85; J. Necker, Éloge de Jean-Baptiste Colbert (Paris, 1773), p. 
21. 
Daisy Gibbs  191 
  
individual motives and interests were ignored.1 Therefore, the 
exaltation of the role of the labourer did not necessarily translate into 
calls for remuneration parallel to their apparent national value. 
However, it did inform a certain ‘mercantilist morality’, which urged 
that workers should at least be entitled to a basic subsistence.2 This 
explains the distinction between labouring and idle poor in the work of 
Steuart, Necker and even the ‘pre-Marxian’ Linguet.3  
 
There are, however, some difficulties as to what might constitute 
national goals. In this brief account of Furniss’ argument, national goals 
come across as simple jingoism, though in the writing of Steuart and 
Necker, the issue is far more complex. Necker tended to evoke a social 
contract type arrangement, where understandings of happiness, unique 
to each group of peoples, had drawn them together in the need to 
protect their own peculiar happiness and hence unite for mutual self-
preservation. Happiness, ultimately became the state’s raison d’être: 
 
the formation of multiple societies, disunited in their interests and 
affection, soon obliged each of them to add to the care of their happiness, 
the concern necessary to preserve it… The desire of happiness had only 
required simple notions of order, justice, and equity; the need for strength 
gave birth to all political combinations, and the functions of the sovereign 
increased; the production of riches, labour, commerce and industry, which 
in connection to happiness had appertained to nothing but the caprice of 
self-interest [intérêt personel], became, through their connection to public 
strength, the object of meditation, and of watchfulness for the 
government.4 
 
Happiness was a complex preoccupation for economic writers of the 
seventeenth century particularly, and Necker was not unusual in 
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connecting it with constitutional ideas. Although the chivalric standard 
of the honourableness of humankind had been left in brightly coloured 
tatters, human initiative was soon justified in new ways.1 In the French 
Jansenist tradition, Pierre Nicole argued in the 1670s that the ‘amour 
propre’ (self-love) which guided individuals to seek ‘bonheur’ (the 
French term for happiness which Necker also used) was not an 
irredeemable selfish passion, because it led to social behaviour.2 In this 
he therefore pre-empted Necker by about a hundred years.  
 
For Necker, the nation’s need for wealth and power issued in the first 
place from a need to protect the singular characteristics (the peculiar 
interpretation of happiness) of its people. These characteristics in turn 
lent prosperity to a nation which grew increasingly complex and 
competitive amongst its rivals. As Joanna Innes has argued of 
Anglophone ideas of happiness, therefore, membership of a powerful 
political entity protected and promoted happiness in Necker’s account 
also.3 However, he remained insistent on the point that happiness was 
as important as power to the state, and that the two were separate and 
yet interdependent matters.4 Because of these links, it seems that it was 
next to impossible to state the national case without stating a 
humanitarian case. In reality the nation was a complex network of both 
interests and passions and it was the role of the statesman to balance 
and often order them by priority.5  
 
Steuart seemed to agree, arguing that the ideal government should 
entertain an ‘exact and impartial regard for the interest of every class’.6 
The realisation of the interests of all classes was, therefore, the national 
goal. This was not as impossible as it sounded, for the pursuit of 
interest made the behaviour of individuals predictable and therefore 
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governable.1 He made it his own mission, which he shared with Necker, 
to analyse the various interests within the nation. To this end, they both 
split society into two key classes. For Necker it was the proprietors and 
the propertyless, for Steuart, the farmers and the free hands.2 
 
In each case, it came down to which interests were united, and which 
were counter-productive, or even mutually exclusive. Necker accepted 
that, if grain were to become superfluous within the closed borders of 
France, then ‘convulsions would compromise the good of the people, 
and disturb the general harmony by aggravating every different class in 
society successively’.3 On the other hand, he maintained that stability 
did not necessarily require exportation, which was detrimental to 
national wealth if it starved the people and stemmed population 
growth. He therefore accused the physiocrats of pursuing doctrines, 
especially the net-product theory of the Tableau Économique, which 
favoured only the proprietor class to the detriment of society at large.4 
This same charge was levelled by Linguet.5 There was a balance to 
strike.  
 
Steuart identified a similar problem in Britain. For although the 
bounties served as the solution to the problem of excessively low grain 
prices, he maintained that there was still no real mechanism in place to 
protect consumers when grain prices spiralled. He believed that 
therefore ‘something still remains to be done, in order to carry this 
branch of English policy to its full perfection’.6 Donald Winch has 
pointed out that, where Steuart preached intervention, Adam Smith 
would have a statesman step back, powerless as he was to properly 
understand and judge impartially the interests of every party based on 
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his own imperfect information.1 Apparently the problem with Steuart’s 
version was his own decision not to engage with the realities of 
contemporary statecraft, which left the main body of his work 
inherently utopian.2 This overlooks the fact, however, that in terms of 
the grain trade, Steuart developed two specific and pragmatic schemes, 
which moved beyond Principles, resolving the perceived problem in a 
concrete rather than theoretical way.  
 
In Considerations on the Interest of the County of Lanark, Steuart tackled 
the issue of uneven development in Scotland. He explained that the 
rapid expansion of Glasgow had caused an agricultural boom in the 
surrounding country. This meant that, while the wages of agricultural 
labourers were high, so too was the price of subsistence. The 
relationship between these two, and its effect on the poor, was his 
concern.3 However, Steuart was careful in his definition of ‘the poor’, by 
which he meant ‘the indigent only (who live by charity, forming a class 
still lower than any of the industrious)’.4  
 
In spite of their indigence, Steuart maintained that the poor people of 
Scotland were not indolent. Scotland had poor laws dating from 1574, 
but they were not always enforced. Alternative institutions, such as 
Kirk sessions or traditional charitable arrangements, challenged the 
state, laying claim to the charge of the poor. This meant that the 
character of the Scottish poor laws was discretional. By the eighteenth 
century, legal disputes over contributions gave landowners a sense of 
their own privilege to direct the funds collected by the church.5 Overall 
Scottish poor relief was less comprehensive than in England and Wales, 
which was in fact a point of envy south of the border. Stringent Scottish 
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culture was congratulated for the industry and thrift that it supposedly 
impressed upon its poor.1 Steuart agreed that the provisions of the 
Scottish version of poor law were sufficient. He emphasised the role of 
the pastor in remaining acquainted with the condition of the indigent 
poor in his parish, so that they neither slid too far into poverty, nor had 
the opportunity to grow idle. 2  
 
The problem for Steuart was not wages or poor-relief, but the cost of 
subsistence. For this reason, his projects should not be understood as 
charitable endeavours. For he also meant to benefit the farmers who, he 
believed, suffered when Britain was forced by harvest failure to open its 
ports to foreign grain.3 Even in normal conditions he admitted that he 
could ‘not understand, why prices [of subsistence] should still be lower 
than the poorest Manufacturer can afford to pay’.4 A careful grain policy 
was a means of striking that elusive balance between not only the 
interests of the farmers and the poor, but also between the landed and 
manufacturing interests. 
 
His answer was to close British borders, allowing for any potential 
Scottish surplus to be sold in England. Scotland, he argued, was not yet 
in a position to benefit from a granary scheme. This was because its 
consumption of grain still matched or even exceeded its productive 
capacity.5 Evidently he had formed a clear sense of the agricultural and 
general economic disparity between the two nations. Nevertheless, he 
now understood the edges of Britain as the final limits of the national 
economy, and added ‘what a happy thing it is for Scotland to have so 
ready, and so plentiful a market as that of England to have recourse to!’6 
Economically, Britain was a strongly composite nation in this portrayal, 
and, in spite of a possible hint of irony and resentment in the comment, 
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Steuart seemed to think that a shared market offered the potential to 
redress the imbalance. Moreover, T.C. Smout contends that Steuart was 
right in emphasising the effects which uneven growth was having on 
agricultural development in Scotland, and the need to create a steady 
effective demand for the surpluses which would result.1  
 
For England, however, a detailed granary scheme was presented as the 
best cure for fluctuations in grain prices. Redman has suggested that 
Steuart was potentially not so well versed in English political economy.2 
In fact she argues that he was probably more heavily influenced by the 
Austro-German economic tradition of Cameralism. The general tenets 
thereof were attentive to the paternalist role of the state, as opposed to 
those of mercantilism which were supposedly preoccupied with the 
aggrandizement of the state itself.3 Granary schemes were highly 
recommended in cameralist thought. Johann Joachim Becher, Wilhelm 
Freiherr von Schröder, and Johann Heinrich Gottlob von Justi all agreed 
that a granary system was a viable state enterprise. Justi in particular 
argued that state granaries could serve to stabilise grain prices from 
season to season.4 Clearly this was an idea in which Steuart 
enthusiastically invested. 
 
Nevertheless, Steuart maintained that he was sensitive to local 
conditions, and as we have seen, he did not suggest granary schemes 
haphazardly. An appraisal of the imports and exports of English grain 
led Steuart to judge that the granary policy was highly appropriate for 
England, though it would be pointless in Scotland for the time being.5 
Evidently, Steuart responded to a range of influences, but also paid 
heed to what he thought of as demonstrable fact, particularly the 
statistics pertaining to the grain trade.  
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The national scheme for granaries, which he developed for England, 
relied heavily on existing English structures. According to his plan, an 
increase in the existing Land Tax of one penny in the pound was to pay 
for a whole series of public granaries. These were to make purchases 
and pay farmers whenever wheat prices fell below 40s per quarter.1 
Therefore, rather than banning exports, Steuart intended that British 
farmers should be offered the alternative of selling their abundant 
supplies to the government. The granaries would open their doors to 
consumers only when grain prices exceeded 48s per quarter, but would 
be forbidden from competing with grain merchants if the prices which 
the latter could offer were lower.2 Consumers themselves were also to 
be carefully screened, for the granaries were in part designed to offer 
grain at low prices to the most needy. The screening process was also 
based on existing structures provided at hospital, corporation or 
individual business level, or else by villages, towns and cities.3 
 
The English granary, and Scottish supply thereof, did not flatly 
contradict the principles of a free market and foreign exports. Like the 
bounty system, each aimed to stimulate agriculture by preventing grain 
prices from crashing, supposedly protecting the consumer from the 
opposite contingency all the while. Laurent Augier and Christine Théré 
have accordingly seen Steuart’s granary scheme as a price stabilising 
mechanism in a trade that was intrinsically unstable.4 Even though the 
granary scheme especially placed a great deal of responsibility and 
power in the visible hand of the state, it was simultaneously a means of 
hijacking market impulses, whilst protecting the poor from the more 
supposedly damaging aspects thereof. It represented an appreciation of 
the possible communion of interests, yet a deep distrust of an 
unsupervised market. 
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Necker agreed that a sound political economy needed to treat the grain 
trade as a unique case. Grain prices were not decided by a series of 
Newtonian forces alone, but also by speculation and anticipation on the 
part of merchants and crowds of consumers respectively. He argued 
that unfortunately ‘the anxiety of the consumers… lends power to the 
merchants’.1 This meant that the price of grain could not be relied upon 
to rise in proportion to an increase of demand, but was prone to 
escalate wildly due to consumer panic.2 Though the eighteenth century 
had already seen some reflection on crowd behaviour, Necker was 
apparently the first to apply the new learning to economic analysis, 
realising that collective psychology could easily overawe individual 
rationality.3 Evidently the passions of greed and fear still had roles to 
play in his analysis when it came to the essential nature of the grain 
trade. 
 
Necker argued that permanent laws regarding the grain trade were a 
danger, as they usually pandered to excessive freedom, which was open 
to abuse, or pedantic restriction, which penalised the useful services of 
merchants. Harris has argued that Necker’s proposals received undue 
condemnation from the Physiocrats, given that his measures tended to 
preserve internal liberty and the property rights of merchants. This, 
Harris points out, was the conclusion of Morellet.4 Internal freedom was 
important to Necker, however, he recommended that exportation 
should only be permitted when grain prices were at or below twenty 
livres per setier at two consecutive markets in regions where exports 
were made. Even then, only flour was to be allowed to exit the land, 
meaning that French millers would be paid for performing a process 
that would otherwise have become the task of foreign labour.5  
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Necker also admitted that price was an uncertain proxy for surplus. 
Steuart had maintained that, by erecting granaries on a local basis with 
reference to special registers of the poor, and estimating annual 
consumption at eight bushels per person, the pre-exportation needs of 
the entire nation could be ascertained and provided for.1 Though he did 
not mention them in his scheme, the lists furnished by the poor laws in 
England and even Scotland (where perhaps it was funds rather than 
information, which was lacking) may have inspired these registers.2 
Perhaps an aging Steuart was also influenced by the growing trend after 
the 1760s for compiling detailed local information.3 In any case, he 
certainly seems to have been far more optimistic than Necker about the 
competence of the state when it came to generating information.  
 
Jacob Soll has shown that, although Necker was an avowed admirer of 
that information master, Colbert, he did not agree with his policies on 
secret information gathering on behalf of the state. Not only was it 
impractical, but it also undermined trust in the French state finances 
and took absolutist intervention into private affairs too far.4 Ultimately 
Necker maintained that calculating the definitive consumption needs of 
the French in relation to the actual grain production level was 
impossible. The price proxy would have to suffice.5  
 
Nevertheless, Necker also outlined a sort of miniature public granary 
scheme. Perhaps he, the son of a Prussian, was also influenced by the 
German penchant for storing grain. Like Steuart’s, the scheme tried to 
capitalise on existing local structures. It amounted to obliging French 
bakers to purchase and store flour during the harvest season in excess 
of, but in proportion to, their usual commercial needs. This, Necker 
continued, had the added benefit of keeping prices high during the part 
of the year when grain was cheapest, rendering permission to export 
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grain less likely.1 In this sense, it functioned much like Steuart’s scheme. 
In June the bakers would be at liberty to dispose of the grain that they 
had been tasked with stockpiling, thus equalising prices during the pre-
harvest months when traditionally they escalated.2 In order to help the 
bakers recover their losses in purchasing grain above and beyond what 
was profitable, Necker indicated that the profit margins on bread, 
which were controlled by the police, might be permitted to increase.3 
 
Both, therefore, identified limits to the freedom of the market, and 
designed state-sponsored frameworks to cope with local scarcity. 
National and even regional adaptation was clearly very important to 
both authors, but it was the central state which they imagined should 
ultimately administer the frameworks they designed. However, the give 
and take between state responsibility and individual rights therefore 
became an important concern for both authors. It meant that they 
needed to consider the idea of liberty very carefully. 
 
Slaves, Servants, Subjects 
  
In the work of Steuart, Necker and also Linguet, history and a perhaps 
idealised notion of the past play an important role, particularly in the 
justification of the interventionist policies which the three proposed. All 
three displayed some interest in the idea of labour relations, and the 
dilemmas of an essentially freelance labourer in post-feudal economies. 
These dilemmas challenged the apparently unmitigated good of liberty, 
which the physiocrats and others proposed as the optimum guiding 
principle of political economy. Each acknowledged that curtailing the 
civil liberties of the poor could offer a more secure existence. However, 
this could also challenge the success and even cohesion of the nation 
state. For this reason, they carefully pondered the power and 
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responsibility of the state in relation to a nation of subjects, as opposed 
to citizens. 
 
The historiography has tended, broadly speaking, to identify at least 
two separate interpretations of the term liberty in eighteenth-century 
European thought: positive and negative liberty. The former was the 
classical republican sense: it meant freedom from tyranny. This sense 
was purely political, and required that all citizens be invested with 
virtue, the characteristic of self-government.1 By the eighteenth century 
the idea of the republic was not meant literally, at least, not in large 
states. It was more of a metaphor for articulating a sense of remorse at 
the loss of the moral qualities that had supposedly characterised the 
citizens of ancient republics.2 The latter was the jurisprudential 
definition of the term, the freedom to enjoy rights. In this sense, an 
individual could enjoy freedom, without necessarily participating in 
government. Where the rights of fellow citizens ended, the freedom of 
individual action ensued.3  
 
Emma Rothschild suggests that, later, the issue was organised in terms 
of the political and economic sphere. In relation to politics, the idea of 
positive freedom was potentially the more subversive of the two. For 
instance, in Britain it challenged the notion of government by 
representatives and not delegates. Meanwhile, in the economic sphere, 
the terminology could be associated with the right to engage in trade 
and other innocuous and even useful activity.4 For according to John 
Pocock, the prelude to liberalism saw a struggle to reconcile the purely 
political ideal of virtue – which was inevitably corrupted by opulence – 
with commercial society. The result, he suggests, was manners, a new 
way for individuals to relate to one another in a social, and not purely 
political, sense.5 Overall, Pocock seeks to explain the moment when 
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classical republicanism degenerated into a jurisprudential possessive 
individualism, which, he suggests, predated capitalism.1  
 
This moment had apparently already passed when the physiocrats, and 
later Adam Smith posed the notion of liberty, in its jurisprudential 
sense, based on natural law. As seen in chapter 2, the deregulation of 
the grain trade in France was understood in part as the triumph of the 
freedom of the individual to prosper.2 However, the practical 
complications of liberalisation led Steuart, Necker and Linguet to 
entertain serious doubts about the benefits of freedom and to speculate 
on the role of the state.  
 
Linguet is sometimes considered as a mercantilist, but more recently as 
a pre-Marxist. A failed engineer, he made his living as a propagandist, 
particularly for Terray and his reintroduction of regulation of the grain 
trade after 1774.3 Linguet had initially written in favour of deregulation 
of the grain trade, but changed tack after the scheme seemed to fail in 
practice. Soon enough, he also accused the physiocrats of a doctrinaire 
approach, which ignored the evidence. He argued that without the 
regulation, speculation on grain was immoral but unavoidable. For 
grain could easily be hoarded up in secret to play on the passions of the 
crowd, causing panic and price spikes.4 Like Necker, he suspected that 
individual rationality was easily lost in the frenzy of a crowd.5 
 
Such market failures led Linguet to question the freedom of the 
labourer in a wage-economy. Seeing society, like Necker, as comprised 
of two classes, propertied and un-propertied, Linguet contended that 
the poor were held captive in a system of exploitation.6 The condition of 
the poor, Linguet continued, compared unfavourably with even the 
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slavery of the past.1 This could not be said, however, of the present 
condition of contemporary colonial slaves, who, Linguet admitted, were 
‘a thousand times more degraded’ than European workers.2 In fact, he 
used the example of contemporary West Indian slavery, which he 
considered the horrible result of philosophy and utility taken to their 
extremes, to illustrate that logical calculations of profit must always be 
tempered by the humanitarian criterion.3 
 
Meanwhile, the condition of the free labouring poor in Europe was, 
according to Linguet’s reasoning, inferior even to that of horses. The 
slaves of antiquity and the horses of the present never suffered from 
want of food. Servitude had been, he argued, ‘the only way to assure, I 
cannot say happiness, but at least the subsistence of that part of 
mankind destined to earn, through quotidian manual labour, their daily 
nourishment.4 Slavery had formerly counterbalanced the problems 
which he presumed were caused by uneven property distribution. Now, 
with the advent of a free and national labour market, this measure was 
lost. 
 
This was no mere analogy. For Linguet, slavery was a historical reality, 
which preceded the contemporary situation. He stated explicitly that a 
certain right or entitlement emerged as a part of the shift to free labour:  
 
I have already raised several of the reasons from where we derive this 
obligation… it is connected to the changes made to our customs and our 
constitution by the extinction of personal servitude.5  
 
In promoting free markets, physiocratic reasoning avoided the issue of 
the potential distress of the poorest ranks of society by arguing that the 
labouring poor held property in the form of their own labour.6 This was 
                                                         
1 S.N.H. Linguet, Du Pain et du Bled (London, 1774), p. 129. 
2 Ibid, p. 131. 
3 Ibid, p. 132. 
4 Ibid, p. 130. 
5 Ibid, p. 207. 
6 Levy, Linguet, p. 104. 
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a Lockean extension of the jurisprudential theory of natural law.1 
Linguet, however, emphasised that this put the labourer at the mercy of 
economic fluctuations, bearing all the risk inherent in economies 
subject to agricultural crises.2 He established a basic ‘entitlement’ to 
subsistence, also rooted in the natural law tradition, which made the 
right to life the only natural property right, all other property rights 
coming from positive law.3 This, together with a mercantilist argument 
that rendered the common people of key importance, plus the fact of 
their inherent vulnerability to price fluctuation, led him to claim that 
‘the supposed proprietor [of grain] can be no more than its guardian: 
his prerogative… yields to a right even more sacred, the source or pitfall 
of all rights, necessity’.4  
 
The lost relationship between property owners and poor labourers was 
also a theme in Necker’s work. Like Linguet, he argued that the change 
from payment in kind in an idealised feudal setting to the wages paid to 
free labourers removed certain responsibilities on the part of the 
employer. Wages did not necessarily bear relation to the cost of living, 
whereas feudal exchanges apparently had: 
 
The proprietors… who would have blushed to enjoy the continual labour of 
one of their fellow creatures without procuring him an honest subsistence, 
have been able, without remorse, to abandon themselves to their 
tyrannical greed, when this labour, valued in cash, has dispensed them 
from examining whether with this money the miserable labourer could 
provide for all his needs.5 
 
Whereas Linguet had preferred feudalism or even slavery in place of 
the contemporary arrangement of wage-labour, Necker only used it to 
demonstrate the illusory effects of cash wages and taxes. He 
                                                         
1 Pocock, Virtue, p. 45. 
2 Linguet, Du Pain, p. 211.  
3 Levy, Linguet, pp. 104-106. 
4 Linguet, Du Pain, p. 67. 
5 Necker, Sur la Législation, I, pp. 80-1. 
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emphasised the idea that, in those supposedly simpler and more honest 
times, the labourer was less prone to exploitation. In some ways the 
former system had its benefits, according to Necker.  
 
Yet slavery or restricted freedom came across as an uncouth 
arrangement in his work. For instance, he argued that behind some 
forms of liberty ‘is placed the slavery of the multitude’.1 Here he meant 
that freedom of the market, and the liberty of the merchants to sell or 
withhold goods at their leisure, could make slaves of the supposedly 
free labourers who were left to toil in permanent fear of want. The 
analogy was apt, for in classical thought slavery meant the condition of 
being obnoxious, that is ‘ perpetually subject or liable to harm or 
punishment’.2 Market fluctuations, he supposed, left the poor 
permanently and arbitrarily vulnerable to harm in the form of 
starvation. Nevertheless, monetisation and the modernisation which it 
seemed to entail was not systemically problematic in Necker’s work; it 
was the concurrent pitfalls of abuse and exploitation on the part of the 
proprietor class which he condemned. 
 
Steuart echoed this notion, also acknowledging the decline of feudalism 
as a relatively recent historical development and part of a process of 
monetisation, industrialisation and ultimately also integration under a 
single national government.3 Within an explanation of the non-
taxability of wages and exchanges made in kind, he depicted the feudal 
manors of the past as autonomous and hostile. The freedom which 
developing cities offered, he continued, drew away vassals and, with the 
discovery and settlement of a new continent, the production of 
manufactured goods began in earnest. Then, he continued, the feudal 
lords were drawn to the city, admiring the opulence of their prince’s 
domain. City dwelling became the norm, leading the lords to demand 
                                                         
1 Ibid, p. 186. Like Linguet, Necker abhorred contemporary slavery, later becoming an 
important member of the Amis des Noirs. D.Y. Kadish, ‘Translation in Context’ in D.Y. 
Kadish and F. Massardier-Kenney (eds.), Translating Slavery (Kent, OH, 2009), p. 46. 
2 Skinner, Liberty, p. 42. 
3 Kobayashi, ‘On the Method’, p. 112. 
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cash to support their new luxurious lifestyles. This, according to 
Steuart, led them to sell the product of their land for profit, rather than 
to supply it in direct exchange for the services of their vassals.1  
 
Steuart emphasised that enslaved or feudal labourers were less 
productive than their free counterparts. Contemporary economic 
growth, he believed, could be put down to wage-labour and the self-
interest on the part of workers which it prompted.2 This analysis of the 
productivity of free labourers and tenant farmers released from feudal 
dues was not especially extraordinary, particularly when applied to the 
case of Steuart’s homeland. After the union, would-be improvers of the 
Scottish situation associated the remnants of Scottish feudalism with an 
insecurity of ownership of profit, which in turn came to be blamed for 
an apparent divergence between the prosperity of England and that of 
Scotland.3 Parliamentary and pamphlet rhetoric around the abolition of 
heritable jurisdictions condemned this allegedly economically 
restraining characteristic of highland culture, blaming the near slavish 
conditions of Scottish tenancy for the relative underdevelopment of its 
economy.4 Even Andrew Fletcher criticised this supposed bastion of the 
free Scottish nobility and constitution, arguing that the institution 
entailed only the systemic entrenchment of poverty.5  
 
Steuart however, depicted commercialisation in a wistful light as a 
fundamental change which put an end to the old manner of social 
relations. This exposed newly independent wage labourers to the new 
danger of starvation. In his concern for the wage labourer and nostalgia 
for the patriarchal and protective social relations of yore, Steuart 
belonged to an authoritarian strain of the civic republican tradition, 
                                                         
1 Steuart, Principles, I, pp. 69-70. 
2 M. Guenther, ‘A Peculiar Silence’, Atlantic Studies, 8:4 (2011), p. 456. 
3 Skinner suggests that Hume hinted at the same in his History of Great Britain (1754). 
Steuart, Principles (1966 edn.), p. 206, n. 
4 J. Hoppit, ‘Compulsion, Compensation and Property Rights in Britain, 1688–1833’, 
P&P, 210:1 (2011), pp. 112-3.  
5 C. Kidd, Subverting Scotland’s Past (Cambridge, 1993), p. 35. 
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which also included the likes of Andrew Fletcher.1 He also echoed 
cameralist misgivings about what Justi referred to as the ‘plague of 
money’.2 
 
Like many of the critics of the heritable jurisdictions in Scotland, 
Steuart considered feudal servitude as a condition similar to slavery.3 
However, in his opinion, this was not necessarily an adverse condition, 
for he saw feudalism as a perpetuation of the beneficial principles of 
classical slavery. This was characterised by the exchange of 
subordination in return for dependence. Just as a slave of classical 
antiquity was unfree, but usually quite well cared for and protected by a 
master, so had feudal servants expected patronage from their lord.4 In 
his nostalgia for the old ways, Steuart departed from those who bitterly 
criticised the institutional hangovers of Scotland’s old constitution. 
Feudal servants were at least saved from the exploitative temperament 
of the free market system. It was better for the poor to serve a human 
master as vassals, than to live as obnoxii, in constant fear of the 
arbitrary dangers of the economy.5 
 
However, the legal reforms in Scotland were also part of a process of 
pacification and assimilation in the aftermath of the rebellion of 1745.6 
Steuart likewise appreciated the decline of the old feudal system as a 
force for an increased integration on a national level. According to 
Steuart, feudal lords, faced with economic growth, grew instinctively 
pacified and unified, so that they ‘no more appeared to one another as 
objects of jealousy, but of emulation’.7 No longer were the leaders of 
society at large isolated on their separate and independent estates. 
Rather, they, and their servants, were integrated into a system of 
                                                         
1 M. Ignatieff, ‘John Millar and Individualism’ in Hont and Ignatieff (eds.), Wealth and 
Virtue, p. 325. 
2 Quoted by Hutchison, Before Adam Smith, p. 251. 
3 Kidd, Subverting, p. 153. 
4 Steuart, Principles, I, p. 255. 
5 Skinner, Liberty, pp. 42-3. 
6 Kidd, Subverting, p. 156. 
7 Steuart, Principles, I, p. 70. 
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reciprocity on a national basis. This fitted neatly into Steuart’s overall 
notion of reciprocal dependencies as society’s glue. 
 
Necker also personally oversaw a similar process of national 
consolidation, which sprung in some ways from his own status as an 
outsider. As we have seen, he began by abolishing the venal offices of 
the insubordinate Intendants of Finance. However, he soon extended 
the process of removing offices in favour of salaried positions to every 
level of administration.1 Those who lost the offices they had purchased 
were offered refunds, not unlike a few former owners of heritable 
jurisdictions who were granted compensation.2 Not only did Necker’s 
systematic abolition of venal offices represent a more economical way 
of running the state, but it also drained some of the symbolic and 
patrimonial power of the court.3 The sale of offices was part of the 
complex system of privilege that entrenched the inequalities of 
feudalism, and attempted to keep elites invested in a monarchy that 
teetered atop a vast patrimonial pyramid. Feudalism still pervaded 
French society in all of these senses, and indeed the formal one: it was 
only when Necker himself authored an edict in 1779, that feudal 
serfdom in France was finally officially abolished.4 
 
The decline of feudalism did not necessarily leave the poor at a loose 
end. Steuart observed that the vassals’ bonds of subordination were 
transferred from the lord of the manor to the king or state.5 He had 
noted that the greater the degree of the dependence of an individual or 
class upon another, the greater the degree of subordination the former 
was obliged to offer to the latter.6 Dependence was after all a 
corruption of virtue, or the freedom of self-government.7 Free labourers 
                                                         
1 Doyle, Venality, p. 137. 
2 Ibid; Hoppit, ‘Compulsion, Compensation and Property Rights’, p. 114. Only 48 per 
cent of these latter claimants were awarded compensation, constituting a trifling 26 
per cent of the money demanded.  
3 Doyle, Venality, p. 138. 
4 J.Q.C. Mackrell, The Attack on ‘Feudalism’ in Eighteenth-Century France (London, 
1973), pp. 128-9. 
5 Steuart, Principles, I, pp. 257-8. 
6 Ibid, p. 257.  
7 Pocock, Virtue, p. 48. 
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now depended upon the king or state to protect them, and for that 
reason they obeyed their national government and integrated into a 
wider society. Steuart concluded that, in an economy where free 
labourers could depend upon their own industry to bring about their 
own subsistence, they lived relatively freely, owing limited 
subordination to the government, which offered them really only 
protection from external dangers.1  
 
A perfectly functioning economy, where labourers worked and fed 
themselves, was expected to tick over without the need for a statesman, 
except that, like a watch, the economy could be depended upon to go 
wrong at some point.2 For this reason, free society was not necessarily 
to be distinguished from absolutist government, so long as an individual 
head of state was not allowed to make arbitrary changes to legislation 
according to their own will or the interests of one favoured individual 
or section of society. In the spirit of classical republicanism, all of the 
interests had to be represented, and the general good pursued. 
 
However, following Montesquieu, Steuart observed that increasing 
wealth and commercialisation could challenge regimes, as individuals 
became ever more independent of government.3 For Steuart, this could 
even result in a sort of state of anarchy: 
 
violent convulsions have been owing to the short-sightedness of the 
statesmen; who, inattentive to the consequences of growing wealth and 
industry, foolishly imagined that hereditary subordination was to subsist 
among classes, whose situation, with respect to each other, was entirely 
changed.4  
 
This helps explain Steuart’s use of the term, liberalisation, which he saw 
as part of a programme of economic growth, whereby the masses were 
                                                         
1 Steuart, Principles, I, pp. 258-9.  
2 Hirschman, The Passions, p. 87. 
3 Steuart, Principles, I, p. 255; Hirschman, The Passions, p. 85. 
4 Steuart, Principles, I, p. 264. 
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unchained in order to unleash their latent productivity.1 Evidently this 
could be a dangerous course of action for short-sighted governments. 
However, Steuart looked again to his system of mutual reciprocities to 
stabilise free society. Thus the consumerism and capitalism, which had 
played a role in the termination of the original feudal system of 
reciprocity came full circle to cement a new social reciprocity based on 
the diversification of wants.2 This helps to explain Steuart’s apparently 
rather mercantilist stance on luxury.  
 
Luxury was a puzzling and controversial issue in the eighteenth 
century. Eastern luxury was supposed to have corrupted the virtue and 
brought about the downfall of the illustrious yet austere Roman 
Republic.3 However, in the light of a scientific approach, and in 
response to the application of Machiavellian principles of international 
relations to the individual, the idea of personal restraint began to 
crumble.4 New theories about how human behaviour could be managed 
began to spring up, often involving the state. One powerful solution in 
the eighteenth century was the ‘principle of countervailing passions’, 
which pitted the pernicious passions against innocuous interests.5 
 
From here, the human propensity to pursue self-interest took on a 
civilising function. This point was most prominently put by 
Montesquieu, who argued that doux commerce refined and pacified 
people.6 It was also seen to encourage investment in moveable 
property, which allowed the sovereign to engage more effectively in 
fiscal measures. Yet it simultaneously served as a check on potentially 
tyrannical sovereign power. For, through the constant expression of the 
private interests of the entire society, it allowed the true interests of 
                                                         
1 Ibid, p. 265. 
2 R. Ege, ‘The New Interpretation of Steuart by Paul Chamley’ in R. Tortajada (ed.), The 
Economics of James Steuart (Cambridge, 1983), p. 97. 
3 J. Shovlin, Political Economy of Virtue, p. 5. 
4 Hirschman, The Passions, p. 10. 
5 Ibid, p. 20. 
6 Ibid, 60. 
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that society, rather than the passions and dynastic follies of a ruling 
prince, to be pursued.1  
 
Nevertheless, anxiety about luxury persisted.2 Montesquieu lamented 
the unfortunate supplanting of more valuable human virtues which the 
principle of countervailing interests allowed.3 It was feared that the 
civic virtue which promoted the common good of the nation was easily 
lost as members of society expended their efforts on their personal 
comfort instead.4 Likewise, luxury, and the commercial culture that 
necessarily accompanied it, meant investment in moveable, and 
sometimes intangible goods. In the aftermath of the financial revolution 
of the 1690s, it became normal to lend to the government, and to live 
off the returns or expectation thereof. This could be disturbing because 
these creditors became dependent on government for their livelihoods 
and vice versa, corrupting the virtue of their self-government. 5 
Montesquieu harboured doubts about the national debt, while even 
Hume fretted about its potential to ruin ‘all free governments’, 
including Britain’s.6 
 
For Steuart, luxury was a driving force behind superfluity.7 It also 
helped to found a useful reciprocity. For as long as the rich consumed 
domestically manufactured luxuries, they would pay the wages of poor 
labourers.8 It is important to note that he expected no classical 
republican concern for the destiny of the society itself, except perhaps 
on the part of the revered statesman.9 Steuart thought that the 
                                                         
1 Hirschman, The Passions, pp. 74; 78-81. 
2 Shovlin, Political Economy of Virtue, p. 14. 
3 Hirschman, The Passions, p. 80. 
4 M. Kwass, Privilege and the Politics of Taxation (Cambridge, 2000), p. 234. 
5 J. Hoppit, ‘Checking the Leviathan, 1688-1832’ in D. Winch and P.K. O’Brien, (eds.), 
The Political Economy of British Historical Experience, 1688-1914 (Oxford, 2002), p. 
286; Pocock, Virtue, pp. 68-9; D. Hume ‘Of Civil Liberty’ in E.F. Miller (ed.), David 
Hume, p. 96. 
6 Hirschman, The Passions, p. 80. 
7 N. Kobayashi, ‘Introduction: The First System of Political Economy’ in Skinner, (ed.), 
Principles (1998 edn.), I, p. lxxiv. 
8 Smout, ‘Where had the Scottish Economy got to?’, p. 64. Here Steuart followed Hume, 
whose thoughts on luxury are discussed below pp. 260-1. 
9 Ege, ‘The New Interpretation of Steuart’, p. 97. 
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statesman only had to ensure that labourers could afford a realistic 
subsistence by developing sensible legislation, to which anyone who 
wished to enjoy membership of society was obliged to submit. This 
echoed Hume’s idea that justice had to be established in order to keep 
individual interest in line with the general interest.1 The public good 
would not appear spontaneously from the interests of individuals who 
were free to pursue their own good; it had to be arbitrated by the state 
and accepted by a disciplined nation of subordinated citizens, or 
subjects.2 
 
Necker shared the view, contrary to physiocratic teaching, that a 
restrained luxury was a spur to circulation, innovation, and the arts. It 
created work for the labouring classes.3 Moreover, to some extent, 
Necker agreed with Steuart’s portrayal of interdependency. Having 
defended luxury by stating that ‘society is founded upon a gentle 
reciprocity of concessions and sacrifices’,4 he later argued that if the 
monarch could expect his subjects to protect the state, then in return 
they were at least owed protection from sudden price rises.5  
 
Where Steuart saw the labouring classes as now virtually free to 
participate in an open market subject to restriction, Necker believed 
that the servitude of French labourers still continued indefinitely. This 
was due to an irreversibly unfavourable labour market, which meant 
that the people remained at the mercy of the relatively small class of 
proprietors (‘classe des propriétaires’).6 Because of the inevitable 
imbalance of power, French labourers could never be free to pursue 
their own economic aspirations. Their rights under a liberal 
government could not be protected, thanks to the structural 
inequalities of contemporary society. A physiocratic liberty, which 
                                                         
1 Force, Self-Interest, p. 211. 
2 Redman, ‘Steuart’s Statesman’, p. 55. 
3 Shovlin, Political Economy of Virtue, pp. 142; 145.  
4 Necker, Éloge, p. 34.  
5 Necker, Sur la Législation, I, pp. 163-4.  
6 Ibid, p. 166; quote p. 119.  
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offered the people the right to buy and sell without restriction could 
only ever end in their exploitation, another sort of servitude.  
 
Furthermore, there were other ways in which Necker considered the 
French labouring classes inevitably less free than in other societies. In a 
direct comparison of Britain and France, Necker argued that, in the 
former, political rights were widespread, and the political interests of 
the British popular classes therefore ranged beyond grain prices. In 
contrast to these ‘many sorts of interests in society… [the people] of 
France have none, so they are indifferent to everything, except the price 
of grain’.1 Because of their limited outlet for political expression, Necker 
thought, when prices did rise sharply, the people rioted. He considered 
this reaction justified, given the condition and position of the labouring 
classes within society. It was part of their dialogue with the state, which 
ensured that it carried out its reciprocal duty of protecting their 
interests, basic as they were.2 
 
Overall, the French were an ‘infant people’,3 who could not be expected 
to look into the reasoning and potential economic benefits of an 
unregulated grain trade. Meanwhile, he argued that the physiocrats’ 
‘unlimited love of liberty in political economy and the exaggerated hate 
of prohibition go back to man’s childhood’.4 Necker clearly understood 
childhood in a similar way to Steuart, who had pointed out that children 
existed in a sort of servitude, in the sense that they were totally reliant 
upon and hence subordinate to their parents.5  
 
A patriarchal economy, complete with paterfamilias, was Steuart’s 
explicit ideal for a national economy. Such a paternal society bound the 
propertied and the poor, who in the end did not really need their 
freedom, together. Necker concurred that the strict application of the 
                                                         
1 Ibid, p. 160.  
2 Ibid.  
3 Ibid, p. 153.  
4 Ibid, p. 185.  
5 Steuart, Principles, I, p. 256. Under Roman law, children as well as slaves were 
obnoxii. Skinner, Liberty, p. 41. 
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legal claims of property and liberty in a free market economy was a 
rejection of this paternalism.1 A physiocratic and ultimately Smithian 
insistence on property rights and liberty was a hasty and immature 
approach to political economy. To be a member of a society, even a 
well-to-do and educated member, was to agree to the balance of 
authority and responsibility, relinquishing fantasies of freedom.2  
 
According to Necker, the condition of the people was fixed because they 
lacked the leisure to become enlightened.3 The monarch, as legislator, 
was obliged to accommodate them by ensuring that sudden price rises 
did not occur. This required regulation, even if this was not profitable 
on a national level. Necker drew a distinction between actual need and 
the fear of want. Rather, therefore, than having to do directly with a 
biological imperative or right of humankind, as in Linguet’s thesis, 
Necker made the danger of starvation into an issue of happiness or 
social stability, which was always a national concern. It was a matter of 
balancing all interests within the nation. This balancing sometimes even 
included compromising the interest of the state itself, in terms of its 
overall growth and performance.  
 
In this sense, Necker’s explanation confirms John Walter and Keith 
Wrightson’s analysis of dearth and its role in strengthening social order 
in early modern societies.4 In Necker’s depiction, shortage or perceived 
shortage offered the normally silent French masses a word or two in a 
dialogue, which saw the authority and status of government go 
unquestioned, so long as it publicly took measures against shortage. 
Offering the people even potentially economically irrational safeguards 
secured their participation in a system which, at the same time, 
repressed them. Welfare even more explicitly overtook liberty in 
Necker’s account than in Steuart’s. However, for both the responsibility 
                                                         
1 C. Bouton, The Flour War (Pennsylvania, 1993), p. 176. 
2 G. Faccarello, ‘Galiani, Necker and Turgot’ in idem (ed.) Studies in the History of 
French Political Economy (London, 1998), p. 141. 
3 Necker, Sur la Législation, I, pp. 156-7.  
4 J. Walter and K. Wrightson, ‘Dearth and the Social Order in Early Modern England’, 
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for welfare now resided firmly with a national government, and was no 




Necker and Steuart’s relationship to mercantilism is complicated, 
especially because of their own conscious attempts to avoid 
doctrinarism. Nevertheless, some of their thoughts, particularly when it 
came to population theory or to raw materials, betrayed certain 
assumptions about the role of the economy in relation to the power of 
the nation state and the supposedly limited nature of the world market. 
However, the definition of the nation and especially national good is a 
problem for criticisms of so-called mercantilism, which depict it as 
inherently backward. In fact, this is the loophole that allowed for 
Keynes to give the system its reprieve. The analysis of Steuart and 
Necker actually ran deeper than simple consideration of balance of 
trade; they examined the social relations which constituted the nation 
and, in a sense, also the stability and utility of that unit.  
 
In many ways, the attitudes of these two authors and Linguet towards 
feudalism, and towards the social configuration that followed, bear a 
resemblance to E.P. Thompson’s analysis of the moral economy. Their 
work, like Thompson’s, focussed on teasing out the implications of 
capitalisation and the tensions placed on old notions of hierarchy and 
inequality by the new norms. Thompson depicted the orderly and 
paradigmatic behaviour of rioting crowds as evidence of ‘some deeply 
embedded, “structural” reciprocity’.1 The work of Necker and Steuart 
particularly, reveal attempts to trace the path of this reciprocity into 
contemporary post-feudal society. In each case, it brought them to 
consider the relationship between the nation – now composed of 
                                                         
1 E. P. Thompson, ‘Patrician Society, Plebeian Culture’, Journal of Social History, 7:4 
(1974), p. 402. 
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supposedly unbound subjects rather than lords and vassals – and the 
state.  
 
For both authors, the decline of feudalism occasioned new roles for the 
state, particularly intervention in the grain trade. The roles which 
Steuart and Necker assigned to their respective statesman were similar, 
but there were important differences. For each, the key danger which 
labourers faced was that grain prices would exceed their means. Both 
also maintained that it was within the competence and the remit of a 
statesman to prevent this from happening. However, Steuart was far 
more prepared than Necker to credit the notion that self-interest could 
result in mutually beneficial social relations, because he saw society as 
bound by economic, as opposed to moral or political, reciprocities. For 
Steuart, reciprocity could be found in the interchange created by luxury 
(that is, non-essential) consumption. He supposed that the proprietor 
and employer were as dependent on the labourers’ efforts as the 
labourers were upon the wages they received from their employers. 
Even the statesman’s interventions were economically reasonable 
(rather than merely moral), because, thanks to the doctrine of the 
centrality of labourers, if they failed to subsist, then society was liable 
to implode.  
 
For Steuart, the statesman remained an almost uninterested observer 
who checked not the relationship between the producer and consumer; 
seller and buyer; or employer and wage earner, but rather the 
relationship between wages and prices. Hence the granary scheme 
which he designed entirely to this end. Steuart was preoccupied with 
the statesman’s solicitous manipulation of monetary policy and he even 
envisioned his granary system as a sort of bank where grain was 
currency.1 It was essential, then, for the statesman to keep an eye on the 
relationship between money and value 
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By comparison, for Necker, employers were virtually independent of 
the individual labourer, as each could be easily replaced in a labour 
market so prejudiced against them as a class. Necker seemed to think 
that, in a system of wage-labour in an unfavourable market, the old 
reciprocity was more likely to have been relocated in the direct 
relationship between the people and their sovereign government. What 
this meant was that, for Necker, the survival and happiness of the 
labouring classes were rooted entirely in the reciprocal political 
relationship which they shared with the statesman.  
 
Self-interest was a negative force, which meant that economic ties 
between classes could only be exploitative. Necker expected a 
statesman, therefore, to use explicit regulation, rather than the more 
subtle manipulation of economic forces, to protect vulnerable members 
of society. In this sense, the labouring classes were more tightly bound 
to their government and their class than in Steuart’s system, where 
there was perhaps more interclass cohesion. This is why Necker could 
possibly be classed as a predecessor of socialist thinkers, where the 
same could not apply to Steuart, in spite of all that they did share. 
 
For both Steuart and Necker, the need of the common people for grain 
promoted national cohesion, and potentially national identity, or at 
least belonging. However, for Necker the relationship was far more 
centralised, with reciprocity operating basically on a many to one basis. 
Meanwhile, in Steuart’s work reciprocity still operated on a many to 
many basis, with the statesman as a benevolent but almost uninvolved 
overseer.  
 
In fact, Steuart’s theory even allowed him to begin to examine the 
potential international reciprocities for which need and luxury could 
allow. He could imagine a situation where a developed nation, such as 
Britain, might have recourse to foreign grain imports. Therefore, he 
argued that ‘trade has an evident tendency towards the improvement of 
the world in general, by rendering the inhabitants of one country 
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industrious, in order to supply the wants of another, without any 
prejudice to themselves’.1 Necker’s model, by comparison, called for 
self-sufficiency in a hostile world where potential dependence on an 
international grain trade would leave the nation at the mercy of its 
enemies.2  
 
Necker’s nation clearly maintained its independence and peculiarity at 
all costs, but in Steuart’s work the situation is slightly less pronounced. 
The cohesion which he presented, nevertheless, depended on 
complimentary but peculiar national products, and hence economic 
identities. As in his depiction of the situation within the nation, there 
was reciprocity, yet hierarchy remained. Moreover, the goal of the 
nation dependent on another for its subsistence remained national 
enrichment, and though the two might grow together, clearly an 
imbalance of wealth and power was to remain intact. In this way 
therefore, both authors seem to have been limited to considering the 
nation as the greatest possible economic and political unit, even in spite 
of international economic bonds of reciprocity. 
  
                                                         
1 Steuart, Principles, I, p. 137 
2 Necker, Sur la Législation, II, pp. 70-1. 
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This chapter turns to the theory behind the deregulation of the grain 
trade in Britain and France. It considers free trade arguments before 
Adam Smith by focussing on the work of Anne-Robert-Jacques Turgot 
(1727-81) in the French case and that of Josiah Tucker (1713-99) in the 
British. Turgot wrote at length on the grain trade, especially in relation 
to his role as intendant in the Limousin region. Tucker, the Dean of 
Gloucester, meanwhile did not treat the grain issue specifically in his 
many works on political economy and other subjects. However, in the 
course of his correspondence with Charles the Third Viscount 
Townshend (1700-1764) his views on the issue were made explicit. For 
this reason, although Turgot and Tucker are the main foci of the 
chapter, it will also treat the work of Townshend, which Tucker himself 
admitted was highly influential on his own.1 
 
In turn, the influence of Tucker’s work on the Gournay group, the 
physiocrats, and ultimately on Turgot, has been acknowledged by 
historians of economic thought.2 Tucker and Turgot were in 
correspondence, and Turgot even translated some of the dean’s work 
into French. In spite of this, Tucker’s work has not survived the test of 
time as well as that of his French counterpart. This can, in part, be 
attributed to the fact that he penned no single great work. However, 
Tucker’s work has also been somewhat overlooked and often treated as 
simple mercantilism, in spite of his commitment to many of the 
                                                         
1 Tucker to Townshend, 13th July 1752 in The Manuscripts of the Marquess Townshend, 
HMC, Eleventh Annual Report, Appendix, Part IV (London, 1887), p. 379. 
2 R.L. Schuyler (ed.), Josiah Tucker (New York, 1931), p. 11. 
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principles of free trade which underpinned the work of Turgot and 
ultimately of Adam Smith.  
 
Turgot himself displayed some apprehension of being dubbed a ‘Man of 
Systems’, because his work made a remarkably simple model of the 
apparently complex and variable nature of what is now called 
economics. For this reason, as with the previous chapter, the approach 
of the authors is dealt with first. The first section explores the apparent 
French preference for Cartesian logic in opposition to supposedly 
British empiricism by examining the epistemological positioning of the 
authors together with their own ideas about who was qualified to study 
their commercial subject.  
 
Treating the subject as a science, Turgot and Tucker found that they 
had to deal with the notion of self-interest, and it is their treatments of 
this in relation to government supervision and the general good which 
the second section of this chapter investigates. The admiration and the 
aspersions which each cast upon the political configuration of the rival 
nation is explored in relation to their respective ideas about liberty in 
an economic and political sense. 
 
The final section explores how these thoughts on an individual level 
were channelled into their views on the international situation. In 
particular this section explores the ‘rich country- poor country 
problem’ in an effort to understand how Tucker and Turgot positioned 
their own nation and fellow citizens in a putative system of global free 
trade. Overall the chapter concludes that, although Tucker and Turgot 
both believed in free trade, they differed in their notions of how to 
establish lasting commercial freedom and of what global free trade 
could mean for their respective nations. For while Turgot depicted 
France as poised to thrive in a free trade world, Tucker presented 
Britain on the edge of a precipice, and concerned himself with divining 
how Britain’s teetering supremacy might be delivered. 
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Natural Law and the Science of Political Economy 
 
Josiah Tucker’s origins were relatively humble. However, a sound 
education at a grammar school followed by St John’s College, Oxford, 
together with his ability to make friends in high places, got him on his 
way. Having taken holy orders, he was appointed curate at St Stephens 
in Bristol in 1737 and two years later, was made rector at All Saint’s in 
Bristol also. He cut his literary teeth on theological issues, launching his 
career as a publicist, and controversialist, with a biting critique of 
Methodism, which was then flourishing in Bristol.1 
 
The bustling Atlantic port of Bristol, where he could observe the 
comings and goings of merchants and businessmen, continued to 
inspire Tucker’s work for the duration of his career. Though he 
pondered theological and social issues – including the naturalisation of 
foreign Protestants and Jews – he soon also sunk his teeth into political 
economy. He published his highly successful Brief Essay in 1749. The 
work treated economic issues, such as foreign trade, monopoly and 
restriction, together with social questions such as religion, 
naturalisation, and political liberty, which continued to preoccupy its 
author.2 
 
Tucker’s work was extremely popular and he was consulted as an 
authority on trade by MPs.3 Evidently Tucker’s commercial expertise 
was well respected by the Bishop of Norwich, Thomas Hayter, who was 
tutor to the future George III. For, in 1752 he commissioned Tucker to 
write a handbook for the prince.4 However, the project was never 
completed, and in the author’s lifetime what there was only circulated 
as a complete whole on a private basis amongst friends as Elements of 
                                                         
1 R.T. Cornish, ‘Tucker, Josiah (1713–1799)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography 
(Oxford, 2004) [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/27790, accessed 22 
September 2015]; T. Hutchison, Before Adam Smith (Oxford, 1988), p. 228. 
2 Ibid, pp. 228-9 
3 K. Willis, ‘The Role in Parliament of the Economic Ideas of Adam Smith, 1776-1800’, 
History of Political Economy, 11:4 (1979), p. 537. 
4 Hutchison, Before Adam Smith, p. 299. 
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Commerce and Theory of Taxes, though fragments were eventually also 
published under other titles.1 
 
In the preface to his Four Tracts published in 1774, Tucker gave his 
reasons for terminating the project. Ever the one to revel in his own 
reputation as a controversialist, he wrote that  
 
I had not made a great Progress, before I discovered that such a Work was 
by no means proper to be sheltered under the protection of a Royal 
Patronage, on account of the many jealousies to which it was liable, and 
the many cavils which might be raised against it.2  
 
This was no exaggeration: Tucker’s views regularly got him into 
trouble. In Bristol he was physically assaulted in the street for his attack 
on Methodism, and later burnt in effigy for his favourable stance on 
Jewish naturalisation. However, his work also helped him to make 
valuable alliances. For example, his support of Robert Nugent’s bill for 
naturalising foreign Protestants ultimately led to Tucker’s appointment 
as Dean of Gloucester in 1758.3 
 
Yet the historiography has not been kind to Tucker either. The 
originality and pro-free trade stance that he claimed for himself have 
not impressed economic historians. Jacob Viner dismissed Tucker as a 
mercantilist, citing the fact that Tucker still invested in a ‘balance of 
labour’ doctrine, which led him to encourage the regulation of foreign 
trade.4 Overall, Viner’s work cautions against reading too much into 
‘stray and vague anticipations of later doctrine’ in the work of Tucker 
and most of his contemporaries.5 Terence Hutchison likewise argued 
                                                         
1 Schuyler, Josiah Tucker, p. 12.  
2 J. Tucker, ‘Four Tracts together with Two Sermons’ [1774] in The Collected Works of 
Josiah Tucker (London, 1993), II, p. vii. 
3 Cornish, ‘Tucker, Josiah’ [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/27790, accessed 
22 September 2015]. 
4 Hutchison, Before Adam Smith, p. 238; J. Viner, Studies in the Theory of International 
Trade (London, 1937), p. 64. 
5 Ibid, p. 92. Sir Dudley North; William Paterson; Isaac Gervaise; and George Whatley 
are the only exceptions which Viner allows to this rule.  
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that, although Tucker pioneered some liberal thoughts, he nevertheless 
insisted on a ‘strong role for government’.1 Murray Rothbard concurred 
that Tucker was ‘extravagantly hailed in his day as a free trader’.2  
 
Robert Livingstone Schuyler was likewise sceptical about the novelty of 
Tucker’s thought, and also relegated the Dean of Gloucester to the ranks 
of the so-called mercantilists. However Schuyler allowed, and George 
Shelton agreed, that Tucker was somewhat unorthodox in envisioning 
economic life and theory as something like a discrete science.3  
 
In Brief Essay, Tucker duly announced his intention to confound 
popular opinion that this ‘science’ was ‘not reducible to any fixed and 
certain principles’.4 Most of all, he maintained, the subject was not to be 
considered the sole preserve of merchants. Their opinions – which 
depended on their private interests – were bound to clash, precluding 
general consensus on most points.5  
 
A similar point was made by George Whatley, who advised that the 
opinion of merchants ‘must ever be the Spring of his actions: 
Government ought, notwithstanding, to endevor to procure particular 
Informations from every one’.6 To that end, Tucker suggested that a 
‘person of a liberal and learned education, not concerned in trade, is 
better qualified to engage in the study of it as a Science, than a 
merchant’.7 For Tucker, then, first-hand experience, though it was 
useful, was not the primary qualification for dealing with commercial 
and ultimately economic subject matter. The issue of trade and its 
regulation needed to be demystified and placed on the curriculum of 
the unbiased gentleman’s liberal education. 
                                                         
1 Hutchison, Before Adam Smith, pp. 231-2. 
2 M.N. Rothbard, Economic Thought before Adam Smith (Aldershot, 1995), p. 335. 
3 Schuyler (ed.), Josiah Tucker, p. 13; G. Shelton, Dean Tucker and Eighteenth-Century 
Economic and Political Thought (London, 1981), p.50. 
4 J. Tucker, ‘Brief Essay’ (1753 version) in Collected Works, I, p. v. 
5 Shelton, Dean Tucker, p. 49. 
6 G. Whatley and B. Franklin, Principles of Trade (London, 1774), pp. 32-3. Adam Smith 
agreed with this point. A. Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of 
Nations, eds. R.H. Campbell, A.S. Skinner, and W.B. Todd, (Oxford, 1976), I.xi.10. 
7 Tucker, ‘Brief Essay’, p. vi. 
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Tucker was not alone in his patronage of this so-called science. His 
correspondent, Charles Townshend, established an essay prize in the 
subject as a means of ‘introducing the Science of Trade into… 
[Cambridge] university’.1 Even though it echoed the calls, raised by the 
likes of William Petty and Joseph Massie, for a theoretical approach to 
trade at Oxford and Cambridge, the proposed subject matter was 
entirely ‘maverick’ for its time.2 Unfortunately it quickly became clear 
that the subject was ‘so entirely foreign to the present system of our 
education that the introduction of it will probably be attended with 
some difficulties’.3  
 
In its first year, the competition was a pleasing success for both 
Townshend and the university. It elicited an uncontroversial prize-
winning essay about the connections between trade and civil liberty. 
Evidently, few questioned the assumption that Britain benefitted 
commercially from its supposedly exemplary record of civil liberty.4 
The masters at Cambridge believed with Townshend that British 
merchants enjoyed freedom from arbitrary government intervention, 
which encouraged them in their enterprises.5  
 
However, the second year proved a fiasco. The masters at Cambridge 
decided to set an essay question of their own fabrication in preference 
to the suggestions offered by their benefactor. James Raven points out 
that Townshend’s prime suggestion, which prompted comment on 
national morality and regulation, could well invite controversy. It was 
rejected, he argues, due to fears that it might embroil the university in 
the contentious debates over the Jew Bill, of which Tucker was so active 
                                                         
1 Townshend to the Reverend Doctor Yonge, 5th November 1754 in Manuscripts, p. 
385. 
2 J. R. Raven, ‘Viscount Townshend and the Cambridge Prize for Trade Theory, 1754–
1756’, HJ, 28:3 (1985), pp. 536-7. 
3 Dr Yonge to Townshend, 17th October 1754 in Manuscripts, p. 384. 
4 Raven, ‘The Cambridge Prize’, p. 545. 
5 D.C. North and B.R. Weingast, ‘Constitutions and Commitment’, Journal of Economic 
History, 49:4 (1989), p. 829.  
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a part.1 Therefore, ‘populousness’, the second matter offered by 
Townshend in his list, was selected.  
 
However, in addition to Townshend’s ‘On what circumstances does the 
populousness of a country principally depend?’ a second part was 
added, namely, ‘& what effect has the populousness of a Nation on its 
trade?’ Townshend was enraged. He argued that this question 
precluded proper analysis of the direct relationship which he saw 
between increasing trade and population growth.2 Moreover, according 
to Raven, Townshend thought that the rejection of his preferred 
question betrayed an unwillingness on the part of the institution to 
engage in objective discussion about trade.3 He haughtily refused to 
even so much as glance over the winning entry and discontinued the 
annual competition.4 The problem of expertise in the subject, therefore, 
even thwarted attempts to promote its study at university level. 
 
Townshend had expressed his view of the role of trade in a nation in 
National Thoughts, a pamphlet published under the alias ‘a landowner’. 
This nom-de-plume supposedly signified that the author was writing 
against his own private interests.5 It immediately elicited alarm on the 
part of other landowners and traders who argued that, without the 
subsidy, grain exports would cease.6  
 
However, Townshend’s landholdings were in Norfolk, where bounty 
payments out of King’s Lynn and Great Yarmouth were extremely high. 
From about 1750, the serious financial demands which bounty 
payments made on the national treasury put the matter on the public 
agenda. It evidently also worried Townshend who published this piece 
on the issue in 1751.7 Moreover, in spite of the bucolic evocations of the 
                                                         
1 Raven, ‘The Cambridge Prize’, pp. 547-8. 
2 Townshend to Reverend Law, 26th January 1756 in Manuscripts, p. 388. 
3 Raven, ‘The Cambridge Prize’, p. 550. 
4 Townshend to Law, 26th June 1756 in Manuscripts, p. 391. 
5 Rothbard, Economic Thought, p. 336. 
6 D.G. Barnes, A History of the English Corn Laws (London, 1930), p. 25. 
7 Ibid, pp. 23-4. 
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nom-de-plume, the Townshends of Raynham, like their neighbours the 
Walpoles, were immersed in commercial concerns.1 The author clearly 
had a range of matters on his mind as he wrote. 
 
This pamphlet prompted the initial exchange with Tucker, who also 
initially disagreed with Townshend’s standpoint and argued that 
exporting grain was an unrewarding occupation without the incentive 
of the bounty payments.2 Ultimately, however, he was converted and 
declared himself Townshend’s disciple.3 He remarked especially on 
what he found to be the sagacity of Townshend’s method wherein 
 
a man should form to himself a general plan drawn from ye properties of 
commerce & then descend to particulars and individuals, & observe 
whether they are co-operating with ye general interest.4 
 
Townshend had apparently achieved this in National Thoughts by first 
laying down ‘such general maxims of trade as cannot, in my opinion, be 
controverted’.5 In revealing thus that he had already tasked himself 
with challenging these general statements, and found them 
incontrovertible, it seems that Townshend was employing a rhetorical, 
and somewhat deductive, method to reason out self-evident truths in a 
world that was inherently ordered. Thanks largely to Newtonian 
philosophy, actual observed particulars were in the process of 
devaluation in the esteem of British philosophers. By the eighteenth 
century they were preoccupied with liberal governmentality and 
prioritised ‘universals and the (invisible) laws of nature’,6 which were 
thought to guide everything from planetary arrangements to the 
economy.  
 
                                                         
1 Raven, ‘The Cambridge Prize’, p. 543. 
2 Tucker to Townshend, 12th March 1752 in Manuscripts, pp. 371-2. 
3 Tucker to Townshend, 13th July 1752 in ibid, p. 379. 
4 Ibid, p. 375. Hume made a similar point about drawing general conclusions from 
particular cases. D. Hume, ‘Of Commerce’ in E.F. Miller (ed.), David Hume 
(Indianapolis, 1987), p. 254. 
5 C. Townshend, National Thoughts (London, 1751), p. 26. 
6 M. Poovey, A History of the Modern Fact (Chicago & London, 1998), p. 214. 
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However, Townshend’s next move, as Tucker described, was to decide 
whether the corn bounty policy was aligned with these maxims. Here 
he added in the Bishop of Ely’s wheat price data, in order to prove his 
overall point that the corn bounty was harmful.1 These figures, 
therefore, helped Townshend to subvert the inductive objection and 
ground his universal abstractions in numerical fact. This conformed to 
the old-fashioned way, more akin to political arithmetic and loosely 
informed by Baconian empiricism.2 In a way, then, he pre-empted 
Smith, who famously scoffed at political arithmetic, but nevertheless 
engaged with the figures and theories which it had furnished. For it was 
not the ‘impulse’ towards statistics itself, but the ‘inspiring message, the 
suggestive program [of political arithmetic], which wilted in the 
wooden hands of the Scottish professor’.3 
 
Tucker’s method of generating universal knowledge ultimately also 
required the kind of observation, and not mere reasoning, which made 
good his claim to scientific enquiry according to its contemporary 
meaning.4 He understood commerce as a natural human inclination, 
which meant that the same principles were to be observed in all human 
interactions in every society, and duly encouraged young readers to 
make a general tour. This was not so that they could buy exotic and 
lavish clothing and take on foreign airs, but so that they could ‘rub off 
local prejudices’ and unravel the commercial mores of other societies, 
becoming acquainted with the universal characteristics which 
supposedly united them all.5  
 
Tucker credited all human beings with certain ‘powers’ including ‘the 
prerogative of reason and reflection’.6 However, he allowed most 
people only to apply them in the identification and pursuit of their own 
                                                         
1 Townshend, National Thoughts, p. 28. 
2 Poovey, Modern Fact, p. 149. 
3 J.A. Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis (London, 1955), p. 212. 
4 Ibid, p.155; B.J. Shapiro, A Culture of Fact (Ithaca & London, 2000), p. 77. 
5 J. Tucker, ‘Instructions for Travellers’ [1758] in Collected Works, III, p. 3. 
6 J. Tucker, ‘The Elements of Commerce and Theory of Taxes’ [1755] in Collected 
Works (London, 1993)’, III, p.55. 
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good within social limits. Self-interest was for Tucker universal, but it 
did not necessarily result in universal benefit or even accord. He argued 
that  
 
the circulation of commerce being only directed by the reason or wisdom 
of man, is therefore subject to all those impediments, obstructions and 
irregularities, which result from the vices and extravagancies, the partial 
interests, the false conceptions, and mistaken policy of mankind.1  
 
Humankind was imbued with self-love. Tucker followed Bernard 
Mandeville and others in remarking that public good emanated from 
the free pursuit of individual interest.2 He even agreed that self-love 
offered the capacity for civilisation and sociability along the lines that 
Montesquieu and Hume had sketched.3 Where formerly only a virtuous 
devotion to the polis was enough to socialise individuals, the new bonds 
forged by commercial activity and the politeness it required allowed the 
formation of a more modern and harmonious society.4 
 
However, Tucker also implied that self-interest could corrupt the field 
of study that he was attempting to establish. He remarked that the 
student of commerce had to be careful to adhere to universal principals 
first, or else it was likely that ‘he studies Trade only as a Monopolist, & 
doth more hurt than good to the community’.5 The true science of 
commerce had to be freed of the prejudices that grew from self-interest, 
and then deployed in the form of political economy. This prevented 
harm from coming to a society composed of self-interested individuals. 
Hence he thought of the Board of Trade as ‘Guardians of the Publick 
Welfare’.6 The implication was that a statesman or an economist 
                                                         
1 Ibid, p. 60. 
2 Viner, Studies, p. 99. 
3 A.O. Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests (Princeton, 1977), p. 61. 
4 J.G.A. Pocock, Virtue, Commerce, and History (Cambridge, 1985), pp. 114-5. 
5 Tucker to Townshend, 12th March 1752 in Manuscripts, p. 375. 
6 Tucker, ‘Brief Essay’, p. ix. 
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needed to be disinterested in order to fully appreciate the subtleties of 
the economic system.1 
 
If private interest were put aside, the general principles of trade could 
be carefully divined by humankind, particularly by observing Christian 
morals, since they operated in an intricate system, formed by ‘the same 
good Being who formed the religious system’.2 The Dean of Gloucester, 
a man of the church, was obviously very well-placed, therefore, to write 
on the subject. Moreover, Tucker was neither a trader nor a landowner, 
and proclaimed, ‘I have no private ends of my own to serve, either one 
way or the other’.3 Evidently, self-interest could be relegated to the 
economic sphere, and there had to be some other motive to guide 
governments and economists.4  
 
However, Tucker also singled out the landed-interest as peculiarly 
qualified to arbitrate on the subject simply because their private 
interests were, he supposed, intrinsically linked to the good of the 
nation in which their property was immovably situated.5 In this sense, 
Tucker was tackling what John Pocock identifies as the ‘tension 
between virtue and commerce’.6 He was committed to the idea that 
‘political capacity’ was not rooted in inalienable rights, but was made 
possible by inequalities and the necessary exchange of property. For if 
rights were not inalienable, then representatives could not be elected, 
and there could be no government. Actually, individuals gave up their 
claim to a political personality, in order to participate in a society where 
they owned property, though no longer necessarily in the landed form.7 
Tucker clutched one last shred of the virtue of yore, when he 
recommended that a proprietary connection to the land itself could 
save representatives from the corruption inherent in the government of 
                                                         
1 P. Force, Self-Interest before Adam Smith (Cambridge, 2003), p. 204. 
2 Tucker, ‘Instructions for Travellers’, p. 73. 
3 Tucker, ‘Brief Essay’, p. 140. 
4 Force, Self-Interest, p. 206. 
5 Tucker, ‘Brief Essay’, p. x. 
6 Pocock, Virtue, p. 122. 
7 Ibid, pp. 119-20. 
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a society without rights.1 How satisfying it must have been for Tucker 
when the landowning Townshend used corn price data to prove that his 
stance, which seemed economically irrational on the private level, was 
beneficial to both his nation and his class.  
 
Turgot, another correspondent of Tucker, seems to have been similarly 
inclined towards the idea of a scientific political economy. He agreed 
that the studies and learning of a merchant ‘only amounts to a part of 
the science of commerce’.2 Although Turgot contributed to the 
Encyclopédie and was anxious for Morellet to get on with his 
dictionary,3 he implied that the subject needed to be moved forward 
from works of reference such as Savary’s Dictionnaire Universel de 
Commerce (1723), which was penned as guide to terminology 
predominantly for merchants.4 Turgot argued that it was up to a 
‘philosopher and a statesman’ to consider the reasons behind price-
revolutions, diversity of fashion, and the fundamental natural laws 
which guided commerce in its entirety, as well as ‘the complicated 
relations by which commerce is bound with all branches of political 
economy’.5  
 
However, in the process of putting this science to paper, Turgot’s 
master, Vincent de Gournay had been branded a ‘man of systems’ by his 
critics. Turgot had been under the tutelage of the anglophile Intendant 
of Commerce since 1755. It was during this period that he wrote 
several pieces for the Encyclopédie and was also introduced to the work 
of British political economists, including Josiah Tucker.6 He was already 
                                                         
1 Here Tucker’s thought bore relations to physiocratic theory and Turgot’s project for 
provincial assemblies. J. Shovlin, The Political Economy of Virtue (London, 2006), p. 
143. 
2 A.R.J. Turgot, ‘Éloge de Vincent Gournay’ [1759] in G. Schelle (ed.), Oeuvres de Turgot 
(Paris, 1913), I, p. 596. 
3 Turgot to Mlle de Lespinasse, 26th January 1770 in Oeuvres, III, p. 421. 
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Thought (Cambridge, 2013), p. 13. 
5 Turgot, ‘Éloge’, pp. 596-7. 
6 F. Bayard, J. Felix, and P. Hamon, Dictionnaire des Surintendants et Contrôleurs 
Généraux des Finances (Paris, 2000), pp. 175-6. 
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published, therefore, when, in 1759, Gournay died, and took it upon 
himself to defend his legacy.  
 
Interpreting the charge levelled against Gournay in ‘philosophical’, that 
is, essentially methodological or even epistemological terms, Turgot 
surmised that Gournay’s critics were casting aspersions on the practice 
of assuming patterns from single observations and the ‘mania for plying 
facts to ideas and not ideas to facts’.1 Turgot retorted that Gournay’s 
efforts, and his own, tended to the polar opposite of presuming more 
knowledge than could ever be experimentally demonstrated, by 
promoting free-trade in opposition to government intervention. 
Actually, he argued, commerce depended upon  
 
a profusion of operations whose immensity alone prevents their being 
known and which, moreover, always depend on a multitude of ever 
changing circumstances which cannot be mastered or foreseen.2  
 
Nobody could be more expert in the matter of trade than the 
individuals concerned in each and every transaction. The experts of 
industry were not to be found amongst the virtuosi in government 
office or laboratories, but in the workshops and factories themselves. 
Across the Channel the failure of English science to compile an epic 
Baconian ‘History of Trades’ had proved these limits.3 It was practical 
for economic thinkers to retreat from the overwhelming complexities of 
the plethora of individual contributions to and interactions with the 
growing economy. 
 
For Turgot, free trade was to be the triumph of the collective 
omniscience over the tyranny of the foolhardy individual who would 
presume to know it all. This theory also reflected his understanding of 
the origins of human language, which he, like Étienne Bonnot de 
                                                         
1 Turgot, ‘Éloge’, p. 619. 
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Condillac, believed developed from innumerable individual encounters 
and exchanges.1 Meanwhile, the impossibility of understanding all 
potential variations of trade and trading circumstances essentially 
allowed Turgot to invoke the absurdities of, and hence effectively 
shelve, empirical inductive reasoning as far as the economist was 
concerned.2 This allowed him to focus his attention on the general and 
universal aspects of his subject, whilst endorsing the ‘sensationalist 
epistemology’ of the multitude.3  
 
Turgot’s most systematic piece on the subject of political economy had, 
like Tucker’s, an unusual initial intended readership: it was written to 
help two Chinese visitors to France understand the research questions 
which he had put to them about their own economy.4 It was therefore 
part of a research project into the political economy of China. The 
‘pronounced sinophilia’ at the court of Versailles is known to have 
influenced Quesnay and the physiocrats.5 Thought about the Chinese 
economy clearly also inspired Turgot to consider the technical aspects 
of political economy at home and abroad. However, it was only with 
reluctance on his part that the result was published.  
 
Nevertheless, in 1766 Turgot’s piece appeared in Éphémérides du 
Citoyen, (by then the mouthpiece of Physiocracy)6 under the title 
Réflexions sur la Formation et la Distribution des Richesses. The work 
modelled the third phase of Turgot’s wider stadial theory of economic 
development, namely the origins and development of agricultural 
capitalism.7 It conforms to the kind of ‘conjectural history’, which was 
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“conversion” (1765–1766)’, The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought, 
22:3 (2015), p. 534. 
7 P. Groenewegen, Eighteenth Century Economics (London, 2002). A four stages system 
set Turgot apart from the physiocrats, for whom there were only two epochs: ‘before 
the discovery of agriculture and after’. L. Vardi, The Physiocrats and the World of the 
Enlightenment (Cambridge, 2012), p. 130. 
Daisy Gibbs  233 
  
justified on account of the sort of ‘a priori principles’ which Mary 
Poovey has described, and in particular ideas about natural law. 
Meanwhile the stadial theory was also in-keeping with notions of the 
perfectibility of humankind.1 Like Tucker, Turgot also understood the 
economy at large as a somewhat providential system and believed even 
more so than Tucker that, if let alone, even apparently negative human 
attributes (like unrestrained self-interest) could work to the benefit of 
all members of every society.2 
 
This was in spite of the fact that Turgot witnessed the chaos which 
deregulation of the grain trade seemed to cause. Having entered a 
career in public administration in 1751, Turgot was finally appointed 
intendant of the généralité of Limorges in 1761, and many of his most 
important works, including Réflexions, were written during his time in 
this office.3 In this role, Turgot was at the front line of administration 
throughout the deregulation of the grain trade between 1763 and 1770. 
Moreover, he served in a region that suffered heavily from shortage and 
eventually famine. This adversity did not, however, cause Turgot to 
compromise in his commitment to a free grain trade, which he had 
developed under Gournay and in parallel to the physiocrats.4  
 
It was in order to explain his stance and the measures he was taking, 
that Turgot composed two sets of letters. Penned in 1770, these took 
the form of administrative advice to the Controller General, Joseph 
Marie Terray. The Lettres au Controlleur Général generally concerned 
Turgot’s own measures to combat crisis in his region. The Lettres sur le 
Commerce des Grains, meanwhile explained the principles of a free grain 
trade, in an attempt to convince Terray to preserve the liberal 
legislation. In comparison with Tucker, Turgot was often relatively 
                                                         
1 Poovey, Modern Fact, p. 223; R.L. Meek, ‘Smith, Turgot, and the “Four Stages” 
Theory’, History of Political Economy, 3:1 (1971), p. 24. 
2 Hirschman, The Passions, p. 42; L. Dupré, The Enlightenment and the Intellectual 
Foundations of Modern Culture (New Haven, 2004), p. 207. 
3 Bayard et al., Dictionnaire, pp. 175-6. 
4 E. Rothschild, ‘Commerce and the State: Turgot, Condorcet and Smith’, The Economic 
Journal, 102:414 (1992), pp. 1202-3. 
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reluctant to see his work published. Even though he was convinced that 
the Controller General had not so much as scanned this important work, 
it was only posthumously that the letters were published in full.1  
 
Like Townshend, Turgot attempted to confound the popular experience 
of a government policy by using figures which proved prevalent opinion 
to be misinformed and unfounded. He used numerical data to illustrate 
that real-life experience actually played out just as theory predicted. He 
presented the supposed fact that the British, who enjoyed relative 
freedom to export grain, had sent no more than 364,000 setiers abroad 
in eighty years. Turgot concluded therefore that ‘experience is fully in 
agreement with reason here’.2 Like Townshend, Turgot had managed to 
find some numbers to support his theoretical propositions, which 
helped make the specific argument in favour of free trade more robust. 
He devoured information, writing to Tucker in 1773 to request weekly 
grain price tables from a selection of villages, in order to help him 
understand the relationship between regulation and price variation 
that he had detected in France.3 
 
The deployment of fact in the form of numerical data seems to have 
been reserved for special purposes. It was not always an essential part 
of the writing of at least two of the three authors under consideration in 
this chapter, for Tucker and Turgot were often comfortable enough to 
reckon on their reason alone, when writing for a more general public. 
This is in spite of the fact that Friedrich von Hayek placed Tucker in 
firm opposition to Cartesian rationalism, esteeming him amongst the 
‘English contemporaries’ of the Scottish David Hume and Adam Smith, 
who seconded their ‘British tradition’ of liberty. Supposedly British 
liberty was spontaneous and resided firmly outside of government.4 
Hayek used what he perceived as British and French epistemological 
                                                         
1 Schelle (ed.), Oeuvres, III, p. 266, n.; Rothschild, Economic Sentiments, p. 74. 
2 Turgot, ‘Lettres sur le Commerce des Grains’ [1770] in Oeuvres, III, p. 294.  
3 Turgot to Tucker, 10th December 1773 in Oeuvres, III, p. 615. 
4 F.A. Hayek, Constitution of Liberty (London, 2006 edn.), p. 50. The italics are mine: 
Josiah Tucker was from Wales. 
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divergences to understand their rival theories of liberty, arguing that 
the trial and error of British institutional history – sometimes in the 
form of collective morality – freed its theorists from the need for 
‘higher, supernatural intelligence’.1 This account chimed in neatly with 
a ‘dual revolution’ scenario, which assigned economic development to 
Britain, and allowed France the conscious instigation of formal political 
freedoms and rights.2  
 
This, however, overlooks both Tucker’s moral objections to unlimited 
self-love, imbued with Anglican moralising, and Turgot’s (though only 
his protégé, Condorcet, is explicitly mentioned by Hayek) appreciation 
for trial and error in his system of useful knowledge and his conception 
of who was included amongst the rightful possessors of such 
knowledge.3 For as we shall see, Tucker had serious doubts about the 
capacity of individuals to conform to Hayek’s assumed institutional 
moral code, while Turgot had his own apprehensions about 
government intelligence in economic matters. 
 
Liberty, Self-Interest and the Public Good 
 
One of the themes of the Brief Essay, in which Tucker set out to compare 
the characteristics of Britain with those of France, was the effect of the 
form of government on economic growth. It is important to note that, 
although Tucker invested in the notion of universal principles, he also 
accepted that ‘the distinguishing characteristics of a people… depend on 
their National Polity’.4 In other words, it was in the power of the 
government to influence the characteristics of its subjects. Townshend 
also seems to have considered the effects of form of government on 
national prosperity, since another of the questions he suggested for the 
ill-fated Cambridge essay prize challenged the entrant to discuss just 
                                                         
1 Ibid, p. 53.  
2 C. Jones and D. Wahrman, ‘Introduction. An Age of Cultural Revolutions?’ in idem 
(eds.), The Age of Cultural Revolutions (Berkeley, 2002), p. 1. 
3 Clark, Compass, p. 234. 
4 Tucker, ‘Elements’, p. 62. 
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that.1 Here they diverged from Montesquieu’s argument that laws 
needed to suit the characteristics bred in people by their physical 
surroundings, which James Steuart had tended to follow.2 
 
However, above all in his own work Townshend tackled public welfare 
measures. In National Thoughts, Townshend argued that cheap credit, 
to which the poor were apparently known to resort in hard times, 
bypassed the poor law, which was their intended recourse.3 He 
remained concerned with the affairs of the labouring classes and in 
1753 he personally introduced a bill in Parliament that attacked the 
settlement clauses of the poor law and confronted the Elizabethan 
apprenticeship rules. He reviled apprenticeship legislation as a 
‘monopoly’, which ‘in any kind of Trade, by confining the same in a few 
Hands, is prejudicial to the Extension thereof’.4  
 
Tucker also took great pleasure in gainsaying the popular vision of the 
Golden Age of Elizabethan England as he reflected on the institutional 
history of Britain. He maintained that Elizabeth was not the benevolent 
figure which history recalled. In fact, Elizabeth’s was an age of tyranny, 
when the Royal Prerogative was exploited in order to establish unjust 
monopolies. This was in spite of valiant opposition on the part of a band 
of MPs, which included a Townshend ancestor.5 Meanwhile, Tucker 
believed, it was highly incompatible with despotism, and  
 
the views of a Prince, who intends to govern arbitrarily, to permit his 
subjects in general to grow rich by Trade. For indeed, how can this be done 
without granting a general liberty?6 
                                                         
1 Townshend to Dr Thomas, 29th October 1755 in Manuscripts, p. 286. The question 
read ‘Has free trade or a free Government the greater effect in promoting the wealth 
and strength of a Nation?’ Rothbard, Economic Thought, p. 342, n. 48.  
2 A. Garrett, ‘Human Nature’ in K. Haakonssen (ed.), Cambridge History of Eighteenth-
Century Philosophy (Cambridge, 2006), p. 195. 
3 Townshend, National Thoughts, p. 17. 
4 ‘A Bill, Intituled, An Act for encouraging Industry in the Kingdom, by removing 
certain Disabilities and Restraints contained in several former Acts’, House of Lords 
Sessional Papers 1714-1805 (12th November 1747 to 7th June 1753), p. 399.  
5 Tucker, ‘Elements’, pp. 182-185. 
6 Ibid, pp. 196-7. 
Daisy Gibbs  237 
  
 
Elizabeth I, Tucker claimed, had reinforced her own despotic reign by 
granting favours to fawning dependents in the form of monopolies.1 In 
this sense he belonged to the Whig tradition, which maintained that 
virtue and freedom rested on the economic independence granted by 
unchecked ownership of property, often, but not necessarily, of the 
landed variety.2 
 
Tucker made it his own mission to bring the ‘Glorious Revolution in the 
Commercial System, which we have happily obtained in the Political’,3 
by exorcising the nation of monopoly. The revolution of 1689 was 
commonly seen as the end of French style tyranny, 4 and Tucker made 
particular reference to the fact that France continued to suffer from 
many such inconveniences of an absolutist government. Its merchants 
in particular, he argued, could not depend on the security of their gains, 
hampering the overall national capacity for wealth generation.5 
Townshend, who esteemed the ‘safety and security in which every man 
found his person and property in England’, made a similar observation 
about France’s relative lack thereof.6 Both argued that French 
commerce, and hence the development of its national wealth, was 
thwarted by the arbitrary interventions of an unrestrained government 
which was a stranger to credible commitment.7 
 
Furthermore, Tucker argued that tyranny had also pervaded the feudal 
society of former times. ‘Gothic Barons’ had maintained their influence 
by ‘chaining down the Mass of the People in Slavery and Want’.8 He 
formed a theory of civil authority revolving around the development of 
                                                         
1 Cf. Q. Skinner, Liberty before Liberalism (Cambridge, 1998), p. 95. 
2 Pocock, Virtue, p. 231. 
3 Tucker, ‘Elements’, p. 136. 
4 M. Goldie, ‘The English System of Liberty’ in M. Goldie and R. Wokler (eds.), The 
Cambridge History of Eighteenth-Century Political Thought (Cambridge, 2006); I. Hont, 
‘The “Rich Country- Poor Country” Debate in Scottish Classical Political Economy’ in I. 
Hont and M. Ignatieff (eds.), Wealth and Virtue (Cambridge, 1983) p. 285. 
5 Tucker, ‘Brief Essay’, p. 23. 
6 Townshend, National Thoughts, p. 34. 
7 North and Weingast, ‘Constitutions and Commitment’, p. 829. 
8 Tucker, ‘Elements’, p. 91. 
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wage labour, where mutual interest eventually assumed the role 
formerly played by patron/ servant relations.1 Overall, Tucker 
developed a history of receding monarchical and feudal powers in 
which he equated the increasing access to property on the part of the 
‘lower and middling class of People’ with their increasing political 
freedom.2  
 
Tucker referred to certain modes of living which were outdated, yet 
often supported by custom. For instance, he proposed that the custom 
of the ‘Barbarian or Scythian Way of life’, which saw sheep tended by 
wandering shepherds, was a major force in opposition to enclosure, 
which itself was actually in the interest of the poor.3 Custom was 
portrayed as a delusion of the poor, which hid their true interests from 
them. Commerce, on the other hand, had a civilising function in his 
work. Increasing understanding of reciprocal and shared interests 
helped individuals to understand and accept their place in society.4 
Here Tucker was in accordance with David Hume’s work and Scottish 
political economy in general, which saw a landed aristocracy as 
compatible with commerce and the division of labour. At the same time, 
the theory served his crusade against ‘enthusiasm’, in that it rejected 
radical libertarianism as a ‘Puritan survival’.5 
 
Indeed, both Tucker and Townshend portrayed total liberty as 
potentially counterproductive. In National Thoughts Townshend 
identified the depravity of the poor as a problem. Writing at the height 
of the gin craze, he decided that the people of England were a danger to 
the nation’s prosperity due to their ‘idle and licentious behaviour’.6 
Townshend maintained that the government needed to remove access 
to cheap credit on the paltry sums that were required to keep the poor 
                                                         
1 Pocock, Virtue, p .164. 
2 Tucker, ‘Elements’, p. 91. 
3 Ibid, p. 97. 
4 Pocock, Virtue, pp. 262-3; Hont, Jealousy of Trade, p. 162. 
5 Pocock, Virtue, p. 263; Force, Self-Interest, p. 160. 
6 Townshend, National Thoughts, p. 1. 
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in drink and leisure.1 This also tied in with part of his argument against 
the bounty on corn, which maintained that the price of labour had to be 
kept as low as possible to ensure the competitiveness of British goods.2 
Townshend remained, therefore, prisoner to notion that higher wages 
were incompatible with lower unit prices, and necessarily rendered 
goods uncompetitive.3 
 
Tucker agreed with Townshend, seeing popular vices as 
counterproductive to the national good, as they were ‘attended with 
Expense’ and so required higher wages, rendering British-made goods 
uncompetitive in foreign markets.4 The two authors saw social and 
economic issues as inseparable and tended towards the opinion that 
the labouring classes needed to be kept in a strict condition of austerity 
in order for the nation as a whole to make economic gains.5 The poor 
were teetering on the border between vice-ridden passions and healthy 
disciplined interest. In their version, the outcome was not ‘infallible’ as 
it was to Hume, and required intervention.6 
 
Salim Rashid suggests that by the time Townshend came to pen the bill 
of 1753, which would allow for more freedoms for the poor, he had 
revised his thinking somewhat from the paternalism of National 
Thoughts.7 However, it is hard to say for certain whether Townshend 
experienced any sort of epiphany. Tucker certainly managed to agree 
wholeheartedly with Townshend’s concerns about the conduct of the 
poor and to advocate rigid social control without ever identifying any 
                                                         
1 Ibid, p. 5.  
2 Ibid, p. 35. 
3 Adam Smith loosed this ‘Gordian knot’ with his division of labour theory. Hont, 
Jealousy of Trade, p. 373. 
4 Tucker, ‘Brief Essay’, p. 37. 
5 Townshend is specifically named in E.S. Furniss’s discussion of the ‘Doctrine of the 
Social Importance of the Laborer’, though, surprisingly, he is not mentioned in the 
ensuing consideration of the ‘scathing indictments of the lax morals of the lower 
orders by social observers of the period’. Reference to Tucker is made in both cases 
however. E.S. Furniss, The Position of the Labourer in a System of Nationalism (New 
York, 1965), p. 22 n 3; pp. 98-9. 
6 Hirschman, The Passions, p. 66; Pocock, Virtue, p. 69. 
7 S. Rashid, ‘Lord Townshend and the Influence of Moral Philosophy on Laissez-Faire’, 
The Journal of Libertarian Studies, 8:1 (1986), p. 71. 
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contradiction with his enthusiasm for freeing trade.1 Later, when 
considering the colonial crisis in 1774, Tucker explicitly identified strict 
government and social hierarchies with order, stating in the voice of a 
concerned merchant writing to a rebellious American nephew that  
 
Governments there must be of some kind or other; and Peace and 
Subordination are to be preserved; otherwise there would be no such 
Thing as true liberty subsisting in the World.2 
 
Too much of the wrong kind of freedom could definitely be harmful. 
Indeed, since he thought that ‘the Good of any state doth plainly arise 
from the increase, imployment and morals of its subjects’,3 controlling 
the way people behaved was, for Tucker, the key to national prosperity.  
 
An absolutist government, therefore, was actually peculiarly well 
appointed for this purpose, and, referring to the French case, Tucker 
argued that actually ‘the Subordination of the Common People is an 
unspeakable advantage to them in respect to Trade’.4 He considered the 
labouring classes of Britain in need of the sound discipline, which an 
elected government struggled to provide. For the privilege and 
significance apparently accorded them by a culture of electioneering set 
them ‘above control, frees them from all restraint, and brings down the 
Rich to pay their Court to them, contrary to the just and proper order of 
society’.5 In many ways, he seemed to agree with the Augustinian 
position, that the state could and should be used to enforce Christian 
morals and regulate destructive passions.6 
 
Clearly both Tucker and Townshend conceived of liberty as deeply 
entwined in the security of property against arbitrary intervention, 
                                                         
1 Tucker to Townshend, March 12th 1752 in Manuscripts, p. 371. 
2 Tucker, ‘Four Tracts’, p. 93. 
3 Tucker, ‘Elements’, p. 63. Emphasis added.  
4 Tucker, ‘Brief Essay’, p. 14. 
5 Ibid, p. 38.  
6 Hirschman, The Passions, p. 15. Adam Smith strongly disagreed, seeing luxury and 
emulation as stabilising forces in society. Force, Self Interest, pp. 228-9. 
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which was not only afforded by social existence and civil government, 
but even necessitated it.1 However, Tucker insisted that these ideals 
were by no means safe-guarded by democracy. For popular opinion 
could be, as far as Tucker was concerned, a form of monopoly as 
dangerous, if not more so, than the tyrannical merchant monopolies 
which he despised.2 Thus when it came to electioneering, Tucker feared 
that  
 
the English Populace are too deeply versed in Politics,- and yet too little; 
too deeply to obey with Readyness and Cheerfullness; and too little to 
make a wise and prudent choice for themselves.3  
 
With its mixed constitution, Tucker suggested that the British 
government was in danger of pandering to the views of the 
unenlightened masses, whose misunderstandings could prejudice the 
perfection of British political economy which had to remain ‘compatible 
with the good of the Whole’.4 Therefore, since Tucker believed that self-
interest was a potential threat to the economic and general good of the 
nation, a strong government was required to press and enforce policies 
of free trade which he anticipated were likely to be unpopular with the 
people.5 
 
This sort of theoretical incongruity between economic liberty and the 
advocacy of aspects of authoritarian government made an appearance 
in French, and particularly physiocratic, thought also. David McNally 
has attempted to clear up the ‘paradox’ which the physiocratic doctrine 
of legal despotism seems to present by locating it in a wider worldview. 
Physiocracy required that ‘the state establish social arrangements 
which specifically favour a capitalist organization of agriculture at the 
                                                         
1 Pocock, Virtue, p. 180. 
2 In a sense, Hilton L. Root is in agreement, arguing that a ‘more accurate discription 
[of the moral economy] would emphasise the monopolistic character of the policies 
that crowds were trying to defend and the costs their actions imposed on the 
population at large.’ H.L. Root, The Fountain of Privilege (Berkeley, 1994), p. 108. 
3 Tucker, ‘Instructions for Travellers’, p. 67.  
4 Tucker, ‘Elements’, p. 129. 
5 Tucker, ‘Brief Essay’, pp. 50-3. 
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expense of customary rights’.1 In other words, the implementation of 
physiocratic doctrine was to be so newfangled that it was bound to be 
unpopular and required a form of despotism for its enforcement. 
However, legal despotism had an internal safeguard which prevented it 
from becoming the arbitrary exercise of power on the part of the 
sovereign. This safeguard was the fact that the sovereign need not 
design laws, for these could be derived from nature. Legal despotism, 
therefore, was only the administrative configuration in which natural 
laws were allowed to predominate.2  
 
McNally placed Turgot in agreement with the doctrine, essentially 
because he seemed to agree with many of the principles behind it,3 but 
how far Turgot ever conformed to the dogma of the physiocrats is a 
problem in itself.4 Gustav Schelle argued that Turgot was allergic to the 
physiocratic brand of moralising natural law. He could therefore never 
fully subscribe to the doctrine of legal despotism, but nevertheless 
agreed with some of the causes and implications of this mode of 
thought.5  
 
Like the physiocrats, Turgot alleged that whatever the farmer ‘produces 
of the earth beyond his personal requirements is the sole source (fonds) 
of the wages which all other members of society receive in exchange for 
their labour’.6 Thus he agreed with the physiocratic doctrine of the 
primacy of the agricultural ‘productive’ class, and argued that the 
interests of this class were identical to the interests of the rest of the 
                                                         
1 D. McNally, Political Economy and the Rise of Capitalism (Berkeley, 1990), p. 120. 
2 M. Sonenscher, Before the Deluge (Oxford & Princeton, 2007), p. 214; L. Charles and 
P. Steiner, ‘Entre Montesquieu et Rousseau. La Physiocratie parmi les Origines 
Intellectuelles de la Révolution’ in R Bach (ed.), Rousseau: Économie Politique 
(Montmorency, 2000), p. 86. 
3 McNally, Political Economy, p. 131.  
4 For a recent account see P.H. Goutte and G. Klotz, ‘Turgot: a Critic of Physiocracy?’ 
The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought, 22:3 (2015), pp. 28-9 
5 Schelle, Oeuvres, II, p. 29. 
6 A.R.J. Turgot, ‘Réflexions sur la Formation et la Distribution des Richesses’ [1766] in 
Oeuvres, II, p. 537. 
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nation, who ‘receive both their commodities and wages with which they 
buy commodities from them’.1  
 
However, Turgot also distinguished between the owners and the 
cultivators of land more meaningfully than the physiocrats, which 
allowed him to develop a theory of capital investment. He argued that 
the profit which cultivators generated above their production needs 
could not be construed as net product or revenue. This was because he 
thought that it acted as an incentive. Without this, he thought the 
cultivator would be disinclined to invest time and funds in land, when it 
would be far more convenient to lend the money on interest or even 
purchase land outright.2 Moreover, he argued, the profit that 
entrepreneur-cultivators derived from their agricultural activity was 
generally converted into capital, which would ultimately need to be 
reinvested in order to perpetuate agricultural improvement.3 Only the 
gains that the landowners themselves received in rent from the 
cultivators could be considered revenue. 
 
Nevertheless, the theory led Turgot to agree with the physiocrats that, if 
the prices of agricultural production were artificially depressed by 
regulation, then investment in agriculture became unprofitable and 
unattractive to entrepreneur improvers. Under the legislation of the 
grain trade, such cultivators, Turgot argued, faced a double ‘monopoly’: 
firstly they were only allowed to sell to their French compatriots, and 
secondly, they were only allowed to purchase French manufactures. 
They were discouraged from production on both counts.4  
 
The first ‘monopoly’ was especially injurious since production ‘always 
proportions itself to the habitual level of consumption’.5 This meant 
that, as long as exportation remained illegal, cultivators in an average 
                                                         
1 Turgot, ‘Lettres sur le Commerce des Grains’, p. 313. 
2 Turgot, ‘Réflexions’, p. 600.  
3 Ibid, pp. 570-1. 
4 A.R.J. Turgot, ‘Projet de Lettre au Contrôleur Général Bertin sur un Projet d’Edit’ 
[1761] in Oeuvres, II, p. 124. 
5 Turgot, ‘Lettres sur le Commerce des Grains’, p. 319. 
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year produced only as much as the population of France consumed. In a 
poor harvest year this meant shortage. However, as long as the 
cultivators were allowed to export their produce, they furnished a 
surplus relative to the number of consumers in France, since the excess 
was channelled abroad. If harvests failed, Turgot argued, the product 
which normally stood in excess of French demand could then be 
consumed domestically, as local prices rose to match the costs of 
transporting grain abroad.  
 
Turgot also developed the idea of a marché général price. He 
emphasised that this was not the price at a specific market like the prix 
du marché, but a general market price which was established thanks to 
the ease of communications between ports where grain was bought and 
sold.1 If the free circulation of grain were perfected, then the highest 
price that inland consumers could expect would be the marché général 
price plus the costs of transport to their location.2 
 
Turgot believed that an unregulated grain trade was the only way to 
encourage proper circulation and the appropriate storage of supplies. 
Public administration of such matters inevitably ended in losses on the 
government’s account. It also discouraged merchants who were unable 
to compete with a subsidized and often corrupt public vendor who 
operated at a loss.3 Free merchants by comparison, who always kept 
themselves informed of market conditions, understood when or where 
to sell grain. They were therefore far more efficient at addressing 
scarcity than the clumsy efforts of administrators who were generally 
fixated on local conditions.4 He inquired   
 
                                                         
1 Ibid, p. 295, n. 
2 Ibid, pp. 343-4; in his notes to George Whatley’s Principles of Trade, Benjamin 
Franklin explained a very similar point using the analogy of water level. Whatley and 
Franklin, Principles, p. 47, n. 
3 Turgot, ‘Lettres sur le Commerce des Grains’, p. 276. DuPont could not find the 
originals of the letter on public granaries, but supplied his own notes in lieu of the lost 
letters.  
4 Ibid, p. 332. 
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do we think that in dismissing commerce by means of debasement, in 
intimidating storage, in announcing that we regard the property of grain as 
less sacred than any other kind, in exposing it to the whim and the ignorant 
or interested inspection of a gaggle of judges or sub-administrators we can 
transport or store it effectively?1 
 
The rhetorical device challenged the notion of grain as a privileged 
commodity, proposing that, by refusing to allow it to behave as any 
other moveable property, administrators were in fact debasing it. 
Consumers, Turgot argued, could stand to be exposed to a free grain 
trade because they were protected by the natural law of competition, 
‘which is a restraint on everybody, and which renders all those 
manoeuvres and all those claims to monopoly… impossible’.2 The 
market was an even better overseer than government officials, who had 
the potential to be just as immoral as merchants. Therefore, though the 
people currently languished under an ‘empire of prohibitions’,3 Turgot 
did not offer absolute freedom in its place, for liberalisation from 
human laws entailed subjection to natural ones. 
 
In light of the tumults and shortage which seemed to accompany the 
deregulation of the grain trade, however, the principles of Turgot, let 
alone the perhaps even more abstract theories of the physiocrats, 
became hard to defend. Turgot had first-hand experience of this 
problem as the Intendant of the Limousin region throughout the crisis 
of the late 1760s. This was a particularly difficult region, situated in the 
agriculturally backward southern interior, where métayage was 
prevalent. This system saw farmers surrender their crop to the 
landlord, retaining a modest share for their own consumption. Turgot, 
following physiocratic thought, contrasted this negatively with the 
capitalist tenant farming of the north.4 Meanwhile, the people generally 
                                                         
1 Ibid, p. 323. 
2 Ibid, p. 332.  
3 Ibid, p. 343. 
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Daisy Gibbs  246 
  
thrived on the cheaper grains such as buckwheat or maize, as well as 
turnips and chestnuts.1  
 
All of this meant that, in the Limousin, even the highest grain prices 
relative to normal for the region failed to exceed the marché général 
prices of wheat at the port towns. Therefore there was little incentive 
for merchants to bring grain.2 As a result, when the alternative food-
crops of the region, buckwheat and chestnuts, failed due to wind and 
rain, as they did in 1769, Turgot had little choice but to intervene. 
However, he prioritised and therefore preserved the free grain trade, by 
compromising the freedom of other markets, such as the labour market 
where he implemented public work schemes.3 He understood 
lawmaking as a process which made progress through the freedom for 
trial and error, and disapproved of the notion of omniscient lawgivers.4 
 
Overall, Turgot acknowledged that the establishment of free trade was 
going to take time. The ‘hypothetical-deductive method’ of economic 
modelling depended on a time lapse to prove its case against the 
observation characteristic of traditional political economy.5 In 
particular Turgot realised that the people, and hence also the 
authorities who governed them directly, seemed unwilling to adopt the 
new system. This meant education was required. In order for the 
system to work, Turgot contended that 
 
liberty must not only be established without contradiction and trouble, 
both on the part of the magistrates, as well as on the part of the people… 
but this change must also be sufficiently consolidated, well-known and 
                                                         
332; cf. A. Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, eds. 
R.H. Campbell, A.S. Skinner, and W.B. Todd (Oxford, 1976), III.ii.11. 
1 A.R.J. Turgot, ‘Lettres au Contrôleur Général’ [1770] in Oeuvres, III, p. 112. 
2 Ibid, p. 121. 
3 Rothschild, ‘Commerce and the State’, p. 1206. 
4 Clark, Compass, p. 234.  
5 A. Skornicki, L’Économiste, la Cour et la Patrie (Paris, 2011), p. 322. 
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even ancient so that the merchants experience a total confidence and dare 
to risk their fortune on this assurance.1  
 
The problem was that, just when prices were supposedly reaching the 
point where the market would come to the rescue of consumers, local 
authorities were swooping in with anti-liberal interventions.2   
 
Turgot accused the government of succumbing to popular prejudice by 
clinging to grain laws, which were the ‘relics of gothic barbarism and 
the weakness of all governments which had not recognised the 
importance of trade, nor knew to defend public liberty from the 
invasions of the monopolising spirit and of private interests’.3 As 
Tucker had harked back to the Elizabethan era, so Turgot evoked an 
even older medieval past, where over-mighty courtiers abused the 
freedom of the individual in securing private monopolies against the 
interests of the honest commercial-minded farmer.  
 
Though suffering a decline at the turn of the century, the use of the term 
‘monopoly’ expanded, in both French and English-language texts, after 
1740. The term was also tracking another, namely ‘liberty’, although the 
latter was far more common.4 Evidently, the two could act as antonyms. 
As shown in chapter two, the Rouen parlement had identified monopoly 
as the abuse which caused the failure of the liberalisation project.5 
Monopoly was generally seen as an inevitable ‘shortcoming’ of the new 
liberal order, and the remedy which proponents of freedom offered was 
‘even more enlightenment’.6 Liberal commerce not only caused 
increasing refinement, therefore, but it also required it.  
 
However, in the work of Tucker and Turgot the term ‘monopoly’ was 
applied to instances where formal politics trespassed into the economic 
                                                         
1 Turgot, ‘Lettres au Contrôleur Général’, p. 119. 
2 Turgot, ‘Lettres sur le Commerce des Grains’, p. 341-2  
3 Turgot, ‘Éloge’, p. 602. 
4 Google Ngram viewer (https://books.google.com/ngrams, accessed 7 October 2015). 
5 See above p. 111. 
6 Rothschild, Economic Sentiments, p. 157.  
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sphere. If this happened, even ‘angel’ monopolists could make 
mistakes.1 Benjamin Franklin summed up the fears of both authors, 
commenting that most laws ‘for regulating, directing, or restraining of 
Trade; have, we think, either been political Blunders, or Jobbs obtain’d 
by artful Men, for private Advantage’.2 Meanwhile, the idea that the 
economy was governed by its own rules, like any other aspect of nature 
which science observed, meant that it could be safely emancipated from 
dirigiste regimes. This was the point of Quesnay’s Tableau Économique.3  
 
This was not as subversive as it may sound. Arnault Skornicki sees 
steps towards the invention of a discrete field of economics in this 
period as an endogenous process within the political consolidation of 
central power.4 A depoliticised and hence free economic space, as 
opposed to the patrimonial and feudal economy of the dark ages, 
undermined the old court of fawning and unproductive aristocrats. 
Laissez-faire offered a way out of the ‘welfare state for the privileged’ 
that persisted in France especially.5 Freed from this medieval baggage, 
an enlightened and liberal monarch would be left to govern the 
commercial environment (rather than the people) in accordance with 
the law of nature.6 This was possible because, thanks to the ‘harmony-
of-interests doctrine’, the monarch’s interests, unlike those of the 
bloated aristocracy, could be identified with the public good.7 
 
In the history which Turgot depicted, worthy landlords came to realise 
that the slavery or vassalage of the past could be exchanged for the 
more incentivised, productive and hands-off systems of métayage and 
eventually tenant farming.8 These allowed for improvement and the 
                                                         
1 Ibid, p. 161. 
2 Whatley and Franklin, Principles, pp. 33-4.  
3 C. Larrère, L’Invention de l’Économie au XVIIIe Siècle (Paris, 1992), p. 193. 
4 Skornicki, L'Économiste, p. 26. 
5 M. Kwass, Privilege and the Politics of Taxation in Eighteenth-Century France 
(Cambridge, 2000), p. 24. 
6 Skornicki, L'Économiste, p. 213. 
7 Hirschman, The Passions, p. 98; Adam Smith also distinguished between the 
ineffectual nobility and the more useful gentry. R. Phillipson, ‘Adam Smith as Civic 
Moralist’ in Hont and Ignatieff (eds.), Wealth and Virtue, p. 192. 
8 Turgot, ‘Réflexions’, pp. 548-9.  
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generation of ever more wealth from reinvestment. The same tied in 
with the physiocratic doctrine of the ‘commercial nobility’. For 
physiocrats, noble status depended on prosperity, rather than the more 
abstract notion of birthright.1 The civic personality, however, was still 
grounded in the property-ties to the land, from where all wealth was 
supposedly derived.2  
 
Turgot subscribed to a similar vision, advocating a provincial assembly 
system that would see only the owners of land credited as full citizens.3 
At court the commercial nobility was supposed to effectively embody 
the enlightenment and hence effect good policy by helping to translate 
natural law into policy. It was a weak and misguided government 
which, overawed by the ‘tyranny of custom’, pandered to the feudal 
principles that had become enshrined in popular prejudice. Attempting 
to regulate the grain trade could only weaken the regime further, as it 
meant promising ‘to engage personally in procuring them [the people] 
an abundance, whatever happens: but you must be very sure of the fact 
to make such an engagement’. Turgot confessed that ‘no project for 
regulation has given me any such confidence’.4  
 
Both Tucker and Turgot depicted conditions where self-interest in the 
extreme could damage the overall freedom of trade. Contrary to Hayek, 
the British Tucker’s solution was more careful supervision on the part 
of the government, whilst the French Turgot advocated leaving the 
matter as far as possible up to marketplace competition. Both, however, 
were virulently opposed to monopoly, which had obvious links to 
monarchical power. Yet, using the term in its more general sense, they 
opposed popular freedom also. Though they acknowledged that 
                                                         
1 Hume made a similar point, arguing that French economic growth was hampered by 
the commitment to ‘honour’ in an absolute monarchy. D. Hume, ‘Of Civil Liberty’ in 
Miller (ed.), David Hume, p. 93. 
2 Skornicki L'Économiste, p. 210; Charles and Steiner, ‘Entre Montesquieu et 
Rousseau’, p. 92. 
3 Shovlin, Political Economy of Virtue, p. 143. Turgot did not pen the Mémoire sur les 
Administrations Provinciales himself; it was more of a collaboration with Dupont. 
Skornicki L'Économiste, p. 356. 
4 Turgot, ‘Lettres sur le Commerce des Grains’, p. 354. 
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political freedoms were inextricably linked to the economic 
development they were describing, they saw society in many ways as 
conveniently restricted anew by alternative sources, or economic 
forces. These ideas also permeated their thought about the 
international situation. 
 
International Thoughts. The Division of Labour and Mutual Growth. 
 
For both Tucker and Turgot, the natural human propensity for 
exchange constituted the glue of society. In Tucker’s version, humans, 
as compared to brute animals, were highly deficient in isolation from 
society. However, humankind was possessed of a social instinct, which 
inclined individuals to offer each other ‘mutual Assistances’.1 When a 
society is formed, he proposed,  
 
the common Labour of the society is branched out into separate and 
distinct Parts: Then it is that each Individual chooses a particular Course of 
Life, according as his Circumstances, or Genius shall determine his 
Pursuits.2  
 
Tucker thought that humans needed to perform a certain number of 
operations to survive, but in a society these could be shared. This was 
by no means groundbreaking, and this motive for civilisation and 
sociability can be seen ultimately as an intellectual implication of 
Hobbes’s rejection of the Aristotelian ‘zoon politikon’.3  
 
Tucker was more innovative when he reflected that a greater number of 
people in a society meant that each individual member needed to 
perform fewer operations, and so could become more expert at their 
own allotted task.4 Here he began to pre-empt Adam Smith’s division of 
labour theory, though Hume also referred to the ‘partition of labour’ 
                                                         
1 Tucker, ‘Elements’, p. 57.  
2 Ibid. 
3 Hont, Jealousy of Trade, pp. 38; 170. 
4 Tucker, ‘Elements’, p. 63. 
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and discussed the issue with Tucker directly.1 Meanwhile, William 
Petty, Bernard Mandeville and Francis Hutcheson had all made their 
own contributions to the subject’s genealogy.2 
 
It helped that some people were born with special talents, but Tucker 
also viewed specialisation of roles by gender and age group with 
approval. Though he never pinned down the theory with a metaphor as 
neat as Adam Smith’s, Tucker described a button factory where, as a 
machine operator stamped out buttons, a child worked alongside to 
speed up the process by removing the finished article and replacing it 
with a fresh piece of metal. Whereas Smith, drawing on the 
Encyclopédie, delighted in the minute attention which the study of the 
pin factory seemed to represent,3 Tucker had his own reasons for 
relishing the button factory. This form of specialisation not only sped 
up production and reduced cost per unit, but it also meant that women 
and children had no excuse for idleness and could be put to useful 
employment.4 The process did not require skill or intricacy, but small 
and otherwise idle hands.   
 
Turgot’s ideas about the origins of society were even more developed. 
Society began with cultivation, which was ‘the only motive for division, 
and the law which secures the property of all’.5 However, commerce 
would always have to take place because even in a nation of equally 
apportioned land, cultivators would soon find that one no parcel of 
ground could produce everything they needed. Moreover, what the 
earth produced still needed work before it could be consumed: even 
wheat had to be ground into flour and baked before it was edible. If a 
person were ‘reduced to his own field and his own labour, he would 
waste much time and effort in order to be very poorly equipped in 
every respect, and would cultivate his land very badly’.6 Dividing the 
                                                         
1 Hont, Jealousy of Trade, p. 273. 
2 R. Mankin, ‘Pins and Needles’, The Adam Smith Review, 4 (2008), p. 190. 
3 Ibid, pp. 190-1.  
4 Tucker, ‘Instructions’, pp. 34-5. 
5 Turgot, ‘Réflexions’, p. 534. 
6 Ibid, p. 536.  
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labour, therefore, was in the interests of everybody, as each person 
became expert at their role.  
 
This resulted in a tripartite society of cultivators, artisans and 
proprietors, whose ‘reciprocal exchange of needs’ bound them in chains 
of necessity.1 However, Turgot realised that capital advances were 
required at each stage in economic development. Nature provided the 
first advance: farmers initially took their seeds from the spontaneous 
growth of the earth and then survived until the first harvest by hunting 
and fishing. Thereafter advances were formed by savings.2 Everywhere 
this led to an additional division within the agricultural and artisanal or 
industrial pursuits, between the entrepreneurs who provided capital 
advances and the wage labourers who took immediate earnings from 
the advance.3  
 
Because of this, Turgot advocated the physiocratic style policy of a 
single tax on the landowning class, which he called the ‘disponible’ (or 
available) class. He exempted capitalist entrepreneurs from the same, 
on the grounds that their gains were part of a wider process of 
circulation. Taxing land could not hurt the circulation of money, but if 
the capitalist class were deprived of their savings, then the capital 
reserve would be diminished and interest rates would be pushed 
upwards, precluding continued growth.4 
 
The savings rate was, according to Michael Sonenscher, Turgot’s 
answer to what Istvan Hont dubbed the ‘rich country- poor country’ 
problem. This was essentially an inquiry into what made some 
countries rich and others poor and whether this disparity would 
remain into perpetuity.5 Hume had posed the problem in Of Commerce 
(1752), by suggesting that the international trade of a rich country, in 
                                                         
1 Ibid, p. 537. 
2 Ibid, pp. 564-5. 
3 R.L. Meek, Turgot on Progress, Sociology and Economics (London, 1973), p. 22. 
4 Sonenscher, Before the Deluge, pp. 288-290. 
5 Ibid, p. 287; I. Hont, ‘The “Rich Country- Poor Country” Debate’, p. 271. 
Daisy Gibbs  253 
  
spite of a myriad of advantages, was hampered by falling interest rates 
as a result of the influx of currency in exchange for its exported goods. 
This was attended by high costs of domestic labour. Industrial 
initiatives in poor countries therefore gained a competitive advantage. 
They soon became rich themselves from their own export trade, 
deposed the original rich country, and then ultimately suffered the 
same fate themselves.1 For Turgot, however, if the savings rate stayed 
high, and capital was not wasted on luxury, then there would be no 
automatic downfall for a rich country.2 
 
Tucker also disagreed with Hume and argued that his notion of the rich 
country’s demise through commerce only enflamed jealousy of trade, 
by making it seem that ‘every poor Country is the natural and 
unavoidable Enemy of a rich one’.3 Tucker condemned this sort of 
conflict in The Case of Going to War for the Sake of Trade, and, 
interestingly, this was the second of two of his texts which Turgot chose 
to translate.4 The essay was originally a fragment of Elements, but it 
made a timely appearance when published as a standalone pamphlet at 
the end of the Seven Years’ War in 1763.5 Here Tucker argued that war 
was commercially and economically detrimental to winners and losers 
alike, and a distraction from the proper methods of wealth generation.6 
Both Tucker and Turgot abhorred the ‘pathological conjunction’ of 
economic competition and the political and military rivalry of nations, 
which Hume had labelled ‘jealousy of trade’.7 
 
                                                         
1 Sonenscher, Before the Deluge, p. 185; I. Hont, ‘The “Rich Country- Poor Country” 
Debate Revisited’ in C. Wennerlind and M. Schabas (eds.), David Hume’s Political 
Economy (London, 2008), p. 243. 
2 Turgot, ‘Réflexions’, p. 588. 
3 Tucker, ‘Four Tracts’, p. 11. 
4 According to Gustav Schelle, Turgot’s French-language version has been lost. Turgot 
also translated Tucker’s Expediency of a Law for the Naturalization of Foreign 
Protestants (1752). Oeuvres, I, p. 442, n. 
5 It was also reprinted in 1774 as the second of his Four Tracts. Tucker, ‘Four Tracts’, 
p. vi. 
6 Cornish, ‘Tucker, Josiah’, [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/27790, accessed 
22 April 2015]; Tucker, ‘Four Tracts’, p. 66. 
7 Quote from Hont, Jealousy of Trade, p. 6; Tucker, ‘Four Tracts’, p. 74; Turgot to Hume, 
23rd July 1766 in Oeuvres, II, p. 496; Turgot to DuPont, 20th February 1766 in Oeuvres, 
II, p. 512. 
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Tucker’s own answer to the ‘rich country- poor country problem’ was 
that trade could benefit all. Strongly influenced by providentialism, 
Tucker could not believe that the self-preservation instinct sat in 
opposition to the Christian principle of universal benevolence, and that 
it should ultimately lead to self-destruction.1 Rather, he thought that it 
was the self-interest of individuals and states in excess that drove them 
towards the monopolising principles which precluded mutual growth. 
Self-love, therefore, needed to be tempered with reason rather than 
passion.2 
 
This could allow trading nations to exist in harmony.3 According to 
Tucker, while poorer countries grew in wealth and comfort, richer 
countries could nevertheless preserve their advantage through the 
improvement and mechanisation of industry and by maintaining 
constant industriousness.4 Enlightened governments were required to 
ensure that trading remained free, or in other words, protect the even 
playing field from monopolists on an international level, just as he had 
shown was the function of government in domestic trade. 
 
Tucker also alluded to international specialisation and reiterated the 
cohesive power which he had attributed to the division of labour, 
suggesting that  
 
In the natural World, our bountiful Creator hath formed different Soils, and 
appointed different Climates; whereby the inhabitants of different 
Countries may supply each other with their respective Fruits and Products; 
so that by exciting a reciprocal Industry, they may carry on an Intercourse 
mutually beneficial, and universally benevolent.5  
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Tucker was vague about how exactly various trades and industries 
should be divided. Clearly he envisioned Britain as a manufacturing 
nation, but also saw agriculture as ‘a species of manufacture’, and the 
most important one at that.1 Overall, he seems to have advocated mixed 
economies with trade sufficiently open as to absorb the danger of high 
prices of provisions.  
 
Complete international specialisation was not necessarily seen as a 
particularly safe avenue for any country. In his three-island metaphor, 
Jean-François Melon seemed to show that a new balance of wealth 
could not replace the old balance of power and bring peace to Europe. 
The island that supplied provisions would always enjoy supremacy 
over the others until each could become self-sufficient.2 Turgot had 
briefly touched on the autonomy of the farmer in Réflexions, arguing 
that because of the prime necessity of subsistence goods, a farmer and 
ultimately the proprietor had the greatest claim to independence.3 
Nevertheless, elsewhere he had also argued that wealth and a 
burgeoning population were as necessary as agricultural self-
sufficiency for a state to be independent.4  
 
However, his ideas about the contribution which the liberalisation of 
the French grain trade could offer to the international economy is very 
revealing of his attitude to the mutual benefits of international trade. He 
reasoned that by depositing its grain on the marché général, France, by 
virtue of its size and fertility, would greatly swell the overall amount 
available. This was ‘to the profit of all nations and each one in 
particular, in that it must reduce the price at the marché général to the 
benefit of consumers’.5 Turgot envisioned a global grain trade which, 
when finally perfected, would see an end to risk in the ventures of grain 
                                                         
1 Tucker to Townshend, 2nd April 1752 in Manuscripts, p. 374. 
2 J.F. Melon, Essai Politique sur le Commerce [1734] (Bordeaux, 1736 edn.), chapter 1; 
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merchants, since the international market, able to absorb shocks caused 
by local conditions, would always provide grain at a level price, which 
could then be moved inland for a profit.1 
 
Clearly Turgot saw France, at least potentially, as an agricultural 
powerhouse. However, the notion of France as an agricultural state and 
of Britain and the Dutch Republic as trading states, which apparently 
underpinned the physiocratic model,2 did not make a strong 
appearance in his work. Although he conceded that Britain and the 
Dutch Republic enjoyed ‘a prodigious superiority’ in commerce, he put 
this down to their political economy, which he saw as inspired by the 
work of Josiah Child and Johan de Witt, rather than as a result of any 
naturally occurring conditions of the two nations.3 He therefore 
considered France equally capable of becoming a successful commercial 
nation. One of his key departure points from the physiocrats was his 
lack of an insistence on agriculture as the only useful economic pursuit 
in France. In a letter to Dupont de Nemours he repudiated the idea of 
‘alleged national industries’ (prétendue industrie nationale) and called 
the protection of them childish. Trade barriers, he thought, fostered 
misguided jealousy.4  
 
With personal experience of regions far removed from the physiocratic 
idyll, Turgot understood France as heterogeneous and disparate. This 
helped inform his attitude towards local protectionism. He thought that 
national and local prospects were hampered by a ‘hydra’ of local 
institutions and legal frameworks, the relics of a gradual unification, 
which only persisted because ‘the urgent needs of the kingdom have 
not yet allowed for the reformation of this chaos or the establishment of 
a uniform law’.5 The only way to protect various regions from inevitable 
shortage was to integrate them into a larger whole, which thanks to its 
                                                         
1 Turgot, ‘Projet de Lettre au Contrôleur Général’, p. 128. 
2 T.J. Hochstrasser, ‘Physiocracy and the Politics of Laissez-Faire’ in Goldie and Wokler 
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greater variation of environs and conditions, could come to their rescue 
whenever needed.1  
 
All regions, he argued, were equally vulnerable to harvest disaster, and 
the seemingly infertile regions in the south had just as much productive 
potential as the bountiful northern regions and the area around Paris. 
The comparative backwardness of southern agriculture, he asserted, 
was due to the long-term inability there to raise capital and invest in 
improvement which, in turn, could be blamed on the prevalence of 
métayage as opposed to tenant farming. Entrepreneurs were simply not 
attracted to the region because of its chronically low grain prices, which 
seemed to result from market controls. It was the influence of large 
cities like Paris that rendered agriculture profitable and improvable, 
but the markets of the south were shielded from the capital’s influence, 
and hence shut off from development.2  
 
Here, for comparison, Turgot referred to what he saw as the equivalent 
situation in Britain: England and Scotland. Due to the high value of 
English grain, entrepreneurs were attracted to agricultural activities, 
and tenant farming had become the norm, with métayage extinct. In 
Scotland also, métayers were becoming thin on the ground, presumably 
because of the influence of the post-union free trade.3 Turgot’s system 
of thought about free trade and progress made it impossible for him to 
draw meaningful fundamental differences between nations, so that all 
apparent divergence had to depend on custom or the effects of 
government intervention.  
 
Tucker did not hesitate to contextualise his observations on the rich 
country- poor country debate in the relationship between England and 
Scotland, and Hont has observed the discrepancy between the approach 
of the Welshman and of the ‘North-Briton’ to this issue. The Scottish 
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Hume saw the low wages of his compatriots as a competitive advantage, 
and a reason to involve his country in the predominantly English 
manufacturing industry.1 Tucker, by comparison, saw England’s lead as 
permanent as the two countries grew wealthier in tandem. A wealthier 
Scotland was merely a wealthier trading partner, which, he argued by 
alluding to individual shopkeepers, could not be a bad thing.2 In spite of 
his intolerance of restrictions on trade, which he thought exhibited 
excessive self-love on a national level,3 his underlying assumption was 
that England was able to remain the shopkeeper of choice through 
consistent industriousness and constant improvement. 
 
His attitude to colonies was informed by the same logic: if the American 
colonies were allowed their independence, then Britain would 
ultimately win over the majority of transatlantic trade by means of its 
existing and continuing commercial prowess.4 However, when it came 
to Scotland and Ireland, Tucker was highly in favour of full integration 
with Britain, as part of his wider stance on immigration and 
naturalisation. In fact, he argued that it was preferable to incorporate 
and enrich Ireland than to let France gain by Irish trade.5  
 
At the point of writing his Brief Essay Tucker still imagined that the 
American colonies could be highly beneficial to the metropole. Yet even 
as he wrote in favour of incorporating Ireland into Britain, he was 
already anticipating the difficulties of maintaining a distant overseas 
empire.6 He soon argued that the colonies had begun very quickly ‘to 
shew no other Marks of Attachment to their antient Parent, than what 
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arose from Views of Self-Interest and Self-Love’.1 Nevertheless, Tucker 
argued that this drive for colonial independence was inevitable, 
particularly under a free constitution.2 Ultimately he concluded that 
both the British and Americans only stood to lose from continuing in 
their unhappy and potentially violent relationship.3 Thus Tucker 
understood the American desire for independence, but was clearly 
unable to conceive of the Irish not wishing to be wedded to Britain. This 
was because he understood the Irish union as in the interests of both 
parties, where the interests of the American colonies, he believed, had 
diverged from the British.4  
 
However, what Tucker ultimately wished to extend to Ireland seems 
more like amalgamation into one composite nation rather than an 
empire. He considered Ireland about as foreign as Yorkshire, which he 
thought had historically been independent itself. He reasoned that 
Britain and Ireland having ‘one common Head,- one common Interest 
both in Church and State,- the same Friends,- and the same Enemies… 
ought to have been long since consolidated together’.5 He promoted a 
single united kingdom where a share of predicted Scottish and Irish 
gains reverted to England not only through taxation, but also through 
more enthusiastic participation in English trade on the part of the Celtic 
Fringe nations.6 When it came to defending his stance on American 
independence in view of a possible copycat Irish rebellion, he 
emphasised the physical proximity of Ireland and the commercial 
benefits which he expected both Britain and Ireland to reap from a 
union.7 Interest, or economic concerns had a lot to answer for when it 
came to Tucker’s vision of national boundaries. 
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Turgot also mused on the meaning of nationhood and national 
belonging, deciding that a nation was constituted by shared language, 
but a people had to be ‘enclosed in a territory and united under a single 
government’.1 The British and the Pennsylvanians belonged to the same 
nation, therefore, as did the French and the Swiss, but, through their 
independence, each was a separate people. Ethnicity, in other words, 
did not determine belonging to a nation state. Turgot looked forward to 
the point when the colonies of both Britain and France would be cut 
loose to form new independent trading entities, and remarked to 
DuPont that colonial possessions were really only useful for spreading 
the language of the metropole.2  
 
In comparison with Turgot, Tucker’s appreciation of free trade had its 
limits. Even as he discussed the rich country- poor country issue and 
described the mutual gains offered by free international exchange, 
Tucker offered suggestions to ensure English commercial dominance by 
using the tax regime to ‘discourage the too great or excessive 
Consumption of alien Manufactures’.3 Not only did he advocate the 
manipulation of international trade by using tariffs and duties, but he 
also considered bounties on nascent industries useful.4 However, his 
advocacy of economic props boiled down to his desire to safeguard 
Britain’s status as a rich nation. He evidently did not doubt the British 
capacity for continual improvement, only the commitment of British 
people to this destiny.  
 
Tucker was deeply opposed to popular vice, but he also reviled the 
apparent indulgences of the higher echelons of society, prescribing 
taxation on ‘Injoyment’.5 Interestingly Hume also did not condemn the 
                                                         
1 Turgot to DuPont, 20th February 1766, Oeuvres, II, p. 514. 
2 Turgot to Tucker, 12th September 1770, Oeuvres, III, p. 422; Turgot to DuPont, 20th 
February 1766, Oeuvres, II, p. 512.  
3 Tucker, ‘Four Tracts’, p. 42. Adam Smith was also not above deeming the luxury 
consumption of foreign goods by idle individuals ‘in every respect hurtful to the 
society’. Smith, WN, II.ii.33-4. 
4 Tucker, ‘Elements’, p. 132. 
5 Ibid, p. 214; Adam Smith argued that a tax on menservants, thought of as a non-
essential or luxury expense of the rich, actually fell most heavily on the middling sort 
and not the rich. Smith, WN, V.ii.g.12. 
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fact that taxation could curtail luxury. He argued against Turgot in their 
correspondence that taxation should not fall upon the land, preferring 
the indirect method. He rather callously pointed out that higher grain 
prices made the poor work more and consume less; indirect tax would 
simply have the same effect.1 
 
This was, however, somewhat contradictory to his argument elsewhere, 
and generally speaking Hume was in favour of luxury. Civic virtue 
inspired members of small primitive societies like Sparta, but Hume 
argued that ‘as these principles are too disinterested and too difficult to 
support, it is requisite to govern men by other passions, and animate 
them with a spirit of avarice and industry, art and luxury’.2 As hordes of 
vassals matured into an independent middling sort, they became 
committed to liberal property rights, and hence grew into a strong base 
for a liberal constitution.3 Hume defined luxury itself as ‘great 
refinement in the gratification of the senses; and any degree of it may 
be innocent or blameable’.4 Focussing on the public goods which luxury 
seemed to offer, he could more or less ignore its negative connotations 
for individuals. In fact he thought that if the overall social outcome of 
luxury was beneficial, then the question of individual vice was 
irrelevant.5 In this he pre-empted Adam Smith.6  
 
However, luxury remained a contentious issue. Not only could it have a 
corrupting effect on individual morals, but it could also be thought to 
induce sterility in the economy. This was the view of the physiocrats, 
who saw aristocratic excess and ornamentation as detracting from 
investment in the land.7 Turgot inherited this ambivalence, since his 
theory of economic growth more or less depended on the savings 
                                                         
1 Hume to Turgot, September 1766 in J.Y.T. Greig (ed.), The Letters of David Hume 
(New York & London, 1983), p. 94. 
2 Hume, ‘Of Commerce’, p. 263. 
3 J. Robertson, ‘The Scottish Enlightenment at the Limits of the Civic Tradition’ in Hont 
and Ignatieff (eds.), Wealth and Virtue, p. 157. 
4 D. Hume, ‘Of Refinement in the Arts’ in Miller (ed.), David Hume, p. 268. 
5 C.J. Berry, The Idea of Luxury (Cambridge, 1994), p. 145; Force, Self-Interest, pp. 212-
3.  
6 Force, Self-Interest, p. 160. 
7 Berry, Luxury, p. 139. 
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accumulated by capitalists. In his physiocrat-informed understanding, 
luxury undermined long-term economic growth, and hence also tax 
yields: overall it tended to destroy a nation’s capital.1  
 
The aristocracy was afflicted by luxury, but those who wished to 
become rich still had no choice but to be thrifty.2 According to Turgot 
thrift was already the prevailing mind-set in Europe, and he knew this, 
he argued, because interest rates had been in continual decline over the 
centuries.3 Characteristically, although he condemned luxury, he 
seemed to believe that the issue would right itself if left alone. Thus 
Turgot offered no elaborate tax scheme akin to Tucker’s, only the single 
tax on land. Their divergence in this regard is emblematic of their 




Tucker and Turgot wrote handbooks for generating national wealth. 
Though both understood the world in terms of universal and generally 
applicable principles, underlying Tucker’s advocacy of free trade was 
the perceived need for careful supervision of both the producers and 
consumers of Britain itself. The same concern for specifically British 
enrichment pervades Townshend’s pamphlet too. Their desire to 
protect the British economy evidently coincided with the idea of 
universal principals, because they interpreted Britain’s leading 
economic situation as by no means intrinsic or permanent. Tucker and 
Townshend, then, were anxious to preserve national industriousness, 
and hence a position at the top of a hierarchy of nations which were all 
making their way up a gradual incline towards enrichment. Tucker in 
particular, nevertheless, managed to avoid classic mercantilist wisdom. 
Thanks to his profound belief in improvement he saw global trade and 
wealth as infinitely expandable. In spite of this, he still insisted that the 
                                                         
1 Turgot, ‘Réflexions’, p. 588; Shovlin, Political Economy of Virtue, p. 142. 
2 Turgot, ‘Réflexions’, p. 589. 
3 Ibid, pp. 588-9. 
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greatest share at any one time could and should be dominated by 
Britain. 
 
Turgot’s aims, however, are less clear. The French context is clearly a 
given in his practical discussions of the grain trade. Most of his 
theoretical work, meanwhile, explained how a nation like France could 
produce stable taxable revenue. More or less silent on the issue of how 
to spend the tax, Turgot’s work nevertheless tended towards the 
protection and perpetuation of the existing government, of which he 
was a functioning part. He regularly made reference to British success, 
as he perceived it, in generating an export market for agricultural 
produce and developing the farming sector, although he agreed with 
Tucker and Townshend in rejecting corn bounties. Evidently he 
believed that France was playing catch up, but his work was not 
ostensibly nationalistic in the way that Tucker’s and Townshend’s was. 
 
They all agreed on the fundamental point that, in order to provide for 
the nation, farmers required a free market for their produce. This 
meant that their understanding of the national good, one way or 
another, coincided. Turgot argued that the interests of the poor 
consumers of grain were identical to those of the capitalist producers. A 
similar association of interests appeared in Tucker’s work also, for he 
understood a landowner’s bond to immovable property as a bond to the 
very substance of the nation. Both understood nationality in a very 
literal way, which, since it essentially depended on physical settlement 
and the allegiance of interests, easily allowed for naturalisation. Their 
emphasis on landowners, meanwhile, meant that the ‘public good’ was 
not located in the welfare of the people at all, but in the welfare of 
agricultural capitalists. Turgot and Tucker more or less marginalised 
the poor, therefore, and concentrated on the benefits of agricultural 
proprietors only.  
 
This seems to have also informed their idea of sovereignty, which 
neither saw as resting with the people in any meaningful way. Tucker 
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was unabashed in his rejection of individual rights and his adherence to 
representative government in all it entailed. He despised increased 
enfranchisement and the shameless electioneering which he thought it 
involved. Turgot, meanwhile, would even deny the title of full 
citizenship to all those who were not possessed of property. Their 
appreciations of political freedoms were strictly limited, and they were 
well aware that their economic designs were antithetical to popular 
custom. By casting the popular objections to free trade as the cries of a 
villainous monopoly, they justified policies which seemed to fly in the 
face of due concern for the welfare of the poor.  
 
Yet one of the fundamental discrepancies between the two was in 
relation to the circumstances that they thought were required to 
establish and maintain the commercial freedom which they both 
advocated. Removing monopolies was insufficient for Tucker, as he 
believed that unrestrained self-love would descend into base self-
interest. People could not be trusted at all times to adhere voluntarily to 
a Christian moral code, so an enlightened government was needed to 
arbitrate between rival interests, or else face renewed monopoly. For 
Turgot, however, the market mechanism generally sufficed, and he 
understood individual negotiations as adequately suited to addressing 
any potential conflict between private interests. He was therefore 
adamant that the issue should be removed from the mandate of the 
administration.  
 
When it came to the international grain market, therefore, Turgot had a 
strong sense of its workings and reliability, as well as its potential to 
unify and calibrate France economically. Therein lay his understanding 
of contemporary France and his vision for its future. For he rejected the 
parochialism which he identified in attitudes towards the regulation of 
grain in particular and which he blamed for the uneven development of 
the country. Tucker, meanwhile, found no fault with the uneven 
development that he saw in Britain and the wider world, which he 
thought needed some sort of order. Even as he hoped for union with 
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Ireland, he saw it in terms of returns made out to England, allowing 
wealth to Ireland only in proportion to England’s. Turgot, therefore, 
looked forward to a free trade world and the unified prosperous France 
which he imagined accompanied it, where Tucker anticipated the future 
with certain apprehensions. 
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This chapter reintroduces the most influential of Adam Smith’s work, 
An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, to the 
discussion. The contemporary significance of Smith’s work is a 
controversial matter. It clearly aimed to tackle contemporary issues, 
since David Hume accused Smith of delaying its publication in order to 
treat the highly topical colonial situation.1 However, it has been argued 
that its actual influence was limited. For example, Smith’s timing on the 
colonial issue was actually quite poor, as the eventual publication of 
Wealth of Nations on 9th March 1776 came ‘too early for Parliament to 
listen to his proposals, and… too late for Congress to want to listen to 
them’.2 In spite of this, Hume implied shortly after its publication that 
London was buzzing with the Wealth of Nations.3  
 
Though he clearly wished to inform opinion on important 
contemporary issues, the renown which the author’s name enjoys today 
was laboured and gradual. In fact, immediately following his death, 
Smith fell into relative obscurity, only to be, in spite of the multiplicity 
of possible interpretations of his work and views, ‘transformed, by 
1800, into the modern hero of commerce’.4 Thus Smith’s influence on 
economic thought and history since the nineteenth century is, by 
comparison with the earlier period, easily acknowledgeable. Given the 
danger of anachronism that this profound influence presents, it has 
                                                         
1 Hume to Smith, dated 8th February 1776 in E.C. Mossner and I.S. Ross (eds.), The 
Correspondence of Adam Smith (Oxford, 1987), p. 185. 
2 D. Stevens, ‘Adam Smith and the Colonial Disturbances’ in A.S. Skinner and T. Wilson 
(eds.), Essays on Adam Smith (Oxford, 1975), p. 217. 
3 Hume to Smith, dated 3rd May 1776 in Mossner and Ross (eds.), Correspondence, p. 
194. 
4 E. Rothschild, Economic Sentiments (Cambridge, MA, 2001), p. 64. 
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been more expedient until now to more or less exclude the work from 
the analysis. However, Smith’s work can hardly be simply ignored, 
given its almost unparalleled scope and structure at the time of 
publishing, and its endurance in spite of more recent opprobrium.  
 
Besides this, Smith discussed the grain trade at length, making a 
contribution at the end of the eighteenth century to this particular 
debate at least. In fact, Istvan Hont and Michael Ignatieff see Smith’s 
offering on the grain trade, together with the implications of his wider 
conclusions for the same, as the most controversial element of his work 
in his own lifetime.1 Governor Thomas Pownall, who supplied the only 
thoroughgoing analysis of the work during the remainder of Smith’s 
life, certainly took issue with its treatment of the grain trade.2 In a 
public letter to Smith he defended the corn bounty and measures that 
served to discourage the importation of foreign grain under normal 
circumstances. He argued that although the nation as a whole 
benefitted from the influx of wealth generated by trade, the landed class 
and agricultural labourers were the last to see any advantage. He 
thought that the bounty, however, helped to allocate some of the 
nation’s growing prosperity directly to the agricultural sector, in order 
to prevent a depression in that part of the economy.3  
 
Pownall had been instrumental in the passing of the legislation of 1772, 
which placed duties on wheat imports; forbade exportation and 
allowed free importation of wheat when it exceeded 48s per bushel; 
and preserved the bounty on any grain exported otherwise.4 Hont and 
Ignatieff suggest that Smith’s dissatisfaction with this act can ‘indicate 
how far beyond the common sense consensus his advocacy of “natural 
                                                         
1 I. Hont and M. Ignatieff, ‘Needs and Justice in the Wealth of Nations: an Introductory 
Essay’ in idem (eds.), Wealth and Virtue (Cambridge, 1983), p. 14. 
2 R.R. Teichgraeber, ‘“Less Abused than I had Reason to Expect”: The Reception of The 
Wealth of Nations in Britain, 1776–90’, HJ, 30:2 (1987), p. 338. 
3 T. Pownall, ‘A Letter from Governor Pownall to Adam Smith’ dated 25th September 
1776 and reprinted as Appendix A in Mossner and Ross (eds.), Correspondence, pp. 
361-4.  
4 D.G. Barnes, A History of the English Corn Laws 1660-1846 (London, 1930), p. 42. 
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liberty” had taken him’.1 Only the physiocrats had dared to go as far as 
Smith in his advocacy of the freedom of owners of grain to exercise 
their property rights over the vital commodity.2 Evidently Pownall felt 
that it was necessary to publicly defend these measures from the 
challenge posed by Wealth of Nations. He likewise called into question 
Smith’s thought on money and trade monopolies as well as his stance 
on the colonies.3 
 
The Wealth of Nations was also drawn without much hesitation into 
debates over grain regulation in Scotland during 1777. At issue was 
whether to raise the minimum price limit at which the Scottish 
importation of oats and oatmeal was permitted. This rise would cause 
the price of bread in Scotland to escalate, and, it was argued, cause 
wages to increase also, compromising the competitiveness of Scottish 
manufactures. Opponents of the change, and of the corn laws generally, 
made use of Smith’s work, reducing it, however, to little more than a 
slogan in favour of absolute freedom of trade.4  
 
Smith’s work on the grain trade would later resurface in debates on the 
corn laws of 1815.5 His uncompromising position on the regulation of 
the grain trade informed the reputation of his book at large, serving to 
amplify the free-trade content therein. It is because of its focus on the 
grain trade and the practicalities of economic competition that this 
chapter concentrates primarily on the Wealth of Nations, rather than on 
the catalogue of Smith’s work, although it makes references to his 
general philosophy of commercial man.6 
 
Kirk Willis argues that Smith actually had an important effect on key 
politicians of his time, such as Lord Shelburne and William Pitt. He 
states that the free trade doctrine of the Wealth of Nations ‘helped to 
                                                         
1 Hont and Ignatieff, ‘Needs and Justice’, p. 20. 
2 Ibid, p. 21. 
3 Pownall, ‘Letter ’, p. 375. 
4 Teichgraeber, ‘The Reception of Wealth of Nations’, pp. 351-3. 
5 D.G. Barnes, English Corn Laws, pp. 119-125. 
6 I. Hont, Jealousy of Trade (Cambridge, MA & London, 2005), p. 51. 
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free Pitt from the grip of the old protectionist orthodoxies’, suggesting 
that the Commercial Treaty of 1786, which relaxed duties on French 
agricultural goods, owed its success in part to Smith’s influence on Pitt.1 
This fed back into Smith’s reputation. According to Richard 
Teichgraeber, ‘with the events of 1786 came an unprecedented level of 
public acclaim for the author of the Wealth of Nations’.2   
 
It was only then that Smith was respected as an authority on trade, 
though, for the time being, only one of many. The Wealth of Nations was 
frequently cited in Parliament, but so too were the works of David 
Hume, Josiah Tucker and Arthur Young. Even the likes of John Locke, 
Gregory King, Charles Davenant and Josiah Child continued to be cited. 
Moreover, there was little if any discussion of Smith’s thought in 
Parliament. MPs often mined the Wealth of Nations for catchphrases 
and statistics. 3 The full impact of Smith’s thought thereafter was 
perhaps softened for the time being by the association of its author with 
French Revolutionary principles, together with the fact that some of its 
matter seemed simply impractical at the end of the eighteenth century, 
especially in a wartime context.4 
 
Since then, however, economists in particular have favoured Adam 
Smith. Because of this, Hont argues that Smith’s thought is sometimes 
reduced to hard economic principles, at the cost of neglecting his 
‘humane, liberal, and cautious politics’.5 He distinguishes Smith’s work 
from physiocratic thought (which it seems superficially to resemble) by 
highlighting Smith’s disdain for the forcible means by which he 
supposed the physiocrats intended to implement their own corrective 
system. Although Smith also endeavoured to correct, he seemed 
nevertheless to entertain a paradoxical respect for misguided opinion 
and sentiment. It is argued that Smith actually perceived the identity of 
                                                         
1 K. Willis, ‘The Role in Parliament of the Economic Ideas of Adam Smith, 1776-1800’, 
History of Political Economy, 11:4 (1979), p. 539. 
2 Teichgraeber, ‘The Reception of Wealth of Nations’, p. 362. 
3 Ibid, p. 362; Teichgraeber, ‘The Reception of Wealth of Nations’, p. 510. 
4 Willis, ‘Ideas of Smith in Parliament’, pp. 542-4. 
5 Hont, Jealousy of Trade, p. 356. 
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nations in their errors of judgement when it came to political economy. 
For this reason, this chapter follows Hont’s lead by examining Smith’s 
own studies of the mercantile and physiocratic systems, particularly in 
terms of how to govern the grain trade. In this way it attempts to unlock 
Smith’s vision of national character and reveal an apprehension 
towards globalisation. 
 
Thus the first section deals with mercantilism and the mercantile 
system, carefully distinguishing Smith’s version from the 
historiographical concept, which is something quite different. 
Mercantilism has become something of a vague catchall term that exists 
only for the historian’s convenience. However, Smith understood the 
mercantile system as a very specific and almost tangible historical 
reality. He saw it as a crucial misunderstanding about the generation of 
national wealth which had allowed individuals and groups to 
manipulate government in their own favour and in pursuit of their own 
interests. Importantly, of course, Smith did not condemn the pursuit of 
self-interest itself, but argued that its political expression caused 
inefficiencies in the allocation of resources and labour.1 
 
The second section moves onto Smith’s interpretation of the 
physiocratic system, particularly the elements and ideas which he 
criticised and ultimately rejected, such as the notion of agricultural 
kingdoms and commercial republics. It is argued that Smith saw both 
the mercantile and physiocratic systems as equally fallacious and 
artificial. Evidently he objected to the excessively violent imposition of 
any sort of policy on society, even if it was theoretically correct. The 
third section, therefore, explores further Smith’s own rejection of 
systems of political economy as he understood them, and ultimately 
investigates his own approach to government. His own system is 
complicated all the more by the fact that he attacked so virulently the 
notion of systematised economic planning and intervention. 
 
                                                         
1 A.O. Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests (Princeton, 1977), p. 103.  
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The ‘mercantile system’ is perhaps one of Smith’s most famous and 
notorious creations. Smith has taken much of the flack for this 
Frankenstein’s monster of historiography, which, patched together and 
given a life of its own by a new science, somehow refuses to be borne 
away into intellectual obscurity by the icy tides of modern scepticism. A 
modern Prometheus in his own right, Smith has also been held 
personally responsible for setting the world ablaze with a burning 
desire for the gains of unfettered capitalism.1 However, Smith can only 
take so much credit, for many of the ideas most closely associated with 
his thought – the division of labour; laissez-faire; and even the 
mercantile system – were already in circulation when he came to put 
pen to paper. The originality and provenance of Smith’s thought has 
been well explored, and is not the focus of this chapter.2 Rather, the 
chapter argues that even Smith contemplated the free-trade future 
which he depicted with some apprehension. For it could be argued that 
Smith understood the division of labour and the four-stage theory of 
economic growth as processes which ended in homogeneous and 
intellectually sterile societies, and that, actually, he understood failure 
to achieve political economic perfection as the defining factors of the 
economic identity of Britain and the other nations he studied. 
 
The Mercantile System 
 
Lars Magnusson sees mercantilism as a revolution in economic thought 
that predated Adam Smith’s contribution. According to Terence 
Hutchison, this sort of revolution requires four conditions, namely: 
changes in ‘research priorities’; changes to empirical content; a new 
conceptual framework; and new policy objectives.3 The first two, 
Magnusson sees in the propensity of economic authors of the sixteenth 
                                                         
1 S.J. Pack, Capitalism as a Moral System (Aldershot, 1991), p. 1. 
2 See for example J.A. Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis (London, 1955), p. 
185; E.A.J. Johnson, Predecessors of Adam Smith (New York, 1965), p. 10; T. Hutchison, 
Before Adam Smith (Oxford, 1988), p. 362; D.P. O’Brien, The Classical Economists 
Revisited (Princeton, NJ & Oxford, 2004), pp. 35-44. 
3 L. Magnusson, Mercantilism (London, 1994), p. 9; T. Hutchison, On Revolutions and 
Progress in Economic Knowledge (Cambridge, 1978), pp. 291-4. 
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and seventeenth centuries to describe the economy in the rational 
terms and the anatomical metaphors of the scientific revolution. They 
researched the economy – with empirical principals borrowed from 
Francis Bacon – as a natural and independently functioning system.1 
For example, Thomas Mun concerned himself with the causes and 
effects of economic growth in general when he argued that England had 
an unfavourable balance of trade to thank for its deplorable economic 
situation. This is compared with the narrow and often accusatory 
approach of Mun’s predecessors, such as Gerard Malynes’ attempt to 
blame foreign bankers, and not the wider economic forces which 
influenced their behaviour, for the economic dislocation of the 1620s.2  
 
Although some of the national policy objectives of mercantilism seem to 
be derived from orthodox economic wisdom or even stereotypes – such 
as the benefits of exporting more than was imported – Magnusson 
argues that the balance of trade doctrine was invented anew to better 
justify and convey that message.3 This discourse has long been treated 
as a fallacy and an aberration, which had to be abandoned before 
economics proper could be born. However, Magnusson repositions it as 
an intellectual predecessor of modern economics because it apparently 
represented an innovative conceptual framework. This new framework, 
Magnusson supposes, also made for a shift in the general concerns of 
policy from the consideration of the allocation of wealth, to a 
preoccupation with its generation through foreign trade, thus satisfying 
the final two conditions of a revolution in economics.4  
 
Magnusson argues that tracts on economics should be understood 
within long-standing discourses and epistemological systems.5 His 
version of mercantilism is something more akin to a process than a 
fixed doctrine, allowing for a great deal of variation in the subjects and 
                                                         
1 Magnusson, Mercantilism, p. 11. 
2 Ibid, p. 72.  
3 Ibid, p. 74.  
4 Ibid, p. 9.  
5 Ibid, p. 23. 
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outcomes of the literature, provided the authors conformed to an 
overall pattern of thought. Frameworks such as the balance of trade 
doctrine could come and go, and Magnusson, following E.A. Johnson, 
allows that the balance of trade morphed after the 1760s into an 
emphasis on ‘foreign paid incomes’.1 However, he argues, it was the 
process of fixing economic meanings to borrowed terms and viewing 
the subject as a discreet science which made possible the future 
development of modern economics.2 
 
Continuing this line of reasoning, Magnusson depicts Adam Smith’s 
condemnation of the mercantile system as one of the greatest cover-ups 
of all time. It ‘suppressed’ all memory of a seventeenth-century 
revolution in economic thought.3 He admittedly closely follows 
Hutchison’s example, opening the question of Smith’s status as a 
revolutionary, whilst also acknowledging the point made by others that 
Smith was perhaps a synthesiser rather than pioneer of eighteenth-
century opinion.4  
 
Adam Smith did not write about mercantilism, but it is implied that he 
inherited a straw man from the physiocrats, called the mercantile 
system, which in turn stereotyped the thought of earlier economic 
thinkers.5 In order to support his own conclusions, Magnusson must 
argue that Smith deliberately depicted the doctrine of the mercantile 
system as hopelessly deluded, in order to overstate the innovative 
quality of his own work.6 This is relatively easy when focussing on 
Smith’s chief objection to the mercantilist system of thought: that it 
confused money with wealth. Here Magnusson himself is by no means 
unprecedented. D.C. Coleman, for example, identified that what little 
                                                         
1 L. Magnusson, ‘Is Mercantilism a Useful Concept Still?’ in M. Isenmann (ed.), 
Merkantilismus: Wiederaufnahme einer Debatte (Stuttgart, 2014), pp. 21-2; Johnson, 
Predecessors, p. 151. 
2 Magnusson, Mercantilism, p. 168. 
3 Ibid, p. 216. 
4 Hutchison, On Revolutions and Progress, p. 23; R.H. Campbell and A.S. Skinner, 
‘Introduction’ in A. Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of 
Nations, eds. W.B. Todd, R. H. Campbell, and A.S. Skinner (Oxford, 1976), I, p. 23. 
5 Magnusson, Mercantilism, p. 25. 
6 Ibid, p. 216. 
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Adam Smith did write of mercantilist theory was ‘largely wrong’, 
particularly when it came to overemphasising the convention, known as 
bullionism, of identifying national wealth with the quantity of precious 
metals in the nation.1 
 
However, the very fact that Adam Smith, according to Magnusson, 
stifled the seventeenth-century revolution means that he must have 
identified the same actual economic discourse as Magnusson, and then 
decided to denigrate it under the guise of ‘the mercantile system’. For if 
the impression of innovation was truly Adam Smith’s goal, then a 
seventeenth-century revolution as described by Magnusson was surely 
his main rival. Yet Magnusson is quick to admit that Smith himself 
blurred the line which connected the participants of the discourse to 
the apparent practical manifestations of the mercantile system via the 
cardinal falsehood of his version of the mercantile system: equating 
wealth and money.2 Joseph Schumpeter particularly resented this 
‘unintelligent criticism’ because, he suggested, Smith was conscious of 
its fallaciousness, but nevertheless vaguely insinuated it, deliberately 
misleading his own readers.3 
 
All this implies that Smith’s key target was not the authors of the 
standard discourse of the previous century at all. The defamation of the 
mercantile system was merely the collateral damage of a blunt attack 
on the injudicious architects of its application and perpetuation in 
Smith’s own times. After all, Smith prefaced Book IV of the Wealth of 
Nations – which dealt specifically with the mercantile system – with the 
statement that this was ‘the modern system, and is best understood in 
our own country and in our own times’.4 
 
                                                         
1 D.C. Coleman, ‘Adam Smith, Businessmen, and the Mercantile System in England’, 
History of European Ideas, 9:2 (1988), p. 164. 
2 Magnusson, Mercantilism, p. 25;  
3 Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis, p. 361, n. 24. 
4 Smith, WN, IV.2.  
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What Magnusson attacks most viciously in his own book is the 
depiction put forth by Smith, as well as more modern historians such as 
Robert B. Ekelund and Robert D. Tollison, that sees the principles of the 
mercantile system as a simple justification on the part of rent-seeking 
individuals for their lobbying activities, which prejudiced government 
in favour of their private interests.1 Magnusson dismisses this view on 
the grounds that the economists, Ekelund and Tollison, failed to relate 
the rent-seeking industry of state monopolies, which they consider the 
essence of mercantilism, back to the body of literature to which he 
himself applies the term. It does not seem to trouble Magnusson in his 
flurry of criticism, that, however effectively or otherwise, Ekelund, 
Tollison, and, most importantly of all, Smith may well have been 
discussing something quite different to the seventeenth-century 
discourse which is the subject of his own book.  
 
Smith’s own condemnation of the existing grain regulation was closely 
related to his argument against the mercantile system and its iterations 
in political economy. He deemed the laws highly overrated in a 
digression within Book IV of the Wealth of Nations, which criticised the 
mercantile system in general.2 However, before moving on to the 
specifics of the grain trade, Smith dealt with bounties, declaring them a 
practical manifestation of the pathological notion that a favourable 
balance of trade was the key to national enrichment.3 The corn bounty 
itself, Smith agued, was enacted as an ‘expedient’ to artificially inflate 
falling grain prices by a parliament which, in 1689, he said, was packed 
with landowners.4  
 
However, he closely related this tactic to the landowners’ emulation of 
their commercial counterparts. In this sense, Smith depicted the 
commercial monopolising tendency infecting the minds of the 
                                                         
1 Magnusson, Mercantilism, p. 49; R.B. Ekelund and R.D. Tollison, Mercantilism as a 
Rent-Seeking Society (College Station, TX, 1981), p. 5.  
2 Smith, WN, IV.v.b.1-53. 
3 Ibid, IV.v.a.1-40.  
4 Ibid, I.xi.g.10. 
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landowning classes – normally the most immune of all groups to such a 
‘wretched spirit’ – who therefore lent their support to an unhelpful and 
unwholesome policy.1 Unfortunately, according to Smith, the 
landowners were misled by their own greed, and, he stated bluntly, the 
only people whose interests were really served by the bounty were the 
corn merchants. Here then, Smith was objecting to the old adage that 
‘interest will not lie’, because, as Gunn has also pointed out, interest is 
not always easily determined.2 Certainly, Smith argued, the landowners 
who demanded the bounty ‘did not act with that compleat 
comprehension of their own interest which commonly directs the 
conduct of those two other orders of people [merchants and 
manufacturers]’.3  
 
Nevertheless, landowners’ desire for state subsidy was not itself 
directly to blame for the failure of the policy. An export bounty was not, 
Smith contended, an effective way of increasing the price of the export 
good, in this case grain. Nor, therefore, was it a means of enhancing the 
value of land through improvement.4 Allocating blame to government in 
general, Smith declared that due to the prejudicial emphasis on trade, 
which assumed that wealth comes from exportation and not 
production, the corn bounties were failing to reward agricultural 
investment. The winners, of course, were the merchants, whose interest 
had been neatly served thanks to inept self-interest on the part of the 
landed interest, coupled with their incompetent implementation 
thereof, as part of the legislature. The mercantile system, not the self-
interest of the landowners, was to blame in this case, because it was 
indeed ‘the mercantile system [that] proposes to enrich the whole 
country, and to put money into all our pockets by means of the balance 
of trade’.5 
 
                                                         
1 Ibid, IV.ii.21.  
2 J.A.W. Gunn, ‘Interest Will Not Lie’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 29:4 (1968), p. 556. 
3 Smith, WN, IV.v.a.24. 
4 Ibid, IV.v.a.25. 
5 Ibid, IV.v.a.1. 
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In this sense, it appears that Smith was not necessarily adverse to 
bounties in principle. Those designed with the real national good – such 
as national defence or fishing – at heart were deemed acceptable.1 The 
key problem with the corn bounty according to Smith, it seems, was 
that it failed to reward actual production in the same way as the so-
called tonnage bounties, which were offered to certain fisheries. 
Nevertheless, it is perhaps likely that Smith would still condemn a 
bounty on grain production on the grounds that bounties artificially 
prejudiced the pursuits of individuals, which ought to be guided by 
market forces rather than legislation.2 After all, he criticized the 
bounties on fishing on the same grounds, only to justify them once 
more for their supposed contribution to national defence, as a means of 
putting mariners through their paces.3 Smith was silent on the question 
of whether boosting land values was a helpful national as well as 
private aim, though he condemned the bounty for raising the nominal 
value of grain, which in turn, he thought, discouraged industry.4 
 
Interestingly, at this point Smith did not downplay the special 
characteristics of grain, as perhaps his French counterparts, such as 
Anne-Robert-Jacques Turgot, might have. In fact, Smith argued that 
corn did not function in the same way as manufactured goods, because 
‘the nature of things has stamped upon corn a real value which cannot 
be altered by merely altering its money price’.5 For Smith, grain prices 
were the long-term measure of true value where gold and silver, ideal 
for assessing short-term price fluctuations, were on a steady decline.6 
This is not to say that Smith believed any less than Turgot that grain 
should be subject to market forces rather than regulation. Indeed, it 
meant that he saw any attempt to regulate the price of grain as, in the 
                                                         
1 J. Hoppit, ‘Bounties, the Economy and the State in Britain, 1689-1800’ in P. Gauci 
(ed.), Regulating the British Economy, 1660-1850 (Farnham, 2011), p. 159. 
2 Smith, WN, IV.v.a.3. 
3 Ibid, IV.v.a.27. 
4 Ibid, IV.v.a.21. 
5 Ibid, IV.v.a.23. 
6 Ibid, IV.v.a.15 & 16. Governor Thomas Pownall disagreed with this point, arguing 
that the value of all goods was relative. Pownall, ‘Letter’, p. 346. 
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words of Donald Winch, ‘self-defeating’.1 Bounties, he argued, did not 
boost the value of land, but only placed a double burden on consumers, 
in the form of taxes raised to make bounty pay-outs, and the 
inconvenience of a period of higher relative prices as wages lagged 
behind corn prices.2 
 
What seems like a vilification of the grain merchants in the section on 
bounties is immediately balanced by Smith’s official digression on the 
subject, which more or less comes to their rescue. According to Smith, 
their trade was peculiarly ‘exposed to popular odium’, which itself 
stemmed from the ‘ancient policy of Europe’.3 Here Smith seems to have 
reversed the causal link that the likes of Josiah Tucker and Turgot drew 
between misinformed popular opinion and legislation and which 
blamed the people for their old-fashioned views.4 Ignoring the 
contemporary case of France, Smith suggested that a change in the laws 
restricting inland dealers would simply put a stop to popular prejudice 
in the same way as he argued it had for the ‘imaginary crime’ of 
witchcraft. He wrote that 
 
The law which should restore entire freedom to the inland trade of corn, 
would probably prove as effectual to put an end to the popular fears of 
engrossing and forestalling.5 
 
By making popular opinion the result of legislation, and not vice versa, 
Smith absolved the people of responsibility for the same. It seems that 
their natural inclinations were in a suspended state as a result of faulty 
legislation, but that, as soon as these problems could be resolved, the 
market and human trading inclinations would suffice to resolve 
subsistence issues.6 
                                                         
1 D. Winch, ‘Science and the Legislator’, The Economic Journal, 93:371 (1983), p. 507. 
2 Smith, WN, IV.v.a.8. 
3 Ibid, IV.v.b.7; 9. 
4 See above p. 249. 
5 Smith, WN, IV.v.b.26. 
6 Smith, like David Hume, saw economic regulation as the reign of terror. Rothschild, 
Economic Sentiments, p. 13. 
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The inland grain merchants, in Smith’s depiction, were more subject to 
economic forces than most merchants, as they were so numerous and 
yet dispersed as to be unable to conglomerate or institute informal 
monopolies.1 However, because of the nature of their business, Smith 
argued, corn merchants were especially vulnerable to popular 
opprobrium and government control. Smith attempted to outline the 
fabrication of a web of regulation stemming from the laws of Edward VI 
in 1551, and show that it was based on fundamental misunderstandings 
of the proper functioning of the economy, and particularly the division 
of labour.2 However, he also tried to show that the more recent lifting of 
several regulations first and foremost by 15 Charles II, c.7 (1663) and 
then by 12 George III, c. 71 (1772), had diminished the subsistence 
problem more than any law which imposed restrictions.3 
 
Regulation of the importation and exportation of grain was another 
problem. For these regulations ‘though prior to the establishment of the 
bounty, were dictated by the same spirit, by the same principles, which 
afterwards enacted that regulation’.4 Smith had already pointed out 
that regulation of this sort had been designed to reward and augment 
national agriculture, along the same lines as monopolies and other 
institutions benefitted industry.5 However, in a chapter describing the 
effects of restraints of importation, Smith had shown that such 
regulation tended only to support merchants of the commodity in 
question.6 Smith pointed out that the duties on the importation of grain 
(which were so high that they essentially constituted a prohibition), 
together with the grain bounty, meant that Britain was constantly 
either exporting vast quantities of grain, or importing the same in times 
of dearth. If not for the regulation, he suggested, one year’s surplus 
would relieve another year’s shortage, and international grain 
                                                         
1 Smith, WN, IV.v.b.4. 
2 Ibid, IV.v.b.21. 
3 Ibid, IV.v.b.22; 27. 
4 Ibid, IV.v.b.35. 
5 Ibid, III.iv.20. 
6 Ibid, IV.ii.16. 
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merchants would be out of a job. Smith observed that these merchants 
were accordingly the most eager supporters of the renewal of the 
bounty, where landowners had finally woken up to the faults thereof.1 
 
Concluding his discussion of the corn laws, Smith maintained that 
Britain’s current prosperity could by no means be attributed, as it 
apparently often was, to ‘that system of laws… which is connected with 
the establishment of the bounty’.2 Addressing the laws themselves, 
especially in relation to foreign exports, Smith argued that  
 
To hinder, besides, the farmer from sending his goods at all times to the 
best market, is evidently to sacrifice the ordinary laws of justice to an idea 
of publick utility.3 
 
This point tends to confirm the arguments of both Istvan Hont and J.T. 
Young on the issue of Smith’s approach to state intervention in the 
economy. Ideas or projects for public utility were probably doomed to 
end in mercantilist mismanagement or even despotism.4 Smith 
continued to separate out the political sphere, a forum for public folly, 
and the economic sphere, an arena for private gain.5 Now he was 
prepared to blame popular prejudice for the instigation of laws, 
because, it seems, they had certain ideas about their own utility, which 
even a legislator ought not to entertain. The economic arena had to 
remain, as far as possible, undefiled by political intervention of any sort.  
 
D.C. Coleman complained that Smith was very vague about the actual 
historical processes behind the generation of the mercantile system. He 
                                                         
1 Ibid, IV.ii.20. 
2 Ibid, IV.v.b.43.  
3 Ibid, IV.v.b.39. 
4 Hont, Jealousy of Trade, p. 377; J.T. Young, ‘Unintended Order and Intervention: 
Adam Smith’s Theory of the Role of the State’ in S.G.  Medema and P.J.  Boettke (eds.), 
The Role of Government in the History of Economic Thought (Durham, 2005), p. 97.  
5 Hirschman, The Passions, p. 104. David Hume also drew a distinction between the 
political interests of government and the commercial interests of society. J. Robertson, 
‘The Scottish Enlightenment at the Limits of the Civic Tradition’ in Hont and Ignatieff 
(eds.), Wealth and Virtue, p. 154. 
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himself considered mercantilism as no more than an ‘unplanned 
miscellany of regulatory measures’.1  In other words, Smith’s system 
and the vague idea of mercantilism that followed it were fictional. He 
argued that it was therefore misleading of Smith to label this a system, 
along with the genuinely ‘theoretical construct’ of physiocracy. 
However, it seems that Smith’s depiction of the legislation which 
surrounded corn was not too far removed from the legislative ‘ragbag’ 
which Coleman himself conjured.2 This bundle of regulations, or system 
of laws was shown to have developed from a series of self-interested 
initiatives; misapprehensions about how wealth was generated; ancient 
prejudices about the causes of shortage; and surviving vestiges of 
former systems.  
 
The laws themselves were not actually part of the so-called ‘mercantile 
system’. When related to the corn laws and their history, Adam Smith 
depicted the mercantile system as a myth of national wealth generation 
which was then translated into a specific mode of expression and deftly 
drawn upon in order to realise private interests. However, the culprits 
are somewhat harder to distinguish. As Coleman and also Charles 
Wilson have pointed out, Smith seems to have been inclined towards 
‘physiocratic antipathy’ and ‘a remarkable hostility towards the agents 
of… enterprise’.3  
 
Yet Smith did not stop at criticising those who had apparently devised 
the system and its blunders. He also blamed those who invested in such 
a system and actually believed that systematic state intervention in the 
economy was useful for generating growth or even so much as stability. 
Such a system made a whimsy of the complexities of the natural system, 
which could not be expected to conform to simple maxims about the 
balance of trade. In this sense, his thought resembled that of Anne-
                                                         
1 Coleman, ‘Adam Smith, Businessmen, and the Mercantile system’, p. 164. 
2 Ibid, pp. 164; 165. 
3 Ibid, p. 161; quote from C. Wilson, ‘“Mercantilism”: Some Vicissitudes of an Idea’ in 
idem, Economic History and the Historian (London, 1969) p. 64. 
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Robert-Jacques Turgot, and his predecessor, Jacques-Claude-Marie 
Vincent de Gournay.1 
 
Against the existing ‘system of laws’ governing the grain trade, Smith 
offered the ‘liberal system of free exportation and free importation’. 
This was to transform the various nations of Europe into one great 
famine-free ‘empire’.2 He envisioned a transcontinental market, which, 
independent of misguided nationalist or utilitarian intervention, 
allocated grain exactly when and where it was needed. In this apparent 
preference for laissez-faire, especially in the grain trade, Smith’s 
thought has been likened to physiocratic thought.3 However, Smith had 
his own objections to that system also. 
The Physiocratic System 
 
The physiocratic system, Smith declared, only existed ‘in the 
speculations of a few men of great learning and ingenuity in France’.4 In 
other words, it had not yet caught on in the same way as had the 
mercantile or ‘commercial’ system. It was perhaps for this reason that 
he dedicated just one chapter to it, tacked on to the end of a book 
committed otherwise almost entirely to exposing the mercantile 
system. 
 
Though Smith considered what he called the ‘agricultural system’ to be 
teeming with errors, he was relatively complimentary of the 
physiocrats; they had designed a model which closely approximated his 
own perception of the functioning of the economy.5 Thanks to the 
shared elements of theory between Smith and the physiocrats, 
particularly the emphasis placed on laissez-faire, the originality of 
Smith’s thought is again a subject of controversy. However, historians 
such as Andrew Skinner have endeavoured to show that Smith’s key 
                                                         
1 See above, pp. 230-1. 
2 Smith, WN, IV.v.b.39. 
3 O’Brien, The Classical Economists, p. 43. 
4 Smith, WN, IV.ix.2. 
5 Ibid, IV.ix.2. 
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ideas, and in particular the division of labour theory, were in place 
before he embarked, as the tutor to the stepson of Charles Townshend 
(in turn the brilliant son of our own Charles Townshend), on a tour of 
Europe and, crucially, before his eighteen-month sojourn in France 
from 1765.1 During this time he did, however, witness the beginning of 
the strife over the recent deregulation of the French grain trade.2 
 
As Hont has shown, Smith tended to criticise the physiocrats for their 
apparent adherence to the idea that the economy could and should be 
manipulated in any sense. Thus, though Smith agreed with the 
physiocrats in the theory of their system, which had economic liberty at 
its core, he disagreed with the mode of abrupt and forcible practical 
application of the theory which the physiocrats seemed to have in 
mind.3 Smith viewed the current economic condition of Europe as a 
perversion of the natural path, for as A.W. Coats also pointed out, 
Smith’s application of the term natural, as applied to economic 
progress, by no means connoted inevitability.4  
 
However, according to Hont, Smith thought that European economies 
had nevertheless managed to revert to a general pattern of growth, as 
an unintended consequence of the interventions of statesmen. Thus, 
Hont writes that for Smith, ‘the art of economy was not in 
superimposing the natural order on the actual one, but rather 
discovering how natural progress asserts itself… through the complex 
development of unintended consequences’.5 Therefore, according to 
Hont, although Smith, like the physiocrats, subscribed to the idea of 
natural law, the notion that a government should try to enforce this law 
was inherently offensive to his perception thereof.6  
                                                         
1 Willis, ‘Ideas of Smith in Parliament’, p. 522; A. Skinner, A System of Social Science 
(Oxford, 1996), pp. 124-5; D. Winch, ‘Smith, Adam (bap. 1723, d. 1790)’, Oxford 
Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford, 2004) 
[http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/25767, accessed 25 June 2015] 
2 Hont and Ignatieff, ‘Needs and Justice’, p. 15.  
3 Hont, Jealousy of Trade, p. 355. 
4 A.W. Coats, ‘Adam Smith and the Mercantile System’ in A.S. Skinner and T. Wilson 
(eds.), Essays on Adam Smith (Oxford, 1975), p. 223 
5 Hont, Jealousy of Trade, p. 375. 
6 Ibid, p. 361. 
Daisy Gibbs  284 
  
 
Likewise, Rothschild has argued that Smith harboured a profound 
respect for the freedom of public opinion, which precipitated also a 
bizarre reverence for apparent public misapprehensions and 
prejudices.1 For he acknowledged that all parts of society were equally 
motivated by their own interests, which included not just material gain, 
but intangible social advantage and respect.2 Since he believed that 
most individuals were preoccupied with their own daily occupations, he 
understood that it was naturally difficult for them to have a sense of 
genuine political wisdom.3 Attempting to inculcate new values too 
abruptly went far beyond the remit of the government. 
 
Smith discussed the physiocratic system in relation to the mercantilist 
system, which he thought had been implemented most notably in 
France by Jean-Baptiste Colbert. According to Smith, Colbert was 
guided by the ‘prejudices’ of a system which told him that France 
needed to export more labour value than it imported in a vicious zero-
sum game, where even the number of trade routes was finite. So he 
sacrificed the natural development of agriculture to the demands of 
cities, which he erroneously saw as the source of wealth. As a result, he 
distorted the natural balance of industry, by forcing labour into the 
industrial channel, leaving French agriculture stunted and unable to 
support continuous growth of the economy in general.4  
 
According to Smith, it seems that Colbert had been highly susceptible to 
the mercantile system by dint of his own quirks and foibles. He was a 
‘laborious and plodding man of business’ to whom the idea of 
regulation and state control was highly appealing.5 Smith described him 
in detail as  
 
                                                         
1 Rothschild, Economic Sentiments, p. 68. 
2 Hirschman, The Passions, p. 111.  
3 R. Phillipson, ‘Adam Smith as Civic Moralist’ in Hont and Ignatieff (eds.), Wealth and 
Virtue, p. 191.  
4 Magnusson, Mercantilism, p. 185; Smith, WN, IV.ix.3. 
5 Smith, WN, IV.ix.3. 
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a man of probity, of great industry and knowledge of detail; of great 
experience and accurateness in the examination of publick accounts, and 
of abilities, in short, every way fitted for introducing a method and good 
order into the collection and expenditure of the publick revenue.1 
 
In other words, a bit of a bean-counter. Whether it is fair to typecast 
Colbert as a mercantilist, with all its implied Smithian disdain, has been 
questioned.2 Certainly Smith’s reduction of Colbert’s character to a 
‘plodding’ stereotype is unfair to a ‘remarkable bibliophile’ and patron 
of the arts.3 However, thought about the balance of trade was 
dominated by the terminology and imagery of double-entry 
bookkeeping and it suited the purposes of Smith’s argument to create a 
persona preoccupied with neat columns of figures.4   
 
Though intelligent, Smith implied that this caricatured Colbert was just 
the sort to invest in wrongheaded ideas of a balance of trade and to 
expect that he could, by counting, achieve economic perfection. Smith 
seemed to think that while these skills were suited to the 
administration of public accounts, Colbert had supposedly been foolish 
enough to attempt to extend this bureaucratic approach to national 
commerce. It was this kind of behaviour which Smith argued had led 
Colbert to crush the natural economic inclinations and liberties of 
French subjects with regulation. 
 
Smith then portrayed the physiocratic system as a backlash against the 
fallacies of the mercantile system. It was a corrective, by which its 
proponents hoped to bend ‘the rod’ as far in the one direction as had 
proponents of the mercantile system in the other.5 The ingenious 
physiocratic system had found, according to Smith, ‘numerous’ 
followers. It had also positively influenced the political economy of 
                                                         
1 Ibid. 
2 M. Isenmann, ‘War Colbert ein ,,Mercantilist’’?’ in idem (ed.), Merkantilismus, p. 167. 
3 I. Murat, Colbert (Charlottesville, 1984), p. 117. 
4 A. Finkelstein, Harmony and the Balance (Ann Arbor, 2000), p. 90. 
5 Smith, WN, IV.ix.4; Hont, Jealousy of Trade, p. 363. 
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France, especially by removing many of the various ‘oppressions’ which 
were stifling French agriculture.1  
 
Smith also approved of the physiocratic answer to the ‘rich country- 
poor country debate’. Their version saw rich mercantile nations 
gradually supplanted by nations that earned a surplus through steady 
agricultural improvement and invested in new manufacturing efforts of 
their own. To this Smith grafted his own key element for sustainable 
long-term economic growth: the division of labour.2 Smith understood 
and agreed with the theory that mercantile states came to the rescue of 
purely agricultural entities, which thanks to ‘some defect in their policy’ 
had no manufacture of their own. He very much approved of the 
physiocratic doctrine which advised landed nations to allow 
unrestricted and duty-free exchange with their commercial neighbours. 
Otherwise, he noted, they risked inflating the costs of manufactured 
goods at home, depressing the prices of their own domestic agricultural 
produce.3  
 
Nevertheless, it is clear that Smith also considered the notion of the 
agricultural kingdom, biased towards the primary sector, as something 
of an aberration. For, he maintained, internal commerce, the exchange 
of domestic agricultural produce for manufactures, was of great 
importance in any nation. In order to explore the issue, Smith examined 
cases of nations that had, he thought, rejected trade. Thus he explored 
the model of the supposedly rich but underdeveloped China, a model of 
perfection among the physiocrats.4 According to Smith, the Chinese 
esteemed agriculture above industrial labour and initiatives, and 
spurned overseas trading. However, China enjoyed an extensive inland 
trade,5 which meant that the division of labour was supported by the 
                                                         
1 Smith, WN, IV.ix.38. 
2 I. Hont, ‘The “Rich Country- Poor Country” Debate in Scottish Classical Political 
Economy’ in Hont and Ignatieff (eds.), Wealth and Virtue, p. 300. 
3 Smith, WN, IV.ix.26 
4 G. Lottes, ‘China in European Political Thought’ in T.H.C. Lee (ed.), China and Europe 
(Hong Kong, 1991), p. 75. 
5 David Hume made the same point. D. Hume ‘Of Commerce’ in E.F. Miller (ed.), David 
Hume (Indianapolis, 1987), p. 264. 
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domestic market alone, and the nation grew wealthy.1 This, Smith 
thought, was an important first step to commercial supremacy, for such 
a nation ought to be beginning to engage in overseas trade.2 In Smith’s 
analysis, it was, therefore, Chinese political economy which halted 
economic development there, and not the intrinsic characteristics of the 
Chinese people themselves, as Montesquieu thought.3 
 
However, in its partiality towards nations like China, and its potential 
for fanaticism, physiocracy was, according to Smith, potentially even 
more harmfully inconsistent than the mercantile system. His chief 
concern with the system was its apparent devaluation of the so-called 
‘barren and unproductive’ class of manufacturers.4 Smith believed that 
manufacturing had far more potential for improvement than 
agriculture, due to its potential for subdivision. Thus for continual 
economic augmentation, the industrial and not the agricultural sphere 
was to be depended upon. Hence, as Laurent Dobuzinskis has indicated, 
where Quesnay saw only the flat circulation of wealth, Smith imagined 
it rising in a spiral of infinite growth.5 
 
Smith concluded that the system was quite good, but ‘in representing 
the labour which is employed upon land as the only productive labour, 
the notions which it inculcates are perhaps too narrow and confined’.6 
These inculcations presented a danger. He argued that to place 
restrictions on manufacturing and trade risked inflating the cost of 
manufactured goods, which in turn would depress the prices of 
agricultural produce and therefore discourage investment in 
agriculture.7 As agricultural development was actually an unintended 
                                                         
1 Towards the end of WN, Smith attributed Britain’s economic prowess to uniformity 
of the internal tax regime and lack of internal tolls and duties, advantages which the 
French economy did not enjoy. Smith, WN, V.ii.k.69. 
2 Smith, WN, IV.ix.41. 
3 Smith, WN, I, p. 112, n.33. 
4 Smith, WN, IV.ix.29. 
5 Ibid, IV.ix.35; L. Dobuzinskis, ‘Adam Smith and French Political Economy’ in D.F. 
Hardwick and L. Marsh (eds.), Propriety and Prosperity (Basingstoke & New York, 
2014), p. 69 
6 Smith, WN, IV.ix.38. 
7 Ibid, IV.ix.38; 49. 
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consequence of the mercantile system, the unintended consequence of 
the agricultural or physiocratic system would be to ‘in the end 
discourage their own favourite species of industry’.1  
 
Physiocracy, therefore, was also an unnatural system which had been 
concocted, unlike the other, within Smith’s lifetime, in order to guide 
(wisely or not) the next generation of French ministers. It was 
essentially the equal and opposite of the mercantile system, and was, it 
seems, potentially susceptible to some of the same pitfalls. Smith 
reckoned the natural inclinations of people sufficient to guide them into 
the most appropriate mode of employment and hence establish, 
without government prompts, a ‘natural balance of industry’. This 
rendered Quesnay’s ‘arithmetical formularies’ totally unnecessary and 
slightly suspect.2 Smith noted in passing that this was a system which 
appealed to quacks and lovers of paradox.3 Most importantly he 
criticised the inflexible and contrived regimen which the French 
physician seemed to propose.4 
 
Hont sees Smith attacking the mercantile system and feudalism as the 
institutional underpinnings of unfreedom, splitting the physiocratic 
system off into a category of its own, best described as the preserve of 
projectors.5 However, it seems that, in Smith’s depiction, the so-called 
commercial and agricultural systems were a pair of malformed casts of 
development applied by zealots to force the uneven or lopsided growth 
of states according to their own premature vision of the final form, be it 
agricultural or commercial. In Smith’s vision, though he acknowledged 
that some nations had a greater or lesser land base, it seems that a 
natural and perfectly developed nation was both. Apparently the 
international division of labour, or specialisation, could be helpful, but 
was not to be valued above a domestic ‘natural balance’.6 
                                                         
1 Ibid, IV.ix.49. 
2 Ibid, IV.ix.27; Hirschman, The Passions, p. 100-4  
3 Smith, WN, IV.ix.38. 
4 Ibid, IV.ix.28. 
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Here, as Hont has shown, Smith departed from the physiocrats again. 
They were reluctant to accept the commercial stage as a final and 
inevitable phase of an archetypal nation’s natural development.1 Hont 
argues that Smith himself saw the proper four-stages path as perverted 
in Europe thanks to its institutional development, but he acknowledged 
that a clean slate like the economy of the colonies was an opportunity 
for the realisation of the natural order of things.2  
 
Winch describes Smith’s attitude towards America as ‘optimistic’.3 Land 
there was abundant; taxes and rents negligible; wages were high; and 
the settlers skilled and experienced. However, when it came to the 
existing regulation of the colonies, Smith was somewhat gloomier. 
Nevertheless, he had a certain appreciation for the fact that the 
Navigation Acts seemed to have established, for the time being, a 
coherent mutually beneficial economic unit. The regulation of the 
colonial economy had actually, serendipitously, restricted them to a 
natural course of development which prioritised the establishment of 
the agricultural foundation of a fully-developed economy according to a 
four-stage plan.4 Smith thought that the colonies were largely 
unscathed by economic regulation, which was actually most deleterious 
to the metropole which imposed it. Apparently, modern historians have 
tended to agree with this observation.5  
 
What seemed unjust politically had its hidden benefits for economic 
development. For, as Smith put it, 
 
                                                         
1 Hont, Jealousy of Trade, p. 369.  
2 Ibid, pp. 374-5. 
3 D. Winch, Classical Political Economy and Colonies (London, 1965), p. 90. 
4 A.S. Skinner, ‘Adam Smith and America: The Political Economy of Conflict’ in R.B. 
Sher and J.R. Smitten (eds.), Scotland and America in the Age of Enlightenment 
(Edinburgh, 1990), pp. 150-1. 
5 D. Stevens, ‘Adam Smith and the Colonial Disturbances’ in Skinner and Wilson (eds.), 
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Though they had not, therefore, been prohibited from establishing such 
manufactures, yet in their present state of improvement, a regard to their 
own interest would, probably, have prevented them from doing so.1 
 
Their own interests would ‘probably’ have kept the colonists on course, 
so long as they did not get any ideas from the mercantile system. The 
logic ran that, thanks to the ‘very extensive market’ for agricultural 
goods furnished by the more developed economies of the Old World, 
the natural order of American development was as much as 
guaranteed.2 
 
The North American colonies provided Smith with an example of 
natural order achieved as an unintended consequence of intervention 
on the part of statesmen.3 After all, Smith’s discussion of colonies 
appeared in Book IV, which dealt with systems of political economy.4 
However, it was the serendipitously archetypal development of the 
colonies, which, in Smith’s system, rendered eventual confrontation 
inevitable.5 The tension came from the fact that this sort of division of 
labour, mutually beneficial as it was for the time being, was ultimately 
unsustainable. This was because, as he had shown with China, a 
national economy was incomplete, according to Smith, until it not only 
included an internal exchange of manufactured for unmanufactured 
goods, but also participation in overseas exchange of more than 
subsistence goods. While in economic infancy, the regulation of the 
colonies was only an emblem of their subordination. However, as they 
matured, it was quickly becoming a genuine hindrance and a 
disadvantage.6  
 
                                                         
1 Smith, WN, IV.vii.b.44. 
2 Ibid, II.v.21; quote from IV.vii.b.27. 
3 Hont, Jealousy of Trade, p. 374. 
4 Smith, WN, IV.vii. 
5 Skinner, ‘Adam Smith and America’, p. 153. 
6 B. Bailyn, ‘1776. A Year of Challenge – a World Transformed’, Journal of Law and 
Economics, 19:3 (1976), pp. 465-6. 
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The idea of specialisation enshrined in the Navigation Acts, therefore, 
had its expiration date. It is for this reason that Smith’s theoretical 
conception of national economic identity is somewhat complex, 
certainly more so than the physiocratic stereotypes of agricultural 
kingdom and commercial republic. The physiocrats evaluated nations 
based on their size, situation and topographical characteristics, 
distinguishing France, therefore, from its rivals, Britain and the United 
Provinces.1 Smith, meanwhile, also acknowledged certain natural 
economic advantages that some nations enjoyed by virtue of their 
peculiar situation. Most notably, he conceded that, due to the expenses 
incurred in cultivation, the sustained production of wine in his native 
Scotland was impossible, or at the very least pointless, when Burgundy 
or Claret were easily to be imported for a fraction of the price.2 
 
Nevertheless, competitive advantages did not amount to a prescribed 
policy for Smith, as it did for the physiocrats. Hence, such advantages or 
disadvantages were also not to be taken as a hallmark of economic 
identity in any meaningful way. After all, if it had been deemed 
desirable by a sufficiently powerful faction, Smith suggested, steps 
could have been taken to transform Scotland into a wine country, 
simply by banning the import of foreign wine. Though this seemed 
ludicrous, Smith was keen to point out that actual policies restricting 
various imports followed this flawed logic.3  
 
Perhaps he was even mocking the notion held, according to Rosalind 
Mitchison, by improvers of Scotland in particular, that every country 
should have its own ‘staple product’.4 Even David Hume invested to an 
extent in the idea of staple products, which were based on the natural 
                                                         
1 P. Steiner, ‘Physiocracy and French Pre-Classical Political Economy’ in W.J. Samuels, 
J.E. Biddle, and J.B. Davis (eds.), A Companion to the History of Economic Thought 
(Oxford, 2003), p. 64. 
2 Smith, WN, IV.ii.15. Smith’s thinking bore relations to that of Josiah Tucker and David 
Hume. See above p. 235. 
3 Smith, WN, IV.ii.15-16. 
4 R. Mitchison, ‘Patriotism and National Identity in Eighteenth-Century Scotland’ in 
T.W. Moody (ed.), Nationality and the Pursuit of National Independence (Belfast, 1978), 
p. 81. 
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conditions of a nation or region. Nevertheless, if these were lost, then 
the nation could ‘blame their own idleness, or bad government’.1 
Evidently Hume also must have thought that there was something in 
the idea that regulation might provide life-support for a nation’s staple 
product. In any case, Smith was clear that it was foolish to apply 
regulations in order to attempt to foster one. 
 
Smith, in fact, seems to have identified all nations as removed by 
varying degrees from an identical ideal. If economic identities existed 
for nations, it was in the form of their deviation from the Smithian 
paradigm of perfection. That Smith did not advocate, as Hont has 
shown, snapping divergent economies back into a preconceived ideal, 
indicates that he perceived irremovable national identity in 
institutional configurations. It was for these reasons, therefore, that he 
famously declared that 
 
To expect, indeed, that the freedom of trade should ever be entirely 
restored in Great Britain, is as absurd as to expect that an Oceana or 
Utopia should ever be established in it.2 
 
Britain’s institutional biases were, for Smith, a feature of the national 
consciousness or opinion, which he esteemed so highly.3 George Stigler 
has argued that, while Smith usually depicted economic behaviour as 
governed by the highly rational motivation of self-interest, when it 
came to politics he allowed for irrational behaviour, emphasising the 
role of emotion, prejudice and ignorance.4 Clearly national economic 
identity was an important prejudice, which Smith seems to have 
potentially acknowledged. On board the ‘ship of state’, it was structural 
leanings or biases such as these for which he needed to accommodate 
in his own system of navigation.   
                                                         
1 D. Hume, ‘Of the Jealousy of Trade’ in E.F. Miller (ed.), David Hume, p. 330. 
2 Smith, WN, IV.ii.43. 
3 Rothschild, Economic Sentiments, p. 68. 
4 G.J. Stigler, ‘Smith’s Travels on the Ship of State’ in Skinner and Wilson (eds.), Essays 
on Adam Smith, pp. 240-1. 
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Adam Smith’s ‘System’ 
 
Tracing the same intellectual genealogy as A.V. Judges, Magnusson 
alleges that Adam Smith lifted the term ‘mercantile system’ from the 
Marquis de Mirabeau’s Philosophie Rurale of 1763. Here the French 
author and physiocrat had attacked the ‘système mercantile’, and in 
particular, what he saw as its most flawed assumption: the belief that a 
nation might grow rich by importing money.1 The idea of systems, 
however, as we have seen, dated back even further, at least to Jean-
François Melon’s Essai Politique sur le Commerce.2 Though strictly 
positive in Melon’s work, the notion of systematic thinking took on a 
dubious quality for other economic writers, such as Anne-Robert-
Jacques Turgot and James Steuart. For, as we have seen, Turgot took 
pains to spare his mentor, Gournay from the aspersions cast on him as a 
‘man of systems’. Likewise, Steuart hoped in his work to avoid the trap 
of over-simplified systematic thinking. 
 
There can be no doubt but that, when he came to applying the term 
system to both the mercantilist and physiocratic modes of thought, 
Smith was well aware of its negative connotations. Indeed, in a passage 
which closely echoes James Steuart’s thought on the matter of systems, 
Smith dissected education and the systems fabricated by philosophers 
and charlatans: 
 
Different authors gave different systems both of natural and moral 
philosophy. But the arguments by which they supported those different 
systems, far from being always demonstrations, were frequently at best 
but slender probabilities, and sometimes mere sophisms, which had no 
                                                         
1 A.V. Judges, ‘The Idea of a Mercantile State’ in D.C. Coleman (ed.), Revisions in 
Mercantilism (London, 1969), p.38; Magnusson, Mercantilism, p. 25. 
2 See above p. 181. 
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other foundation but the inaccuracy and the ambiguity of common 
language.1 
 
This systemising spirit, Smith argued, stemmed from the invention of 
human language itself, and was evident in the philosophical systems 
and religions of ancient civilisations. However, the same disposition 
was apt to infect political economists, particularly those who, like the 
physiocrats, tended to run in a sect. Smith argued that ‘the admiration 
of this whole sect for their master… is not inferior to that of any of the 
ancient philosophers for the founders of their respective systems’.2 In 
other words, Quesnay’s followers were capable, according to Smith, of 
little independent critical thought. Such was the awe with which they 
beheld the genius of their leader that the physiocrats had grown blind 
to the flaws of this sparkling model. What is more, modern 
commentators, such as Joseph Schumpeter and Ronald Meek, tend to 
agree with Smith on this point, seeing the physiocrats as a school or 
sect as devoted to their leader as the followers of Marx and Keynes.3 
 
Smith was not necessarily opposed to systematic thinking: his approach 
to knowledge generation was indeed predicated upon producing 
‘system knowledge’.4 He subscribed to Newtonian inductive thinking 
and searched for cosmic interconnections.5 However, he also thought 
that it was the task of a student to critically assess systems in order to 
explode those which were false or obsolete. Smith thought that state 
education, where funding was not predicated on performance, often 
perpetuated false doctrines. Such institutions had no reason to teach 
anything but antiquated and apparently debunked theories.6 Evidently, 
                                                         
1 Smith, WN, V.i.f.26; cf. J. Steuart: ‘The imperfection also of language engages us 
frequently in disputes merely verbal’. An Inquiry into the Principles of Political 
Œconomy, ed. A. Skinner (Edinburgh, 1998), I, p. 9  
2 Smith, WN, IV.ix.38. 
3 Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis, p. 223; R.L. Meek, The Economics of 
Physiocracy (London, 1962), p. 27. 
4 K. Haakonssen, The Science of a Legislator (Cambridge, 1981), p. 79. 
5 Campbell and Skinner, ‘Introduction’, pp. 2-3. 
6 Smith, WN, V.i.f.46. 
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Smith saw vested interest as a powerful force in the generation and 
preservation of questionable knowledge. 
 
In this way, Smith wielded the accusation of uncritical and systematic 
thinking as a weapon against rival theories. Even James Steuart, who 
himself explicitly opposed systems of thought, was not safe. Smith 
famously dismissed Steuart’s major work, writing to William Pulteney, 
that ‘without once mentioning the book, I flatter myself that every false 
principle in it, will meet with a clear and distinct confutation in mine’.1 
Because of this deliberate omission, it is harder to determine precisely 
what Smith thought of Steuart’s various ideas. As we saw, Hutchison 
and Magnusson suggest that Smith’s successors exaggerated the 
primitiveness of political economy and particularly the mercantile 
system before 1776, thus undermining the contribution made to the 
subject by Steuart and others.2 Meanwhile, Gary Anderson and Robert 
Tollison have come to Smith’s rescue, arguing that Steuart’s work 
indeed represented the ‘apotheosis’ of a rival system of thought, 
meaning that Smith was justified in his icy treatment of his fellow 
Scotsman.3 Finally, Hont has argued that Smith saw Steuart, and the 
physiocrats alike, as well-meaning, but ultimately wrong-headed 
projectors, thus distinguishing them from what he interprets as the real 
scourge of Wealth of Nations: corrupt institutions, such as the 
mercantile system and feudalism.4 
 
Smith evidently considered Steuart’s work to be littered with false 
principles. However, since he made the conscious decision not to refer 
to them explicitly, it is next to impossible to decide whether they align, 
as is normally claimed, with the erroneous logic of the mercantile 
system that was portrayed in Wealth of Nations.  
 
                                                         
1 Smith to William Pulteney, dated 3rd September 1772 in Mossner and Ross (eds.), 
Correspondence, p. 164. 
2 Hutchison, On Revolutions, p. 217; Magnusson, Mercantilism, p. 2. 
3 G.M. Anderson and R.D. Tollison, ‘Sir James Steuart as the Apotheosis of Mercantilism 
and His Relation to Adam Smith’, Southern Economic Journal, 51:2 (1984), p. 457. 
4 Hont, Jealousy of Trade, p. 361. 
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However, for Smith to associate Steuart’s work too closely with the 
mercantile system would risk giving Steuart ownership of a system of 
values, albeit supposedly misguided values, which Smith seemed to be 
deliberately keeping vague. He drew no straight lines from Mun or 
other individual writers to the shadowy intellectual tendency which 
mistook money for wealth.1 Connecting the mercantile system to 
Steuart’s Principles could connect it to more developed and credible 
tenets than perhaps Smith was prepared or able to refute. For although 
Steuart seemed to invest in some of the ideas which Smith designated 
as false, he nevertheless produced some tolerable policy prescriptions 
to deal with some of the observable problems of his time.2 By declining 
to so much as acknowledge Steuart’s contribution, Smith reduced him 
to a mere adherent of a specious system, just like the myriad of 
unnamed physiocrat disciples who blithely trailed in Quesnay’s 
misguided footsteps.3 
 
Nevertheless, Smith, a student of astronomy as well as a political 
economist, appreciated the appeal of ‘the beauty of a systematical 
arrangement’.4 Indeed, Rothschild has argued that Smith’s famous 
‘invisible hand’ was no more than a device aimed at the same lovers of 
system who would otherwise be inclined to get their own hands dirty 
and intervene with the economy.5 Smith’s own system is therefore 
elusive in the Wealth of Nations, and normally referred to 
hypothetically when explaining the behaviour of economic agents. For 
example, ‘perfect liberty’ is referred to when explaining the meaning of 
the ‘market price’,6 and is touched on in relation to the proper 
employment of labour and stock (or capital).7  
 
                                                         
1 Judges, ‘The Idea of a Mercantile State’, p. 39. 
2 A. Skinner, ‘Sir James Steuart: Author of a System’ in M. Blaug (ed.), David Hume 
(1711-1776) and James Steuart (1712-1780) (Aldershot, 1991), p. 294. 
3 Cf. Hutchison, On Revolutions, pp. 217-8. 
4 Smith, WN, V.i.f.25 
5 E. Rothschild, ‘Adam Smith and the Invisible Hand’, The American Economic Review, 
84:2 (1994), p. 322. 
6 Smith, WN, I.vii.6; 30. 
7 Ibid, I.x.a.1. 
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However, the ‘system of natural liberty’ itself is described only in 
opposition to the two systems of political economy in Book IV. Here it is 
the system which ‘establishes itself of its own accord’ in the absence of 
economic ‘preference or restraint’.1 Most importantly, it is not, as Young 
points out, to be understood as a rival system of political economy.2 
Rather, the term is used as shorthand for the conditions wherein 
economic agents are left to their own devices, within the laws of justice. 
Such an environment obviated the need for intervention on the part of 
the sovereign. Any sovereign that did dare to meddle ‘must always be 
exposed to innumerable delusions’.3 This system or mechanism was 
above human control and understanding. Smith’s description of the free 
economy therefore, bears a resemblance to that proffered by Turgot in 
his defence of Gournay, who, he maintained, was not subject to any such 
delusions.4  
 
Nevertheless, Smith left the sovereign with three duties, namely: 
defence; the arbitration of justice; and ‘errecting and maintaining 
certain publick works and certain publick institutions, which it can 
never be for the interest of any individual… to erect and maintain’.5 
Because of this, Jacob Viner denied Smith the status of ‘doctrinaire 
advocate of laissez-faire’. Smith, he argued, appreciated the dangers 
which private interest could pose to that of the public, and was in 
favour of laissez-faire only in so far as it was the best and fairest 
instrument of resource allocation or the provision of services.6 Various 
historians have followed suit, also attempting to explain the concrete 
examples of exceptions from the rule of non-intervention in Smith’s 
work.  
 
                                                         
1 Ibid, IV.ix.51. 
2 J.T. Young, ‘Justice Versus Expediency. The Wealth of Nations as an anti-Political 
Economy’ in E.L. Forget and S. Peart (eds.), Reflections on the Classical Canon in 
Economics (London & New York, 2001), p. 155.  
3 Smith, WN, IV.ix.51. 
4 See above p. 231.  
5 Smith, WN, IV.ix.51. 
6 J. Viner, The Long View and the Short (London, 1958), pp. 244-5; Young, ‘Unintended 
Order and Intervention’, p. 91. 
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Skinner suggests that while Smith dismissed conscious paternalism as 
incompetent, he nevertheless saw state intervention as necessary in 
correcting the weaknesses of individuals (such as ignorance or 
myopia)1 and providing services where the market failed to do so 
(namely defence; justice; infrastructure; and possibly education).2 In a 
similar way, Winch ultimately fitted Smith’s interventionism into a 
holistic – or, at least, not merely economic – model established in the 
sum of his writings. This model required the balancing of jurisprudence, 
reason of state and economic priorities, allowing for the concrete policy 
directives which appeared in Wealth of Nations.3  
 
Meanwhile, Nathan Rosenberg suggests that a key theme in Smith’s 
work is the pursuit of ‘the details of the institutional structure which 
will best harmonize the individual's pursuit of his selfish interests with 
the broader interests of society’.4 In this sense, he argues that Smith 
viewed the mercantile system as an institution that allowed for 
merchants and others to pursue their own interest without benefiting 
society as a whole.5 As an alternative, Rosenberg maintains, Smith 
attempted to sketch out institutional circumstances which linked 
reward (and hence self-interest) to socially beneficial performance.6  
 
Smith’s approach has even been deemed explicitly utilitarian, to the 
extent that he used public utility as a category for judging the viability 
and prudence of policy.7 Finally, J.T. Young, dismissing this theory, 
argues that Smith saw utility as the unintended consequence of the 
natural and social inclination of human passions towards commutative 
justice, which also happened to be the ideal condition for the proper 
functioning of the economy.8 According to Young, Smith thought that 
                                                         
1 Skinner, A System of Social Science, pp. 183-5. 
2 Ibid, pp. 188-191. 
3 Winch, ‘Science and the Legislator’, pp. 508-9.   
4 N. Rosenberg, ‘Some Institutional Aspects of the Wealth of Nations’, Journal of 
Political Economy, 68:6 (1960), p. 559. 
5 Ibid, p. 560. 
6 Ibid, p. 570. 
7 T.D. Campbell and I.S. Ross, ‘The Utilitarianism of Adam Smith’s Policy Advice’, 
Journal of the History of Ideas, 42:1 (1981), p. 92. 
8 J.T. Young, ‘Unintended Order and Intervention’, pp. 96-98. 
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those instances when public utility or indeed equity did not follow as 
the unintended consequence of justice were the ones which required 
intervention, which therefore adhered to a consistent pattern.1 
 
However, Smith’s interventionism did not end with his 
recommendations for positive intervention in political economy: he had 
to at least address the existing regime of regulation and misallocation. 
Smith’s work could be seen as intrinsically interventionist, for he 
advocated ‘allowing every man to pursue his own interest his own way, 
upon the liberal plan of equality, liberty and justice’.2 This sort of 
negative freedom for all parties required definition and, it seems, a 
planner or arbiter.3 Winch in particular has pointed out that Smith’s 
assertion, that political economy was a ‘branch of the science of a 
statesman or legislator', seemed more than anything else to thoroughly 
contradict the idea of non-interventionism.4 
 
Hont and Rothschild imply that Smith was aware of the implicit 
interventionism of liberal policy.5 Just like the physiocrats, Smith was 
caught up in the paradox of implementing non-intervention. For Hont, 
Smith averted this contradiction by emphasising that unintended good 
could come of existing erroneous government policy: how else had any 
growth at all been possible under the mercantile system?6 As we know, 
Smith was sufficiently realistic (or defeatist) to admit that a purely free-
trade Britain was a utopian fantasy. However, he also implied that 
British independence, identity, and indeed supremacy all depended on 
its existing regulation. For even as he fantasised about a free 
international grain trade, he appreciated that the individual states of 
the European continent would thus also disappear into one utopian 
‘empire’.7 
                                                         
1 Ibid, p. 106. 
2 Smith, WN, IV.ix.3. Emphasis added. 
3 Q. Skinner, Liberty before Liberalism (Cambridge, 1998), pp. 112-3. 
4 Winch, ‘Science and the Legislator’, p. 501. 
5 Hont, Jealousy of Trade, pp. 361-2. 
6 Ibid, p. 374; Smith, WN, IV.ix.28. 
7 Smith, WN, IV.v.b.39. 
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This was an interesting choice of term for Smith, given that empire was 
traditionally the downfall of republics.1 Later in the same section Smith 
referred to small states such as the Swiss cantons and the city-states of 
Italy. He argued that it was wise for small republics to limit exportation 
of grain while the greater states which surrounded them pursued 
mercantilist policies.2 Here Smith entered a debate, which Richard 
Whatmore has described, about the survival of small republics in the 
face of the burgeoning commercial empires of Britain and France. 
Evidently Smith seems to have agreed with the common view that the 
inherent inequality of commerce was incompatible with the virtue 
required to make a small republic into a viable alternative to a 
sprawling empire.3 
 
The great empire which Smith envisioned perhaps resembled the 
Roman Empire, which drew its grain from Sardinia, Sicily, and 
increasingly North Africa. G.E. Rickman highlights the political 
significance of grain in Rome, where, by the early years of the empire, 
the commodity was being distributed for free to maintain political 
stability.4 Edward Gibbon complained that, by the later stages of the 
empire, grain and other commodities were being freely bestowed on an 
idle and licentious Roman crowd by a lax and fearful government.5 In 
general, this international grain sharing scheme, though peaceful, was 
not consistent with a virtuous republican political character. 
 
Meanwhile, Smith clearly acknowledged the role which national rivalry 
had to play in political economy. In particular he lamented that a 
mutually beneficial commercial exchange with France was being 
                                                         
1 Pocock, Virtue, pp. 146-7.  
2 Smith, WN, IV.v.b.39. 
3 R. Whatmore, ‘“Neither Masters nor Slaves”: Small States and Empire in the Long 
Eighteenth Century’ in D. Kelly (ed.), Lineages of Empire: the Historical Roots of British 
Imperial Thought (Oxford, 2009), p. 70. 
4 G.E. Rickman, ‘The Grain Trade under the Roman Empire’, Memoirs of the American 
Academy in Rome, 36 (1980), p. 263-4. 
5 E. Gibbon, The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, ed. D. Womersley, 
(London, 1994), I, p. 600. 
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sacrificed due to jealousy of trade. He complained that too much 
emphasis had fallen on the British manufacturing endeavour, so that 
instead of trading with France, British manufacturers attempted to 
reproduce French products, which were prevented by regulation from 
entering the market. This was partly a ramification of mercantilist 
ignorance, which taught that national wealth came from exporting more 
than neighbouring states could. However, Smith also acknowledged 
that the mutual growth of a trading partner could be regretted in 
wartime.1 Thus he complained that 
 
If those two countries [Britain and France], however, were to consider their 
real interest, without mercantile jealousy or national animosity, the 
commerce of France might be more advantageous to Great Britain than 
that of any other country.2 
 
Smith made references to France throughout the Wealth of Nations, 
especially, of course, in relation to the physiocratic system. 
Unfortunately, all the factors which Smith showed could make for a 
uniquely profitable trading relationship between Britain and France 
were also revealed to be the causes of the bitter rivalry between the 
two nations. Thus he argued that 
 
Mercantile jealousy is excited, and both inflames, and is itself inflamed, by 
the violence of national animosity: And the traders of both countries have 
announced, with all the passionate confidence of interested falsehood, the 
certain ruin of each, in consequence of that unfavourable balance of trade, 
which, they pretend, would be the infallible effect of an unrestrained 
commerce with the other.3   
 
Clearly Smith was somewhat scornful of the false economics of 
animosity which he detected. Yet he had already deemed economic 
                                                         
1 Smith, WN,, IV.iii.c.11.  
2 Ibid, IV.iii.c.12. 
3 Ibid, IV.iii.c.13. 
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intervention for matters of national defence a permissible policy. Not 
only was he in favour of the civic virtue of martial combat, but he also 
did not object to standing armies.1 Smith suggested that military action 
was reasonable in preserving liberty, security of property, and the 
Protestant religion in British territories, although he suggested that 
Ireland and the North American colonies were enjoying these rights at 
the expense of a metropole beleaguered by national debt.2  
 
Smith also famously justified the Navigation Acts. Although he 
acknowledged that the regulations were inefficient because they 
removed many potential buyers and sellers from the British market, he 
nevertheless defended them on the grounds that they offered the 
opportunity to develop a strong naval force.3 In this sense, he also 
justified the ‘round-about foreign trade of consumption’ which he 
implied preoccupied British political economy against national 
economic interest.4  
 
Thus he envisioned Britain as a nation of over-mighty merchants, a 
view that is borne out also in his depiction of the grain trade. Here 
merchants exported vast quantities of the stuff in times of plenty, only 
to ship much the same amount back in again when harvests fell short.5 
For better or for worse, Smith argued, the biases of the British economy 
were entrenched, for the numbers of merchants and manufacturers 
now in business, together with their leagues of employees, constituted a 
                                                         
1 Rothschild, Economic Sentiments, pp. 68-9. 
2 Smith, WN, V.iii.88. 
3 Ibid, IV.ii.24; 30. 
4 Ibid, IV.iii.c.5. Smith argued that round-about trade, that is, exchanging foreign goods 
abroad in return for other foreign goods, was less beneficial than exchanging 
domestically manufactured goods for the latter, which, as Bloomfield has pointed out, 
bore an uncanny resemblance to the mercantilist idea of ‘balance of employment’. A.I. 
Bloomfield, ‘Adam Smith and the Theory of International Trade’ in A.S. Skinner and T. 
Wilson (eds.), Essays on Adam Smith, p. 473. Governor Thomas Pownall thought that 
Smith’s economic analysis of the commercial monopoly was wanting. It was his 
opinion that the circuits which merchants were encouraged to take were highly 
beneficial, as they offered the opportunity for the ‘superlucration’ of profits. 
Teichgraeber, ‘The Reception of The Wealth of Nations in Britain’, p. 348. 
5 Smith, WN, IV.v.a.22. 
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formidable interest group.1 Yet Smith’s attitude towards the bias is also 
somewhat ambiguous. 
 
Pocock has drawn attention to the anxiety with which the Scottish 
moral philosophers in particular perceived the implications of the 
division of labour and a modern economy. They apprehended with 
dread the fact that occupational specialisation spelled the end for the 
idealised warrior citizens, who bore arms and understood their own 
‘moral freedoms’.2 Smith himself deplored the intellectual ‘torpor’ 
which awaited those who bore the brunt of the division of labour. This 
modern workforce squandered their lives, performing the monotonous 
single operations allocated to them by the progress of the division of 
labour until their minds were dulled to every other intellectual, social, 
spiritual, or indeed martial pursuit.3 Thus Smith depicted a future free 
of dire poverty and war, but which was nevertheless also desensitised 
and devoid of the full range of human emotion and activity. Playing 
their limited roles in a wider empire, Smith hoped, or perhaps feared, 
that states too could lose their defining identities. 
 
However, Smith left it to a more enlightened statesmen of the future to 
actually implement the insipid natural system.4 In fact Richard 
Teichgraeber has argued that Smith looked on in amazement at the ease 
with which the sort of free-trade ideas espoused in Wealth of Nations 
began to take in the immediate aftermath of its publication.5 Flawed as 
it was, Smith seems to have acknowledged that the errors of the 
mercantile system had helped to develop a mighty force to fight the 
wars which the system itself served to perpetuate. He hinted at paths 
out of the self-sustaining loop of war for trade and trade for war, among 
them a free and unsubsidised grain trade. Though he despised 
vainglorious warfare and the national vanity project that was 
                                                         
1 Ibid, IV.ii.43. 
2 J.G.A. Pocock, ‘The Political Limits to Premodern Economics’ in J. Dunn (ed.), The 
Economic Limits to Modern Politics (Cambridge, 1990), p. 133. 
3 Smith, WN, V.i.f.50; D. Winch, Adam Smith’s Politics (Cambridge, 1978), p. 111-120. 
4 Smith, WN, IV.vii.c.44. 
5 Teichgraeber, ‘The Reception of The Wealth of Nations’, p. 359.  
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colonialism, for the time being, it seems, he revered too much the right 
of ardent and passionate public opinion to indulge in such prejudice 
and folly.1 Ultimately he depicted the potential monotony of a peaceful 




Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations contained complete, though unequal, 
descriptions of two systems of political economy: the mercantile and 
the physiocratic system. He proceeded to show that each had its own 
peculiar imperfections. However, the mercantile system was Smith’s 
primary target. He portrayed it as a bundle of principles which had 
guided statesmen and politicians erroneously into attempting to 
manipulate the economy. In particular, it offered alluring sophisms, 
such as the balance of trade doctrine, which taught that national 
economic growth was exclusively export led.  
 
It was this system of thought which deceived statesmen into heavily 
regulating the economy. An important example was the corn trade. 
Here even landowners, misinformed by the casuistry of the mercantile 
system and the treacherous example of the merchant interest, helped to 
cast a net of regulation over the production and marketing of grain. This 
of all trades, Smith argued, was best left to its own devices, and the 
grain bounty especially was ineffective if not downright harmful. In 
general, he pointed out, bounties were the preserve of failing industries, 
which the false reasoning of the mercantile system deceived the 
government into protecting.  
 
Similar fallacious reasoning, however, informed the physiocratic system 
also. Even though the physiocrats celebrated free trade and the natural 
system just as highly as Smith, he nevertheless had plenty of criticism 
for this system too. Physiocracy undervalued the national 
                                                         
1 Rothschild, Economic Sentiments, p. 68. 
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manufacturing initiative. As far as Smith was concerned, both a healthy 
agricultural and a strong manufacturing sector were necessary 
components of a developed economy. Smith believed that internal 
commerce was perhaps the most important kind. This, at least, was how 
he imagined the Chinese economy thrived, in spite of its government’s 
disdain for international trade.  
 
Though Smith acknowledged that the physiocratic doctrine had 
inspired some positive changes in France, particularly in regard to 
agriculture, he viewed the system as potentially dangerous. He thought 
that the bias towards agriculture, which was the system’s raison d’être, 
would ultimately cause the price of manufactured goods to escalate, 
diminishing the cost of agricultural goods, contrary to the system’s 
most cherished intensions. However, at the time of writing Wealth of 
Nations, Smith was relatively confident that the physiocratic system had 
no future as an influential doctrine; it was the product of its times and 
too academic to persist.1 
 
However, most importantly, Smith argued that both of these systems 
shared the same fatal flaw: the fact that they were artificial constructs 
designed to manhandle the economic mechanism into compliance. 
Statesmen and philosophers in their ignorance and their hubris had 
designed each of the systems in order to pre-empt natural progress and 
to mould the economy into the form that they determined most 
beneficial. Though they stood for completely opposite ends, the fact that 
each system advocated intervention of sorts to create an economy 
based on a preconceived and therefore inherently prejudiced model 
was enough for Smith to dismiss them as fallacious. In reality, Smith 
argued, only nature in the guise of the innumerable rational decisions of 
countless individuals could decide the most appropriate economic 
configuration for a nation. 
 
                                                         
1 Hont, Jealousy of Trade, p. 381. 
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This, however, left Smith with a dilemma. Hont has shown that Smith 
was reluctant to endorse any intervention, and, moreover, that he 
discerned growth and progress in Britain and other countries in spite of 
the influence of the mercantile system.1 Smith urged some unravelling 
of the threads of regulation which he saw as stifling economic growth 
and equality, particularly when it came the grain trade, and the 
restrictions on Ireland’s agricultural sector.2 However, there was some 
regulatory apparatus of which he approved, despite his vehement 
attack on the mercantile system which had precipitated it. National 
defence, for Smith, not only fell within the field of action of an otherwise 
near-redundant statesman, but also justified state intervention in 
commercial activity.  
 
The importance of this issue, however, was apt to fade in as far as war 
was rendered unessential in a world where peaceful free trade 
prevailed. Smith’s attitude to the after effects of the free trade and 
economic liberalism which he seemingly promoted is somewhat 
ambiguous. He prescribed state education for labourers whose working 
lives he expected to become so specialised that they themselves would 
come to resemble mere automatons in the sterility of their minds. He 
made no direct comment on the corresponding docility awaiting free 
trade states, though he implied that, without their excessively 
competitive political economies, nations were liable to dissolve into one 
great homogenous empire. 
 
For Smith, Britain was defined in its political economy by its aggression. 
Having abandoned themselves to the falsehoods of the mercantile 
system, Smith’s real-world statesmen and politicians had nurtured an 
economy which prioritised mercantile pursuits above all. In spite of the 
fact that he supposed many countries were under this same illusion, he 
depicted Britain in most detail in the Wealth of Nations, and commented 
on the interested groups that had developed there. He portrayed the 
                                                         
1 Ibid, p. 374. 
2 Smith, WN, IV.ii.17. 
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mercantile and manufacturing interest as swollen out of proportion, 
encompassing now not only merchants and manufacturers themselves, 
but also their underlings. Moreover, he made few suggestions as to how 
the problem of Britain’s economic deformity was to be addressed, for, 
he hinted, the interests of these groups, who naturally tended to their 
own preservation, were now, and so forever, disproportionately 
represented. 
 
In spite of his objections to vacuous national animosity, Smith also 
identified British values, typical of the eighteenth century, which had to 
be defended. These were, of course, liberty; security of property; and 
religious toleration.1 Smith had to admit that, for the protection of 
these, the ingrained hostility of the mercantile system was peculiarly 
adept. Still, it also served to intensify national animosity so that nations 
became trapped in loop of economic tension and conflict. There was, 
therefore, more than one way in which Smith considered Britain and 
other mercantilist nations to be irreversibly shackled to the system. 
Moreover, it seems that, in some ways, Smith struggled to decide 
whether indeed national identity and autonomy should be sacrificed to 
the perfection of political economy, and civic virtue abandoned to free 
trade.  
 
                                                         
1 Ibid, V.iii.88. Rothschild argues that Smith’s conception of liberty potentially 
incorporated political as well as economic freedoms, in spite of the increasing 
contemporary anxiety towards the former. Rothschild, Economic Sentiments, p. 59. 




This thesis set out to combine recent trends in the historiography of 
nationhood and economic thought with the detailed social history of the 
likes of E.P. Thompson and Ernest Labrousse, by making local case 
studies of the grain trade in practice and by analysing a selection of 
contemporary published works. In this way it has begun to probe 
experiences of national belonging and citizenship in eighteenth-century 
Britain and France. The findings of this thesis have been many and 
detailed, however, there are three central points to make in conclusion.  
 
The first two have to do with conditions which historians have 
sometimes argued were necessary for economic growth in this period: 
nationalism and liberty. This thesis has revealed that the two concepts 
were not always universally experienced or embraced in eighteenth-
century Britain and France. Nor were their effects obvious, 
straightforward or predictable. The so-called economic nationalism of 
mercantilism, for example, could have effects not all together conducive 
to national economic development. The third point, which this 
conclusion makes, is about governmental processes and structures. For, 
in the course of exploring experiences of citizenship and national 
belonging, this thesis has shed some light on the important subjects of 
relationships between the centre and the periphery and the role of the 
state in everyday life. 
 
Although this thesis was presented as a comparative history in the 
introduction, the transnational interplay of ideas has inevitably played 
an important role. Changing economic conditions led eighteenth-
century writers of various nationalities to make their own international 
comparisons, and to investigate the reasons for economic growth and 
Daisy Gibbs  309 
  
decline.1 They considered comparative characteristics and tried to 
assess the causes of the differences that they detected.  
 
Many writers not only travelled abroad in the course of their 
researches, but also struck up correspondences and even friendships 
with their foreign counterparts. In the course of these interactions, 
ideas were shared or borrowed. Even protectionist ideas, such as 
German-style national granaries, could be imported into thought about 
the British grain situation, without much consideration of the irony that 
this presents. This thesis has therefore exposed a paradoxical 
relationship between the histoire croisée of the borderless flow of 
economic thought in the eighteenth century, and the nationalistic and 
closed economic attitude that it often engendered.  
 
For in spite of the transnational flow of ideas, the unit of analysis 
remained the nation. Perhaps economic thinkers deliberately 
overlooked the local alliances, which formed in regional communities 
like Norfolk and Tours with the aim of preserving smaller economic 
ecosystems. These local coalitions did not seem to fit in with the broad 
national approach to economic thought which depended on clashing or 
coordinating class interests. However, these case studies show that the 
translation of this national element of economic thought into practice 
was not always straightforward. Even apparently widespread and 
popular ideas, such as those of mercantilism, either failed to penetrate 
society, or else underwent reinterpretation as they percolated 
downwards towards local level.  
 
In Norfolk something similar to the moral economy prevailed even into 
the late eighteenth century. Popular hostility to high subsistence prices 
prompted and justified action by local authorities, who agreed that the 
grain visible in surrounding fields was failing to translate into plenty in 
the marketplace. They too explicitly blamed this problem on 
exportation of grain overseas. However, their sympathy for the cause of 
                                                         
1 R. Whatmore, Republicanism and the French Revolution (Oxford, 2000), p. 19. 
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the rioters was enhanced by the fact that they associated high grain 
prices with the decline of the woolens industry in the region. This was 
an industry in which many members of the local government were 
directly concerned. They seem to have invested sincerely in 
mercantilist propositions, which suggested that growth depended on 
exporting manufactured goods abroad as cheaply as possible, ideally in 
exchange for money. This was translated into their business logic: the 
authorities of Norwich saw overseas export of manufactured goods as 
the key to their own prosperity. Selling manufactured goods abroad 
was therefore prioritised over the exportation of agricultural goods like 
wheat, barley and malt. 
 
The desire of merchants to export grain hurt the Norwich industrial 
interest and therefore, they supposed, also the national interest. As a 
result they demanded a national halt to grain exportation, whilst 
promoting the export of their own manufactured goods. The role that 
Norfolk grain could play in the economies of other parts of the nation 
went unstated. Norfolk worsted and the malt business were the only 
concerns of the petitions which emanated from Norwich regarding 
grain.  
 
In this way, mercantilist thought allowed Norfolk authorities to 
articulate their localised commercial survival in terms which might 
appeal to a national parliament and challenge the interests of the 
provincial elite which dominated there. Mercantilism offered a 
rationale for parochial interests that honoured a version of the moral 
economy and helped to hold in check the modernising activities of 
parliament.1 
 
Meanwhile, in the colonial arena, the mercantilist agenda sometimes 
justified the suppression of enterprise by the metropolitan state. 
Colonies were assigned a specific role according to mercantilist theory, 
casting some profit making activities outside the national cause. The 
                                                         
1 H.L. Root, The Fountain of Privilege (Berkeley, 1994), p. 111. 
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government at the centre on one hand, and traders, planters, and 
authorities at the periphery on the other, disagreed about how the 
national interest was best served. Lip service to the idea of the national 
good was evidently not enough to prevent enterprising individuals 
colluding with the enemy. During the Seven Years’ War, for example, 
the French inhabitants of the West Indian islands occupied by British 
forces collaborated with their ‘oppressors’. Observers like Adam Smith 
were right to think that the idea of the national good was used to justify 
the pursuit of some private interests and rent-seeking activities, whilst 
impeding other sorts of growth. 
 
In France, mercantilism was used initially to articulate and justify a 
programme of deregulation. When this programme began to fail, local 
authorities in Tours grew sympathetic towards the popular preference 
for a locally regulated grain trade. Of course, a controlled trade also had 
its attractions for the officers themselves in the form of marketplace 
fees and rents from tollgates. Meanwhile, the heads of local 
manufacturing initiatives also attempted to tap into the same 
justification for very localised protection of subsistence goods. Unlike 
the Norfolk authorities, however, those of Tours, and even those at the 
parlement level in Rouen, failed to invoke mercantilist ideas to justify 
their mutinous actions. They related to the state, and particularly to the 
monarch, in humanitarian terms.  
 
At French provincial level, in the absence of a shared mercantilist 
agenda, it seems that it was harder to see local and central interests as 
even rhetorically aligned. Perhaps mercantilist ideas could otherwise 
have served as a transparent government rationale, without which state 
activity could become the object of intrigue and suspicion. Mercantilist 
language evidently sometimes contributed to a sense of belonging to a 
wider whole and could potentially help regions and even individuals to 
understand their own economic endeavours as efforts towards a 
greater goal.  
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However, it did not offer a realistic explanation about how this could be 
achieved. This meant that it could be used in service of parochial 
objectives, which were detrimental to national economic growth 
according to modern economists.1 Since definitions of what was 
actually beneficial to the nation varied, the idea of mercantilism as 
‘economic nationalism’ is therefore problematic. This means that the 
idea that a sense of nationality was necessarily also a force in favour of 
economic development is also questionable.2 
 
The idea of divergent interests also plagued the notion of liberty. 
Liberty, or the security of property, was understood in the eighteenth 
century as an important condition for investment and enterprise. Still 
now economic historians argue, apparently without reservation, that 
the liberal constitution of Britain proved a key advantage for economic 
growth above and beyond absolute monarchies, such as France.3 
However, when it came to the grain trade, the idea of unrestrained 
freedom of property proved to be problematic in conceptual and 
constitutional terms. 
 
In France, for example, libéralisation was rejected as a faulty new 
technology for dealing with the old problem of subsistence. This was 
because, without traditional restraints, selfish traders were thought to 
undermine the general interest through hoarding and speculation. This 
view was propounded by the Rouen parlement in spite of its 
commitment to liberty. Due to the behaviour of selfish individuals, total 
liberty was not a sound practical policy for the administration of 
national subsistence.  
 
David Todd denies continuity between protectionist thought in France 
after 1830 and earlier mercantile jealousy, arguing that the former 
                                                         
1 Ibid, pp. 85-6.  
2 Cf. D.S. Landes, Wealth and Poverty Of Nations (London, 1998); L. Greenfeld, The 
Spirit of Capitalism (Cambridge, MA & London, 2003), p. 21. 
3 D.C. North and B.R. Weingast, ‘Constitutions and Commitment’, The Journal of 
Economic History, 49:4 (1989), p. 808. 
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emerged in part as a rejection of the ‘urban pauperism’ associated with 
British free trade industrialism.1  It is true that much mercantilist 
thought of the eighteenth century was indeed predicated on jealous or 
martial inclinations, and failed to consider the plight of the labouring 
poor. For example, Jean-François Melon’s three island metaphor 
preached self-sufficiency as a mode of commercial self-defence in an 
inherently hostile international environment. Developing a strong and 
diversified economy was not a simple economic objective, but a matter 
of international relations.2 However, there were those who considered 
the problem in humanitarian terms, pondering the relationship 
between wages and prices of food. Their work exhibited a ‘patriarchal 
compassion’ for the poor that moved beyond the simple objective of 
national ‘power and plenty’, and the maintenance of a thriving 
workforce, and resulted in protectionist-style regulation.3 
  
This was because, as well as resulting in social instability in practice, 
the notion of liberty also proved conceptually problematic. James 
Steuart and Jacques Necker believed that liberty and the property rights 
which it seemed to entail could result in a paradoxical condition of 
slavery for many. They explained this by referring to the structural 
inequalities of information and dependence, which rendered a 
beneficent economic outcome next to impossible without certain state 
interventions. Meanwhile, they viewed the nation state as a relatively 
new formulation, which needed to take on the formerly feudal 
responsibility for the welfare of what was now an entire people. This 
did not lead them to condemn imported manufactures in the same way 
as the protectionists of the nineteenth century would, because they did 
not identify wage rates as a core variable in the equation. Instead it 
                                                         
1 D. Todd, Free Trade and its Enemies in France, 1814-1851 (Cambridge, 2015), pp. 
123-4. 
2 I. Hont, Jealousy of Trade (Cambridge, MA & London, 2005), pp. 30-2. 
3 Todd, Free Trade, p. 158; J. Viner, ‘Power Versus Plenty as Objectives of Foreign 
Policy in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries’, World Politics, 1:1 (1948), p. 26; 
E.S. Furniss, The Position of the Labourer in a System of Nationalism (New York, 1965), 
pp. 187-9. 
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meant providing subsistence at a stable and low price, without, 
however, undermining the profitability of land.  
 
Their reverence for the illiberal structures of the past made both 
Steuart and Necker suspicious of freedom and uninhibited citizenship. 
However, Steuart was more prepared to see the force of self-interest 
harnessed for the national good. He therefore offered a relatively high 
degree of freedom even to the poor. Necker, meanwhile, understood the 
poor of France as trapped in a state of unenlightened poverty. They had 
to rely on a direct relationship with the state, and had the right to 
protest when it failed to fulfil the role of provider, which had been 
transferred to the state in lieu of the personal guarantees of the feudal 
structure. Necker worked personally to enhance the machinery of the 
state, to the detriment of remnants of feudal privilege, and saw liberty 
as a naivety that underestimated the structural imbalances which 
subjects without property faced.  
 
Liberty was not a straightforward notion even for those in favour of 
laissez-faire. Josiah Tucker claimed to be in favour of liberty, however 
he held the poor in disdain and reproached the rich for their perceived 
excesses and vice. He therefore saw benefits in the taxation of luxury 
consumption and in an absolute regime free from the apparent evils of 
electioneering. If society operated according to the good Christian 
values of diligence and decency, then well-intentioned self-love would 
generate a healthy prosperity. However, total liberty was the first step 
to an immoral condition, and one which government had to work with 
the forces of nature to prevent. 
 
Meanwhile, although Anne-Robert-Jacques Turgot appreciated the 
autonomy of the individual perhaps more so than Tucker, he still 
believed in a system where behaviour was moderated by the proper 
pursuit of interest. He looked with even greater confidence than Tucker 
to earthly forces. Here many interests interacted, often apparently in 
opposition to one another, in order to create conditions amenable to 
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both producers and consumers of goods. This offsetting of individual 
interests technically constituted the national interest, and prevented 
any one individual or group from enjoying a free rein.  
 
However, both supposed that the most reliable judges of good policy 
were the owners of landed property. This was because the security 
which property provided to individual owners meant that they were 
fully independent of the state, and were not to be seduced by the 
privilege and monopoly which it could offer.1 Moreover, the interest of 
the propertied class was apparently inextricably linked to the good of 
the nation at large. This was clearly demonstrable in the case of the 
grain trade, where the encouragement of cultivators by way of the 
apparently dangerous practice of exporting grain, actually meant that a 
greater plenty was furnished in the domestic market. For this reason, 
even enlightened despotism, as long as it was advised by a landed 
oligarchy, could serve as an appropriate system of government in a 
liberal economic environment. The state itself was expected to take a 
step back from micromanaging individual interactions and transactions, 
only tempering the conditions in which they acted.2  
 
Advocates of free trade therefore cherished strong views about the 
direction in which progress lay. They could not easily sympathise with 
the pleas of the people, local authorities, and manufacturers because 
they believed that intervention disturbed the autonomous mechanism 
of the economy. Even well intentioned interference was prone to 
mishap either by accident or through the perversion of the process by 
crafty private interest. The people themselves especially could not be 
trusted in their state of intellectual darkness, and had to be forced into 
compliance until they could finally appreciate where their interest lay. 
It was ironic that, given his sympathy for individual expertise over the 
ineptitude of government intervention, Turgot should suggest that the 
poor could not be trusted to find their own interest in the interim. 
                                                         
1 J.G.A. Pocock, Virtue, Commerce, and History (Cambridge, 1985), p. 66.  
2 A. Skornicki, L’Économiste, la Cour et la Patrie (Paris, 2011), p. 213. 
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However, he blamed former misguided regulation and the 
entrenchment of these ideas in the popular mind-set for their 
resistance to change. Adam Smith came to similar conclusions. 
 
Tucker, Turgot and Smith understood their own role as that of 
observers and interpreters of a natural system, and their science as 
akin to that of Isaac Newton. Their devotion to this conjectural science 
meant, however, that they repudiated those, such as Steuart and 
Necker, who presumed to build their own systems of political economy 
on observation and experience. Turgot and Smith especially argued that 
the reality of the economy, and the many interactions which constituted 
it, was too complex to be observed, let alone managed. In this sense, the 
state was required to withdraw again, and ignore the immediate 
practical implications of measures such as the free trade in grain. Its 
role was not to intervene in the present strife of individuals, but to 
furnish a commercial environment where there could be no strife.1 
Although economics began to be understood as a science in the 
eighteenth century, for the time being it required an enormous leap of 
faith, which defied practical observation and multiple conceptual 
paradoxes. 
 
The idea of liberty naturally provoked thought about constitution and 
government processes. In France, local authorities also ultimately 
objected to the deregulation of the grain trade because it limited their 
ability to control the movement of grain and to raise revenue from its 
transportation and sale. There is an even stronger sense in the French 
case than in the British that local institutions were challenging the 
competence of central government when it came to the grain trade. This 
is most explicit in the case of the Rouen parlement, which construed the 
deregulation of the grain trade in terms of liberty. It was an ironic twist, 
therefore, that this self-proclaimed bastion of liberty should, in the end, 
oppose libéralisation.  
 
                                                         
1 E. Rothschild, Economic Sentiments (Cambridge, MA, & London, 2001), pp. 69-70. 
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However, the sort of liberty enshrined in the deregulation of the grain 
trade was, for the time being, the creature of the state. Only later did it 
slip its chains to become French liberalism. For now the liberalisation 
project was supposed to undermine privileged strongholds, such as the 
Rouen parlement.1 Its failure seemed to reassure this institution, and 
local police institutions in Tours and other places, that the 
administration of the grain trade belonged with them. They therefore 
vied with central government over this piece of legislative turf. Where 
Norwich authorities liaised with the national legislature in order to 
protect local interests, the highest of authority at Rouen, and 
representatives of authority on a somewhat lower level at Tours, simply 
defied orders and reinstated officially or unofficially the superannuated 
legislation. The word of the Parliament of Westminster was law, but it 
could be swayed by petitioning. Meanwhile, the parlements of France 
battled to inform legislation. Successful cases such as the reinstatement 
of grain regulation in 1771 gave them ammunition for the continuing 
onslaught.  
 
It is this institutional element which is possibly the most fertile ground 
that this study of the grain trade has raked over. Like Michael Kwass’s 
work on taxation, the study of the grain trade can help to reveal the 
‘human interaction’ behind political frictions.2 This thesis has raised 
questions about how people, including grassroots rioters and 
businesspeople as well as elite members of parochial government, 
interacted with the central state and legislature. This was clearly a 
matter for contemporary reflection also. For problems of subsistence 
were closely linked with puzzling questions about how to govern a 
country, and which opinions mattered therein.   
 
These questions were treated very formally in France, where the issue 
of representation seems to have been growing more and more urgent 
                                                         
1 Skornicki, L’Économiste, p. 28; J. Miller, Mastering the Market (Cambridge, 1999), p. 
60. 
2 M. Kwass, Privilege and the Politics of Taxation in Eighteenth-Century France 
(Cambridge, 2000), p. 15. 
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over the course of the second half of the eighteenth century. 
Reformulating local government and representation had been a point of 
interest for the physiocrats, which Turgot was drawn into, and which 
even the anti-physiocratic Necker inherited.1 However, 
governmentality also perplexed the likes of Tucker, who was searching 
for new sources of constraint in a seemingly godless and borderline 
anarchic society. 
 
The libéralisation of the French grain trade therefore had grave 
implications for the interconnected ideas of liberty and citizenship, as 
well as for the notion of government itself. This thesis has begun to 
probe the issue, however, there is more left to be understood about 
how grand new schemes of regulation were translated into practice on 
a day to day basis, and how resistance to change was interpreted and 
dealt with. The deregulation of the grain trade in France offers a prime 
example of legislation that failed largely for practical infrastructural 
reasons, but also at least in part because it was rejected on ideological 
grounds by the popular orders of society. Similarly, the riot that struck 
Norwich in 1766 precipitated a petition in Parliament which sought a 
ban on exports. Exploring the grain trade offers a line into extra-
parliamentary activity, which saw those excluded from formal 
government nevertheless become involved therein.2 By examining the 
relations between central and provincial government, the thesis has 
therefore touched on processes of government and a sort of informal 
representation.  
 
The notion of ‘public opinion’, especially in France, was in a state of 
transformation in this period. Keith Baker has shown how the character 
of the concept was transformed from ‘the flickering lamp of “opinion”… 
into the unremitting light of “public opinion”, the light of the universal 
tribunal before which citizens and governments alike must now 
                                                         
1 Ibid, p. 260. 
2 J. Hoppit and J. Innes, ‘Introduction’ in J. Hoppit (ed.), Failed legislation, 1660-1800 
(London, 1997), p. 21. 
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appear’.1 Initially a doubtful authority, which was linked to private 
interest and subjectivity, opinion took on a new sense of collective 
wisdom. Though in the English language the meaning was fixed by 
1730, in French the connotations of the term remained uncertain. 
However, in the hands of Necker at least, it garnered a ‘nebulous’ 
quality and stood for the public spirit or good.2 Baker argues that the 
term was a political invention, a new source of authority to 
counterbalance the absolute authority of the monarch, which, though 
only an intellectual construct, made the French revolution ‘thinkable’.3 
 
Jürgen Habermas sought the origins of this emerging intellectual force 
in the coffee house culture of the bourgeoisie, who resented the central 
state’s intervention in their affairs and the appropriation of their 
private goods.4 Kwass has elaborated on this by looking at privilege as 
part and parcel of those private goods that came under threat from a 
centralising fiscal military state. He looks beyond the republic of letters 
and printed literature for the origins of the public sphere. Ultimately he 
argues that the constitutional strife, which universal taxation 
exacerbated, helped to generate a highly politicised public sphere.5 This 
thesis has tried to show that privilege was also sometimes nestled in a 
sense of autonomous activity and responsibility, and that ‘constitutional 
strife’ could include even those who were not part of the fragmented 
government in an obvious way. It is suggested that this also helped to 
inform the notion of a public sphere which opposed the state. 
 
This can be viewed as the ghost of the moral economy, which had 
apparently returned to haunt modernising governments in Britain and 
France. Subsistence matters had evidently constituted one of the issues 
                                                         
1 K.M. Baker, Inventing the French Revolution (Cambridge, 1990), p. 168. 
2 M. Ozouf, ‘L’Opinion Publique’ in K.M. Baker (ed.), The French Revolution and the 
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3 Baker, Inventing the French Revolution, p. 199. 
4 J. Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (Cambridge, 1989), 
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5 Kwass, Privilege, pp. 322-3. 
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deemed within the remit of crowd action.1 And yet, this patrician 
society and plebeian culture was apparently in the midst of a process of 
reformulation for a non-feudal, non-rural setting. Urban rioting could 
and did influence policy on a local and eventually national level, and in 
this sense the input of the rioting poor was justified. Popular protest 
was functioning as a means of offering advice or opinion on 
government policy.2 
 
Here there is scope especially for further case studies and research 
scrutinising this notion in relation to the composite nature of the state 
in Britain. Britain’s Corn Laws were applicable to the whole composite 
nation. However, it might be worth exploring the extent to which they 
were obeyed, enhanced or subverted in different parts of the country 
when they seemed to be failing. In Norfolk we saw that local authorities 
appealed to the Parliament at Westminster, deeming parliamentary 
petitioning an appropriate recourse for this kind of economic grievance. 
Given, however, that the legislative authority of parliament in economic 
matters was not yet utilized in the eighteenth century in the same way 
in England, Wales, Scotland and Ireland, an issue such as the regulation 
of grain could make for an interesting further point of comparison for 
continuing research into the way that government functioned in the 
past.3 
                                                         
1 E.P. Thompson, ‘Patrician Society, Plebeian Culture’, Journal of Social History, 7:4 
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2 J. Nicolas, La Rébellion Française (Paris, 2002), p. 435.  
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